Japan Earthquake: Political Aspects

  • Thread starter Thread starter jlduh
  • Start date Start date
  • Tags Tags
    Earthquake Japan
Click For Summary
A new thread has been created to discuss the political aspects surrounding the Fukushima nuclear disaster, complementing the existing scientific discussions. This space aims to address concerns about the transparency and communication of authorities like TEPCO regarding evacuation decisions and safety measures. Contributors are encouraged to document their opinions with sourced information to foster a respectful and informed debate. The thread also highlights the potential for tensions between Japanese authorities and international players as the situation evolves, particularly regarding accountability for the disaster. Overall, it serves as a platform for analyzing the broader implications of the accident beyond the technical details.
  • #301


Calvadosser said:
You also need people in charge who want to know what is the true situation, rather than bullgarbageting themselves that things are not really all that bad.

The Soviet military was heavily involved in the response to Chernobyl. I'm surprised that military involvement seems absent in the Fukushima crisis.

This topic may be more adequate for the political thread. (But indeed the government seems to be totally absent from the remedial efforts at the plant. Apparently it decided to let TEPCO run the entire operation, including diagnostic, planning, and on-site monitoring. Even AREVA seems to have more authority there than the Prime Minister; and NISA apparently can't even get TEPCO to send them legible faxes of the plant status forms.

This may have been the biggest mistake Kan made in this crisis. Recall that the Chernobyl managers and their bosses insisted that everything was under control, until Gorbachev pushed them aside.)

The problems that exist in the world today cannot be solved by the
level of thinking that created them.
-- Albert Einstein​
 
Engineering news on Phys.org
  • #302


NUCENG said:
Despite what suspicions some posters have expressed here about "plant men", "shills", or several other negative references, most engineers that are successful in the nuclear industry are successful because they don't accept things at face value. They "pull the string" to find out what is really behind an event. Experience is the best teacher and an engineer (whatever his or her industry) who is afraid of being wrong is in the wrong occupation. You may never be able to prove WHAT happened, but by elimination of what did NOT happen you may actually learn more. I am learning a lot her

In my opinion the overall public reception of engineers is another problem. Because there is practically none. At least no positive.
The people are taking their working technology for granted. They can surf in the internet because there is a computer, they can drive a car because there are engines. It's a little bit like deus ex machina. The thing works because it works.
Engineers are technical blockheads who are living in their own little play world, but they are not connected to all these modern wonders - that's what many people are thinking subconciously. If there's someone who gets praise for very well engineered solutions, it's mostly the investor - people like Steve Jobbs for example.
But then there's an accident, an big accident, Fukushima. According to the public, there are many people at fault. Managers, politicians - but also engineers who dared to build such a ticking bomb called a "nuclear plant". They were blended by their own hybris, they are dangerous gamblers, that's why many people think they can't trust engineers anymore.

But they are missing the point. Engineers must be curious, they must have visions. Otherwise, there'll be no technological advance. Currently, the public is condemning the one thing which defines an engineer - his curiosity to solve a problem.
This curiosity brought us to the Moon and and in the sky, and it brought us to Hiroshima and Chernobyl.
Of course we have to make sure that those visions don't go overboard, we have to evaluate what impact our solutions will have to mankind. But condemning our curious nature and thus distrusting every engineer is the wrong way.

Note quite on topic, but I had those thoughts lingering around in my head for weeks~
 
  • #303


NUCENG said:
Despite what suspicions some posters have expressed here about "plant men", "shills", or several other negative references, most engineers that are successful in the nuclear industry are successful because they don't accept things at face value.
well there's been one allegedly plant man who said chernobyl NPP was in middle of pripyat' and pripyat' was not evacuated for several days.
That what provoked (or re-provoked) the negative references. You can hardly blame people for negative response to such statement (and you are in no position to blame people for mixing you up with another nuke guy coz you've been openly declaring that you mix up me with someone else).

There is a lot of 'pro nuclear' websites online spreading this exact sort of nonsense (with articles written by nuclear engineers, supposedly); rather than achieving their stated goal of promotion of nuclear power, they make nuclear power look bad, very bad, to anyone who can check the facts.
 
Last edited:
  • #304


NUCENG said:
Actually no, there are several characteristics of Cs and I that would make significant differences in their transport. Cs readily deposits of colder horizontal surfaces. An order (or three) of magnitude can easily occur depending on how it gets to the sample point.
Yes but does that apply for solutions? Cs compounds are very water soluble.
One of the principles of release analysis is the use of the SBGT system filters. The HEPA filter efficiency for CsI is assumed to be 99.9%. For other isotopes such as noble gases there may be some filtration in the charcoal filter beds but basically most noble gases are directly released to the environment. I know those systems didn't work here, but the point is there are things that can make big defferences in transport. In the long run Cs deposition could become a significant problem that will remain embedded in concrete and debris long after all the water is processed.
Hmm, so there may be filters in spent fuel pool sufficient to take out the Cs but not I ? The filter has to take out same molar amount of anions as cations.
Use of contaminated water to cool the pools early in the event would be expected to add both Cs and I, but in what ratio? That depends on the transport to the poin of cooling water suction. If that path was fairly slow and had a lot of cool horizontal surfaces the Cs getting to the suction could have been at a much lower concentration. Before you jump on me, I do not know if that explains it or not . There are way too many unknowns for me to make that call.
Well, I've been looking at various soil samples and seawater samples and fish samples and it just doesn't look like anywhere the ratio was changed this much over transport from the original leaks.
SFP4 is a tough call. I was surprised by how little evidence of damage was shown in the video and photos considering that the roof was so heavily damaged. Most of the debris was blown out or over the pool. There is some debris in the pool and it could have damaged rods releasing fission products from the gap. There was an extended loss of fuel pool cooling, but my calculations tell me that the fuel was not uncovered. Debris could have blocked natural circulation water flow in some channeled fuel bundles allowing localized heatup.

The Boral inserts are in the sides of each rack position As such the rack and fuel bundles in the cells will actually tend to protect the Boral. If the pool didn't uncover fuel the boral would not have been much over 100 degC depending on submergence pressure. Further if the boral had been extensively damaged and allowed recriticality I would have expected more radioactivity in the pool because there is no forced flow in the pool to cool a critical fuel assembly. Inside the reactor the recirculation system cools the rods with millions of pounds of recirculation flow per hour.
I dunno, the tops of some of the fuel racks look thermally damaged compared to other racks. But not very damaged. It can't get thermally damaged if it is covered by water, so it had to be uncovered at least a bit.
My best guess for SFP4 is that it experienced hydrogen evolution by radiolysis and pool boiling and some limited mechanical damage due to debris that released some fission products into the pool. Additional pool contamination from cooling water is a strong possibility as well based on the large leaks, feed and bleed addition of water to fuel pools, and the high concentrations measured in the shore area.
I'm kind of sceptical regarding radiolysis hydrogen. A lot of hydrogen had to be produced. With the boiling again, it can reduce the recombination some but I don't believe it'd go from barely any hydrogen to filling up entire building and blowing it apart (despite building not being exactly hydrogen-tight). Hydrogen and oxygen don't recombine very well to start with, that's the thing (there's multiple reactions going with atomic oxygen and atomic hydrogen, some ending with h2o and some ending with h2 and o2 , and h2 and o2 are stable and don't recombine unless themselves radiolysed), even if steam totally prevents recombination that's still not many orders of magnitude increase in h2 that gets out. There's very little bubbling in the SFP as seen on video. Definitely not cubic metres per hour.

The #4 explosion is just strange. You'd think it'd be easy to prevent by removing a panel. And there was so much damage on the lower floors, more than in #3.
 
Last edited:
  • #305


Dmytry said:
h2 and o2 are stable and don't recombine unless themselves radiolysed), even if steam totally prevents recombination that's still not many orders of magnitude increase in h2 that gets out. There's very little bubbling in the SFP as seen on video. Definitely not cubic metres per hour.

Have you counted the bubbles you see in that short video? Can you get a volume estimate? For a visual reference, remember a fuel assembly is about 20cm on a side.

Ah. Here you go:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/contract/cr6213/
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #306


Wow, if you applied that logic consistently you'd never do anything unless you did it yourself. Toilet backed up? Better call the carpenter, you know that plumber makes his living off broken pipes...

[EDIT} oh yeah, don't bother looking, I've been a 'shill' for the "nuke complex" for over 30 years.



zapperzero said:
Well I tend to do the routine maintenance work on my motorbikes myself, after having been ripped off by mechanics once too often. I even went so far as to acquire the skills needed to change lightbulbs in the house :D.

But other than that, I tend to trust those who have demonstrable expertise. I would certainly trust QuantumPion to understand a decay chain or a jet pump and be able to discuss such subjects in a reasonable and balanced manner.

Yet, I would not blindly trust him, or you, or anyone else in the industry when the talk turns to "is nuclear power really necessary?" just as I wouldn't trust my mechanic to answer truthfully if I ask "hey, do you think it would be an issue if I checked my spark plugs all by myself from now on?".

Fair enough. I don't advocate blind trust. I also don't advocate blind distrust. It's the 'blind' part that isn't necessary or required.
 
  • #307


zapperzero said:
Have you counted the bubbles you see in that short video? Can you get a volume estimate? For a visual reference, remember a fuel assembly is about 20cm on a side.
order of magnitude, easily. Remember, cubic metre of air is 1000 litres, and 1 litre is 10cm x 10cm x 10cm (obviously) . If you aren't numerically blind, its no problem to notice that it is quite a few orders of magnitude off. A couple small bubbles, the flow is what, under a litre per second? and probably a lot of it is dissolved air released by heat. The cube of 10x10x10 meters has 1000 cubic metres.
http://www.houseoffoust.com/fukushima/blueprint.html
so we get thousands cubic metres of air there.
The concentration, hydrogen in air is flammable at >4% <75% volume concentration and can detonate at >18% <60% , with steam its of same order of magnitude but you need more hydrogen. Tens to hundreds cubic metres of hydrogen needed.
The problem is whenever one would bother to notice or not, and then it boils down to motivation.
[[This is btw why houses don't blow up so often due to gas stoves (to think about it, i'd say houses blow up less often to gas stoves than nuclear reactors for varying reasons). You have to leave gas fully on for quite some time before it can blow. There's a lot of litres in a room.]]

Also if i recall correctly they removed a panel in #4 prior to explosion (hopefully someone can find reference). In any case it shouldn't have been totally air tight in first place and not after quake, tsunami, and after#3 blew up so hard there was a discussion that it might've damaged #4 this bad.
 
Last edited:
  • #309


Dmytry said:
order of magnitude, easily. Remember, cubic metre of air is 1000 litres, and 1 litre is 10cm x 10cm x 10cm (obviously) . If you aren't numerically blind, its no problem to notice that it is quite a few orders of magnitude off. A couple small bubbles, the flow is what, under a litre per second? and probably a lot of it is dissolved air released by heat. The cube of 10x10x10 meters has 1000 cubic metres.
http://www.houseoffoust.com/fukushima/blueprint.html
so we get thousands cubic metres of air there.
Tens to hundreds cubic metres of hydrogen needed.

Let's say hydrogen production is really inefficient and you only get 10%. of steam volume radiolysed so 0.1 liter/second. Your 1000 cubic metres would get to be filled to 10% hydrogen (more than enough for deflagration) in a million seconds, which is about 15 days and a half. I take 4% as a lower concentration limit needed for deflagration, I only need seven days and change.

I don't see your "many" orders of magnitude here, sorry. Perhaps I am innumerate and I lost some zeroes somewhere.

You are seeing the pool in a relatively stable state, at 60 degrees Celsius or so, on April 30 I believe. Now try and take into account the much higher temps that the uncooled pool reached. At one point TEPCO said it was boiling. Way more steam. Way more radiolysis.

By the way, those deflagration limits you cite are for normal air. Radiolysis produces hydrogen and oxygen. I'm not sure anyone ever tried to see what the limits are in an oxygen-enriched atmosphere, but I am willing to bet my bottom dollar the lower limit gets lower, not higher.
 
  • #310
Land is precious in Japan. Idle land barely exists there.

Fukushima’s nuclear meltdown puts forest industry near collapse

“If we can't go into thin the trees for a year or longer, the underbrush will grow and the saplings that have been newly planted will suffer from lack of sunlight,” said Hiroshi Sagara, a forestry cooperative chief, the Mainichi Daily News (MDN) reports. “The forest will fall into disrepair and trees will fail to grow well.”

Adding to the woes are concerns of severe soil contamination caused by radioactive materials, a probability which would impact the forest industry for some time to come. “Improving soil quality (in forests) is harder than it is for farmland. Even if the evacuation orders are rescinded, it may be a long time before radiation levels are low enough for workers to go in there,” Sagara added.


http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/307506#ixzz1OgtirATw"
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #311


Tsutsuji just posted details about water treatment facility, between othe rthings:

tsutsuji said:
The buildings must be watertight to prevent leaks into ground water... etc.

Which makes me wonder, why reactor and diesel buildings have been not designed this way. Shouldn't be difficult, as they are already quite sturdy. Sounds easier and cheaper than antitsunami wall. It won't protect turbine buildings, but these - even if destroyed - are not source of problems we observe since the earthquake.

Could be that'll be one of the lessons learned.
 
  • #312


Borek said:
Which makes me wonder, why reactor and diesel buildings have been not designed this way. Shouldn't be difficult, as they are already quite sturdy. Sounds easier and cheaper than antitsunami wall.

Might be cheaper AND make more sense. An anti-tsunami wall, if breached, slows water from flowing back into the sea, which is another problem. So water tightness seems an excellent overall precaution to take. Also situating mobile fuel tanks so they are not the first to take a hit like front line soldiers would have been good too.
 
  • #313


Borek said:
Tsutsuji just posted details about water treatment facility, between othe rthings:



Which makes me wonder, why reactor and diesel buildings have been not designed this way. Shouldn't be difficult, as they are already quite sturdy. Sounds easier and cheaper than antitsunami wall. It won't protect turbine buildings, but these - even if destroyed - are not source of problems we observe since the earthquake.

Could be that'll be one of the lessons learned.

we need a call from physicists and engineers all over the world for the United Nations
Security Council to take control of the situation at Fukushima Daiichi, and establish
a board of renowned physicists and engineers (where's Richard Feynman when you need him?) to direct these emergency operations (and, of course, Japan will provide any
and all resources that are needed).
 
  • #314


"The Japanese Government’s longer term response to protect the public, including evacuation, has been impressive and extremely well organized" : http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/missionsummary010611.pdf

Peter Karamoskos: Well, firstly, the problem lies in the exclusion zone. The Japanese instituted a 20 kilometre exclusion zone, and up to 30 kilometres they said people should stay indoors, but within the first week the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, both said that that was too little and you needed to have an 80 kilometre exclusion zone.

So that would, that's just basic public health 101, if you like. Furthermore, it would have enabled appropriate counter measures for people exposed to radioactive iodine.

Now I don't know precisely what the doses of people outside the exclusion zone were, but the fact that the overseas authorities were advocating an 80 kilometre exclusion zone, tells me that it wasn't of a safe level. And, perhaps, people who could have benefited from iodine, failed to receive it, and children particularly.

Doctor Karamoskos is the public representative of the Radiation Health Committee of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, although he is not representing ARPANSA tonight.
Broadcast: 10/06/2011 http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2011/s3241511.htm
I also wish we knew a little more of what happened at Futaba hospital and the exact number of casualties before the IAEA or anybody concludes that the evacuation was "extremely well organised". The 45 possible death figure mentioned by Mainichi on 26 April : http://mdn.mainichi.jp/features/archive/news/2011/04/20110426p2a00m0na006000c.html does not fit well with "extremely well organized".

The following 7 May article http://www.asahi.com/special/10005/TKY201105060448.html mentions 60 people reported by municipalities as having died immediately after evacuation, but the causal relationship between evacuation and death had yet to be investigated. The government will pay compensations in cases when the causal relationship is established. Compensations will also be provided when people's health deteriorated because of the evacuation.

The following 9 June article http://sankei.jp.msn.com/affairs/news/110609/dst11060918200014-n1.htm tells about 10 people, among which 7 bedridden elderly, who died while waiting for the Japanese military or other evacuation teams : 4 at Futaba hospital, 3 at Nishi hospital, and 3 at Imamura hospital, citing dehydration or the lack of medication as factors aggravating their illnesses.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #315


I'm not going to click the link, it would be too distressing to read the details, but I took care of my elderly mother as she was dying, and for them to leave bedbound people to die of dehydration means they left them for a really long time. A long, agonizing time. Not only in pain, but panicking and abandoned.

I've no words I can use in public for that.
 
  • #316


ElliotLake said:
for them to leave bedbound people to die of dehydration means they left them for a really long time. A long, agonizing time. Not only in pain, but panicking and abandoned.

I've no words I can use in public for that.

They did not "die of dehydration". The article states that tap water was unavailable, and that an insufficient fluid intake, coupled with insufficient medicine available to treat the illnesses that the 72 to 93 year old people had (including 7 who were bedridden due to dementia and/or other problems), contributed to making their illnesses worse. It also states that the cause of death was mostly stroke or "cardiac dysfunction".

That doesn't diminish government or other responsibility in dealing with the actual situation at hand, nor in planning for such circumstances in the shadows of a nuclear plant. But it appears that it was a combination of things, and not due to dehydration.
 
  • #317


@Hiyodori:
tsutsuji said:
The following 9 June article http://sankei.jp.msn.com/affairs/news/110609/dst11060918200014-n1.htm tells about 10 people, among which 7 bedridden elderly, who died while waiting for the Japanese military or other evacuation teams : 4 at Futaba hospital, 3 at Nishi hospital, and 3 at Imamura hospital, citing dehydration or the lack of medication as factors aggravating their illnesses.
Insufficient fluid intake IS dehydration--and splitting hairs, the heart stops-- "cardiac dysfunction" -- when you die of dehydration. My father was a physician who did a lot of emergency work, I am familiar with these things.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #318


For some reason, just the thought that even one person died from Fukushima is hard for the supporters of nuclear power to entertain. This is based on internet conversations only.
 
  • #319


ElliotLake said:
@Hiyodori:

Insufficient fluid intake IS dehydration--and splitting hairs, the heart stops-- "cardiac dysfunction" -- when you die of dehydration. My father was a physician who did a lot of emergency work, I am familiar with these things.

And what is death due to lack of medication? And does dehydration at any level lead to stroke? The quoted article does *not* imply that these people died due only to lack of fluid intake. The article, not me, only suggests that this was one contributing cause. As does tsutsuji in his/her original post. Thus your implication that everyone was dying of thirst, alone, panicking, abandoned cannot be extrapolated from the article. If you will not read it (or cannot, since it's in Japanese), then I would suggest that you shouldn't comment on its content.

Support, or lack thereof, of nuclear power and/or TEPCO and/or the Japanese government's pre-disaster preparation and post-disaster response has nothing to do with our responsibility to comment on the facts as known. In this case the "facts" are provided by the Sankei Shimbun newspaper.
 
  • #320


Let's try a full translation of the MSN-Sankei article :

救助待つ間に10人死亡 3月 原発10キロ圏内の3病院
Rescue-waiting 10 people die : March : 3 hospitals in the 10 km radius zone
2011.6.9 18:17

福島第1原発から半径10キロ圏内にある五つの病院のうち3病院の患者計10人が、政府の避難指示を受けて救助の自衛隊などを待っていた3月12~15日に院内で相次いで死亡していたことが9日、各病院への取材で分かった。10人のうち少なくとも7人は寝たきりの高齢者。断水で水分補給ができなかったり薬剤が不足したりした上、持病が悪化した患者もいたという。
An interview to each hospital on June 9th revealed that 10 patients at 3 among the 5 hospitals within the 10 km radius of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, being subject to the government's evacuation order, died one after one other between March 12th and March 15th while waiting for the Self Defense Forces or other evacuation teams. At least seven people are 10 bedridden elderly people. It was said that it includes patients whose chronic illness worsened for reasons such as, in the context of water supply cut off: hydration impossibility, and shortage of medication.

10人が亡くなったのは双葉病院(福島県大熊町、4人)、西病院(同県浪江町、3人)、今村病院(同県富岡町、3人)。双葉、今村の両病院で死亡した7人は認知症などで寝たきりの72~93歳で、死因は脳梗塞や心機能不全など。西病院は「カルテなどを院内から持ち出せず、死因や年齢は不明」としている。
The hospitals where the 10 people died are Futaba Hospital (Ookuma City, Fukushima prefecture, 4 people), Nishi Hospital (Namie City, same prefecture, 3 people), Imamura Hospital (Tomioka City, same prefecture, 3 people). The 7 people who died at Futaba Hospital and Nishi Hospital were 72~93 year old patients suffering from dementia and the causes of death include cerebral stroke and cardiac dysfunction. Concerning Nishi Hospital, we were told that the patients' medical records could not be transported and that the patients' ages and causes of death are therefore unknown.

政府は地震発生から15時間後の12日午前5時44分、10キロ圏内に避難を指示。圏内にある5病院とも入院患者の搬送手段がなく、自治体や自衛隊に救助を要請した。
15 hours after the earthquake, at 5:44 AM on March 12th, the government issued the evacuation order in the 10 km radius zone. None of the 5 hospitals in the zone had means of transportation for the patients, and they applied to local governments or to the Self Defense Forces for rescue.

http://sankei.jp.msn.com/affairs/news/110609/dst11060918200014-n1.htm

There is more in the following Okinawa Times article maked with "(Kyodo news)" and dated 19:12 9 June 2011. The first and last paragraphs are exactly the same as the first and second paragraphs of MSN-Sankei. Here is what the middle paragraph is saying :
福島県は原発から10キロ圏内を防災対策の重点地域(EPZ)に指定。原発事故時の避難に備え、圏内の病院は入院患者の移送先や搬送用車両の確保などの計画を「あらかじめ定めておく」と地域防災計画に規定している。しかし「避難計画を備えていた」とするのは1病院のみ。県も各病院に計画の整備状況を確認していなかった。

In Fukushima prefecture, priority areas for disaster management (EPZ) are defined 10 km around nuclear power plants. In the regional disaster prevention plan, hospitals within the zones are instructed to "prepare in advance" the means of transportation and the destination of patients in case of an evacuation following a nuclear power plant accident. However, hospitals saying "the evacuation plan was prepared" are only one hospital. Neither had the prefectural administration checked the preparedness of each hospital's plans.

http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/article/2011-06-09_18978/

See also the following picture http://static2.stuff.co.nz/1300064019/949/4766949_600x400.jpg captioned with "Futaba Kosei Hospital patients disembark after being evacuated from a hospital near the troubled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear complex. They might have been exposed to radiation while waiting for evacuation." on http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/asia/j...-admits-being-unprepared-for-nuclear-disaster (you must click on the pictures to browse them. For this picture and caption to appear, you must click 20 times or so). Other related picture captioned with "Futaba Kosei Hospital patients who might have been exposed to radiation are carried into the compound of Fukushima Gender Equality Center in Nihonmatsu in Fukushima Prefecture Sunday morning, March 13, 2011, after being evacuated from the hospital in Futaba town near the troubled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station. They were waiting for evacuation when an explosion of Unit 1 reactor of the complex blew off the top part of its walls on Saturday, one day after a strong earthquake and tsunami hit northeastern Japan. " at http://www.cleveland.com/world/index.ssf/2011/03/japan_races_to_prevent_nuke_re.html.

The Futaba Hospital in Okuma town (North West of the plant) and the Futaba Kosei Hospital in Futaba town (South West of the plant) are two different hospitals.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #321
There is more in the following Chugoku Shinbun article, among other paragraphs which are exactly the same as those translated above :

3病院の入院患者の避難状況は、死者がなかった2病院と比べ、ほぼ半日以上遅れており、県などを含む関係機関の対応の迅速さが明暗を分けた可能性もある。

Evacuations at those three hospitals were performed about half a day later than at the remaining 2 hospitals where no deaths occured, possibly reflecting a contrast in the response speed of the concerned organizations including the prefectural administration.

(...)

双葉病院では同日午前、職員が役場に行き、入院患者の避難をサポートするよう要請。自力で歩ける患者は同日中に避難したが、寝たきりの入院患者約130人を運ぶバスの到着は14、15日になった。
At Futaba Hospital on the morning of March 12th, hospital employees went to the town hall requesting evacuation support. The patients that were able to walk by their own strength were evacuated on the same day, but the bus(es) transporting the 130 bedridden patients arrived on March 14th and 15th.

西病院も役場などに救助を要請。患者約70人が14日から、自衛隊とヘリやバスで避難した。
Nishi Hospital requested help at the town hall too. About 70 patients were evacuated by helicopter or bus by the Self Defense Force on March 14th.

今村病院の約100人は13日夜から14日朝にかけ、自衛隊ヘリが何度も往復して搬送した。
The transportation of about 100 patients from Imamura Hospital was carried out by a number of rotations of the Self Defense Force helicopter from the night of March 13th to the morning of March 14th.

残る双葉厚生病院と県立大野病院は13日午前までに全員の避難が終了。
Full evacuation of the remaining Futaba Kosei Hospital and Ono Prefectural Hospital had been completed by the morning of March 13th.

避難計画について今村病院は「備えていた」と説明。しかし移送先に想定していた病院が地震による被害で受け入れられない状態となり、患者は別の避難所に運ばれたという。双葉病院は「計画の有無を確認できない」とし、西、双葉厚生、県立大野の各病院は「なかった」としている。
Concerning the evacuation plan, Imamura Hospital explains "it was prepared". However because the destination hospital had been damaged by the earthquake, it could not accept patients and they had to be taken to a different evacuation place. Futaba Hospital says "we are unable to check the existence or absence of a plan". Nishi Hospital, Futaba Kosei Hospital, and Ono Prefectural Hospital all say "there was none".

http://www.chugoku-np.co.jp/News/Sp201106100047.html
 
Last edited:
  • #322


I'm looking at the webcam right now. There is no fog, wind is offshore, you can see the moon and clouds, but you can't see any steam. I can however clearly see the distortion in the clouds where the steam is pouring out of building three and four. No, it's not the camera causing it. Other areas are rock solid and show no distortion.

Of course the Japanese and one of the worlds most powerful corporations can't afford to put an actual real modern webcams up. They could only do one, and it's static and horrible.

This, of all things, shows their true attitude to the world.
 
  • #323


robinson said:
I'm looking at the webcam right now. There is no fog, wind is offshore, you can see the moon and clouds, but you can't see any steam. I can however clearly see the distortion in the clouds where the steam is pouring out of building three and four. No, it's not the camera causing it. Other areas are rock solid and show no distortion.

Of course the Japanese and one of the worlds most powerful corporations can't afford to put an actual real modern webcams up. They could only do one, and it's static and horrible.

This, of all things, shows their true attitude to the world.

I admit that I am a little miffed by the quality and placement of the camera, but you have to remember a few things.

1.) They didn't have to provide anything.
2.) It is eating up (i'm sure) still limited communication channels.
3.) I think they have bigger problems.

This is the type of thing that the news media covers, but due to the nature of the situation they can't do safely. Name any other large scale industrial accident where the company provided coverage? they don't
 
  • #324


radio_guy said:
This is the type of thing that the news media covers, but due to the nature of the situation they can't do safely. Name any other large scale industrial accident where the company provided coverage? they don't

Oh it is in their interest to provide something. The playbook for such a big disaster is bound to be a bit different than the one for a refinery fire. The availability of trustworthy, technically apt information sources outside their direct control (ZAMG, IAEA etc) also changes things a bit.

The very fact that it is available limits the pool of interested parties that are willing to try and set up live monitoring of their own. The news media was covering this, quite safely, (remember there was a JNN live feed?) but they gave up.

Big media could be having a field day with Fukushima. They could be crawling all over Japan looking for the temp workers and the refugees, wringing every possible tear out of every displaced 100 year old Japanese grandmother, asking every Fukushima school child about how afraid they feel when they go to school with dosimeters on.

Just to clarify: I am not arguing that TEPCO are evil or whatever. Just that there are professionals handling TEPCO public relations and that they are doing one heck of a good job.
 
  • #326


radio_guy said:
snip >
]
. Name any other large scale industrial accident where the company provided coverage? they don't

Not nitpicking but did you forget a little thing called the deepwater horizon incident and the Chilean miners, to name just two?
 
  • #328


westfield said:
Not nitpicking but did you forget a little thing called the deepwater horizon incident and the Chilean miners, to name just two?

I knew there would be some.. I forgot about BP
 
  • #329


Don't think it has already been mentionned...

Italian people rejet massively Berlusconi plan for nuclear energy in June 12 referendum, where for the first time in 16 years, more than 50% (57%) of the voters participated.

Almost 95% of the voters expressed their wish to withdraw from any nuclear power.

This a a new crucial political step against nuclear development in Europe, after Swiss and (above all) Germany decision to close all its nuke plants before 2022 (6 already stopped now).

President Sarkozy had already annouced (proudly, as usual...) that "he" sold 4 Areva EPR to Italy for its future program, he will have to review its position after this referendum!

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/13/berlusconi-nuclear-power
 
  • #330


Around 1700 children would still be in the 20-30kms zone...

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110609005998.htm

How to convince people to evacuate in a country where land is scarce?
 
Last edited by a moderator:

Similar threads

  • · Replies 5 ·
Replies
5
Views
4K
  • · Replies 14K ·
473
Replies
14K
Views
4M
  • · Replies 2K ·
60
Replies
2K
Views
451K
  • · Replies 12 ·
Replies
12
Views
49K
  • · Replies 28 ·
Replies
28
Views
10K
  • · Replies 14 ·
Replies
14
Views
3K
  • · Replies 1 ·
Replies
1
Views
3K
  • · Replies 11 ·
Replies
11
Views
5K
  • · Replies 28 ·
Replies
28
Views
8K
Replies
38
Views
5K