What is Evidence? How to Handle It Beyond Our Minds

[Iacchus32]

Evidence? What evidence do we have, but what the "experiential mind" dictates? Doesn't that in effect suggest it's not possible to know anything outside of what the mind knows? If so, then how do we present the evidence outside of "the context" of what our minds perceive? I mean how exactly are we to handle it, in what we determine what is admissable and, what isn't? It is after all, a part of "our experience."

 

[RingoKid]

If we all but share one mind and that mind knows everything then what more is there to know?

Our intellect according to our genetic/cultural makeup and a bit of training allows some of us to experience more of this mind than others and project it more effectively.

The evidence is in cross referencing conclusions form various sources whether they be indigenous old world, nu age western or alien remnants then putting it all on the net and letting people come to their own conclusions.

Natural selection using logic, reason, intuition and instinct will decide on the best answer and collectively it will resonate with people until critical mass is achieved in our awareness then it's all happy families

paradigm shifted

 

[Iacchus32]

Well I guess what I'm trying to say is what is evidence (or truth) without a mind to witness it? Doesn't that in effect suggest the evidence is wholly subject to that which does the interpreting? Where does one find any objectivity in that? But then again, maybe this is the whole lesson which needs to be learned, that we can't know the truth unless we "experience" it? And, that maybe we shouldn't be so quick to discount those things which seem to arise solely from the mind, since it is after all the only means we have by which to know anything.

 

[Philocrat]

There is a school of thought which holds that:

The Senses are the suppliers of evidence!

I am not quite sure if the mind ever dictates. But one thing that I have personally observed is that the mind is always extrapolating and making estimates from what the senses supply. Would you call the product of this 'EVIDENCE'?

 

[Iacchus32]

There is a school of thought which holds that:

The Senses are the suppliers of evidence!

I am not quite sure if the mind ever dictates. But one thing that I have personally observed is that the mind is always extrapolating and making estimates from what the senses supply. Would you call the product of this 'EVIDENCE'?

Yes, the evidence has to be extrapolated or, at the very least "witnessed" ... which, is accomplished by means of an "experiential mind."

 

[Philocrat]

Yes, the evidence has to be extrapolated or, at the very least "witnessed" ... which, is accomplished by means of an "experiential mind."

What do you think of the sort of mind that has never been exposed to any information from the external world...that is from outset completely disconnected from the senses? Call it a 'HUMOID' if you like. Do you think that such a mind would comprehend, let alone appreciate, the notion of 'EVIDENCE?

 

[Iacchus32]

What do you think of the sort of mind that has never been exposed to any information from the external world...that is from outset completely disconnected from the senses? Call it a 'HUMOID' if you like. Do you think that such a mind would comprehend, let alone appreciate, the notion of 'EVIDENCE?

About as close as I could get to that would be somebody who was in a coma. In which case we have to ask, why do these people appear as if nobody is home? Where did their personality (and/or identity) go in other words? And yet quite often, if and when they're revived, they have these remarkable stories to tell, about existing in some other dimension or state.

As for someone who is born in a vegetative state, without their brain hooked up, I don't see how it's possible to develop the mind, without some sort of stimulus. Unless of course it's possible to do so by means of stimulus from this other dimension? But then again, if such a thing were possible (or, such a state existed), it would probably involve a different format, and couldn't be communicated directly to this world, if the person could be revived at a later date. I suspect it would be more akin to delaying the birth experience ... albeit maybe this is what entertains the fetus (which appears to be asleep) through its development?

 

[Mentat]

Evidence? What evidence do we have, but what the "experiential mind" dictates? Doesn't that in effect suggest it's not possible to know anything outside of what the mind knows? If so, then how do we present the evidence outside of "the context" of what our minds perceive? I mean how exactly are we to handle it, in what we determine what is admissable and, what isn't? It is after all, a part of "our experience."

This is all on the lines of David Hume's "Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding". What it leads you to is Solipsism, and the only way to salvage objectivity without changing the premises is to add the "veil of mind" (as Rorty calls it). Kant added this concept, for that very purpose. Kant made it so that we don't just have our experiential mind, but that is just a biased representation of an objective sensory input. IOW, on the way from *object* to *conscious representation*, there is a filtering, of sorts, which causes you to represent something one way and someone else to represent it some other way.

This was, IMHO, the pivotal insight/mistake(?) that caused philosophy to go down the road it's been going down since. Philosophy now only concerns itself with a theory of knowledge which will refine the accuracy of our representations.

But it didn't have to be that way. We don't have to take all of Hume's premises for granted. You talk of evidence (which is justification of belief), and the only thing you can think of is the difference between what is real and what is perceived as such. This proves that the Hume/Kant bias is already deeply ingrained in you (as it is in most philosophers). But what if you were offered a completely different concept? What if, instead of accurate representation in the mind, what mattered for "evidence" or "proof" would simply be social convention? IOW, what if what counted as "justification" was simply what arguments would allow you to make the claim in public without being successfully countered?

Thus, "evidence" isn't (or doesn't have to be) "what the experiential mind dictates". It could simply be what justifies a claim in argument.

Think about it. Ever since Plato, philosophers have been concerned with "truth" as a function of how compelled we are to believe something. Before Plato, winning an argument (so to speak) was the more important thing. Truth equalled your ability to support your belief in rational argument. It did not equal some compulsion that physical objects place on you to perceive things a certain way. It also didn't equal the things about which an introspective inquiry would leave you incorrigible (that was Descartes' doing). But what if those were the wrong paradigm shifts?

Oh well, I've babbled enough. Gotta go.

 

[honestrosewater]

What if, instead of accurate representation in the mind, what mattered for "evidence" or "proof" would simply be social convention? IOW, what if what counted as "justification" was simply what arguments would allow you to make the claim in public without being successfully countered?

What counts as "a claim", "an argument", "being made in public", and "being successfully countered"? (Because I want to know:) Can it be determined whether, say, "meaning" has the same meaning for all arguers? Can all arguers be forced to follow the same rules? Can an arguer form new beliefs by arguing with itself? Can an argument end in all claims being successfully countered? I guess I should also ask what counts as "an arguer".

 

[Canute]

Yeah, Honestrosewater says it all really. There is no intrasubjective means of ascertaining what is true (in any absolute sense). Nor can we trust our senses, which are inevitably theory-laden. Nor can we trust our reason, by which nothing can be known for certain. As Mentat says, solipsism may be the case as far as the evidence of our senses and of our reason goes. This doesn't mean we cannot know things, but it does place tight restrictions on what we can know and how, and what we should count as convincing evidence.

 

[Mentat]

What counts as "a claim"

A proposition.

, "an argument"

Reasoning that supports that proposition.

, "being made in public"

If the proposition takes the form of utterance or text, and other members of the same "group" (peers) hear/read it, it is public.

, and "being successfully countered"?

Simply losing in argument.

(Because I want to know:) Can it be determined whether, say, "meaning" has the same meaning for all arguers?

No. But isn't it common-sensical that the meaning assigned to "meaning" which withstands argument the best will be the most socially accepted (i.e. the currently true) one?

Can all arguers be forced to follow the same rules?

Not any more than all chess-players can be "forced" to follow all the rules of chess.

Can an arguer form new beliefs by arguing with itself?

What does "arguing with oneself" entail?

Can an argument end in all claims being successfully countered?

Sure it can. The "truth" would then be that you hadn't yet discovered the truth about whatever it is you are discussing.

I guess I should also ask what counts as "an arguer".

Anyone player in a particular language-game who will play by the rules.

 

[Mentat]

Yeah, Honestrosewater says it all really. There is no intrasubjective means of ascertaining what is true (in any absolute sense). Nor can we trust our senses, which are inevitably theory-laden. Nor can we trust our reason, by which nothing can be known for certain. As Mentat says, solipsism may be the case as far as the evidence of our senses and of our reason goes. This doesn't mean we cannot know things, but it does place tight restrictions on what we can know and how, and what we should count as convincing evidence.

This is all very fine, if we take up the biases of both Locke and Kant.

What if, instead of thinking of "knowledge" as the accuracy of our mental representations relative to the physical things they are supposed to represent, we could at least consider the social/linguistic alternative.

As a thought-experiment, try to think about what knowledge and truth are, without any reference to Lockean or Kantian concepts. Obviously, philosophers had some concept of what constituted "truth", "knowledge", etc, prior to the 17th century. What if all of the post-Cartesian, Dualistic, Mirror-of-nature approach to evidence and justification was misguided?

After all, there are very few self-respecting philosophers who would promote the total, original, mind-body duality of Descartes. There are also very few who would purposely succomb to the idea of "mind-stuff" inherent in Locke.

Now, without the aforementioned biases, philosophy might not need so complicated a vocabulary to describe things that the lay-person never has to encounter, never has to consider -- indeed, wouldn't understand. Of course, one could simply say that that one is uneducated, and so it is only logical that s/he can't conceive of higher philosophical concepts. And yet, according to the very philosophers who gave you your framework (the framework of representationalism that is at the heart of most of the comments made on this forum, along with most of the philosophies of mind ever published), there should be nothing more obvious and intuitive then those things which relate directly to one's own cognitive processes.

 

[Philocrat]

THE LOGICAL AND QUANTITATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF DECLARATORY AND EXISTENTIAL CLAIMS

PROPOSITIONS

All propositions are conclusions. Because of this, every one of it has a deductive origin. Even if the creator and holder of such a proposition did not intend it to be so, someone else who hears it will ensure that it so be. This is also equlivalent to adequately and materially implying that a proposition is an abberviation of a fully deduced argumment.


BELIEFS

All beliefs have the same quantitative and logical structures as propositions. Because of this, all propositions and beliefs unavoidably share the same epistemological fate.


COVERSATIONS

A conversation, as philosophically defined, is a collection of sentences. Without submitting to any controversy, I am willing to claim that all sentences (including questions, commands, exclamations, metaphore, etc) are propositions since they are usually intended (either directly or indirectly) to convey some truth values.

Every conversation creates two or multiple referencial positions either in the abstract logical space or in the real external world for the installation of all participants. This is wholly compatible with saying that a conversation can take place between:

1) A and A

2) A and B

3) A and B and C

4) (A, B) and (C, D)

And so on. However, by analysis, (1) is equivalent to someone just thinking by himself because thinking is also conversational in structure. It is equivalent to saying : "I am conversing with myself". (2) is equivalent to two people having a conversation with each other, and so is (3) equivalent to three people having a conversation. And lastly, (4) is equivalent ot one group of two people having a conversation with another group of two people. You can increase the complexities of these arrangements and regroupings as much as you like, the conversational principles governing them fundamentally remain the same.

The standard claim in conversational theory is that:

Every statement or proposition from every participant must contribute to the intermediate truth-values and the overall truth value of the whole conversation. That the boundary of truth is the whole conversation itself.

That a good conversation is marked by how relevant a given proposition or statement is to the subject matter under discourse.

PROBLEM: If you naively claim that you are a solipsist, then this is what you are quantitatively and logically implying:

1) All proppositions are always made from A to A (you are the speaker and hearer of your own noise)

2) All beliefs are always composed, held and propagated from A to A

3) All conversations are always conducted between A and A

Spooky, isn't it?

 

[RingoKid]

sorry but it all keeps coming back to this, which i figured out years ago.

accept nothing as fact
question everything
determine your own truth
define your own reality

the key is the definition of nothing

nothing is perfect
in the space where nothing exists
will one find perfection
the perfect nothing

...seek

>>so nothing CAN be known if you look for it. The space is a compactified dimension and in it all is known but not a thing exists there because thoughts are not physical ?

 

[Iacchus32]

Yeah, Honestrosewater says it all really. There is no intrasubjective means of ascertaining what is true (in any absolute sense). Nor can we trust our senses, which are inevitably theory-laden. Nor can we trust our reason, by which nothing can be known for certain. As Mentat says, solipsism may be the case as far as the evidence of our senses and of our reason goes. This doesn't mean we cannot know things, but it does place tight restrictions on what we can know and how, and what we should count as convincing evidence.

It all begins with and ends with, the mind, however. Which leads me to ask, is the mind merely the mechanism by which we experience reality? If so, why should we be so quick to dismiss those things that the mind sees? ... period. Especially when it involves those things which are not a part of our everyday reality which only the mind can see, that are non-physical in other words. How do we in fact know that the mind hasn't faithfully witnessed something which actually does exist, suggesting in part that there's a whole world of reality -- an abstract dimension of thought if you will -- unto the mind itself? Indeed, is it possible that our imaginations are a living environment unto themeselves? Which of course would help to elucidate this living entity/being we call consciousness.

Sorry Mentat, I don't mean to discount anything you're trying to say here, because it is very important that we understand the medium we have to work with when it comes to drawing our conclusions. In which case how much leeway do we really have with the observations we make with our minds, when in fact this is all we have to work with? But then again since this is all inherent with nature's design, maybe it isn't necessary for us to look outside of it (the experiential mind) for the answer? Thus far nature has been more than willing to share its secrets with us don't you think?

 

[honestrosewater]

A proposition.
Reasoning that supports that proposition.
If the proposition takes the form of utterance or text, and other members of the same "group" (peers) hear/read it, it is public.
Simply losing in argument.
Anyone player in a particular language-game who will play by the rules.

So what you're decribing is logicians using logic; A player is a logician, and a language-game is a logic, right? I ask because Logic is already established.

No. But isn't it common-sensical that the meaning assigned to "meaning" which withstands argument the best will be the most socially accepted (i.e. the currently true) one?

But that's exactly my question- How do you know others are assigning the same meaning to a word?
Say arguer X and arguer Y are arguing with each other. X and Y are using the same language L. X and Y are arguing about X's claim: "The interpretation of L used by X is identical to the interpretation of L used by Y." How could this argument end?
I haven't really thought this through, but surely you all can help me along (I doubt these are new questions). Might X and Y need to decide the truth or falsity of a few more claims: (1a) L is consistent, (1b) L is complete, (2a) In all respects, X and Y are the same arguer, or (2b) In all relevant respects, X and Y are the same arguer.
I don't know what are relevant respects in all cases. In some cases, X and Y both being humans with normal vision and having seen the sun could be relevant respects, while X and Y living in different countries could be an irrelevant respect.

Not any more than all chess-players can be "forced" to follow all the rules of chess.

Can all chess-players be forced to follow at least one set of rules? If it isn't obvious, I'm thinking of physical rules.

What does "arguing with oneself" entail?

I would have said it entails that all claims are made by the same arguer. But I might have to change that, depending on the answers to my other questions.

Sure it can. The "truth" would then be that you hadn't yet discovered the truth about whatever it is you are discussing.

But don't all arguers have to agree that "we haven't yet discovered the truth about what we are discussing" is true?

 

[Mentat]

So what you're decribing is logicians using logic; A player is a logician, and a language-game is a logic, right?

No, a "player" is any participant in a "language-game" (Sprach-spiel). There's no easy way to get through this, but I'll do my best to paraphrase the concept:

Think of what a "game" is. Try to define it rigidly. You will soon discover that you can't, because whatever definition you come up with will either leave out some type of game (board game, card game, olympic game, kids playing games), or will be so broad that it will include things that are clearly not "games". What makes a game a game is it's (in Wittgenstein's terms) "family resemblances". There may not be anyone common factor to all games, but there are many factors that are common to a lot of games; games that, in turn have other things in common with yet other games which they don't have incommon with the aforementioned...

A language-game is the same concept. There are innumerable language-games (asking for something and having it brought to you, saying something and having it repeated, asking questions, identifying objects, etc). What you will notice if you examine the plethura of language-games is that they don't all have anyone thing in common, but they have "family resemblances", just like "games" (hence the term, "language-game", since categorization of a type of language use, is much like a categorization of a type of "game").

Games, however, typically have rules. These rules can be strict, and necessarily adhered to, or they can be completely ad hoc (as with so many games that little children make up as they go along), or they can be anything in between. So with language-games; they have rules, but "rules" in different senses and to different degrees of necessity/importance/rigidness.

So, what I was saying before was that, in philosophical discussion, the "moves" we can make (considering "philosophical discussion" to be yet another "language-game" with its own "rules") are different than the "moves" we can make in other language-games. What is important is to realize that "truth" is a mostly philosophical notion, and (depending on which brand of philosophy you are practising (social, as with the pre-Platonics; epistemological, as with the post-Kantians; etc)) can mean simply "that which I can get away with saying (i.e. a "move" I'm allowed to make) in this particular language-game".

I ask because Logic is already established.

Logic is a set of rules for a set of "games". Logic is supposed to describe, and limit, all possible games. I won't make any claims about whether that's the case or not, but I will say that it lacks relevance, since all language-games will be bound by some rules, and those rules will be "logical" in some way or another.

But that's exactly my question- How do you know others are assigning the same meaning to a word?
Say arguer X and arguer Y are arguing with each other. X and Y are using the same language L. X and Y are arguing about X's claim: "The interpretation of L used by X is identical to the interpretation of L used by Y." How could this argument end?
I haven't really thought this through, but surely you all can help me along (I doubt these are new questions). Might X and Y need to decide the truth or falsity of a few more claims: (1a) L is consistent, (1b) L is complete...

Those are assumed upon the taking up of a certain language-game. In much the same way, we assume that the rules of some new board game (for example) are going to be consistent, even if we haven't ever played the game before.

(2a) In all respects, X and Y are the same arguer, or (2b) In all relevant respects, X and Y are the same arguer.

Why would X and Y be the same arguer?

I don't know what are relevant respects in all cases. In some cases, X and Y both being humans with normal vision and having seen the sun could be relevant respects, while X and Y living in different countries could be an irrelevant respect.

Oh, so you're talking about when they agree with one another, right? When they agree, do they become the same arguer? Is that what you are asking?

If so, then I'd say that it isn't an argument and doesn't enter into the problem of discovering "truth". After all, if two people agree on something, then the "game" is over.

Can all chess-players be forced to follow at least one set of rules? If it isn't obvious, I'm thinking of physical rules.

The point is the rules that they must follow in order to play "chess". If they start moving the king as though it were a rook, they aren't playing "chess" anymore, they're playing something else (similar to chess, perhaps, but a different game).

I would have said it entails that all claims are made by the same arguer. But I might have to change that, depending on the answers to my other questions.

Think of it in terms of "games" an my answer (the one I would give) will seem obvious.

But don't all arguers have to agree that "we haven't yet discovered the truth about what we are discussing" is true?

Why should they? As long as they all agree that they haven't yet agreed...I don't think I really understand what you're asking. Clarify please.

 

[Philocrat]

No, a "player" is any participant in a "language-game" (Sprach-spiel). There's no easy way to get through this, but I'll do my best to paraphrase the concept:

Think of what a "game" is. Try to define it rigidly. You will soon discover that you can't, because whatever definition you come up with will either leave out some type of game (board game, card game, olympic game, kids playing games), or will be so broad that it will include things that are clearly not "games". What makes a game a game is it's (in Wittgenstein's terms) "family resemblances". There may not be anyone common factor to all games, but there are many factors that are common to a lot of games; games that, in turn have other things in common with yet other games which they don't have incommon with the aforementioned...

A language-game is the same concept. There are innumerable language-games (asking for something and having it brought to you, saying something and having it repeated, asking questions, identifying objects, etc). What you will notice if you examine the plethura of language-games is that they don't all have anyone thing in common, but they have "family resemblances", just like "games" (hence the term, "language-game", since categorization of a type of language use, is much like a categorization of a type of "game").

Games, however, typically have rules. These rules can be strict, and necessarily adhered to, or they can be completely ad hoc (as with so many games that little children make up as they go along), or they can be anything in between. So with language-games; they have rules, but "rules" in different senses and to different degrees of necessity/importance/rigidness.

So, what I was saying before was that, in philosophical discussion, the "moves" we can make (considering "philosophical discussion" to be yet another "language-game" with its own "rules") are different than the "moves" we can make in other language-games. What is important is to realize that "truth" is a mostly philosophical notion, and (depending on which brand of philosophy you are practising (social, as with the pre-Platonics; epistemological, as with the post-Kantians; etc)) can mean simply "that which I can get away with saying (i.e. a "move" I'm allowed to make) in this particular language-game".

Mentat, you are painting a picture of the world whose societies all function like 'Games'. The fundamental issue here is not necessarily about whether 'one or more games are ever like' but mainly about 'what is common to all games?' or 'what is the common outcome or outcomes of all games, regardless of how widely or narrowly they all structurally and functionaly vary?'

As soon as you ask these questions, the next most important or significant questions that would confront you are these:

1) Why do all games have these common features or outcomes ?

2) How much do these common features or outcomes affect the way all games are currently played?

3) What can be collectively done by all the players to structurally and functionally improve the nature of all games?

4)And, ultemately, what is the fundamental benefit for all the players committing themselves to such a project of games improvement?

These are the hard-headed questions that now demand carefully thought out answers. So, what are these common features? They are these:

1) PLAYERS

All games need Players, otherwise it is not a game

2) RULES

All games must have rules, or methods.

3) PLAY

All games need to be played. If you design a game with players and rules without ever playing it, then it would be either a furniture that you just sit down and admire forever or it is not a game at all.

4) RESULT

All games always result in three possible outcomes (a) WIN, (2) LOSE or (3) DRAW

These are the key common features. The variations in the Player types, rules, or the physical designs of all games seem to be trivially insiginificant, if not irrelevant.

PROBLEM: Every win produces Happiness for both the Winners and their loyal supporters. Every Loss produces Unhappiness for the Loosers and their supporters. Every draw brings happiness to all the players and their supporters on both sides of the game. Question: Supposing all the players structurally and functionaly progress to a point in their overall existence such that they bocome so smart that all games always end in a draw, would these players still be happy with this new state of affair? Would games still be games?

 

[Mentat]

Mentat, you are painting a picture of the world whose societies all function like 'Games'. The fundamental issue here is not necessarily about whether 'one or more games are ever like' but mainly about 'what is common to all games?' or 'what is the common outcome or outcomes of all games, regardless of how widely or narrowly they all structurally and functionaly vary?'

No, no, Wittgenstein expected people to try this, and nipped it in the bud. To fuss about what is "common to all games" will lead you to a definition that is either too rigid, or too permissive. It simply cannot be done. And, even if it could, why would you want to?

No, when you think of the difference between chess, soccer, gymnastics, and kids outside throwing a ball at one another and making up rules as they go and scoffing at the very concept of their being made more rigid (the rules, that is)...just think about it for a while.

 

[Doctordick]

What evidence do we have, but what the "experiential mind" dictates?

Clearly the answer is "None!" IMHO this is a very important question; and one not discussed anywhere in this thread!

If we all but share one mind and that mind knows everything then what more is there to know?

Oh, so now somebody knows everything do they? What round hole did you pull that out of?

And, that maybe we shouldn't be so quick to discount those things which seem to arise solely from the mind, since it is after all the only means we have by which to know anything.

I don't think anyone here wants to discuss it!

The Senses are the suppliers of evidence!

Doesn't that presume a mind knowing what senses are?

Yes, the evidence has to be extrapolated or, at the very least "witnessed" ... which, is accomplished by means of an "experiential mind."

Aren't you being led astray here? We had this concept "a mind" (some inexplicable source of ideas). Now I can work with that and the problems it poses, but now you add "senses"! Why and where did that arise? From your mind or not? Apparently it's just another inexplicable source; but a source of what?

What do you think of the sort of mind that has never been exposed to any information from the external world...that is from outset completely disconnected from the senses? Call it a 'HUMOID' if you like.

Why don't we just call it a "fetus" at the moment of conception? Or do you think that single cell is already connected to "its senses"?

About as close as I could get to that would be somebody who was in a coma.

Now here you have gotten so far astray as to be no longer on subject. A person in a coma has all kinds of operating connections to their senses. They breath, their heart beats, they digest food. A mind, cut off from their senses? Get out of here; you haven't even thought about this "mind" processes its ideas yet! You added "senses" and are now dividing the mind into two different states "conscious" and "unconscious"! You started with one "primitive" and are now up to three without making any progress at all. (Not even an argument as to why these three conceptual "primitives" are necessary.)

What if, instead of accurate representation in the mind, what mattered for "evidence" or "proof" would simply be social convention? IOW, what if what counted as "justification" was simply what arguments would allow you to make the claim in public without being successfully countered?

Now, haven't you just side stepped the whole question here? How does that mind deal with "social convention" without senses or consciousness? Off the subject?

I guess I should also ask what counts as "an arguer".

Talk about off the subject! Like puppies barking at one another. It appears to me that everybody on this forum just spouts forth without ever putting an iota of thought into what they are saying. I think it's called Attention Deficit Syndrome.

Yeah, Honestrosewater says it all really.

I'm glad someone has got this all figured out. How come I don't see lacchus32 jumping in and agreeing?

And yet, according to the very philosophers who gave you your framework (the framework of representationalism that is at the heart of most of the comments made on this forum, along with most of the philosophies of mind ever published), there should be nothing more obvious and intuitive then those things which relate directly to one's own cognitive processes.

So you think "intuition" is the best source of "knowledge". How did you come to that conclusion?

If you naively claim that you are a solipsist, then this is what you are quantitatively and logically implying:

1) All proppositions are always made from A to A (you are the speaker and hearer of your own noise)

2) All beliefs are always composed, held and propagated from A to A

3) All conversations are always conducted between A and A

Spooky, isn't it?

If that were true, one would have to be pretty stupid to claim to be a solipsist then wouldn't one? Are you sure you are not oversimplifying the issues here? Would Hume agree with you?

sorry but it all keeps coming back to this, which i figured out years ago.

Well, now we have two people who have it all figured out. :zzz:

In which case how much leeway do we really have with the observations we make with our minds, when in fact this is all we have to work with?

Sounds to me like you are trying to get back on subject. Do you really think it'll work?

But that's exactly my question- How do you know others are assigning the same meaning to a word?

Now that's an interesting question; exactly how does one come to know the meaning of a word? Back to that fetus (or Humoid if you prefer); exactly how did it come to know the meaning of that first word it came to know? And what, pray tell, was it?

Why should they? As long as they all agree that they haven't yet agreed...I don't think I really understand what you're asking. Clarify please.

Boy, you sure said a lot for someone who didn't understand what he was being asked! :

Supposing all the players structurally and functionaly progress to a point in their overall existence such that they bocome so smart that all games always end in a draw, would these players still be happy with this new state of affair? Would games still be games?

Let's see now, "What is Evidence?" has been brought to "Would games still be games?" It reminds me of that "phone" game we used to play when I was a kid. One person writes something down (reasonably complex) and then whispers it to another. The message is then passed from one child to another (works pretty good with about twenty kids). Then the last one writes down the message. Finally the first and last messages are compared. They seldom have anything to do with one another.

...just think about it for a while.

I suspect that request is beyond the capabilities of most people on this forum; but, perhaps I am in error. I wrote what I wrote because I found the original question interesting (apparently no one else agreed) and a thread which avoided the whole issue.

Is there anyone here who is interested in continuing with a discussion of exactly what the consequences of the constraint pointed out by lacchus32 might be?

What evidence do we have, but what the "experiential mind" dictates?

As I said earlier, the answer is clearly "None!" I think I have some very important things to say concerning the consequences of that fact, but it would require a little thought and I wouldn't want to over tax your attention span.

Have fun -- Dick :shy:

 

[Iacchus32]

Clearly the answer is "None!" IMHO this is a very important question; and one not discussed anywhere in this thread!

I agree, this is a very important question, because what it really gets down to is how can we know anything if we don't know ourselves? Or, for that matter, is there really "a self" there for us to know?

I don't think anyone here wants to discuss it!

Well, I was beginning to wonder about that myself but, I think the problem lies in the fact that most of us are applying this to things we (allegedly) examine outside of the mind, to further our own particular brand of research, while I'm more concerned with the mind's ability to look at itself, and understand what "a mind" is from the standpoint of being a mind that is ... if, you catch my drift?

Oh, and thanks for showing an interest.

Now here you have gotten so far astray as to be no longer on subject. A person in a coma has all kinds of operating connections to their senses. They breath, their heart beats, they digest food. A mind, cut off from their senses? Get out of here; you haven't even thought about this "mind" processes its ideas yet! You added "senses" and are now dividing the mind into two different states "conscious" and "unconscious"! You started with one "primitive" and are now up to three without making any progress at all. (Not even an argument as to why these three conceptual "primitives" are necessary.)

I think what I was trying to get at here, at least initially, is where is the "experiential part" of that person that we've come to know as that person? Why is it that they no longer appear to be at home?

I suspect that request is beyond the capabilities of most people on this forum; but, perhaps I am in error. I wrote what I wrote because I found the original question interesting (apparently no one else agreed) and a thread which avoided the whole issue.

Is there anyone here who is interested in continuing with a discussion of exactly what the consequences of the constraint pointed out by lacchus32 might be?

In other words should the mind be given license to reflect on the mind itself, since that's what it seems to be so good at ... the ability to reflect on things? Is the medium of the mind itself a legitimate process in other words?

As I said earlier, the answer is clearly "None!" I think I have some very important things to say concerning the consequences of that fact, but it would require a little thought and I wouldn't want to over tax your attention span.

Have fun -- Dick :shy:

Then by all means let's hear it! While hey admit that I have somewhat of a limited attention span, but heck, it's the only one I've got!

 

[Philocrat]

Doesn't that presume a mind knowing what senses are?

Some people say that there is such thing as a mind/soul/consciousness that extends beyond the material body. They then become locked up in a stalemate of explaining it. Whatever the mind is, I open-mindedly look at it as a contributor to the understanding of the natural world. Being a contributor, it must behave like every other organs in the material body: CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROCESS OF SEEING AND UNDERSTANDING what the whole human self ecounters in every moment of its being. It is immaterial whether it is fundamentally different from the material body or not, in the end, by the sum totality of its worth, it must do something concrete to deserve any place in the whole human body. I couldn't careless what the mind is or where it comes from or what happens to it afterwards, so long as it does something useful while there is a human being in existence.

So, what does it do to deserve a place in the self? It must receive input, compute and display. For example, whatever the sense organs supply to it, it must:

1) Make at least an estimate of what it is. Interprete the shapes, sizes, lines, circles, count, etc.

2) It must label every aspect of it and numerically and norminally map them onto what outwardly constitutes a whole

3) It must name it (that is, the outcome of (3)).

4) And file it away in the memory for subsequent recall and use.

This process is repeated until enough information is built up over time to start conceptualising and making concrete predictions that are wholly relevant and useful to the overall preservation of the beholder of such a mind or consciousness. So, as you can see, I always interprete the whole notion of the mind or consciousness purposively. The ROLE-PLAY PRINCIPLE is the centre piece of my own interpretation of the mind.

On the issue of knowing what the mind or conscousness is and where it is located in the body, as I have consistently argued on this PF, if it is truly posing a 'hard-problem' as it is being alledged, there is no way to know that until we fully study and understand how the meterial body itself is configured and functioned, from the physiological to the neuro-computational level. At the moment no one can honestly turn up and claim to fully know this. Me, I am flexible...I'll wait!

NOTE: By this interpretation, I am not in anyway neglecting the possibility of such deviations as hallucinations, visual illusions, misconceptions, and other spooky types of deviations. I totally acknowledge all these, except that I always look at them as marginal functional errors in the whole process of sensing, interpreting and understanding the world. Just as the sense organs mispercieve so can the mind make quantificational and logical errors in the process of interpretation and understanding.

 

[Iacchus32]

NOTE: By this interpretation, I am not in anyway neglecting the possibility of such deviations as hallucinations, visual illusions, misconceptions, and other spooky types of deviations. I totally acknowledge all these, except that I always look at them as marginal functional errors in the whole process of sensing, interpreting and understanding the world. Just as the sense organs mispercieve so can the mind make quantificational and logical errors in the process of interpretation and understanding.

Which is to say you like to believe you have a firm grip on reality then, correct?

 

[Philocrat]

Which is to say you like to believe you have a firm grip on reality then, correct?

Not necessarily...I am only acknowledging my own perceptual limitations without necessarily inviting anyone else to do the same. That's why I will like to wait until further notice.

 

[honestrosewater]

Why should they? As long as they all agree that they haven't yet agreed...I don't think I really understand what you're asking. Clarify please.

I could be clearer if I knew the rules of the game. Presumably, the rules would state that the game ends when a player makes a claim that is not successfully countered by any other player. So how can a game end with all claims having been successfully countered? If that's one of the rules, the rules are inconsistent. If the players can end the game illegally- IOW their decision does not follow from the rules but is made outside of or independently of the rules- fine, no problem. But they can still end the game legally: If a player can claim something along the lines of "This is the last claim made in this argument" and no other player counters that claim, then the game ends legally, with one player making a claim that is not successfully countered by any other player.

My question about meaning... Say two people meet on a dog lovers discussion forum. After completely describing their dogs to each other, they realize their descriptions are identical: Big floppy ears, brown, furry coat, long, purple tongue, 42 teeth, and so on. So they decide to send pictures of their dogs to each other. Surprisingly, the pictures are not identical; one is a picture of a dog, the other is a picture of a lizard. Do the pictures provide evidence that the words they were using meant different things to each of them? Could their words ever have provided evidence that the words they were using meant different things to each of them?

 

[Doctordick]

"How can we know anything?"

I agree, this is a very important question, because what it really gets down to is how can we know anything if we don't know ourselves? Or, for that matter, is there really "a self" there for us to know?

Now see, I think you are already getting ahead of the problem! Lots of text with little careful thought. Actually, right here in this quote alone you have posed three different questions. Why don't we just start with the first question and worry about the others later? In my opinion, what it really gets down to is how can we "know" anything period? If you can't answer that question everything else is moot.

Some people say that there is such thing as a mind/soul/consciousness that extends beyond the material body.

Yeh, and I know somebody who says we are born knowing everything and have forgotten! There are a lot of dumb ideas out there; if we are going to list them all, I guarantee you'll exceed my attention span! The impression I get is that you are trying to force an interpretation of the word "mind" which will beg the original question: "How can we know anything?"

Which is to say you like to believe you have a firm grip on reality then, correct?

Before one can have a firm grip on reality, one must first at least understand what reality is! Do you think anybody knows what reality is? If so, how did they come to know it? Can no one see the conundrum here?

I am only acknowledging my own perceptual limitations ...

Are you really? How did you come to know what your perceptual limitations are?

In my opinion, we have a very serious problem here. No one above even thought to comment on the "humoid" start point (the fetus). Somehow a single cell having no brain, no eyes, no nerves, no eyes, ears, nose, tongue or fingers comes to know what these things are! As adults they have a mental picture of what they call reality; what they are and what the world around them is and a rough idea of the rules they obey. And no one finds that in the least bit strange? Somehow this entity begins with no knowledge of reality at all and, in a matter of a few short years, has fundamentally solved the problem. This hasn't happened just once; it happens hundreds of millions of times every year. Yet, not only has no one explained how this is accomplished, no one is even interested in examining the problem.

Well I was and am! And the first thing to be done is exactly state what the problem is. Somehow every one of us has managed to create a workable explanation of a body of totally undefined information (reality) which has been transformed by a totally undefined process (our senses). As a fetus, you were certainly not cognizant of any definitions. It follows (as the night the day ) that the problem is a solvable problem! So why don't we just sit down and solve it: come up with a procedure for solving such a problem? Create an explanation of a body of totally undefined information transformed by a totally undefined process! If you cannot do that, how can you ever hope to understand the human mind?

If you have the attention span to follow it, I can show you a solution. Not necessarily "the solution" but "a solution". Understanding that solution opens one's eyes to some of the the fundamental characteristics and limitations of those solutions our minds have created.

Do I have anyone's interest? -- Dick

 

[Philocrat]

How did you come to know what your perceptual limitations are?

I can't claim to know that, but as I have argued elsewhere on this forum, it seems as if the human mind is naturally predisposed to make some estimates about what is wrong with things and how things ought to be. They appear to me as estimates of some sort. We tend to all want more than there is or more than things currently are. On this, I always keep an open my until we make some scientific progress in the science of man, if any.

In my opinion, we have a very serious problem here. No one above even thought to comment on the "humoid" start point (the fetus). Somehow a single cell having no brain, no eyes, no nerves, no eyes, ears, nose, tongue or fingers comes to know what these things are! As adults they have a mental picture of what they call reality; what they are and what the world around them is and a rough idea of the rules they obey. And no one finds that in the least bit strange? Somehow this entity begins with no knowledge of reality at all and, in a matter of a few short years, has fundamentally solved the problem. This hasn't happened just once; it happens hundreds of millions of times every year. Yet, not only has no one explained how this is accomplished, no one is even interested in examining the problem.

And one of the fascinating things about foetus is that it can't even exist without being materially fed from conception. It's mind strangely enough tends to expand as more matter is fed to it. When it comes out of the mother's womb (the contributory cause of it), it still continues to be fed by more matter and throughout its youth to adulthood, it conitunes to rely on more matter for its mind to even make an inch attempt of learning about the natural world and expanding accordingly. Stop feeding it with matter at any point in time, it not only stops acquiring more information, like magic, it everporates. So much of an indendennce! Really, independence of mind?

Well I was and am! And the first thing to be done is exactly state what the problem is. Somehow every one of us has managed to create a workable explanation of a body of totally undefined information (reality) which has been transformed by a totally undefined process (our senses). As a fetus, you were certainly not cognizant of any definitions. It follows (as the night the day ) that the problem is a solvable problem! So why don't we just sit down and solve it: come up with a procedure for solving such a problem? Create an explanation of a body of totally undefined information transformed by a totally undefined process! If you cannot do that, how can you ever hope to understand the human mind?

Grind the world to a hault. Stop everyone from having sex or reproducing in anyway possible, and see what happens. If the soul or mind or consciousness is so independent and unigue, let us all stop having sex and let us see if it can single-handedly reproduce itself without any intervention of matter! The fact that is apparent to me is this:

The LIFE-AND-DEATH CYCLE is a natural mechanism for 'NUMERICAL' preservation of the whole human race ('SAVED-BY-NUMBER' Mechanism). It seems as if the whole of the human race is naturally preserved by numerical recycling of its imperfect parts. The whole process looks entirely like a material process. BIG question for everyman's conscience:

WHY PRESERVE THE WHOLE HUMAN RACE BY NUMERICALLY DESTROYING AND REPLACING THE ACTUAL HUMAN BEINGS THEMSELVES VIA THIS LIFE-AND-DEATH CYCLE OR MECHANISM?

So, when someone asks you: 'is the human race (whole) being preserved?' How do you answer that? That the real human beings (parts) are being numerically destroyed and replaced or recycled in order to do so? What about the real human beings themselves that are being savagedly recycled in the process? Special invisible hands taking care of the business? Oh, yeh? I could be wrong, but the whole process looks wholly materially and mechanically induced. And worst still, even if this cirular process were arguably preserving in the first place, there is currently no guarantee that the human race may not be left with the same fate as the dinosaurs, for there is nothing that I have personally seen that logically rules this out.

And what happens if you could do this:

WHOLLY AND COMPLETELY PRESERVE BOTH THE WHOLE AND ITS PARTS (HUMAN RACE AND THE ACTUAL HUMAN BEINGS) IN THE STRICTEST SENSE OF THE WORD?

If you have the attention span to follow it, I can show you a solution. Not necessarily "the solution" but "a solution". Understanding that solution opens one's eyes to some of the the fundamental characteristics and limitations of those solutions our minds have created.

Do I have anyone's interest? -- Dick

Keep your solution to yourself for now. I have seen enought that invites me to wait until further notice.

 

[RingoKid]

Do I have anyone's interest? -- Dick

no, not really, just your own...

 

[honestrosewater]

If you have the attention span to follow it, I can show you a solution. Not necessarily "the solution" but "a solution". Understanding that solution opens one's eyes to some of the the fundamental characteristics and limitations of those solutions our minds have created.

Do I have anyone's interest? -- Dick

If you would stop insulting people, I would like to discuss your solution.

 

[Iacchus32]

Now see, I think you are already getting ahead of the problem! Lots of text with little careful thought. Actually, right here in this quote alone you have posed three different questions. Why don't we just start with the first question and worry about the others later? In my opinion, what it really gets down to is how can we "know" anything period? If you can't answer that question everything else is moot.

The one thing I do know is it takes "a mind" to know the truth. That in fact we "experience" the truth through our relationship with it. What else can we know of a certainty beyond that? That everything is contingent upon that original something (not nothing) which makes all things certain?

 

[RingoKid]

nothing is certain...

...couldn't resist

 

[Iacchus32]

nothing is certain...

...couldn't resist

Yes, but how could you be so sure? Who (or what) told you this?

 

[RingoKid]

Nobody told me this. It is something that in my experience I have found to be true...

In other words I know and trust myself enough to believe what i have found to be true

knowledge of self is great, isn't it ?

 

[honestrosewater]

The one thing I do know is it takes "a mind" to know the truth. That in fact we "experience" the truth through our relationship with it. What else can we know of a certainty beyond that? That everything is contingent upon that original something (not nothing) which makes all things certain?

This may be a small point, but do you ask, "What entails my experience?" or, "What does my experience entail?"

 

[Mentat]

I could be clearer if I knew the rules of the game. Presumably, the rules would state that the game ends when a player makes a claim that is not successfully countered by any other player. So how can a game end with all claims having been successfully countered?

A game ends when no more legal moves can be made (as with all games), for whatever reason. Do you play chess? If so, think of the difference between winning by stalemate, and winning by checkmate.

My question about meaning... Say two people meet on a dog lovers discussion forum. After completely describing their dogs to each other, they realize their descriptions are identical: Big floppy ears, brown, furry coat, long, purple tongue, 42 teeth, and so on. So they decide to send pictures of their dogs to each other. Surprisingly, the pictures are not identical; one is a picture of a dog, the other is a picture of a lizard. Do the pictures provide evidence that the words they were using meant different things to each of them?

Sure, but I don't see the relevance. If the definitions of the words were not established from the beginning (though both assumed that the other was using the same set of definitions as they were) then confusion should be expected.

Could their words ever have provided evidence that the words they were using meant different things to each of them?

They simply hadn't cleared up all the rules of their language-game yet. Think of trying to play chess with someone who thought that rooks, in addition to their actual legal moves, could also move in space in the forward diagonal directions. They just aren't playing by the same rules as you are, so you are technically not even playing the same game (though there are versions of Shogi (Japanese chess) in which the aforementioned rook moves are indeed legal).

 

[honestrosewater]

A game ends when no more legal moves can be made (as with all games), for whatever reason. Do you play chess? If so, think of the difference between winning by stalemate, and winning by checkmate.

Does your truth game allow draws? Or is it just win or lose? I thought truth was winning and falsity was losing. What would drawing be?

Sure, but I don't see the relevance. If the definitions of the words were not established from the beginning (though both assumed that the other was using the same set of definitions as they were) then confusion should be expected.

If the definitions are stated in words, the same problem applies. How are they to know the definitions mean the same to each of them? Even if this isn't a problem for language games, I am not a language game, and it is a problem for me when playing language games. Some of the words I use refer to objects which are themselves not words. How are two people to know the words they are using refer to the same nonword objects? The same problem arises for other means of public communication.
It seems you are suggesting that only public statements can be true. This is why I suggested that the arguer or player or whatever be the same person- so that language games can be played privately, and private statements can be true. There's surely a better way of explaining this, but I'll have to try again later.

They simply hadn't cleared up all the rules of their language-game yet. Think of trying to play chess with someone who thought that rooks, in addition to their actual legal moves, could also move in space in the forward diagonal directions. They just aren't playing by the same rules as you are, so you are technically not even playing the same game (though there are versions of Shogi (Japanese chess) in which the aforementioned rook moves are indeed legal).

So you think you can infer "X knows Y" from "X does Z"?

 

[Iacchus32]

This may be a small point, but do you ask, "What entails my experience?" or, "What does my experience entail?"

I place full emphasis on the fact that I'm cognizant if this is what you're asking, in the sense that cognizance is elemental, regardless of all the bits and pieces that constitutes cognizance as a whole. Similarly, why place any emphasis on the Hubble telescope as opposed to taking an inventory of all its parts? If you look at it in that sense, what do you need a telescope for? Doesn't it seem like Science is somehow trying to "by-pass" the human mind here?

 

[honestrosewater]

I place full emphasis on the fact that I'm cognizant if this is what you're asking, in the sense that cognizance is elemental, regardless of all the bits and pieces that constitutes cognizance as a whole. Similarly, why place any emphasis on the Hubble telescope as opposed to taking an inventory of all its parts? If you look at it in that sense, what do you need a telescope for? Doesn't it seem like Science is somehow trying to "by-pass" the human mind here?

Well, parts and wholes do fit with what I'm asking, in a way. If X implies Y and Y implies X, X and Y are equivalent. Maybe your question is about whether we are only looking at half of an equivalence? That is, we can try to prove that X imples Y or that Y implies X, but we cannot do both at once, in the same framework. "X" and "Y" might be something like "private" and "public" or "subjective" and "objective". Maybe I'm just spacing out.

 

[Mentat]

Does your truth game allow draws? Or is it just win or lose? I thought truth was winning and falsity was losing. What would drawing be?

Perhaps "stalemate" isn't a good analogy. Think instead of when all the other players give up. That happens in chess, and in most other types of game. So, for all to end up agreeing would be like a "forfeit" on the part of all the other players.

If the definitions are stated in words, the same problem applies. How are they to know the definitions mean the same to each of them? Even if this isn't a problem for language games, I am not a language game, and it is a problem for me when playing language games. Some of the words I use refer to objects which are themselves not words. How are two people to know the words they are using refer to the same nonword objects? The same problem arises for other means of public communication.
It seems you are suggesting that only public statements can be true. This is why I suggested that the arguer or player or whatever be the same person- so that language games can be played privately, and private statements can be true. There's surely a better way of explaining this, but I'll have to try again later.

First off, it is well known (held by Wittgenstein himself, as a matter of fact) that his (Wittgenstein's) language-game framework doesn't allow for a "first truth"...in order to understand one thing, you must understand many things. But there is nothing logically wrong with this. Thus, in order to understand how one word is used, you must understand many other words. This is never a problem in board games. For example, no one wonders whether the rule book is a piece in the game. Also, if someone were to tell you "this is the king, and it moves only one space, but in any direction (provided it's not walking into "check"). Well, you have to understand what "check" is, and you have to understand that when I hold up the king and say "this is the king", I'm naming it (not, for example, demonstrating a legal move). And when I say that it can only move "one space", you must understand what counts for a space (it could mean, as it does in certain other games, "from the space it's on, to a space of the same color").

As to only public statements being true; so? A chess move is only legal if played on a board. Granted, you can play chess by yourself, but in that case, no matter what happens, you win (as my little sister puts it). So, as to finding truth, you could do what you think another player would do -- were he to participate in you language-game, instead of leaving you to play on your own -- but there is no confirmation...you win, no matter what!

So you think you can infer "X knows Y" from "X does Z"?

Not any more than you can infer that I believe what I'm arguing from the fact that I'm arguing toward it (ask Fliption, Royce, Zantra, or any of the older PF veterans...advocatus diaboli).

 

[honestrosewater]

Perhaps "stalemate" isn't a good analogy. Think instead of when all the other players give up. That happens in chess, and in most other types of game. So, for all to end up agreeing would be like a "forfeit" on the part of all the other players.

You move, I counter your move, you forfeit, I forfeit. If a forfeit counts as a move, my last move was not countered. If a forfeit doesn't count as a move, my first move was not countered. I swear I didn't intend to make such a big deal about this, but it's just not going away.

First off, it is well known (held by Wittgenstein himself, as a matter of fact) that his (Wittgenstein's) language-game framework doesn't allow for a "first truth"...in order to understand one thing, you must understand many things. But there is nothing logically wrong with this. Thus, in order to understand how one word is used, you must understand many other words. This is never a problem in board games. For example, no one wonders whether the rule book is a piece in the game. Also, if someone were to tell you "this is the king, and it moves only one space, but in any direction (provided it's not walking into "check"). Well, you have to understand what "check" is, and you have to understand that when I hold up the king and say "this is the king", I'm naming it (not, for example, demonstrating a legal move). And when I say that it can only move "one space", you must understand what counts for a space (it could mean, as it does in certain other games, "from the space it's on, to a space of the same color").

My problem isn't with the rules or strucutre of language-games, it's with the players' knowledge about each other. I'll try a different way below.

As to only public statements being true; so? A chess move is only legal if played on a board. Granted, you can play chess by yourself, but in that case, no matter what happens, you win (as my little sister puts it). So, as to finding truth, you could do what you think another player would do -- were he to participate in you language-game, instead of leaving you to play on your own -- but there is no confirmation...you win, no matter what!

But if someone wins, someone else loses. You are playing both roles: winner and loser. Have you never argued with yourself about something? Solved a problem by yourself after having failed at least once?

Not any more than you can infer that I believe what I'm arguing from the fact that I'm arguing toward it (ask Fliption, Royce, Zantra, or any of the older PF veterans...advocatus diaboli).

I don't have to infer anything. I find some fools to play with, make the claim, "Mentat believes what he is arguing", and, if no one counters my claim, the claim is true. BTW, I'm not going to make this claim in a game with you. I don't have to- others can decide your beliefs for you.

 

[Mentat]

You move, I counter your move, you forfeit, I forfeit. If a forfeit counts as a move, my last move was not countered. If a forfeit doesn't count as a move, my first move was not countered. I swear I didn't intend to make such a big deal about this, but it's just not going away.

A forfeit is (by every definition I've ever heard/read) something one does that ends the game without their having been a "final move" (in the sense that there could be no move made after the "final move").

In debate, there really aren't any final moves, merely moves that persuade the other person to forfeit. However, the game is no less real, and the proposition that was not forfeited is the "winner".

I don't mind your pursuing the point, I just don't see how analyzing only the language-game of debate is going to facillitate understanding of language-games in general.

But if someone wins, someone else loses. You are playing both roles: winner and loser. Have you never argued with yourself about something? Solved a problem by yourself after having failed at least once?

Sure, but I could never have done so if I'd not first played (or at least seen examples of other playing) competitively (against someone else).

So, as to the establishing of something as "true" (i.e. the winning of debate about what is "true"): I have indeed argued with myself (played the "debate" language-game with myself) and decided on the winner of my own accord, but the game itself is of a clearly multi-player nature. I would thus not be able to play it if I had not first seen it played by others; aside from which, my conclusion (victory, forfeiture) will mean nothing unless I can duplicate the result in an actual game (versus someone else).

I don't have to infer anything. I find some fools to play with, make the claim, "Mentat believes what he is arguing", and, if no one counters my claim, the claim is true.

But the fact that it is about me would give me extra weight in the argument. However, if belief (the holding of an idea or proposition strongly) could be observed as (for example) a neural event (as William Calvin may have already discovered, with his "basins of attraction" in the selectionist "game" of synchronously-firing neurons), then even I could lose the debate, and truth would be established by the one that made the best move (and by the forfeiture of all other propositions).

I find it interesting that you are debating with me now, but don't realize that you are hoping to establish truth by the very means that you contend is not sufficient for establishing truth. I guess you probably just want to win this game, but don't think that it has anything to do with actual truth. If that is the case, then I ask you: what more will it require (your proposition) to become current "truth" (or "truth 'till proven otherwise")?

BTW, I'm not going to make this claim in a game with you. I don't have to- others can decide your beliefs for you.

Did you mean "others cannot decide your beliefs for you"?

 

[Mentat]

One point I don't think I made perfectly clear was that the end of a particular debate does not establish universal truth, but that's not for the reason you might think. I'm just holding a more relativist concept of truth, which is what we typically hold anyway (unless we're philosophers, in which case we run into ugly and completely unnecessary dead-ends, trying to define universal truth, and then trying to prove that our definition is universally true...). So, to find "truth" isn't really the point of the language-game. The point is simply to win the language-game.

IOW, I'm not suggesting debate as an alternative way to find universal, absolute truth. I'm suggesting the abandoning of the concept that philosophy can ever discover such a thing, abandoning the search for the geisestwissenschaft for which philosophers have been searching since Kant (or, perhaps since Descartes...after all, he was looking for that which could not be doubted in order to establish a basis for the rigorous understanding of every other phenomenon). In it's place should (I think) stand something more like the Sophist use of debate to establish "current truth".

This is not a revolutionary or off-the-top-of-my-head idea. It's actually a paraphrasing of an aspect of Richard Rorty's philosophy. His philosophy is, in turn, based on the language-games of Wittgenstein, the historic look at epistemology (in the way of Heidegger and Dewey), and the eliminativist approaches of Sellars and Quine.

Just consider the possibility that, in light of the relativistic nature of almost every other area of inquiry (or, at least, of every scientific area of inquiry), we may have taken a bad turn (or a series thereof) in the past that have lead us to the (wrong) idea that philosophy can (or should) establish absolute truths from which all else can be deduced and by which all else can be tested. Maybe philosophy is supposed to be what it was before Plato and Aristotle introduced the concept of incorrigibility by virtue of impression from nature. Maybe it's just supposed to be something very akin to common sense: just another language-game that happens to have a very broad subject matter.

 

[honestrosewater]

I don't mind your pursuing the point, I just don't see how analyzing only the language-game of debate is going to facillitate understanding of language-games in general.

Well, I was especially interested in the debate game.

Sure, but I could never have done so if I'd not first played (or at least seen examples of other playing) competitively (against someone else).

How did the first language-games come about then?

So, as to the establishing of something as "true" (i.e. the winning of debate about what is "true"): I have indeed argued with myself (played the "debate" language-game with myself) and decided on the winner of my own accord,

Don't the rules decide the winner? I mean, I can see how the players and rules are interdependent. But it is still the rules which decide on the winner, yes?

but the game itself is of a clearly multi-player nature. I would thus not be able to play it if I had not first seen it played by others;

I have never heard anyone else talking to themselves internally, yet I am able to do so. I don't happen to remember, but it's certainly possible that I started talking to myself before anyone had told me it was possible or exlained how to do so. I think it's also possible that a person could invent a debate game on their own, without prior knowledge of debate games or help from another person.

aside from which, my conclusion (victory, forfeiture) will mean nothing unless I can duplicate the result in an actual game (versus someone else).

If you are playing by the same rules, what's the difference? One person can't genuinely challenge themselves? That may actually be a good point- I'll have to think about it. In games of stategy, like chess, if you actually play with a strategy or plan, that does present a problem. Perhaps it can be solved by choosing one player's moves randomly by, say, flipping a coin or rolling a die? In games of chance, I see no problem. The debate game isn't so easy to analyze, especially since I don't know the rules.

There is still a problem with relying on other people, if you have access to knowledge or evidence which is inaccessible to others.

But the fact that it is about me would give me extra weight in the argument. However, if belief (the holding of an idea or proposition strongly) could be observed as (for example) a neural event (as William Calvin may have already discovered, with his "basins of attraction" in the selectionist "game" of synchronously-firing neurons), then even I could lose the debate, and truth would be established by the one that made the best move (and by the forfeiture of all other propositions).

Depending on the outcome of the argument over whether or not William Calvin has actually discovered what he claims to have discovered.

I find it interesting that you are debating with me now, but don't realize that you are hoping to establish truth by the very means that you contend is not sufficient for establishing truth. I guess you probably just want to win this game, but don't think that it has anything to do with actual truth.

I don't hope to establish truth solely by debating with you, though it is fun and helpful. I hope to establish truth (or at least get closer to some truth) by following some set of rules. And the truth I establish, if any, is still only true relative to some set of rules. I'm not hoping to establish any absolute truths.

If that is the case, then I ask you: what more will it require (your proposition) to become current "truth" (or "truth 'till proven otherwise")?

I'm not sure I understand what you mean. I don't have a problem with the debate game or any other game per se, since wins and loses are relative. I have a problem with your suggestion that the debate game should replace other "games" like logic, science, and introspection. If that wasn't what you were suggesting, sorry. My main problem with the debate game is its inconsistent results: According to the same rules, Socrates is a man and is not a man. Earth was at one time the center of the universe, but it isn't anymore. I can't know whether or not I am thinking about the color green unless I can successfully defend that claim in a debate game. ??
That last example brings me to my second problem: I'm not convinced that all knowledge and evidence is universally accessible. IOW, there may be an impassable epistemic gap.

Did you mean "others cannot decide your beliefs for you"?

No, I meant others can decide your beliefs for you, for that is what your debate game seems to imply.

IOW, I'm not suggesting debate as an alternative way to find universal, absolute truth. I'm suggesting the abandoning of the concept that philosophy can ever discover such a thing, abandoning the search for the geisestwissenschaft for which philosophers have been searching since Kant (or, perhaps since Descartes...after all, he was looking for that which could not be doubted in order to establish a basis for the rigorous understanding of every other phenomenon). In it's place should (I think) stand something more like the Sophist use of debate to establish "current truth".

This is not a revolutionary or off-the-top-of-my-head idea. It's actually a paraphrasing of an aspect of Richard Rorty's philosophy. His philosophy is, in turn, based on the language-games of Wittgenstein, the historic look at epistemology (in the way of Heidegger and Dewey), and the eliminativist approaches of Sellars and Quine.

Just consider the possibility that, in light of the relativistic nature of almost every other area of inquiry (or, at least, of every scientific area of inquiry), we may have taken a bad turn (or a series thereof) in the past that have lead us to the (wrong) idea that philosophy can (or should) establish absolute truths from which all else can be deduced and by which all else can be tested. Maybe philosophy is supposed to be what it was before Plato and Aristotle introduced the concept of incorrigibility by virtue of impression from nature. Maybe it's just supposed to be something very akin to common sense: just another language-game that happens to have a very broad subject matter.

Okay. I'm not looking for absolute truth. I'm looking for consistency and completeness.

 

[Doctordick]

A note to honestrosewater!

For those who are interested in what I have to say, I apologize for this delayed response but I have been busy with other things. For those who are not interested, there is certainly no requirement that you read anything I say!

If you would stop insulting people, I would like to discuss your solution.

I'm sorry, I don't mean to insult anyone. Nothing I said was intended to be an insult. My only purpose was to get them to stop and think for a moment. I simply can not believe they are serious about most of what they say. I am afraid the world is full of erroneous ideas that have been presumed true without any real thought. It also appears to be no one here with any real interest in thinking about any of it. Maybe you are an exception; it would be wonderful to find someone interested in thinking about some of the things I think about.

Since it would be very difficult for you follow me unless you understood where I was coming from, suppose we begin by looking carefully at some of my previous posts and see if you can understand why I posted them. In particular, I posted my view of the "scientific method" at

https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=429253#post429253

The response was minuscule. It appeared to me that no one saw the significance of the four simple steps. I will try and expand on the issue of understanding it here. A "Super Mentor" complained that he needed help and wanted to know how to perform the procedure on the question, "what is the color, smell, taste and feel of a tau neutrino?" With that question he made it quite clear that he, either had not read what I said; the four steps as a whole exceeded his attention span; or his real purpose was to avoid thinking about it at all. I found his remark both childish and insulting. I gave that reference here because, if you can't comprehend the essence of that simple presentation then we are pretty well wasting our time.

One of the most important points in that list is the fact that a correct analysis should include all possible answers to the question, a realization ignored by almost every supposed scientist. They generally think of one answer and then chase after it as if no other is possible. And, the second most important point occurs in step four where I point out the existence of meaningless questions. Now, anyone who spent even a moment thinking about the issue would comprehend that meaningless questions are the most prevalent of all and drop right through to step four without much thought. If the "Super Mentor" thought about it at all, he saw where his question had to lead: ergo, he either didn't think about it or thought I was so stupid as to believe it was a question worth considering. And, just as an aside, it wasn't a question; it was three ridiculous questions. I only mention that as it is another common error of pseudo thinkers. Asking multiple questions as if they are just clarification of a single question is a quick and dirty way to thoroughly muddy the waters.

If you want to answer a question, pose it well so that the issue is defined and then do your best to include all possible answers in your analysis. Now, we all know that failure is the most probable outcome of that first step; in most cases, we are lucky if we can think of one answer. Nonetheless, one should do their best and then recognize the real shortcoming in their reasoning and keep it in mind always. What we believe to be "truth" is, for the most part a super structure built on a foundation of inadequately defended "truths"; a fact ignored by most everybody. It seems to me that you of all people should be aware of that given your comment about the dog lovers:

My question about meaning... Say two people meet on a dog lovers discussion forum. After completely describing their dogs to each other, they realize their descriptions are identical: Big floppy ears, brown, furry coat, long, purple tongue, 42 teeth, and so on. So they decide to send pictures of their dogs to each other. Surprisingly, the pictures are not identical; one is a picture of a dog, the other is a picture of a lizard. Do the pictures provide evidence that the words they were using meant different things to each of them? Could their words ever have provided evidence that the words they were using meant different things to each of them?

I am sure that, as a child, you heard that question, "how do you know that someone else is seeing the same thing you see when you both call a color green?" As adults, we laugh at such things; but should we? How does one know that others see the world the same way they do? That's actually a pretty big assumption. Now I am not suggesting we argue the point (that would be a total waste of time); rather I argue that one should keep it in mind (it goes to the issue of "all possible answers").

More on the irrationality of some of the posts here and why that irrationality should be obvious to all. Let us examine the general confusion enhanced by the division of philosophy into "ontology" and "epistemology". By dictionary definition, ontology is "a division of metaphysics dealing with the nature of being or reality". That's what's real and what isn't guys! And it should be clear to all that there is no way to answer that question without defining "real": i.e., the essence of ontology is to define reality! So they should define what they mean and then we can talk about it; so long as they don't, it's pretty evident they don't know what they are talking about.

Epistemology is defined to be "the study or theory of the origins, nature, methods and limits of knowledge". Again, without a definition of "knowledge", there is nothing much here to talk about either. Clearly, if we are to be rational, we must accept that we "know" nothing. Philosophers have come to call this "solipsism"; confidently pointing out that, if everything is illusion then nothing is real and the order we see in the universe cannot be defended. Ok, let's look at that rather facile conclusion which seems to be accepted by all.

Many of you are probably reading this off a monitor screen. From your understanding of the meaning of "real" is that image on the screen real or not? (I will presume you think it is real as none of you seem to want to join the "solipsist" camp.) Then ask yourself if your perception of that image is a direct perception or an illusion. If you believe in the modern analysis of what is going on, you should believe that image is sensed via excitations of rods and cones in the retina of your eyes. And that these excitations give rise to nerve impulses on the optic nerve which lead directly to the perception of that screen in your brain. Does anyone out there hold that they are consciously aware of what rods and cones are being excited or which nerve cells are firing? So, even under the common explanation of reality, no one can directly perceive any aspects of reality; everything we perceive is via an illusion created by our brains. Does it logically follow that nothing is real? Well of course not! We are all quite confident we are interacting with a real universe in spite of the fact that we "know" our mental picture of the universe is an illusion created by our brain!

So, what was wrong with the facile "solipsist" categorization above? It's very simple: complete failure to examine all possible answers to the question, "what is real?" Somehow we all have a well developed idea of what reality is and we all managed to figure it out on our own.

And the first thing to be done is exactly state what the problem is. Somehow every one of us has managed to create a workable explanation of a body of totally undefined information (reality) which has been transformed by a totally undefined process (our senses). As a fetus, you were certainly not cognizant of any definitions. It follows (as the night the day ) that the problem is a solvable problem! So why don't we just sit down and solve it: come up with a procedure for solving such a problem? Create an explanation of a body of totally undefined information transformed by a totally undefined process! If you cannot do that, how can you ever hope to understand the human mind?

A simple statement of a solvable problem which ought to be looked at; and what was Philocrat's brilliant response?

Grind the world to a hault. Stop everyone from having sex or reproducing in anyway possible, and see what happens. If the soul or mind or consciousness is so independent and unigue, let us all stop having sex and let us see if it can single-handedly reproduce itself without any intervention of matter! The fact that is apparent to me is this:

The LIFE-AND-DEATH CYCLE is a natural mechanism for 'NUMERICAL' preservation of the whole human race...

Where is this man's mind? Personally, I think the sole purpose of his post was to deflect interest from the question I pointed out! And I think he would agree with that!

Keep your solution to yourself for now. I have seen enought that invites me to wait until further notice.

And Iacchus32 too seems to spend very little time thinking about what he is saying.

I try to stick with those things that I do understand, and from there, extrapolate (through the process of reduction) anything which is universal or fundamental.

Right here he makes the express assertion that he understands something. Not only that, he also apparently thinks that it provides a starting place to deduce "anything which is universal or fundamental". He is going to deduce the rest; there is no opening here to allow for the possibility that his understanding is erroneous. Again, he is stepping off with a presumed answer without examination of the question or the range of possible answers. So Mentat then draws the conversation off into the issue of "certainty". I really don't want to insult anyone but, as a simple fact, this thread is truly on the intellectual level of a box of puppies. My comments are solely meant to encourage them to think a little.

Let me take what is essentially exactly the same starting place and show where a little thought leads me. To paraphrase Iacchus32: "of course I stick with those things that I think I understand, and from there, try and deduce what is universal or fundamental"; but first, I need to have some kind of explanation as to why I think I understand these things and from whence this knowledge came. It seems to me that "intuition" is as good a label as any to place on the process. Now I am not expressing any knowledge of how that process works (I merely label it) but I do know it is quite different from logical deduction. If you have any interest in understanding me on this issue, you should carefully think about a post I made last summer:

https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=222763#post222763

If you understand that post, you should absolutely understand that there is no conclusion out there on any subject which is not based on intuition. That's not a bad thing as there is every evidence that, however it comes into existence, decisions based on intuition are the most dependable which can be achieved. However, it must always be remembered that there can exist no proof that they are correct.

Ok, all this was to bring you back to that original problem posed back at the beginning of this post: "create an explanation of a body of totally undefined information transformed by a totally undefined process!" This is a finite mechanical problem which we all know is solvable (we have all solved it via intuition); so why is no one interested in solving it via logic? Most tell me that's because it can't be solved and I am a crackpot for thinking it can be.

What we have here is a communication problem. That's why I am approaching the issues so carefully. If you can understand this post and the references I give, I will proceed. If not, I will do my best to clarify anything you find confusing.

Okay. I'm not looking for absolute truth. I'm looking for consistency and completeness.

And so am I!

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Iacchus32]

And Iacchus32 too seems to spend very little time thinking about what he is saying.

I try to stick with those things that I do understand, and from there, extrapolate (through the process of reduction) anything which is universal or fundamental.

Right here he makes the express assertion that he understands something. Not only that, he also apparently thinks that it provides a starting place to deduce "anything which is universal or fundamental". He is going to deduce the rest; there is no opening here to allow for the possibility that his understanding is erroneous. Again, he is stepping off with a presumed answer without examination of the question or the range of possible answers. So Mentat then draws the conversation off into the issue of "certainty". I really don't want to insult anyone but, as a simple fact, this thread is truly on the intellectual level of a box of puppies. My comments are solely meant to encourage them to think a little.

And which thread are you referring to here by the way? While I noticed you didn't bother to post the follow-up replies ...

So, to return to the question of Certainty, how can you be "certain" that one's reductions of processes will yeild any greater "certainty" about the phenomenon in question?

What phenomenon is that? Any phenomenon? What if it was a phenomenon you understood intimately, and yet others didn't, and your reason for developing your theories was as a means to try and explain it to others? Would reductionism be helpful here? After all, I'm just trying to make sense out of something. Certainty can only exist with intimate knowledge of something by the way. For example when I say, "I know that I don't know." That is intimate knowledge. So in that sense you know it's at least possible to know something of a certainty which, is the beginning of knowing. This is also the Socratic method I'm referring to here I believe.

If anyone would like to know, the posts Doctordick is referring to here are on the What is Certainty? thread. And please note, I'm not the one who claims to fully understand what reductionist theory is. Mentat is the one who brought it up and I was merely asking for clarification on the matter.

So my advice to you, Doctordick, would be try and keep things in context, unless of course you're really not "serious."

 

[Iacchus32]

One point I don't think I made perfectly clear was that the end of a particular debate does not establish universal truth, but that's not for the reason you might think. I'm just holding a more relativist concept of truth, which is what we typically hold anyway (unless we're philosophers, in which case we run into ugly and completely unnecessary dead-ends, trying to define universal truth, and then trying to prove that our definition is universally true...). So, to find "truth" isn't really the point of the language-game. The point is simply to win the language-game.

The universal truth is very easily defined, at least to where we can acknowledge that it exists.

 

[honestrosewater]

Any conceivable question can be answered via the following procedure:
1. List out all the possible answers! (Now this is the really difficult part as most of us are not bright enough to think of "all" of them. So, the scientists first error is to only work with a few possibilities. Well, that's life; perfection is hard to come by.)

2. For each answer, work out all the logical consequences of that answer being correct. (Now this step is a real bear too. Mainly because working out those consequences requires belief that we know the correct answers to other relevant questions. Oh well, life is tough all over; I guess the best they can do is presume they know the right answer to most questions and truck on. Creed and science seems to be getting mixed here doesn't it.)

3. Now we have "all possible answers" (that we can think of anyway) and the "consequences" relevant to each answer (presuming we know a lot already) and we can just look down those lists of consequences until we find a difference. When we find a difference, all we have to do is look at reality and see which consequence actually occurs. Low and behold, we have eliminated a possible answer (the consequences are not what happens)!

4. As we continue this process, we either eliminate a possible answer or something else happens: two or more answers yield exactly the same consequences. In that second case, it clearly makes no difference at all as to which answer is correct and, if it makes utterly no difference what the answer is, are you really asking a question worth answering?
...
If you want to answer a question, pose it well so that the issue is defined

How does your method handle
Q: Is "no" the answer to this question?
Step 0. By my standards, the question is well-defined. (But I'm not sure what your standards are.)
Step 1. "No" is a possible answer, and all other possible answers are not "no".
Step 2. If the answer to the question is "no", then the answer to the question is not "no". If the answer to the question is not "no", then the answer to the question is "no".
Step 3. There are two different consequences: 1) the answer to the question is "no" and 2) the answer to the question is not "no". I am not sure about the next part: "When we find a difference, all we have to do is look at reality and see which consequence actually occurs." I'll go out on a limb ( ) and say that both consequences occur; Neither can be eliminated.
Step 4. So am I really asking a question worth answering?
Of course, if I had said, in step 3, that neither consequence occurs, step 4 would have yielded the same result (which is actually a question ).
Did I do that correctly? What is your answer to the question in step 4?

Let us examine the general confusion enhanced by the division of philosophy into "ontology" and "epistemology". By dictionary definition, ontology is "a division of metaphysics dealing with the nature of being or reality". That's what's real and what isn't guys! And it should be clear to all that there is no way to answer that question without defining "real": i.e., the essence of ontology is to define reality! So they should define what they mean and then we can talk about it; so long as they don't, it's pretty evident they don't know what they are talking about.

Epistemology is defined to be "the study or theory of the origins, nature, methods and limits of knowledge". Again, without a definition of "knowledge", there is nothing much here to talk about either. Clearly, if we are to be rational, we must accept that we "know" nothing.

I thought you said you were only looking for consistency and completeness. It sounds like you want an absolute (read: nonrelative) definition of something. BTW, did you consider all the possible answers to the questions of what ontology and epistemology are the study of? I'm sure most philosophers will find faults with the dictionary definitions.

Ok, all this was to bring you back to that original problem posed back at the beginning of this post: "create an explanation of a body of totally undefined information transformed by a totally undefined process!" This is a finite mechanical problem which we all know is solvable (we have all solved it via intuition); so why is no one interested in solving it via logic? Most tell me that's because it can't be solved and I am a crackpot for thinking it can be.

I'm not sure what "undefined" means here. Do you just mean undefined by humans?

What we have here is a communication problem. That's why I am approaching the issues so carefully. If you can understand this post and the references I give, I will proceed. If not, I will do my best to clarify anything you find confusing.

I have some problems, but they're probably minor, semantical stuff- IOW, they're not worth arguing about now, but I'll keep them in mind.

 

[Mentat]

How did the first language-games come about then?

In a social setting, of course.

Don't the rules decide the winner? I mean, I can see how the players and rules are interdependent. But it is still the rules which decide on the winner, yes?

Forgive me, but I don't really like the wording of that question. Do you mean that the rules presuppose certain conditions wherein one player could declared (and recognized by the other player(s) as) "winner"?

I have never heard anyone else talking to themselves internally, yet I am able to do so. I don't happen to remember, but it's certainly possible that I started talking to myself before anyone had told me it was possible or exlained how to do so. I think it's also possible that a person could invent a debate game on their own, without prior knowledge of debate games or help from another person.

The very concept of debate is a social one. Surely humans have a pre-disposition for language-games, but that would come to nothing if they'd never had someone show them how to play.

Think of this: Could you have ever even spoken if you'd not been taught the letters, their sounds, the formation of sentences, and the like? Even the teaching of those bare syntactic essentials is done by language-games. For example, the language-game of pointing to a picture of a letter, and then making a sound (e.g. pointing to an "A" and making the complementary sound). It has rules (e.g. one must understand that the letters are "pieces" in the game, and that the sound you make is both a name of the piece and an indication of (at least one of) its possible "moves"), and it is not the only language-game (which is why I don't just refer to it as "learning language"), but it is a rather essential one, if you are ever to play any of the other language-games.

If you are playing by the same rules, what's the difference? One person can't genuinely challenge themselves? That may actually be a good point- I'll have to think about it.

Cute. Seriously, though, you must be able to see (by now) that the games themselves evolved as a multi-player games (evolved for social situations). Playing them on your own is like pretending that there are two people involved, which is just further indication that the game is intended for two people.

In games of stategy, like chess, if you actually play with a strategy or plan, that does present a problem. Perhaps it can be solved by choosing one player's moves randomly by, say, flipping a coin or rolling a die?

But that is not a part of the actual game of chess. I can conceive of someone independently inventing a game exactly like chess, but that was intended to be played alone, and thus requires a die or a coin or some other such way of deciding how the opposing army should behave.

In games of chance, I see no problem. The debate game isn't so easy to analyze, especially since I don't know the rules.

Some games of chance are designed to be played alone...I don't see the relevance.

As to the "debate game", well it's clearly multi-player in origin and nature, but one can do their best to play both sides, so to speak. That doesn't change the nature or origin of the game.

There is still a problem with relying on other people, if you have access to knowledge or evidence which is inaccessible to others.

Do I have access to such knowledge or evidence? If I do, how do you know I do, since it is inaccesible to others?

Besides, is it really so strange a concept that someone win a game because they knew a particular trick/strategy/rule of which the other is unaware? I, myself, have won more than one game of chess against a player who was unaware that pawn-en-passant was a legal move.

As to, specifically the language-game of debate, and the winning thereof by having greater knowledge or a greater amount of evidence on your side...well, how do you know that that's not part of the game? What if it is expected that one win by virtue of having greater knowledge?

Depending on the outcome of the argument over whether or not William Calvin has actually discovered what he claims to have discovered.

Sure. As I've said before, it is an obvious result of the Wittgensteinian framework (from which I get the idea for Sprachspiel ("language-game")) that, in order for one to learn something new, s/he must first know many other (requisite) things.

I don't hope to establish truth solely by debating with you, though it is fun and helpful. I hope to establish truth (or at least get closer to some truth) by following some set of rules. And the truth I establish, if any, is still only true relative to some set of rules. I'm not hoping to establish any absolute truths.

Is that a fact?

Seriously, though, I understand that; it's part of my point. We, in (safe to say) any endeavor other than pure "philosophy" (post-Kantian, theory-of-knowledge, accurate-representation philosophy, that is) don't worry about absolute truth, or the "actual" accuracy of a statement, etc. We just worry about playing the game at hand.

I'm not sure I understand what you mean. I don't have a problem with the debate game or any other game per se, since wins and loses are relative. I have a problem with your suggestion that the debate game should replace other "games" like logic, science, and introspection. If that wasn't what you were suggesting, sorry.

Well, I certainly don't want it to replace logic or science. Nor introspection, for that matter. All I'm really saying is that the concept of "philosophical problems" (viz, the "hard problem of consciousness" vs. the "easy problem") could be dissolved if we'd just stop trying to "polish our internal mirrors of nature" (so to speak), and start speaking in much more relative terms ("current truth" etc). If we'd stop trying to "ground" the accuracy of a statement in something absolute (which is what we've been trying to by introspection since Descartes), then (I think) philosophy would find a much more comfortable place for itself, sans "intractable problems".

Science and logic aren't really language-games. They're games, but not entirely based on linguistics. Philosophy of mind, OTOH, so often falls back on the pure semantics of the thing that it's not hard to imagine it being nothing more than those "pure semantics".

My main problem with the debate game is its inconsistent results: According to the same rules, Socrates is a man and is not a man. Earth was at one time the center of the universe, but it isn't anymore.

I don't know about that first one, but the second example is actually a very good one. For a while, the Earth was considered the center of the Universe. It still is, in some theories (doesn't the idea of a Big Bang that occurred everywhere at once indicate an expansion that's still occurring "everywhere at once", in which case any point in the Universe could be intelligently spoken of as "the center"). Thomas Kuhn explained the paradigm-shifts that take us (as a society) away from one method of explanation and toward another, but they are nothing more than that: methods of explaining phenomena.

I can't know whether or not I am thinking about the color green unless I can successfully defend that claim in a debate game. ??

A commonly accepted rule is that you know more about what you are thinking than anyone else. However, if neurology or neurophysiology develop to the point where one can directly read your cortical patterns, you may lose a bit of that privileged status.

That last example brings me to my second problem: I'm not convinced that all knowledge and evidence is universally accessible. IOW, there may be an impassable epistemic gap.

And yet, this assumption is (almost surely) based on the idea that there are some things about which you are completely incorrigible (your own thoughts, for example), and others about which you are somewhat more doubtful, right?

No, I meant others can decide your beliefs for you, for that is what your debate game seems to imply.

Not really. Belief is a disposition to strongly hold a certain side. In any game that has any competitive aspect of any kind, one must choose a side. Therefore, "belief" is pre-game

Okay. I'm not looking for absolute truth. I'm looking for consistency and completeness.

In whose reference frame?

 

[Mentat]

The universal truth is very easily defined, at least to where we can acknowledge that it exists.

Why would you say that?

 

[Iacchus32]

Why would you say that?

A Universal reference to all things? Well, it all originates from the same place. Therefore the whole of the Universe, and every single last detail therein, must remain consistent with that. I don't see how it can be any less absolute than that, do you?