An argument that moral relativism is wrong.

[Tigers2B1]

An argument that moral relativism is "wrong." :)

I understand that it may be fashionable to call yourself a 'relativist' now-a-days but, before you take that idea as your own, maybe you will test the waters a bit. I, for one, just don’t see the "blank slate" morality approach as being a real possibility. I doubt, that as social animals we are born without certain "moral" attitudes toward one another. For example, the ‘reaction’ we call "empathy." The feeling of "shame." What purpose do these feelings serve? IMO, these are genetic reactions that preserve our social bonds with other individuals. By preserving our social bonds our individual genes gain that much of an advantage. ‘Group behavior’ can be seen working its advantage in many species in nature. Not saying there isn’t a ‘tug and pull’ between self-interest and group-interest. There is. Walking that line is what it is all about when living in a group as a social animal. Solitary animals can act with reckless self-interest. Social animals cannot. So - If we accept that familial "love" (familial bonds) is a genetic mechanism that protects our genetic legacy than why would it be different on a bigger scale when considering social bonds? If determining the limits of self-interested behavior is described, in part, by our genetic inheritance than why isn’t this the basis for a "morality."

Here is an example I read somewhere – sorry I forget where – but think it was in Steven Pinker’s book The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature. ---- It went something like this:

We have a flock of birds infested with ticks. No bird can pull the ticks off their own backs but the two birds, working together, can remove all of the ticks off of each other. Assume there is no advantage to either bird other than this. The disadvantage to each bird is the energy expended in pulling off the ticks of the other bird. Energy that will have to be replaced. Birds take turns pulling off ticks. Now if ‘Bird 1’ expends the energy to pull ticks off ‘Bird 2’ but ‘Bird 2’ does not reciprocate – it seems that ‘Bird 2’ is ahead of the game. All of ‘Bird 2’s’ ticks are gone without expending energy. Having no advantage ‘Bird 1’ will not pull ticks from ‘Bird 2’s’ back again. Others who witnessed this ‘injustice’ will recall ‘Bird 2’s’ behavior when their turn comes since it is in their self-interest to do so. Now, if this behavior is repeated too many times by ‘Bird 2’ – he will die due to tick infestation. So – if with a calculating, cunning ‘Bird 2,’ a bird who wants to cheat, he had still better either be secretive or selective when doing so – or his calculating, cunning genes will stop with his tick infested death. Cooperating genes live for another day.

And here is a very interesting scenario relating to moral choices which comes from Discover Magazine - This relates to the question what are the origins of 'moral choices.’

http://www.discover.com/issues/apr-04/features/whose-life-would-you-save/

Dinner with a philosopher is never just dinner, even when it’s at an obscure Indian restaurant on a quiet side street in Princeton with a 30-year-old postdoctoral researcher. Joshua Greene is a man who spends his days thinking about right and wrong and how we separate the two. He has a particular fondness for moral paradoxes, which he collects the way some people collect snow globes.

“Let’s say you’re walking by a pond and there’s a drowning baby, ” Greene says, over chicken tikka masala. “If you said, ‘I’ve just paid $200 for these shoes and the water would ruin them, so I won’t save the baby,’ you’d be an awful, horrible person. But there are millions of children around the world in the same situation, where just a little money for medicine or food could save their lives. And yet we don’t consider ourselves monsters for having this dinner rather than giving the money to Oxfam. Why is that?”

"The evolutionary origins of morality are easy to imagine in a social species. A sense of fairness would have helped early primates cooperate. A sense of disgust and anger at cheaters would have helped them avoid falling into squabbling. As our ancestors became more self-aware and acquired language, they would transform those feelings into moral codes that they then taught their children.

This idea made a lot of sense to Green. For one thing, it showed how moral judgments can feel so real. "We make moral judgments so automatically tat we really don't understand how they're formed," he says. It also offered a potential solution to the trolley problem: Although the two scenarios have similar outcomes, they trigger different circuits in the brain. Killing someone with your bare hands would most likely have been recognized as immoral millions of years ago. It summons ancient and overwhelmingly negative emotions--despite any good that may come of the killing. It simply feels wrong.

Throwing a switch for a trolley, on the other hand, is not the sort of thing our ancestors confronted. Cause and effect, in this case, are separated by a chain of machines and electrons, so they do not trigger a snap moral judgment. Instead, we rely more on abstract reasoning--weighing costs and benefits, for example--to choose between right and wrong. Or so Green hypothesized."

NOW with that in hand ------ back to our human brothers and sisters. – Taking the ‘bird example,’ our reaction to other people in ‘moral situations’ depends on this same sort of genetic ‘give and take.’ A ‘give and take’ response encoded in our genes that the ‘large majority’ of us have inherited. Yet, you say, we certainly behave differently around different people. One set of responses for our child, another for our friends, and yet another for total strangers. Why? it appears that it would generally be in our interest to help those around us who we know. In our interest to be distrustful of those who are not members of our clan. Genetically, it is probably not in our interest to help a member from another tribe that has come into our territory. In fact, where the evolution of our genetic response is concerned, it is probably in our genetic interest to encourage their absence since we will have to compete for available resources with those folks.

MAYBE, this might translate into modern cultures as a ‘Is this person living in a small town or in a large city?’ question. Taking the example given to us by Discover Magazine – (see the quote above) – and extend it out a bit. Not to just the visceral reaction to killing up close and personal ---- but also to whether we have a personal relationship with the person or we don't. That is, do I know this person AND do others know me? Will others in my ‘social group’ / clan recognize my behavior has good for the group or totally selfish? It is one thing to be a habitual traitor in a small town, and hide that fact, and quite another to blend in with that behavior in a large city. I think that our genes just might be selected for this sort of automatic behavior. They 'think' for us --- always calculating the best chances to past itself to the next generation. As such we remain 'morally loyal' to our social group but not to others. Big, artificial social groups like cities make some of us act in ways that we would not act if we had to be socially accountable. That would make a difference but it would still be a difference with instinctual / social roots IMO.

 

[Dissident Dan]

Why are you equating moral relativism and the "blank slate" idea?

 

[Tigers2B1]

I’m not equating the two. I’m saying that as human social animals we are not born "blank slates' but with a genetic framework that predisposes certain behaviors and feelings. That we are genetically social animals and that genetics are the origins of morals and as such are not relative.

 

[selfAdjoint]

I don't think genetics prescribes our morals. For example killing humans has been common throughout our record (and killing chimps is a feature of the life of our cousins the chimps), yet morals everywhere say thou shalt not kill (except as specified).

 

[Tigers2B1]

I don't think genetics prescribes our morals. For example killing humans has been common throughout our record (and killing chimps is a feature of the life of our cousins the chimps), yet morals everywhere say thou shalt not kill (except as specified).

First, I’m not arguing for an absolute morality here ----- I’m arguing against Relativism. I’m arguing for a genetic framework that pre-describes how we see right and wrong in the world.

But more to your point ----- the act of killing and the social reaction to that killing can be radically different. So social 'right' and 'wrong' may not be described by the actions of an individual. Social groups certainly don't tolerate random murderers in their number nor do they allow for other indiscriminate self-interested acts that break down the social group and it's protections. In addition, the group might favor certain killing – when it favors that group -- for example the killing of a member of another clan, a competitor for the available food and warm places.

Also, there is always a 'give and take' between the immediate self-interest and the long-term social interest when your genes are deciding what course of action helps insures their (genes) continued existence. In simple terms, those genes that predispose the "wrong" behavior in the individual typically don’t get to do that again in the next generation. And to make it even more complicated, if a person can act in a selfish way without repercussions, than he or she may be genetically inclined to do that --- since this creates a survival advantage for the individual. Much like being the bird who is always gets the ticks picked off his back but never has to expend the energy to pick the ticks off the backs of others. (see my first post) Certainly, when the genetic balance favors murder - than that will be the favored behavior.
So - then the question becomes, if we’re not predisposed to a social morality, what is the organizing / directing mechanism that causes us to experience empathy or shame? That these ‘feelings’ are in our genetic self-interest – that these ‘attitudes’ support the social group and therefore the individual within that protecting, providing group, is the point I want to make.

Here is an excerpt from E.O. Wilson’s Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge regarding human universals. That is, human behaviors found in all cultures – no matter how otherwise diverse or distant. The question becomes --- why do we have these similarities?

Included in this quote is Wilson’s take– The link goes to the quote on the Net.

http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/bookauth/eow3.htm

In a classic 1945 compendium, the American anthropologist George P. Murdock listed the universals of culture, which he defined as the social behaviors and institutions recorded in the Human Relations Area file for every one of the hundreds of societies studied to that time. There are sixty-seven universals in the list: age-grading, athletic sports, bodily adornment, calendar, cleanliness training, community organization, cooking, cooperative labor, cosmology, courtship, dancing, decorative art, divination, division of labor, dream interpretation, education, eschatology, ethics, ethnobotany, etiquette, faith healing, family feasting, fire making, folklore, food taboos, funeral rites, games, gestures, gift giving, government, greetings, hair styles, hospitality, housing, hygiene, incest taboos, inheritance rules, joking, kin groups, kinship nomenclature, language, law, luck superstitions, magic, marriage, mealtimes, medicine, obstetrics, penal sanctions, personal names, population policy, postnatal care, pregnancy usages, property rights, propitiation of supernatural beings, puberty customs, religious ritual, residence rules, sexual restrictions, soul concepts, status differentiation, surgery, tool making, trade, visiting, weaving, and weather control.

It is tempting to dismiss these traits as not truly diagnostic for human beings, not really genetic, but inevitable in the evolution of any species that attains complex societies based on high intelligence and complex language, regardless of their hereditary predispositions. But that interpretation is easily refuted. Imagine a termite species that evolved a civilization from the social level of a living species. Take for the purpose the mound-building termites Macrotermes bellicosus of Africa, whose citylike nests beneath the soil each contain millions of inhabitants. Elevate the basic qualities of their social organization in their present-day insection condition to a culture that is guided, as in human culture, by hereditary-based epigenetic rules. The "termite nature" at the foundation of this hexapod civilization would include celibacy and nonreproduction by the workers, the exchange of symbiotic bacteria by the eating of one another's feces, the use of chemical secretions (pheromones) to communicate, and the routine cannibalism of shed skins and dead or injured family members. I have composed the following state-of-the-colony speech for a termite leader to deliver to the multitude, in her attempt to reinforce the supertermite ethical code:

Ever since our ancestors, the macrotermitine termites, achieved ten-kilogram weight and larger brains during their rapid evolution through the late Tertiary Period, and learned to write with pheromonal script, termitic scholarship has elevated and refined ethical philosophy. It is now possible to express the imperatives of moral behavior with precision. These imperatives are self-evident and universal. They are the very essence of termitity. They include the love of darkness and of the deep, saprophytic, basidiomycetic penetralia of the soil; the centrality of colony life amidst the richness of war and trade with other colonies, the sanctity of the physiological caste system; and the evil of personal rights (the colony is ALL!); our deep love for the royal siblings allowed to reproduce; the joy of chemical song; the aesthetic pleasure and deep social satisfaction of eating feces from nestmates' anuses after the shedding of our skins; and the ecstasy of cannibalism and surrender of our own bodies when we are sick or injured (it is more blessed to be eaten than to eat).

 

[russ_watters]

Good (important) topic. I'll be back when I have more time...

 

[Nicomachus]

Well I didn't have time to read all of this but nevertheless obviously contextualism is true. You cannot make moral decisions based on action categories, such as killing and so forth. Killing is not morally wrong, it is an action category. And yes, Tigers2B1, I don't fnid moral relativism very interesting either.
*Nico

 

[selfAdjoint]

I want to be very careful here. I am a believer that selection operates ONLY on individuals. That is, I deny group selection unless and until someone can persuade me that it is rigorously well defined.

So for example we have people who will do random killing - sociopaths - born into every generation. And it's not clear to me that selection prevents them from breeding. And yes, I also believe that a propensity for sociopathism, at least, is genetically determined.

We also have anecdotal evidence that it useful to have sociopaths around when it comes to licit killing, for example warfare. So it is at least possible that the rate of sociopath birth is an Evolutioanary Stable Strategy (ESS). Which kind of throws evo-morals out the window.

 

[Nicomachus]

Evo-morals? hah. Poppycock.
*Nico

 

[loseyourname]

I want to be very careful here. I am a believer that selection operates ONLY on individuals. That is, I deny group selection unless and until someone can persuade me that it is rigorously well defined.

Rigorously, I don't know, but it is becoming fairly well-defined.

So for example we have people who will do random killing - sociopaths - born into every generation. And it's not clear to me that selection prevents them from breeding. And yes, I also believe that a propensity for sociopathism, at least, is genetically determined.

Do you not think that the average woman would be less likely to mate with a sociopath, if she indeed knew of his sickness and was not sick herself?

Now, it may be difficult to imagine this being much of a factor now. But remember, this isn't a trait that evolved recently. It evolved very early in the history of mankind, when men still roamed in very small bands. A member of that small band who behaved unfairly toward or even killed other members of his band would almost certainly be dealt with and not allowed to breed. On the other hand, men who were unfair or murderous toward other groups, at the profit of their own group, would have benifited in kind.

We also have anecdotal evidence that it useful to have sociopaths around when it comes to licit killing, for example warfare. So it is at least possible that the rate of sociopath birth is an Evolutioanary Stable Strategy (ESS). Which kind of throws evo-morals out the window.

As far I know, the hypothesis being thrown out here is that men have evolved a certain group mentality. There is the in-group (family, tribe, country, race, etc.) and the out-group (everyone else). The idea is that we have developed a sense of fairness in dealing with our in-group while pitting ourselves against anyone who is not part of that group. This is used to explain the galling inconsistencies in, say, biblical morality. On the one hand, the Jews are told "thou shalt not kill." On the other, they are told to commit genocide on the native inhabitants of the land of Canaan. This is thought to be a result of their inborn tendency to behave morally toward members of their own in-group while attempting to destroy all other groups.

This is a very hopeful hypothesis in that there are indications that the idea of an in-group has grown over time to encompass a greater number of people. When men first emerged from the ranks of older primates, the only in-group was one's own tribe. That eventually grew to include larger and larger tribes (eventually ethnicities and ethnic nations). In time again this grew to include ideological groups, such as nations that are not based on ethnicity. While the moral behavior toward one's in-group is innate, the basis of that group is not. The hope is that as cultural barriers break down, men will eventually come to see themselves as primarily part of the entire human race, rather than some smaller group, and this hypothetical genetic imperative to behave morally toward one's in-group will produce a more peaceful and ethical world.

Obviously, the hypothesis needs some work, but if it's true, it could mean great things.

 

[Njorl]

First, I’m not arguing for an absolute morality here ----- I’m arguing against Relativism. I’m arguing for a genetic framework that pre-describes how we see right and wrong in the world.

Then you are just arguing absolute morality with a different basis - genetic rather than religious. I consider myself a relativist, but I always believed that our morals were significantly grounded in evolution. Any belief system is subject to the same evolutionary pressures as genes are - survival of the fittest. It does not mean that morals are genetically coded though. Languages face the same pressures. They live and die based on their effectiveness. Would you argue that languages are genetically encoded in us?

So, while I believe that the existence of the concept of morality might be genetic, and a few very basic aspects of morality might also be genetic, most of morality is defined by society. Since no two people see society in exactly the same way, no two people will have the same morality.

Njorl

 

[selfAdjoint]

Do you not think that the average woman would be less likely to mate with a sociopath, if she indeed knew of his sickness and was not sick herself?

Actually they do pretty well at mating. They are experts at fooling others.

 

[loseyourname]

Adjoint, you're still thinking in modern terms. I don't think anybody was covertly killing members of their own tribe for no good reason without retribution and then successfully mating 400,000 years ago when a trait like this would have evolved.

 

[loseyourname]

So, while I believe that the existence of the concept of morality might be genetic, and a few very basic aspects of morality might also be genetic, most of morality is defined by society. Since no two people see society in exactly the same way, no two people will have the same morality.

I don't know that morals differ as much as you think they do. People often cite the phenomenon of Eskimos killing off their old, but I would argue that every culture believes unjustified killing to be wrong. They simply disagree as to what constitutes proper justification. The fact that culture has badly clouded the basic underlying moral structure of a human being doesn't mean that that structure is invalid or even relative.

Either way, the existence of a disagreement very obviously does not rule out the possibility of one party being correct and the other being incorrect.

 

[Nicomachus]

As far I know, the hypothesis being thrown out here is that men have evolved a certain group mentality. There is the in-group (family, tribe, country, race, etc.) and the out-group (everyone else). The idea is that we have developed a sense of fairness in dealing with our in-group while pitting ourselves against anyone who is not part of that group. This is used to explain the galling inconsistencies in, say, biblical morality. On the one hand, the Jews are told "thou shalt not kill." On the other, they are told to commit genocide on the native inhabitants of the land of Canaan. This is thought to be a result of their inborn tendency to behave morally toward members of their own in-group while attempting to destroy all other groups.

Ah, I missed this before. Yes, the mentality you are referring to is probably the notions of "identity" and to a lesser extent "empathy." Although, I do not really accept the in-group/out-group dichotomy. I think it is more based on individualism and the previously mentioned notion of empathy, from a psychological standpoint; I do not accept the validity of the "community" concept. As far as the "Biblical" accounts you dicuss, those are not really about morality, the examples you could give will ultimately be about transcending morality. For example, when Abraham was going to sacrifice his child, obviously that was not moral but it was instance in which Morality was transcended. So I don't think the Biblical accounts would be good justification for an argument on morality of this sort. Though, I agree Jewish/Christian morality is absurd and it is the result of a slave mentality.
*Nico

--Edit-- I should expand, Jews are not told "Thou shalt not kill," they are told "Thou shalt not murder." It seems to be trivial but "killing" is an action category and is neither right nor wrong and murder is probably more relavently defined in contextualism. But genocide, nonetheless =)

 

[Nicomachus]

I don't know that morals differ as much as you think they do. People often cite the phenomenon of Eskimos killing off their old, but I would argue that every culture believes unjustified killing to be wrong. They simply disagree as to what constitutes proper justification. The fact that culture has badly clouded the basic underlying moral structure of a human being doesn't mean that that structure is invalid or even relative.

Well, you are essentially right because contextualism is true. Although, being an objectivist .. that is another story. However, as I said in the previous post "killing" is an action category and is neither right nor wrong and by using the phrase "unjustified killing" it seems you realize it is in context where value can be derived and not the action itself.
*Nico

 

[loseyourname]

Although, I do not really accept the in-group/out-group dichotomy. I think it is more based on individualism and the previously mentioned notion of empathy, from a psychological standpoint; I do not accept the validity of the "community" concept.

Is there any particular reason why you reject it? Pre-moral sentiments such as fairness and justice have been found in lesser primates, such as chimpanzees, as well, who behave by a certain code of conduct within their own social group that does not apply to other groups, with whom they will even go to war.

As far as the "Biblical" accounts you dicuss, those are not really about morality, the examples you could give will ultimately be about transcending morality. For example, when Abraham was going to sacrifice his child, obviously that was not moral but it was instance in which Morality was transcended. So I don't think the Biblical accounts would be good justification for an argument on morality of this sort.

I wasn't trying to make any comment on religion. I was only pointing out an example from ancient times of varying codes of conduct that depended on whether one was interacting with one's own group or with another. We see this in all ancient societies, most of which codified laws prohibiting the unjust treatment of fellow citizens, but which excluded all non-citizens from this application of justice.

--Edit-- I should expand, Jews are not told "Thou shalt not kill," they are told "Thou shalt not murder." It seems to be trivial but "killing" is an action category and is neither right nor wrong and murder is probably more relavently defined in contextualism. But genocide, nonetheless =)

True. I should have clarified that. Still, the point stands that their system of morality extended only to their fellow Jews. They were not allowed to murder their fellows, but they had no problem murdering Gentiles.

 

[loseyourname]

Well, you are essentially right because contextualism is true. Although, being an objectivist .. that is another story. However, as I said in the previous post "killing" is an action category and is neither right nor wrong and by using the phrase "unjustified killing" it seems you realize it is in context where value can be derived and not the action itself.
*Nico

Of course. Murder is what is considered to be wrong. I'm defining murder as unjustified killing.

 

[Nicomachus]

loseyourname, with respect to why I reject the "community" concept and the chimpanzees, I do accept "identity" which you could call the group I suppose, however I contend "community" is more imaginary than anything else. But "identity," I suppose would work equally well in this case, I haven't given it much thought at this point. I suppose the problem is that it is, instead of this "community" or group-concept, it is really the identity, however one chooses to construct one's identity. Though, in effect, I can accept your position for now.
*Nico

 

[loseyourname]

I'm not going to take any strong stance on this because, as I pointed out, much testing remains to be done of this hypothesis, and the hypothesis really isn't fully worked out to begin with. I'm just trying to present it in a way such that the posters here actually understand it, because there seem to be many misconceptions.

Remember what I said about the flexibility of the in-group notion. The only thing postulated to be hardwired into our genetic code is the sense of justice applied to those we identify as part of our in-group. What that in-group consists of is entirely dependent on circumstance, and it may very well only be oneself. The only qualm I have with your characterization is that you say this identity is the choice of the individual in question. I would argue that this identity is formed at a very young age and is mostly separate from that individual's consciousness. This isn't to say that willpower can have no effect, but to say that a person chooses his in-group is a gross oversimplification.

 

[Nicomachus]

When I say one chooses one's identity it may either be simple accident (in this context, a property) or by decision. The mechanism by which one obtains one's identity is irrelavent. However, of course I contend it is based on the individual as I do not believe in some kind of geist encompassing various entities.
*Nico

 

[loseyourname]

If that's how you define choice, but I think you'll be hardpressed to find anyone else that defines an accidental occurence as a chosen occurence. I'm not too sure why you don't believe that primates group into social structures, but hey, it's your belief. Perhaps it's only that you don't believe this structure has any bearing on what becomes of the individual?

 

[Nicomachus]

huh? What do you think an accident is? An accident is a property, in the common philosophical vernacular, which is all that matters to me. If you do not like the previous phrasing then I will say differently : "it is the identity, rather than the group-concept, regardless of how one's identity is constructed." As far as you implication that I do not think primates group into social structures, I think it is a reflection of misunderstanding. I do not accept "community" as a meaningful concept, with your previous mention of Mill I would have thought you would have understood why as opposed to the common misconceptions associated with such a rejection. But nevertheless you are kind of going in circles when I have already said that I, given only a cursory study of it, can accept your position for now, though differing only with respect to containers.
*Nico

 

[loseyourname]

Oh, I'm not arguing with you about anything at this point. You're just confusing me a bit. An accident seems to me to be the exact antithesis of a choice, and I've never heard anyone state otherwise, so you're throwing me off-guard a bit. It doesn't really have much to with the topic, but still. Let me make the distinction here a little clearer. First I said that most of a person's identity is formed at a very-young age (certainly this is the case with the primary in-group he will identify himself as part of; that is, his family). Now I don't know that I would quite say that the family one ends up in is a matter of accident, but it is a matter of chance. Certainly, no person chooses his family. The same is the case with any primate born into a certain social group, or tribe. The given primate did not choose to identify with the group he is a part of; he was simply born into it.

Now before you go citing Mill again about the advances humans have made over other apes, remember that I am only arguing that pre-moral sentiments such as justice evolved first in these apes, so it is perfectly within the bounds of my hypothesis to speak of identity-forming in these animals. I'm not going to go so far as to state that all human morality is genetically-based and a product of evolution, but I will postulate that human morality is based on these pre-moral sentiments that are genetic and that are a product of evolution in primates whose existence preceded that of the human species.

 

[Tigers2B1]

Just to make what sort of "morality" is being advocated - a response to a portion of an earlier post -

Njorl wrote:

Then you are just arguing absolute morality with a different basis - genetic rather than religious.

This is not what it being said. If there's a God lawgiver who handed down an Absolute Moral Code, then the question would be easy to answer. ‘It is what it is’ – 10 Commandments style. End of debate. If not from a god, then it becomes trickier. I’m not arguing for an absolute morality any more than to say that language only comes in one flavor. And to carry the language analogy forward, Norm Chomsky suggests that ALL languages follow a certain underlying structure and, unlike writing and reading – don’t take years of direct study to master. Langauge is acquired without effort, very quickly, and at a very young age. An innate grammar or language logic may be what causes children to say “gooder” rather than “better” even though they have never heard the word “gooder” before. I suspect that like this argues for language acquisition being coded in our genes while reading and writing language isn’t. Language, like number recognition (e.g. recognizing that three bears went into the cave and two come out has an obvious survival advantage) and other abilities offers a survival advantage to the individual. So does acting in the interests of others in your social group.

As Steven Pinker wrote in The Blank Slate, The Modern Denial of Human Nature – “…genes have metaphorical motives – making copies of themselves – and the organisms they design have real motives. But they are not the same motives. Sometimes the most selfish thing a gene can do is wire unselfish motives into the human brain – heartfelt, unstinting, deep-in-the-marrow unselfishness.” That’s the sort of “morality” I’m discussing and advocating.

 

[Tigers2B1]

And maybe on the other side of this debate -- In an attempt to narrow the issue and in an attempt to understand what sort of relativism people who say they are relativists – advocate, I wonder if a Relativist here might address the following: Taking a strictly logical position for now -- Would it be fair to say that IF morals are relative, as as a relativist would claim, than the relativist should grant me – and others – the claim that they are not relative?

To restate the above --- under moral relativism, can anything and anyone be a “evil” or “good” if the speaker believes it so? And if I, or anyone else for that matter, doesn’t agree than they are right in their worlds and you remain are right in yours? They are even right in their profession that you are wrong – and likewise. In other words, if everything is morally relative as an absolute relativist would say, he can’t even argue for his case. To argue a moral case is to try to prove your point to another -- and therefore presupposes a common morality – which can’t be true for a relativist. Can this be right??

 

[selfAdjoint]

I don't think most moral relativists (I am not one) do not support relativism by individuals as you assume. It's more a relativism by societies. As if to say "We cannot judge medieval people, or eskimos, if some of their practices violate our own codes of morality, because their societies are so different from ours."

 

[Nicomachus]

Taking a strictly logical position for now -- Would it be fair to say that IF morals are relative, as as a relativist would claim, than the relativist should grant me – and others – the claim that they are not relative?

You are correct Tigers2B1. Relativism would allow just that.
*Nico

 

[hitssquad]

Fundamentalist morality systems vs Beyondism

morals everywhere say thou shalt not kill (except as specified).

The Beyondism system of morality does not say, "Thou shalt not kill."

 

[selfAdjoint]

I meant naturally arising morals, rather than made-up systems (however logical they might be). The claim I was criticising was that morals are natural to humans because we evolved to have them.

 

[Nicomachus]

--Deleted--

 

[Njorl]

And maybe on the other side of this debate -- In an attempt to narrow the issue and in an attempt to understand what sort of relativism people who say they are relativists – advocate, I wonder if a Relativist here might address the following: Taking a strictly logical position for now -- Would it be fair to say that IF morals are relative, as as a relativist would claim, than the relativist should grant me – and others – the claim that they are not relative?

No, that is a non-sequiter.

Morals are not facts, but the nature of morality is a fact. It is a debated fact which might never be certainly known, but a fact nonetheless. While a moral relativist might argue that stealing is not wrong in some situations, they are not justified by their worldview to say that up is down.

What a moral relativist will grant you is that your belief that morality is not relative is a valid belief - for you.

Njorl

 

[Njorl]

I don't know that morals differ as much as you think they do.

Abortion, war, pre-marital sex, drug use, alchohol use, capitalism, communism are all fine and are also the ultimate evil. Morals differ wildly.

People often cite the phenomenon of Eskimos killing off their old, but I would argue that every culture believes unjustified killing to be wrong. They simply disagree as to what constitutes proper justification.

You are essentially saying that all people share morality because they believe what is unjustified is wrong. Or, more clearly, people agree that what is unjustified is unjustified.

The fact that culture has badly clouded the basic underlying moral structure of a human being doesn't mean that that structure is invalid or even relative.

Culture is the clouding. Without the clouding, there would be only one culture.

Either way, the existence of a disagreement very obviously does not rule out the possibility of one party being correct and the other being incorrect.

No, it is possible that there is one, right morality. I just think that, at most, one person would have it.

Njorl

 

[Njorl]

Just to make what sort of "morality" is being advocated - a response to a portion of an earlier post -

Njorl wrote:



This is not what it being said. If there's a God lawgiver who handed down an Absolute Moral Code, then the question would be easy to answer. ‘It is what it is’ – 10 Commandments style. End of debate. If not from a god, then it becomes trickier. I’m not arguing for an absolute morality any more than to say that language only comes in one flavor. And to carry the language analogy forward, Norm Chomsky suggests that ALL languages follow a certain underlying structure and, unlike writing and reading – don’t take years of direct study to master. Langauge is acquired without effort, very quickly, and at a very young age. An innate grammar or language logic may be what causes children to say “gooder” rather than “better” even though they have never heard the word “gooder” before. I suspect that like this argues for language acquisition being coded in our genes while reading and writing language isn’t. Language, like number recognition (e.g. recognizing that three bears went into the cave and two come out has an obvious survival advantage) and other abilities offers a survival advantage to the individual. So does acting in the interests of others in your social group.

As Steven Pinker wrote in The Blank Slate, The Modern Denial of Human Nature – “…genes have metaphorical motives – making copies of themselves – and the organisms they design have real motives. But they are not the same motives. Sometimes the most selfish thing a gene can do is wire unselfish motives into the human brain – heartfelt, unstinting, deep-in-the-marrow unselfishness.” That’s the sort of “morality” I’m discussing and advocating.

I think we might be on the same track here, just using terms that are traditionally antithetical here.

I am perfectly open to the idea that there is an underlying genetic, evolutionary trend toward behaviour that benefits the propogation of our genes. I have no problem labelling these behaviours as a source of morality. I could even be convinced that these behaviours are an absolute moral code. However, there would be so many layers of contingencies that such an absolute basis for morality would appear to be moral relativism at face value.

When you factor in all of the environmental contingencies, a genetically based absolute moral code looks like moral relativism.

Njorl

 

[Tigers2B1]

No, that is a non-sequiter.

Morals are not facts, but the nature of morality is a fact.

Can you expand on this – I’m not sure I understand the distinction you’re making here. Is it your position that morals aren’t discoverable and at the same time asserting that it is possible to discover the source of morals? That while there may be a source in our genes, for example, it does not follow that there are set moral rules clear enough to distinguish what we refer to as morals?

What a moral relativist will grant you is that your belief that morality is not relative is a valid belief - for you.

Then, considering your response to the above, maybe you’ll tell me why you agree or disagree my statement below –

“--- under moral relativism, can anything and anyone be a “evil” or “good” if the speaker believes it so? And if I, or anyone else for that matter, doesn’t agree than they are right in their worlds and you remain are right in yours? They are even right in their profession that you are wrong – and likewise. In other words, if everything is morally relative as an absolute relativist would say, he can’t even argue for his case. To argue a moral case is to try to prove your point to another -- and therefore presupposes a common morality – which can’t be true for a relativist.”

 

[Tigers2B1]

Abortion, war, pre-marital sex, drug use, alchohol use, capitalism, communism are all fine and are also the ultimate evil. Morals differ wildly.

I’ll let loseyourname speak for him/herself -- but as to my understanding of what loseyourname said - I don’t see you responding to the point made. “Values” differ wildly – not bedrock, discoverable morals. For example - if pushed on the subject of ‘pre-martial sex,’ forcing one to dig deeper to justify their position, both sides of the issue would ultimately have to base their respective arguments in either an appeal to a higher authority (e.g. “God is against “pre-martial sex” – end of story”) OR based their reasons in a common understanding of right and wrong. A common understanding? Right.

And, on a second point, without this common understanding how do you use the term “ultimate evil” and make the statement “Morals differ wildly” and maintain the position at the same time that these statements are without any common meaning? How does the meaning you intend to transfer to me with those words work in the relativist’s world? In that world, where good and bad have lost all meaning, how do people even talk to each other with any purpose?

In short, how do you expect anyone to understand what you’re talking about if these words "differ wildly" and, why are you debating here – if, as you maintain, everything I say is 'right' for me (by definition) and everything you say is 'right' by definition?

You are essentially saying that all people share morality because they believe what is unjustified is wrong...

Again, loseyourname can speak to this but as I read this the point made wasn’t that 'what is wrong is wrong but, instead, that cultures have shared ideas about what is wrong behavior. Killing is generally considered 'wrong' behavior – but the circumstances of different cultures bring different exceptions to that general rule. That humans, as social animals, live in social groups --- and as such function in social systems. A social system that tolerated wholesale random killings brings nothing to the security of the individual and therefore, they don’t exist.

 

[Tigers2B1]

...When you factor in all of the environmental contingencies, a genetically based absolute moral code looks like moral relativism.

Well, as originally stated, I’m not arguing for an absolute moral code --- I’m arguing AGAINST Relativism.

And your statement that it "looks like relativism" might be explained by the focus on individual trees rather than the forest. A focus just like the analogy to world languages that vary to a great degree on the surface but which, according to Chomsky, ALL follow the same universal logical structures. A structure that allows such easy acquisition of language in early childhood ----------- and a genetic structure that allows access in early childhood only. After that it must be learned the hard way – just like reading and writing are at any age. [My prior post has a link to Chomsky's theories regarding the shared universal structure of all languages.]

 

[Nicomachus]

Quote:
Originally Posted by Tigers2B1
And maybe on the other side of this debate -- In an attempt to narrow the issue and in an attempt to understand what sort of relativism people who say they are relativists – advocate, I wonder if a Relativist here might address the following: Taking a strictly logical position for now -- Would it be fair to say that IF morals are relative, as as a relativist would claim, than the relativist should grant me – and others – the claim that they are not relative?

No, that is a non-sequiter.

Morals are not facts, but the nature of morality is a fact. It is a debated fact which might never be certainly known, but a fact nonetheless. While a moral relativist might argue that stealing is not wrong in some situations, they are not justified by their worldview to say that up is down.

What a moral relativist will grant you is that your belief that morality is not relative is a valid belief - for you.

Njorl

That is not a non-sequitur. The assertion Tigers2B1 made about moral relativism follows from its premises. When you give the example "While a moral relativist might argue that stealing is not wrong in some situations ..." It makes me think you are confusing moral relativism with contextualism. Obviously stealing, in itself, is not wrong because it is an action category. Moral relativism is also much different from the relational-dichotomy of up and down so I don't really see the problem.
*Nico

 

[Njorl]

Can you expand on this – I’m not sure I understand the distinction you’re making here. Is it your position that morals aren’t discoverable and at the same time asserting that it is possible to discover the source of morals? That while there may be a source in our genes, for example, it does not follow that there are set moral rules clear enough to distinguish what we refer to as morals?

Re-reading my post, I must admit I phrased that very poorly.

Let me try and make this clear. Moral relativism applies only to morality, value judgements etc. It does not apply to facts in general. A moral relativist is consistant in saying that your system of morality is right for you. However, the true and undetermined nature of morality is not a matter of morality, it is a matter of fact. Many commentators make the mistake that moral relativists believe facts are also at an individuals discretion to accept or reject. This is not so.

This is still a bit fuzzy, so I will try to simplify.

A moral relativist believes that the moral code of a moral absolutist is valid for him. He does not believe that the moral code of the moral relativist is true.

Then, considering your response to the above, maybe you’ll tell me why you agree or disagree my statement below –

“--- under moral relativism, can anything and anyone be a “evil” or “good” if the speaker believes it so?

A moral relativist would rarely label something as evil. I would use it as shorthand for what most people would consider to be evil. The word exists, so using it this way is convenient, and achieves the desired result. If I say "Hitler was evil.", it is shorthand for "Hitler had a radical morality that is so different from my own that it was frighteningly intolerable."

And if I, or anyone else for that matter, doesn’t agree than they are right in their worlds and you remain are right in yours? They are even right in their profession that you are wrong – and likewise.

Remember, moral relativism does not apply to matters of fact, only belief. They may believe that I am wrong. That is perfectly acceptable. Acceptable does not mean true, or accurate, or right, or correct, or good.

In other words, if everything is morally relative as an absolute relativist would say, he can’t even argue for his case. To argue a moral case is to try to prove your point to another -- and therefore presupposes a common morality – which can’t be true for a relativist.”

Not at all. A lack of a common morality does not prevent a moral relativist from arguing a moral point. The objective of an argument is not to be right, but to change the other person's thinking. A moral relativist in this circumstance is merely trying to change another's moral code from one valid belief system to another valid belief system.

The difference is that a moral relativist does this recognizing that it is a purely selfish act. By convincing people to alter their morality to more closely resemble mine, I will have a world in which I am more comfortable. The moral absolutist engages in this argument deluding himself that it is to make the other person think "right", when in reality, his motives are just as selfish as mine.

Don't get the idea that moral relativists are perfectly tolerant of everything around them. We are not. We just see the moral world in terms of "beneficial and harmful" rather than "good and evil" or "right and wrong".

Njorl

 

[Nicomachus]

A moral relativist would rarely label something as evil. I would use it as shorthand for what most people would consider to be evil. The word exists, so using it this way is convenient, and achieves the desired result. If I say "Hitler was evil.", it is shorthand for "Hitler had a radical morality that is so different from my own that it was frighteningly intolerable."

I do not accept the concept of "evil" as pertaining to morality. Evil is simply the intentional causation of calamity. Morality is about value based decision making.

In keeping with this, obviously moral-relativism cannot be equivocated with standard relativism, although I contend they both contain similar problems. As a moral relativist, you deny the objectiveness of values and therefore have no way to justify any of your moral positions. Keep in mind, I am not saying you cannot justify disliking another's system of morality, as in the case of Hitler, but you have no way to justify any moral position at all. Now we may assume this to be true but if this is the case by holding any moral positions you either are doing so on faith or, and this is not meant to be harsh, you (well any moral-relativist) are a hypocrite. To put simply, without the existence of a rational objective foundation you have no standard by which to build a system of morality. If we were all moral-relativists and many of us,despite lack of justification or acceptance of the existence of objective values, made similar moral decisions it would be nothing more than a statistical anomaly, to say the least. Although, I contend that under the system of moral-relativism no moral judgement should be made, but that is also a value judgement ... aaah the vortex of nothingness that follows relativism rears its head again ... =)
*Nico

 

[Tigers2B1]

A moral relativist would rarely label something as evil. I would use it as shorthand for what most people would consider to be evil. The word exists, so using it this way is convenient, and achieves the desired result.

Why do relativists think "most people" even understand the word "evil" and, from that understanding, form a common opinion about what is and isn’t an evil actor – such as in your Hitler example? How can relativists do this in a truly random and morally relative world? What is the coalescing force that drives this if not a beginning, genetically induced, predisposition? What is the mechanism that moves someone, by reaction and without thought, to feel 'sorry' or feel 'empathy' --- if not the genetic predisposition needed in a workable social system?

...If I say "Hitler was evil.", it is shorthand for "Hitler had a radical morality that is so different from my own that it was frighteningly intolerable."

Here's what I don’t understand about your statement. In a truly relative system, - why is it "frighteningly intolerable" to almost anyone that hears about Hitler’s "radical morality?" Also, saying that it is radical implies a center position, a common understanding of what is aberrant – otherwise it could never be recognized as “radical”-

…Don't get the idea that moral relativists are perfectly tolerant of everything around them. We are not. We just see the moral world in terms of "beneficial and harmful" rather than "good and evil" or "right and wrong".

By what touchstone do relativists make "beneficial and harmful" decisions in matters that have no personal concern to them? In the relativists' world how can you decide what is or isn't beneficial or harmful to others -- since that is always relative to them?

And as a thought experiment - take this hypothetical situation which seems to give the 'wrong' answer under the relativist's 'cost-benefit' analysis ---> The 'beneficial' consequences of taking the heart, lungs, liver and other organs from one person, without his consent, and giving those various organs to five people so they can live - would result in more 'benefit' (five live) than 'harm' (one dies) – no? So --- is there nothing more than a cost-benefit analysis to the relativist’s system or is there something more? If there is more to the analysis here, as a relativist, what would it be? Or are you free to harvest the organs in this situation -

 

[Nicomachus]

Yes Tigers2B1, essentially what you have said is anecdotally true and compliments my specific criticism of moral-relativism. Cheers.
*Nico

 

[loseyourname]

Thanks, guys. Your defense of my position is more than adequate. My knowledge runs more toward the sociobiological aspects of this issue, so as the discussion has taken a distinctly philosophical turn, I will accordingly bow out.

Anyway, my point about disagreement not equating with a lack of objective truth is sufficient to reveal the cultural argument for relativism as invalid, although that doesn't necessarily establish the untruth of relativism. I will leave it up to the rest of you to debate that.

 

[Njorl]

Why do relativists think "most people" even understand the word "evil" and, from that understanding, form a common opinion about what is and isn’t an evil actor – such as in your Hitler example?
-

Because dictionaries exist.

How can relativists do this in a truly random and morally relative world?
-

By choosing to do so.

What is the coalescing force that drives this if not a beginning, genetically induced, predisposition? What is the mechanism that moves someone, by reaction and without thought, to feel 'sorry' or feel 'empathy' --- if not the genetic predisposition needed in a workable social system?

-

Such a predisposition is not inconsistent with moral relativism.

Here's what I don’t understand about your statement. In a truly relative system, - why is it "frighteningly intolerable" to almost anyone that hears about Hitler’s "radical morality?"
-

Most people's moral codes have similar aspects, and, on the whole, are not too different from each others. That does not mean they are not all different. Hitler's differed significantly.

Also, saying that it is radical implies a center position, a common understanding of what is aberrant – otherwise it could never be recognized as “radical”-

-

If all morality could be catagorized, and averaged over all humanity, I suppose you could find a center position - an average morality. That does not make it the "right" morality. You can average the wavelengths of everyones favorite color too.

By what touchstone do relativists make "beneficial and harmful" decisions in matters that have no personal concern to them?
-

They don't. That's the whole point.
However, matters that seem to have no impact upon one at face value often do.

In the relativists' world how can you decide what is or isn't beneficial or harmful to others -- since that is always relative to them?
-

I have ears and can hear what they say. I have eyes and can read what they write.

And as a thought experiment - take this hypothetical situation which seems to give the 'wrong' answer under the relativist's 'cost-benefit' analysis ---> The 'beneficial' consequences of taking the heart, lungs, liver and other organs from one person, without his consent, and giving those various organs to five people so they can live - would result in more 'benefit' (five live) than 'harm' (one dies) – no? So --- is there nothing more than a cost-benefit analysis to the relativist’s system or is there something more? If there is more to the analysis here, as a relativist, what would it be? Or are you free to harvest the organs in this situation -

By no means do I get a "wrong" answer. I do not approve of taking the organs from a healthy person. There would be a net harm. If I were to approve of such a thing, I would live in a world in which people can be randomly harvested for organs. The terror that would be inspired is not worth the lives of a few people.

Njorl

 

[hitssquad]

Does the word 'evil' have something to do with moral judgment

I do not accept the concept of "evil" as pertaining to morality. Evil is simply the intentional causation of calamity. Morality is about value based decision making.

What constitutes a calamity is a moral judgment.

• ¹evil
  
  1 a : not good morally : marked by bad moral qualities : violating the rules of morality

(From the M-W Unabridged dictionary.)

I contend that under the system of moral-relativism no moral judgement should be made

Relative moral judgments might be made, a la the moral judgments of Beyondism.

 

[Nicomachus]

I do not really accept your assertion that what constitutes a calamity is a moral judgement. Nevertheless, such is a minor point. I don't care about your cult and I don't see what point you are trying to make, maybe you don't understand the problem, but you did not respond to my criticism of moral relativism. In fact no one has responded to my criticism of moral relativism.
*Nico

 

[russ_watters]

[bold added]Don't get the idea that moral relativists are perfectly tolerant of everything around them. We are not. We just see the moral world in terms of "beneficial and harmful" rather than "good and evil" or "right and wrong".

Njorl

Gee, I was with you until here. You're a moral relativist? You were sounding like a moral absolutist. Maybe I didn't read enough of the thread...


...re-reading, I'm still not sure. "Beneficial and harmful" seems an awful lot like "right and wrong." What's the difference?

It sounds like you are saying since people are all different, what is "beneficial and harmful" to one may be different from another. I don't buy it: people are all fundamentally the same.

I also think though Hitler makes a good example of how far off the average a morality can be, you need to be careful: I think it can be successfully argued that he was mentally ill. Having an actual moral code requires rationality.

I personally am a scientific moral absolutist. I believe that you can get closer and closer (though maybe never achieve) Morality through scientifically analyzing moral challenges. As with any other theory, the correct one is quite simply the one that "works." What works is what enables a stable and prosperous society.

For some issues, its easy: murder is wrong. Why? Because if murder were right, society would disintegrate. Some issues aren't quite so simple.

 

[shadowman]

Obviously stealing, in itself, is not wrong because it is an action category. *Nico

how stupid is this statement? do you know what you are saying? yes the word "stealing" is not wrong, but the concept of staling is wrong. i think you are looking too deep into the picture to understand it. everything wrong and everything right can be determined by a scociety or culture. there is no universal wrong or right, because there are always excusable exceptions to the rule. ie. the guy who is homeless and hungry steals food...etc. but wrong or right is determined as an on-the-whole basis by the society or culure. stealing is usually, by most scocieties' morals, accepted as a wrong.

 

[Nicomachus]

Shadowman, I contend that you are a fool and have no idea of what you are discussing. Blah blah blah is all you present. Stealing is not wrong in itself, stealing is an action category. Please seek an education. You are arguing against contextualism while accepting contextualism ... Do you even know what you are talking about. Contextualism is true therefore action categories in themselves cannot be considered as right or wrong. Argument ad populum doesn't provide any basis for your argument.
You are simply contradicting yourself and yet you call my assertions stupid? You sir should evaluate your positions and intelligence before you presume to make criticism of mine. Obviously, you are uneducated in these matters.
*Nico

 

[loseyourname]

Not that I subscribe to Kantian ethics, but according to the categorical imperative action categories can have moral value without context. I'm not arguing with you, but you shouldn't speak as if you have some kind of monopoly on moral truth. I'm not sure that anyone has really figured it out quite yet.