Are Qualia Real? Debate & Discussion

[hypnagogue]

Who said "physical aspects" of the brain? If there are non-physical aspects to the brain that are responsible for the arisal of consciousness, it is still the brain that is responsible.

Well, it seems to me that the word "brain" picks out that physical bundle of neurons in our heads. Accordingly, it seems that saying "the brain causes consciousness" is an endorsement of physicalism. If you provisionally widen the scope of the term "brain" to refer to whatever nonphysical aspects (if any) might be attendant with those physical neurons, then "brain causes consciousness" becomes a less problematic statement. Even then, we'd have to rule out the radio receiver picture of the brain that Paul Martin brings up. I don't subscribe to such a view myself, but it's not clear to me that it can be easily ruled out.

 

[moving finger]

It's an example of evidence that the brain causes consciousness.

my friend, it is an example of correlation, not an example of cause.

Please try to understand the difference.

The error is in claiming the statement is evidence of cause when it is only evidence of correlation. It's very simple logic.

To say that the post "is evidence that brain causes consciousness" is equivalent to saying that the experiment done by the agent in my little joke is "evidence that fleas hear through their legs".

Neither one is evidence of "cause".

Both are evidence only of "correlation".

There is a world of difference.

MF

 

[hypnagogue]

moving finger, what would you consider evidence of causation?

 

[moving finger]

moving finger, what would you consider evidence of causation?

Hypnagogue, I am not the one who is claiming "evidence of causation". I am claiming evidence of correlation.
I respectfully suggest that the best person to explain what they mean by "evidence of causation" is the person who uses the term.
Can you explain what you consider to be evidence of causation?
MF

 

[loseyourname]

Hypnagogue, I am not the one who is claiming "evidence of causation". I am claiming evidence of correlation.
I respectfully suggest that the best person to explain what they mean by "evidence of causation" is the person who uses the term.
Can you explain what you consider to be evidence of causation?
MF

Correlation, views in every single instance that has ever been verified. The correlation has to work both ways. Whenever we see brains with a certain level of developmental complexity, there is consciousness. Wherever we see consciousness, we find brains associated with it. There are no example of fully developed human brains without consciousness, and there are no examples (outside of possible OBEs) of consciousness without brains. That's about as good as we can do to establish causation, wouldn't you say? Heck, that evidence is stronger than the evidence that you are capable of causing your arm to move. There are plenty of instances of arms moving without the person wanting them to and people who want to move their arms but can't. Nonetheless, I would imagine that you accept a causal connection between your will to move your arm and your arm moving, don't you?

Correlation is evidence of causation, period. Whether or not you find the evidence compelling, you cannot honestly try to tell me that it isn't evidence. A court of law would laugh in your face.

Well, it seems to me that the word "brain" picks out that physical bundle of neurons in our heads. Accordingly, it seems that saying "the brain causes consciousness" is an endorsement of physicalism. If you provisionally widen the scope of the term "brain" to refer to whatever nonphysical aspects (if any) might be attendant with those physical neurons, then "brain causes consciousness" becomes a less problematic statement. Even then, we'd have to rule out the radio receiver picture of the brain that Paul Martin brings up. I don't subscribe to such a view myself, but it's not clear to me that it can be easily ruled out.

In going off of the only two well-articulated anti-physicalist views that I know of, the brain still causes consciousness. In Chalmers' model, it is the brain as information-processing unit. Granted, he speculated that any information-processor, not just brains, might be conscious, but human consciousness is without doubt a product of the brain. In Rosenberg's model, consciousness is an intrinsic property of the material substance from which all things are constituted, but again, human consciousness is a product of the intrinsic properties of human brain material (note: I don't mean matter by this, as matter is something physical - this is simply a substance in the Aristotelian sense; perhaps I shouldn't even refer to it as material, but I do for lack of a better word). In either case, it seems that both men, though anti-physicalist, grant that the human brain is the source of human consciousness.

 

[hypnagogue]

Hypnagogue, I am not the one who is claiming "evidence of causation". I am claiming evidence of correlation.

You're claiming that the brain/mind link is evidence of correlation, but you're also claiming that it's not evidence of causation. To meaningfully make the latter claim, you have to have some idea of the criteria by which we could count something to be a cause. What are those criteria?

I respectfully suggest that the best person to explain what they mean by "evidence of causation" is the person who uses the term.

Agreed, but insofar as you refute that claim, you must have your own interpretation of what it means, upon which you base your refutation.

Bear in mind that I'm not taking any stance on your view by asking these questions; I'm just asking you to make your reasoning more explicit. It would be very clarifying if you could present an example of something that could, in your view, count as evidence for causation. Perhaps you deny that anything could count as evidence for causation? I can't tell from what you've said here thus far.

Can you explain what you consider to be evidence of causation?

That's a difficult question. As a first pass, I might say something like X causes Y if X is a necessary and sufficient condition for Y. We could produce evidence that X is necessary for Y by accumulating many observations that show that Y never occurs if X does not also occur. We could produce evidence that X is sufficient for Y by varying other circumstances in the vicinity and repeatedly observing that Y occurs whenever X occurs.

It seems that procuring evidence for sufficiency is more subtle and difficult than procuring evidence for necessity. In the case of p-consciousness and the brain, it seems impossible (prima facie) to gather empirical evidence for the sufficiency of brain events to produce p-consciousness if we propose that one of the factors that is relevant to the existence of p-consciousness is a non-physical aspect of nature.

 

[learningphysics]

That's another interpretation, but I wouldn't call it an equally valid interpretation. In cases where that happens, we generally see a separation between phenomena and the illusory creator of the phenomena. If we only see consciousness associated with brains and we've never seen a conscious entity that did not have a brain, what reason is there to think that it is possible to have a conscious entity without a brain? You could make the argument you just made about the brain being a mediator with regard to a flashlight. Even though we only see the light associated with the filament, its entirely possible that the filament is simply a mediator and the light in fact has a non-physical source that cannot be detected. Fine. Great hypothesis. What possible reason is there to believe that?

The brain is constantly having its atoms replaced. Yet there is a single stream of consciousness (or is there?). Why is this? What accounts for this? It seems natural to hypothesize something that is permanent, fixed.

As I've mentioned before in this thread... this all comes down to the question: what is having the experience... what is the "conscious entity"?

When we examine what exactly we are referring to when we refer to a "conscious entity" then we can figure out if such an entity can be created by a brain.

 

[loseyourname]

Mill's Methods

Philosopher John Stuart Mill devised a set of five careful methods (or canons) by means of which to analyze and interpret our observations for the purpose of drawing conclusions about the causal relationships they exhibit.

In order to see how each of the five methods work, let's consider their practical application to a specific situation. Suppose that on an otherwise uneventful afternoon, the College Nurse becomes aware that an unusual number of students are suffering from severe indigestion. Ms. Hayes naturally suspects that this symptom results from something the students ate for lunch, and she would like to find out for sure. The Nurse wants to find evidence that will support a conclusion that "Eating ?xxxx? causes indigestion." Mill's Methods can help.

Why don't we use Mill's methods here and see if we have any evidence of causation?

Method of Agreement

Suppose that four students come to Ms. Hayes with indigestion, and she questions each about what they had for lunch. The first had pizza, coleslaw, orange juice, and a cookie; the second had a hot dog and french fries, coleslaw, and iced tea; the third ate pizza and coleslaw and drank iced tea; and the fourth ate only french fries, coleslaw, and chocolate cake. Ms. Hayes, of course, concludes that "Eating coleslaw caused the indigestion."

This is an application of Mill's Method of Agreement: investigation of the cases in which the effect occurred revealed only one prior circumstance that all of them shared. Our customary notion here is that similar effects are likely to arise from a similar cause, and since everyone who fell ill had eaten coleslaw, it was probably the cause.

So let us get together a group of conscious entities and figure out something that they all have in common. All humans, needless to say, are not the same. Some lose legs, some lose fingers, some lose eyes, some lose hair, some lose the ability to speak coherently. All of these people are nonetheless conscious. In fact we see that every conscious human has in common one thing: a functioning brain.

Method of Difference

On the other hand, suppose that only two students arrive at the Nurse's office. The two are roommates who ate together, but one became ill while the other did not. The first had eaten a hot dog, french fries, coleslaw, chocolate cake, and iced tea, while the other had eaten a hot dog, french fries, chocolate cake, and iced tea. Again, Ms. Hayes concludes that the coleslaw is what made the first roommate ill.

This reasoning applies Mill's Method of Difference: comparison of a case in which the effect occurred and a case in which the effect did not occur revealed that only one prior circumstance was present in the first case but not it the second. In such situations, we commonly suppose that, other things being equal, different effects are likely to arise from different causes, and since only the student who had eaten coleslaw became ill, it was probably the cause.

We can use this method as well. Take a human that is conscious. Take a human that is not conscious. What is the difference. The only examples we have of humans that are not conscious are humans that do not have a certain level of brain function. There's our second piece of evidence.

Joint Method of Agreement and Difference

Now put these two situations together by assuming that eight students come to Ms. Hayes: four of them suffered from indigestion, and with each of these four there is another who did not. Each pair of students had exactly the same lunch, except that everyone in the first group ate coleslaw and no one in the second group did. The Nurse arrives at the same conclusion.

This situation is an example of Mill's Joint Method of Agreement and Difference: the first four students are evidence that everyone who got ill had eaten coleslaw, and the four matching pairs are evidence that only those who got ill had eaten coleslaw. This is a powerful combination of the first two methods, since it tends to support our notion that genuine causes are necessary and sufficient conditions for their effects.

We've already done this. All humans that are conscious have a certain level of brain function and all humans that are not conscious do not have a certain level of brain function.

Method of Concomitant Variation

Change the situation again. Suppose that the Nurse sees five students: the first ate no coleslaw and feels fine; the second had one bite of coleslaw and felt a little queasy; the third had half a dish of coleslaw and is fairly ill; the fourth ate a whole dish of coleslaw and is violently ill; and the fifth ate two servings of coleslaw and had to be rushed to the hospital. The conclusion is again that coleslaw caused the indigestion.

This is an example of Mill's Method of Concomitant Variation: the evidence appears to show that there is a direct correlation between the degree to which the cause occurred and the degree to which the effect occurred. This conforms to our ordinary supposition that effects are typically proportional to their causes. In effect, this is a sophisticated version of the Joint Method, one in which we notice not just the occurrence or non-occurrence of the causal terms, but the extent to which each of them took place.

Well, we have this one too. Brains function in degrees. When we lose some functionality, we may still be conscious, but we do eventually reach a certain level beneath which we are no longer conscious due to brain functionality.

Method of Residues

Finally, suppose that Ms. Hayes, during prior investigations of student illness, has already established that pizza tends to produce a rash and iced tea tends to cause headaches. Today, a student arrives at the Nurse's office complaining of headache, indigestion, and a rash; this student reports having eaten pizza, coleslaw, and iced tea for lunch. Since she can account for most of the student's symptoms as the effects of known causes, Ms. Hayes concludes that the additional effect of indigestion must be caused by the additional circumstance of eating coleslaw.

This pattern of reasoning exemplifies Mill's Method of Residues: many elements of a complex effect are shown to result, by reliable causal beliefs, from several elements of a complex cause; whatever remains of the effect must then have been produced by whatever remains of the cause. Notice that if we suppose the truth of all of the causal relationships involved, this method becomes an application of deductive reasoning.

This one we can use as well. People with legs but without a certain level of brain functionality can move their legs but are not conscious. People with functioning eyes but without a certain level of brain functionality can see and respond to stimuli in a mechanical manner, but are not conscious. Note here that consciousness seems to depend only on the level of brain functionality. No other bodily organ matters and it doesn't seem necessary to be in the path of certain radio waves or anything like that. If there is anything else to it, we have yet to detect it.

Nonetheless, several of you are convinced that there is something more to it, that the brain is only a conduit that receives signals from a source of consciousness outside of the body. Perhaps you can tell us what that is and apply Mill's methods to your hypothesis and see how well you can establish evidence of causation.

 

[loseyourname]

The brain is constantly having its atoms replaced. Yet there is a single stream of consciousness (or is there?).

The same can be said of the heart, yet we have a constant flow of blood. No mystery there. The same can be said of the Amazon, yet we have one river. No mystery there. There is a problem of personal identity that has always been tricky in philosophy, but it is not necessary to postulate a permanent, immaterial source of identity for the bloodstream or the Amazon. Same thing for the brain and any effects associated with the brain.

By the way, the brain is the only part of the body that never regenerates any cells once it is fully developed. It is the single most permanent part of the human body.

 

[hypnagogue]

Correlation is evidence of causation, period.

Not necessarily. If we find that B always accompanies C, it could be because there is some sort of causitive link between the two. However, it could also be that they are both caused by A. In that case, although they are always correlated, one does not cause the other.

In going off of the only two well-articulated anti-physicalist views that I know of, the brain still causes consciousness. In Chalmers' model, it is the brain as information-processing unit. Granted, he speculated that any information-processor, not just brains, might be conscious, but human consciousness is without doubt a product of the brain. In Rosenberg's model, consciousness is an intrinsic property of the material substance from which all things are constituted, but again, human consciousness is a product of the intrinsic properties of human brain material (note: I don't mean matter by this, as matter is something physical - this is simply a substance in the Aristotelian sense; perhaps I shouldn't even refer to it as material, but I do for lack of a better word). In either case, it seems that both men, though anti-physicalist, grant that the human brain is the source of human consciousness.

Chalmers proposes that phenomenality is an aspect of information, and Rosenberg proposes that phenomenality is the intrinsic basis of the physical. In both cases, phenomenality does not arise from the physical, but (in some sense) sits along side it. Surely, both accept that the structure and function of the physical brain conditions the nature of a system's p-consciousness, but I don't think either view can be fairly portrayed as saying that consciousness arises from, or is a product of, the brain. In fact, insofar as both accept the logical possibility of zombies, both would claim that we could have a physical brain (in a world distinct from ours in its non-physical aspects, but identical to ours in its physical aspects) but still not have p-consciousness.

So perhaps Chalmers and Rosenberg might say that the physical brain causes p-consciousness to take the particular form it does, but neither would say that the physical brain produces p-consciousness, in the sense that the latter supervenes on the former. On these views, saying that the physical brain causes p-consciousness is like saying one electron causes another electron. Obviously, that's nonsensical; what we mean to say is something like "electron A caused electron B's path to diverge." Likewise, if we attribute causal responsibility from the physical brain to p-consciousness on Chalmers' or Rosenberg's views, it would have to be a causal relation of change, not of creation or production.

 

[loseyourname]

Not necessarily. If we find that B always accompanies C, it could be because there is some sort of causitive link between the two. However, it could also be that they are both caused by A. In that case, although they are always correlated, one does not cause the other.

That's why it is inconclusive evidence. It is, nonetheless, evidence. Seeing someone at the scene of a crime is evidence that he committed the crime. Scanty evidence, but still evidence.

Chalmers proposes that phenomenality is an aspect of information, and Rosenberg proposes that phenomenality is the intrinsic basis of the physical. In both cases, phenomenality does not arise from the physical, but (in some sense) sits along side it. Surely, both accept that the structure and function of the physical brain conditions the nature of a system's p-consciousness, but I don't think either view can be fairly portrayed as saying that consciousness arises from, or is a product of, the brain.

What you are saying doesn't make any sense to me. Phenomenality is an aspect of information. Information, in humans, is stored in and processed by the brain. The information that has phenomenality as an aspect is a product of the brain. In what sense can we say that the brain is not here a cause of consciousness. There is no case in which a brain can process the information that it does and not produce consciousness. Again, strictly speaking, information processing devices other than the brain may produce consciousness. In this case, a brain is not necessary. A brain is, however, necessary for human consciousness, at least until we are able to transfer our selves into information processing machines that can carry out the same functions as a brain.

In the case of Rosenberg's framework, again, is it not the intrinsic base of the physical makeup of the brain that results in human consciousness? If no brain is present, there is nothing that we recognize as consciousness. He is simply postulating properties of the substance of which the brain (indeed, all physical things) is made that are not physically detectable. They are nonetheless, properties of the substance of which the brain is made. We never experience what happens in the non-physical parts of our lymph nodes.

In fact, insofar as both accept the logical possibility of zombies, both would claim that we could have a physical brain (in a world distinct from ours in its non-physical aspects, but identical to ours in its physical aspects) but still not have p-consciousness.

I don't know about Rosenberg, but I remember Chalmers explicitly stating in a paper that you linked to that zombies are an empirical impossibility granted that they have the same brains we have. Logical possibility only means that no contradiction arises. By the same token, no contradiction arises if we imagine that the Earth had no gravitational field. Nonetheless, you are never going to find a person jump at a velocity less than escape velocity and fail to come back down.

So perhaps Chalmers and Rosenberg might say that the physical brain causes p-consciousness to take the particular form it does, but neither would say that the physical brain produces p-consciousness, in the sense that the latter supervenes on the former.

I'm only claiming that what the brain causes is human consciousness. It may not be necessary to all forms of subjective experience, but it is certainly necessary for my subjective experience. Without the brain, my ego, my personality, the world-line of subjective experience that is Adam Acosta, would cease to exist (again, unless Chalmers and Dennett are right and we devise a means of transferring the necessary information-stream into a machine).

 

[hypnagogue]

Actually, Rosenberg's view of causation, and the manner in which he ties this into the mind/body problem, allows us to make a more definite claim here. On Rosenberg's view, the physical is nothing but the pattern of relationships in which the intrinsic phenomenal carriers engage. So Rosenberg's view on the mind/body relation would actually be much closer to an identity relation than one of causal responsibility. That is, on this view, the firings of certain neural assemblies do not produce or otherwise cause us to see a red patch of color; rather, those neuron firings literally are the effective patterns of relationships engaged upon by our intrinsic, phenomenal patch of red in the wider causal nexus.

 

[loseyourname]

Is there any kind of evidential backing for that being the case (other than explanatory elegance)? I'll have to get back into that book when I get a chance. I've been studying causation for several months now and should have a good basis from which to evaluate his claims.

 

[hypnagogue]

I don't know about Rosenberg, but I remember Chalmers explicitly stating in a paper that you linked to that zombies are an empirical impossibility granted that they have the same brains we have. Logical possibility only means that no contradiction arises. By the same token, no contradiction arises if we imagine that the Earth had no gravitational field. Nonetheless, you are never going to find a person jump at a velocity less than escape velocity and fail to come back down.

Right, that's why I added this caveat: "in a world distinct from ours in its non-physical aspects, but identical to ours in its physical aspects." The point is not to argue that we could have a physical replica of me or you in our world, such that it would not be conscious (I don't think anyone really argues for that). The point is to try to demonstrate that the physical aspects of the brain could exist without any attendant p-consciousness; this only works if we suppose 1) there are non-physical aspects of our world that are necessary for the existence of p-consciousness, and 2) in a zombie world physically identical to our own, these non-physical aspects are different in such a way that p-consciousness does not exist.

I'm only claiming that what the brain causes is human consciousness. It may not be necessary to all forms of subjective experience, but it is certainly necessary for my subjective experience. Without the brain, my ego, my personality, the world-line of subjective experience that is Adam Acosta, would cease to exist (again, unless Chalmers and Dennett are right and we devise a means of transferring the necessary information-stream into a machine).

That's a claim for the necessity of the human brain for human consciousness, which I don't think many people argue against (I certainly don't). My point of contention has been the further claim that the physical human brain is a sufficient condition for the existence of human p-consciousness. Obviously, an anti-physicalist is committed to contesting that claim. There are also subtler issues, e.g. whether we should think of the mind/body relation as one of cause and effect or as one of identity. But on the whole, I don't think we disagree too substantially here. I suspect a lot of this discussion is just turning on different ways we interpret the word "cause."

 

[hypnagogue]

Is there any kind of evidential backing for that being the case (other than explanatory elegance)?

Not that I'm aware of (but then, I'm not sure what kind of evidence could discriminate here between identity and cause/effect). However, I think just the sheer explanitory power over such a wide range of problems that Rosenberg's framework has is grounds for taking it seriously. He does propose a sketch of how we might empirically ascertain the existence of natural individuals in chapter 14, I believe, though I'm fuzzy on the details right now. But it does seem that for much of his framework, the only evidence we'll ever be able to get is circumstantial evidence from its ability to explain existing phenomena. Perhaps we might be able to generate novel predictions with it down the line that differentiate it empirically from other theories of consciousness, but that's an open issue, and even then it seems likely that we could only test it via first person verification (and ultimately, verbal report).

I'll have to get back into that book when I get a chance. I've been studying causation for several months now and should have a good basis from which to evaluate his claims.

Please do. We're set to begin the chapter on his theory of causal significance some time over the next few days.

 

[learningphysics]

The same can be said of the heart, yet we have a constant flow of blood. No mystery there. The same can be said of the Amazon, yet we have one river. No mystery there. There is a problem of personal identity that has always been tricky in philosophy, but it is not necessary to postulate a permanent, immaterial source of identity for the bloodstream or the Amazon. Same thing for the brain and any effects associated with the brain.

Yes, I was referring to the problem of personal identity. How do we account for a constant identity through time?

The difference between the case of a river, and a brain, is that associated with the brain... there is something that is having an experience. Now if there was no experience then there would be no problem. Referring to a river would be perfectly analogous to referring to a brain.

"Something" is having the experience associated with a particular human being. Is this "something" going to be the same "something" tomorrow that has an experience associated with a particular human being?

We can't just say the "human being" is experiencing. Then I'd ask... what exactly is being referred to by "human being".

Suppose you learned that a river was "experiencing". All the water of the river is constantly being replaced... wouldn't you ask yourself, what is experiencing? Is it the water? If it is the water then we have the experiencers constantly living and dying as the water is replaced.

By the way, the brain is the only part of the body that never regenerates any cells once it is fully developed. It is the single most permanent part of the human body.

I see. But the atoms that form our brain are replaced regularly aren't they?

 

[hypnagogue]

learningphysics, the point is that what is relevant is not the individual constituent parts, but the higher-order pattern they produce. To that end, functionalism seems to solve your dilemma. Loosely stated, functionalism is the view that what the brain does is relevant for consciousness, rather than the identity of its constituent parts over time. Of course, functionalism comes with its own host of problems, such as interest relativity (different people can slice up the brain into different functional parts; who is correct?) and the problem of what constitutes the proper level of abstraction (should we count neural activity as the fundamental functional unit? Is what happens in the cells important?). But, these problems are not necessarily fatal; for instance, Rosenberg's view incorporates some of the attractive features of functionalism while resolving its drawbacks.

 

[moving finger]

You're claiming that the brain/mind link is evidence of correlation, but you're also claiming that it's not evidence of causation.

No. To be precise, I am claiming that "what was presented in post #183” is not evidence of causation (as requested in the question in #183). What was presented is at most evidence of correlation.

Let’s be clear here – I am NOT saying that “there is no evidence that the brain causes consciousness”, I am saying that “the content of post #183 does not constitute (in my book) evidence that the brain causes consciousness”.

Agreed, but insofar as you refute that claim, you must have your own interpretation of what it means, upon which you base your refutation.

The poster in #183 seems to claim(by implication) that :
The observation that consciousness disappears when the brain is removed somehow is evidence that the brain “causes” consciousness. I disagree. I believe at most it is evidence that there is a correlation between brain and consciousness.

My analogy with the flea in post #184 is similar. Remove the flea’s legs, and observe that the flea no longer jumps at the sound of a gun – are you going to suggest that this is then “evidence” that the flea’s legs are somehow responsible for (ie cause) the flea’s sense of hearing? No, of course not. Then why should the “example” given in post #183 be any different?

Bear in mind that I'm not taking any stance on your view by asking these questions; I'm just asking you to make your reasoning more explicit. It would be very clarifying if you could present an example of something that could, in your view, count as evidence for causation. Perhaps you deny that anything could count as evidence for causation? I can't tell from what you've said here thus far.

How much more explicit can I be?

If someone wishes to claim that post #183 is indeed evidence of causation then (with respect) the onus is on them to show why it is evidence of causation rather than of correlation.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

What kind of evidence of causation is there, besides correlation ?

 

[moving finger]

What kind of evidence of causation is there, besides correlation ?

I hope you are not suggesting that every correlation (eg a correlation observed between A & B) is also evidence of direct causation (ie a direct causative link between A and B)?
MF

 

[Tournesol]

No. It may well be the case that a) there is no evidence but correlation
and b) correlation is not adequate and sufficient.

Which leaves us with the conclusion that we can be *as* sure that consc. is caused
by the brain *as* we are about any other causal relation.

 

[learningphysics]

learningphysics, the point is that what is relevant is not the individual constituent parts, but the higher-order pattern they produce. To that end, functionalism seems to solve your dilemma. Loosely stated, functionalism is the view that what the brain does is relevant for consciousness, rather than the identity of its constituent parts over time. Of course, functionalism comes with its own host of problems, such as interest relativity (different people can slice up the brain into different functional parts; who is correct?) and the problem of what constitutes the proper level of abstraction (should we count neural activity as the fundamental functional unit? Is what happens in the cells important?). But, these problems are not necessarily fatal; for instance, Rosenberg's view incorporates some of the attractive features of functionalism while resolving its drawbacks.

Hypnagogue. The problem remains. Yes, the brain produces a pattern... But again "what is having the experience?"

Is it the pattern that is having the experience? I'd say this is impossible. A pattern is an information entity... not a substance or "thing" of any kind.

What is a pattern? Loosely (I apologize for my rough use of philosophical terms) I'd call it a set of relationships between constituent parts. If each of the constituent parts themselves exhibit no properties of "experience"... then the pattern cannot exhibit any properties of "experience" as it is just the set of relationships between the constituent parts. By definition, the pattern does not experience (if the constituent parts don't)... Also, as I mentioned earlier... it is just an information entity... it is just a bookkeeping tool for the behavior of the consittuent parts.

It makes just about the same sense to say... the geometric arrangement of flowers on a lawn is experiencing... or the set of relative velocities of cars on a race track is experiencing...

What would make sense to me is that when a pattern is formed... the "something" that has experience interfaces with the brain/body.

 

[loseyourname]

I hope you are not suggesting that every correlation (eg a correlation observed between A & B) is also evidence of direct causation (ie a direct causative link between A and B)?
MF

Every correlation is evidence of causation. It isn't necessarily strong evidence, however. Even taking of the flea's legs, though very poor and even more poorly interpreted evidence, is evidence. It looks like you're going ignore my post about Mill's methods, but according to the strongest theory we have of how to determine causation, what was presented here does constitute strong evidence that the brain is causally linked to consciousness. The flea example fails some of Mill's methods and so can be dismissed as evidence of causation.

 

[hypnagogue]

Hypnagogue. The problem remains. Yes, the brain produces a pattern... But again "what is having the experience?"

I can sympathize with your reservations. I don't think a 'pure' functionalism is enough either; but, when supplemented with a rich ontological backing, it seems to do the job. Rosenberg's framework explains subjective experience in terms of causation, which dovetails nicely with functionalism. On his view, intrinsically phenomenal aspects of nature form the basis for the extrinsic relationships described by physics. Furthermore, in his theory of causation, causal connections form inherently individuated systems in nature. It is these natural individuals that are 'having the experience.'

It makes just about the same sense to say... the geometric arrangement of flowers on a lawn is experiencing... or the set of relative velocities of cars on a race track is experiencing...

Sure, it might seem arbitrary; but then again, when we try to make sense of the empirical evidence we have, some sort of functionalism seems to be a strong candidate for explaining p-consciousness. Rosenberg would say that a certain geometric arrangement of flowers is not a natural individual because it does not have the proper sort of causal connections, and thus cannot be a subject of experience. A more traditional, 'pure' functionalist would say that the flowerbed does not experience because it does not perform the right kind of functions.

 

[moving finger]

Every correlation is evidence of causation

I disagree.

The point is - one cannot blindly take every correlation and put it forward as evidence of causation. That is bad science.

But use a scientific method to try and first rule out simple correlation (ie do experiments to demonstrate that what is being observed is perhaps more than "just correlation") and it then becomes acceptable to put this forward as evidence of causation. That is good science.

The specific post that I was referring to was an example of correlation only, claiming to be an example of causation, but no attempt was made in that post to demonstrate it was anything other than correlation. Hence bad science.

MF

 

[hypnagogue]

But use a scientific method to try and first rule out simple correlation (ie do experiments to demonstrate that what is being observed is perhaps more than "just correlation") and it then becomes acceptable to put this forward as evidence of causation. That is good science.

You still haven't specified exactly what such a procedure might be. Can you offer us what you think are the general principles by which we can rule out simple correlation, or at least provide an example (real or hypothetical) where mere correlation is ruled out?

 

[moving finger]

You still haven't specified exactly what such a procedure might be. Can you offer us what you think are the general principles by which we can rule out simple correlation, or at least provide an example (real or hypothetical) where mere correlation is ruled out?

Hi Hypnagogue,
With respect, why should the onus be on MF to specify such a procedure? I'm happy calling post #183 (and let's be clear, my reference was to post #183) simply evidence for a correlation. If others wish to call post #183 evidence for causation then let them first please propose a procedure to distinguish between correlation and causation.

My point is simply this : That in absence of any such procedure, calling post #183 "evidence that brains cause consciousness" is equivalent to calling my joke "evidence that fleas hear through their legs".

That's all.

MF


(ps - sorry, I am not deliberately trying to be obstructive, but with all honesty I do not see why the onus should be on MF to do what the poster of post #183 should have done).

 

[Paul Martin]

I see. But the atoms that form our brain are replaced regularly aren't they?

Feynman called the brain "last week's potatoes".

 

[Paul Martin]

Hypnagogue. The problem remains. Yes, the brain produces a pattern... But again "what is having the experience?"

Exdellent question, learningphysics. Hang in there and don't accept any answers that don't make sense to you.

What would make sense to me is that when a pattern is formed... the "something" that has experience interfaces with the brain/body.

I agree. That is exactly what would make sense to me also.

At the risk of leading you astray, or contaminating your thinking, let me describe how I reached my present position from your starting point.

I posited a "something" that has experience and which interfaces with the brain/body and tried to deduce the consequences. So far I am convinced that those consequences are completely consistent with what we experience as conscious beings and with what we seem to perceive as an external world. I am currently actively soliciting opinions indicating errors in my conclusions.

I think an analogy can be made between your sensible description and the music emanating from a radio. The analogs are: experience : music :: brain/body : radio :: interface : EM radiation :: "something" : radio transmitting station :: "has experience" : "produces music" :: "pattern that is formed" : "audio signal superimposed on an RF carrier signal flowing in a specific set of circuits containing electronic components".

 

[moving finger]

The problem remains. Yes, the brain produces a pattern... But again "what is having the experience?"

Exdellent question, learningphysics. Hang in there and don't accept any answers that don't make sense to you.

I know - Maybe there is a little man in the brain who is “having the experience”?

Hmmmm, but that means there must be another little man inside him, “having his experience”….and another…. And another…… ohhhhh dear…….
(3rd person objective scientist's problem)

I wonder if it could be possible that rather than “something having the experience”, maybe it is instead the “experience which creates the something”?
(1st person subjective solution)

MF

 

[learningphysics]

Exdellent question, learningphysics. Hang in there and don't accept any answers that don't make sense to you.

I agree. That is exactly what would make sense to me also.

At the risk of leading you astray, or contaminating your thinking, let me describe how I reached my present position from your starting point.

I posited a "something" that has experience and which interfaces with the brain/body and tried to deduce the consequences. So far I am convinced that those consequences are completely consistent with what we experience as conscious beings and with what we seem to perceive as an external world. I am currently actively soliciting opinions indicating errors in my conclusions.

I think an analogy can be made between your sensible description and the music emanating from a radio. The analogs are: experience : music :: brain/body : radio :: interface : EM radiation :: "something" : radio transmitting station :: "has experience" : "produces music" :: "pattern that is formed" : "audio signal superimposed on an RF carrier signal flowing in a specific set of circuits containing electronic components".

Hi Paul. Glad someone agrees with me.

Using your analogy... I'd say the physical world is the "radio transmitter", and the "something having the experience" is the "radio receiver".

Meaning the content of experience is determined by the physical world... but for experience to happen there needs to be something that experiences the content... a radio receiver.

 

[learningphysics]

I know - Maybe there is a little man in the brain who is “having the experience”?

Hmmmm, but that means there must be another little man inside him, “having his experience”….and another…. And another…… ohhhhh dear…….
(3rd person objective scientist's problem)

I don't understand the above. My position is that "something" is experiencing. There's no infinite regress or anything like that.

I wonder if it could be possible that rather than “something having the experience”, maybe it is instead the “experience which creates the something”?
(1st person subjective solution)

MF

Well, what is the "something having the experience". There is "something" right? Whether or not it is created by experience or not, doesn't change the fact that this something exists. Tell us what this "something" is.

The notion of experience existing independent of an experiencer seems unintelligible to me. It is simply the nature of experience, that there is something that is experiencing, and something that is experienced.

 

[moving finger]

I don't understand the above. My position is that "something" is experiencing. There's no infinite regress or anything like that.

Then what is wrong with the idea that "I am having the experience"?

Once you start to insist there must be something inside "I" that is having the experience (let us call it "J") then you must also ask "what is inside "J" having the experience?" - is it "K"? In which case, what is inside "K" having the experience?

The only way to break the regress is to accept that there is "nothing inside having the experience" but the experience actually creates the being that is "having it", all in one loop. Not easy to grasp, I know, but it's the only consistent solution (unless you want to get mystical).

Well, what is the "something having the experience". There is "something" right? Whether or not it is created by experience or not, doesn't change the fact that this something exists. Tell us what this "something" is.

The experience is "one" with the "being that is having" the experience. You cannot understand it if you insist on 3rd person objectivism (ie that there is an experience and a separate "thing" having the experience), because this leads either to spiritualism or to infinite regress.

The notion of experience existing independent of an experiencer seems unintelligible to me.

And as long as you think like this you will be forced into either spiritualism (which is actually not an answer), or an infinite regress. You must try to let go of 3rd person objectivism.

It is simply the nature of experience, that there is something that is experiencing, and something that is experienced.

What you describe is the nature of intuition, because all of your life you have looked at the world as if there was an "observer" and an "observed". But consciousness cannot operate like this (unless as I say you accept an infinite regress, or spiritualism), hence accept instead that your intuition is wrong.

MF

 

[loseyourname]

I disagree.

I'm not entirely certain that you do.

The point is - one cannot blindly take every correlation and put it forward as evidence of causation. That is bad science.

Then it is not scientific evidence. That does not mean it isn't evidence. Take the guy at the scene of the crime again. His placement is evidence that he committed the crime. As such, he becomes a suspect. It is, however, very poor evidence that requires a good deal of corroborating evidence to even come close to establishing causation beyond a reasonable doubt. You can call it 'bad forensic science.' That doesn't mean it isn't evidence. It's one small piece in a larger puzzle.

But use a scientific method to try and first rule out simple correlation (ie do experiments to demonstrate that what is being observed is perhaps more than "just correlation") and it then becomes acceptable to put this forward as evidence of causation. That is good science.

Sure. That's exactly what Mill's methods do. In fact, they were formulated as part of a scientific epistemology.

The specific post that I was referring to was an example of correlation only, claiming to be an example of causation, but no attempt was made in that post to demonstrate it was anything other than correlation. Hence bad science.

That is wrong. It did not claim to be an example of causation. It claimed to be evidence of causation. That it is. Hearing voices come out of a radio is evidence that the radio is speaking. Again, very bad evidence, but it is evidence. You seem to be of the school of Canute that nothing is evidence unless it at least approaches being conclusive. That just isn't the case. A great deal of what we call 'evidence' is scanty and circumstanial. Heck, even expert testimony is evidence.

 

[moving finger]

Then it is not scientific evidence. That does not mean it isn't evidence. Take the guy at the scene of the crime again. His placement is evidence that he committed the crime. As such, he becomes a suspect. It is, however, very poor evidence that requires a good deal of corroborating evidence to even come close to establishing causation beyond a reasonable doubt. You can call it 'bad forensic science.' That doesn't mean it isn't evidence. It's one small piece in a larger puzzle.

I'll say it once again - the post referred to was not presenting it as "a piece in a larger puzzle", the post was presenting it as stand-alone evidence pure and simple.

As I said, if you accept this logic then you also accept the logic of my joke as evidence fleas hear through their legs. I wonder why people find this absurd if it is supposed to be so logical?

That's exactly what Mill's methods do. In fact, they were formulated as part of a scientific epistemology.

And that's exactly why I said what I did. This has no bearing at all on post #183.

Hearing voices come out of a radio is evidence that the radio is speaking.

And my joke is evidence that fleas hear through their legs.
MF

 

[hypnagogue]

With respect, why should the onus be on MF to specify such a procedure?

Because it's not entirely clear what MF means when MF says "this is not evidence for causation" but refuses for some reason to tell us what he (she?) thinks would count as such evidence. Perhaps MF and the author of post #183 have different things in mind when they say "evidence for causation." It would be very helpful if they would offer their thoughts on the matter. loseyourname has admirably spoken for the author of post #183 after taking up his cause, but I'm still waiting on MF.

 

[learningphysics]

Then what is wrong with the idea that "I am having the experience"?

Please explain what is being referred to by "I". The body? the brain? what is it? I have no clue what you are referring to.

What I'm suggesting is that there is a soul that is having an experience. I don't see any infinite regress. The soul is not made up of any parts.

Once you start to insist there must be something inside "I" that is having the experience (let us call it "J") then you must also ask "what is inside "J" having the experience?" - is it "K"? In which case, what is inside "K" having the experience?

The only way to break the regress is to accept that there is "nothing inside having the experience" but the experience actually creates the being that is "having it", all in one loop. Not easy to grasp, I know, but it's the only consistent solution (unless you want to get mystical).

Well, my position is that of there being a soul that experiences. So do you agree that I avoid the infinite regress?

You seem to be taking two different positions. 1) Nothing experiences. 2) Some being is created by experience, and that being is having the experience.

I'm not sure which is your position.

What you describe is the nature of intuition, because all of your life you have looked at the world as if there was an "observer" and an "observed". But consciousness cannot operate like this (unless as I say you accept an infinite regress, or spiritualism), hence accept instead that your intuition is wrong.

MF

It is strange that you use the words "I", "you" when you in fact believe that these things do not actually exist.

So the options are to say that "nothing experiences" or go with "spiritualism"... Well, given the options I'll definitely go with "spiritualism".

Although it is intuition, I believe it is more than that (I can't articulate it at the moment, but will try in future posts). The strangeness of the notion of "no-self" is apparent when we consider pain and pleasure. If someone is being tortured... does it make sense to say "pain exists here, but no being is experiencing any pain".

 

[hypnagogue]

So the options are to say that "nothing experiences" or go with "spiritualism"... Well, given the options I'll definitely go with "spiritualism".

Those are not the only options-- in my last response to you, I offered an example of a framework that can coherently identify the 'thing' that experiences. I don't know exactly what you mean by 'spiritualism,' but if you mean a view that claims the existence of souls, then Rosenberg's framework is not spiritualism. You certainly don't have to assume that souls exist in order to account for the experiencing subject.

 

[moving finger]

Because it's not entirely clear what MF means when MF says "this is not evidence for causation" but refuses for some reason to tell us what he (she?) thinks would count as such evidence. Perhaps MF and the author of post #183 have different things in mind when they say "evidence for causation." It would be very helpful if they would offer their thoughts on the matter. loseyourname has admirably spoken for the author of post #183 after taking up his cause, but I'm still waiting on MF.

suggest you instead ask the poster of post #183 to justify his/her claim.
in absence of such justification, MF (on the basis of post #183) claims there is evidence that fleas hear through their legs
MF

 

[moving finger]

Please explain what is being referred to by "I". The body? the brain? what is it? I have no clue what you are referring to.

The thing having the experience.

What I'm suggesting is that there is a soul that is having an experience. I don't see any infinite regress. The soul is not made up of any parts.

You can call it a soul if you wish. A name in itself means nothing, only how you define it makes it take on any meaning.

Well, my position is that of there being a soul that experiences. So do you agree that I avoid the infinite regress?

Yes, as long as you do not then try to isolate what you call the soul, or to look inside what you call the soul, and ask how this thing you call soul is experiencing things without there being something inside to do the experiencing.
What you call soul is convoluted with and interdependent on experience.

You seem to be taking two different positions. 1) Nothing experiences. 2) Some being is created by experience, and that being is having the experience.

No, I don’t think I am, why do you say that?

I'm not sure which is your position.

Normal 3rd person objectivism would try to break the problem down into “the experience” and “the thing doing the experiencing”. This does not work, because the experience and the “thing which experiences” are convoluted with and interdependent on each other. It is not possible to separate them and say “here on the left we have an experience, devoid of the thing which experiences” and “here on the right we have the thing which experiences, devoid of experience”.
If you want to cut out “the thing which has the experience” as a separate entity, and study it in isolation from the experiences, you will never succeed, because the “thing that experiences” is part and parcel of the experiences.
That is my position.

It is strange that you use the words "I", "you" when you in fact believe that these things do not actually exist.

I never said that “I” does not exist. Where did you get that idea?
Look clearly at the beginning of post #233, what is my first sentence?

So the options are to say that "nothing experiences" or go with "spiritualism"... Well, given the options I'll definitely go with "spiritualism".

I never said “nothing experiences”. Again you seem to be not reading correctly.
I said

the experience actually creates the being that is "having it", all in one loop

The experience is "one" with the "being that is having" the experience

Although it is intuition, I believe it is more than that (I can't articulate it at the moment, but will try in future posts).

That’s exactly what intuition is.

The strangeness of the notion of "no-self" is apparent when we consider pain and pleasure. If someone is being tortured... does it make sense to say "pain exists here, but no being is experiencing any pain".

I never said there is “no-self”. Again you seem to be reading things that are not there.

MF

 

[learningphysics]

Normal 3rd person objectivism would try to break the problem down into “the experience” and “the thing doing the experiencing”. This does not work, because the experience and the “thing which experiences” are convoluted with and interdependent on each other. It is not possible to separate them and say “here on the left we have an experience, devoid of the thing which experiences” and “here on the right we have the thing which experiences, devoid of experience”.
If you want to cut out “the thing which has the experience” as a separate entity, and study it in isolation from the experiences, you will never succeed, because the “thing that experiences” is part and parcel of the experiences.
That is my position.

Is "the thing which has the experience" logically and metaphysically equivalent to "the experience"?

Is the referrent of "the thing which has the experience" the same as the referrent of "the experience"?

Are you saying that "the experience is having the experience"?

I'm not sure what you mean by "interdependent"... this implies that there are two different parts... they may not be able to exist separately but that is not the issue... So if there are two different parts... my question remains "What is having the experience"

My question all along has been "what is having the experience". That is all. I never said that the "experiencer" exists devoid of experience (yes, I believe this, but that has not been an issue in this thread)

 

[Paul Martin]

The "infinite regress" straw man

I know - Maybe there is a little man in the brain who is “having the experience”?

Hmmmm, but that means there must be another little man inside him, “having his experience”….and another…. And another…… ohhhhh dear…….
(3rd person objective scientist's problem)

I wonder if it could be possible that rather than “something having the experience”, maybe it is instead the “experience which creates the something”?
(1st person subjective solution)

MF

I think it is a mistake to jump to the conclusion of "infinite regress" whenever a recursive function is encountered. You may never have had a set of nested Russian dolls, but with the mind set you exhibit here, you would stop opening them after the first four (if I counted right in your second paragraph) and say "ohhhhhh dear, there must be an infinite number of dolls here". Nothing in principle prevents the existence of a finite stopping point for any nested sequence I have ever heard of rather than assuming that it continues to "infinity". In fact, in my view, the "infinite" case is the more absurd.

As for your last question, we are talking about experience so it seems perfectly reasonable to me to posit an 'experiencer' in order to talk about what goes on wrt experience. Whether we use a term like 'experiencer' or a "something" makes no difference, as you have pointed out earlier. So, in my view, it makes perfect sense to talk about “something having the experience”. And I think it helps clarify the discussion to talk separately about the “something having the experience” and the experience itself. Maybe in actuality one can't exist without the other but we can certainly identify each of them for purposes of discussion.

Think of a Yin-Yang symbol. The two halves are intertwined, each defines the other, and you can't have one in isolation without either obliterating the one (in case the background is the same color) or dragging the other along anyway (in case the background is different). Yet it is perfectly plausible and useful to talk about each half separately.

But let's go with your suggestion. Instead of talking about “something having the experience”, let's suppose that the “experience ... creates the something” and talk about that. Let's see... The experience creates the something. Hmmmm. What could that something be? Could it be the "something having the experience"?... No, we are taking your suggestion and abandoning that idea for the moment.

What then could it be? Could it be the experience itself? It almost has to be because that is all we are talking about. There seems to be no other candidate once we rule out an 'experiencer', er, I mean "something having the experience".

So that means that your suggestion says "the experience creates the experience". Now, do you suppose these two instances of experience are the same? Or are they different? Well, let's examine both cases.

If they are the same, then there is a strong temptation to jump to the infinite regress conclusion: It must be "experience" all the way down. But, if we don't have a loop here, I think we have nothing but nonsense. On the other hand, we may have stumbled across a solution for any mystery of origins at all. If we are puzzled about the origin of, say, A, then this solution provides the answer: A created A. Very neat and tidy, but utter nonsense.

So it must be that the two experiences are different. Your suggestion must mean that "experience 1 creates experience 2". Now this seems more like it and it begins to sound like some other statements you have made. Of course we are immediately drawn to ask what creates experience 1. And applying the same solution, we discover that each experience is caused by a long chain of preceding experiences. How long? Well it couldn't be infinite or else we would have the dreaded infinite regress which we all abhor.

So we are left with this long history of experiences with no need for anything to have experienced them. This may be possible and may be the case in a zombie world. But as learningphysics has pointed out, there are people in our world who are suffering and being tortured who cry out for a better explanation. They actually feel the problem and would claim that they (they are "something") are having the experience of pain.

With respect, I don't think your suggestion helps.

Paul

 

[selfAdjoint]

If consciousness essentially involve a little man who has the experience, then what about that little man; how does he have that experience? Why he must be conscious! And if conscious, since you hold the little man theory of consciousness, he must have a little man inside him. And by induction every little man must have another little man inside. The induction step depends on the fact that you explain consciouness in general on the little man theory. If the series can stop, it can only be because we have encountered some other theory of consciousness. And if we can contemplate such a thing at step n, why can not we contemplate it at step 1?

 

[Paul Martin]

Glad someone agrees with me.

We seem to agree to some extent, but from what you wrote, there is either some disagreement or some misunderstanding between us.

Using your analogy... I'd say the physical world is the "radio transmitter", and the "something having the experience" is the "radio receiver".

Meaning the content of experience is determined by the physical world... but for experience to happen there needs to be something that experiences the content... a radio receiver.

By saying that, you aren't using my analogy in the same way I am. I think I see what you mean as you explained it in your last paragraph here, but that does not fit with my analogy. I think it is because you are attempting to show the flow of information or content from a sender to a receiver, or from a cause to an effect. My use of the analogy does not show that.

What I am trying to show in the analogy are the separately identifiable parts involved in experience, where those parts reside, and how they are connected. The analogy does not show an analogous flow of content of information or effect. The analogy again, for reference is

experience : music :: brain/body : radio :: interface : EM radiation :: "something that has experience" : radio transmitting station :: "has experience" : "produces music" :: "pattern that is formed" : "audio signal superimposed on an RF carrier signal flowing in a specific set of circuits containing electronic components".

The points I want to illustrate with the analogy are that
1. The brain/body, the "pattern that is formed", and the experience itself, all occur or exist in this physical world (just as the radio, the AF and RF signals, and the music occur or exist in the room where the radio is located).
2. The "something" which has the experience is not in the world or part of it (just as the transmitting station is not in the room with the radio or part of it).
3. There is an interface of some sort connecting the "something" with the brain/body (just as EM radiation connects the transmitter with the receiver).

The analogy does not show the flow of information or influence because I have "has experience" analogous to "produces music". One is an input and the other is an output. Moreover, in the radio case, the flow of information is one way only, I believe the link between consciousness and brain is two-way. (The Mars rover is really a better analogy.)

I think we agree that there is "something that has experience" which is important and which we would like to understand better. Where we might not agree is with my belief that there is only one such thing in all reality and that it does not reside or exist in our physical universe.

Paul

 

[learningphysics]

If consciousness essentially involve a little man who has the experience, then what about that little man; how does he have that experience? Why he must be conscious! And if conscious, since you hold the little man theory of consciousness, he must have a little man inside him.

It seems that you're saying step 1 is:
The human body is conscious... so the little man theory of consciousness=> there's a little man inside the human body that is experiencing and is conscious etc...

But I'd say this first step is wrong. My belief is that the human body is not conscious or experiencing... but the "little man" is conscious and experiencing... There is no need to say there's another "little man" inside the first one. If there is such a need, then please explain it. The reason we hypothesize a "little man" is because the body itself (the matter of the body) is not experiencing and not conscious.

ie: I'm not saying that the little man exists because the body is conscious... on the contrary, I'm saying the "little man" exists because the body is NOT conscious. So the process ends right there. There's no need to say there's another "little man".

I don't see the infinite regress.

My belief is that there's a substance not made up of any parts... call it a soul if you will... that has experience. The experiences have a correspondence with the physical changes of the body.

Hypnogue... I'll try to read "A Place for consciousness" and see the other option.

 

[learningphysics]

The points I want to illustrate with the analogy are that
1. The brain/body, the "pattern that is formed", and the experience itself, all occur or exist in this physical world (just as the radio, the AF and RF signals, and the music occur or exist in the room where the radio is located).

Alright. I don't know if I'd say that the "experience" is happening in the physical world though.

2. The "something" which has the experience is not in the world or part of it (just as the transmitting station is not in the room with the radio or part of it).

Yes. That's fine. But wouldn't a transceiver be a more apt analogy as the connection is two-way like you said?

3. There is an interface of some sort connecting the "something" with the brain/body (just as EM radiation connects the transmitter with the receiver).

Yes. This is fine.

The analogy does not show the flow of information or influence because I have "has experience" analogous to "produces music". One is an input and the other is an output. Moreover, in the radio case, the flow of information is one way only, I believe the link between consciousness and brain is two-way. (The Mars rover is really a better analogy.)

That's fine. But doesn't "produces music" imply a flow of information from the producer? Wouldn't "producing and receiving music" be a more apt analogy. (I just want to make sure I understand your ideas. Not trying to nitpick).

It seems like the big difference between what I said and you said is that I was emphasizing the "experiencer" as a "receiver" and you were emphasizing the "experiencer" as a "transceiver" that can influence or be influenced?

Where we might not agree is with my belief that there is only one such thing in all reality and that it does not reside or exist in our physical universe.

I agree that an experiencer does not reside in the physical universe. I'm not certain that there is only one such thing.

 

[Paul Martin]

If consciousness essentially involve a little man who has the experience, then what about that little man;

Of course we don't literally mean a little man, but 'little man' is just as good a symbol as 'CC', 'TEOx', 'something', 'conscious experiencer', 'driver', or any other symbol we have used for this purpose. Since you chose to use 'little man', I'll go along with it. In my view I consider it to be equivalent to the other symbols which I take to mean "the thing that experiences consciousness".

I don't think I need to caution you, selfAdjoint, but for other readers, please bear in mind that my views on this subject are not orthodox or common. Please don't interpret anything I say as a fact, but simply as my answers to questions based on my personal point of view.

how does he have that experience? Why he must be conscious!

I agree that the little man must be conscious.

And if conscious, since you hold the little man theory of consciousness, he must have a little man inside him.

I don't know what the "little man theory of consciousness" is so I can't say whether I hold it or not. Nevertheless, I do think there is a little man inside the little man. (Using my more usual symbolism, I think that the driver of these human body vehicles is itself a vehicle being driven by a yet higher level driver.)

And by induction every little man must have another little man inside.

I don't accept induction as a reason for concluding that the little men are nested. Nevertheless, I do think they are to some depth (I suspect the depth may be 11 based in part on Plato's suggestion and the number of dimensions in some versions of string theory. But that's not important here.)

The induction step depends on the fact that you explain consciouness in general on the little man theory.

This is irrelevant in my explanation.

If the series can stop, it can only be because we have encountered some other theory of consciousness.

I can't confirm or deny that assertion. But in my "theory of consciousness", the series does stop as I mentioned.

And if we can contemplate such a thing at step n, why can not we contemplate it at step 1?

Here's why in my view: Think of the little men as drivers and organisms as vehicles being driven. I think there may be more vehicles than drivers -- oops! I mean there may be more people than little men. (It's a lot harder to visualize this way, but I said I would use your symbolism so I will). So if we are at level 1, then those little men exist at level 2. But those little men in turn "contain" little men, but again, there are more little men at level 2 than there are at level 3. (More vehicles than drivers.) Similarly there are more at level 3 than at level 4. Since we start with a finite number of organisms here on earth, it is easy to see that at some finite level, the number of little men shrinks to 1. The little man at that level is the only real consciousness. It is the only real driver. The only thing that can experience. The only possessor of free will. The only knower. It is the thing that can and has constructed everything else in reality by pure conscious thought, just as Berkeley proposed. The various levels of reality that are inhabited by these little men, were constructed in a helical pattern as I have described elsewhere in this forum. I see no mystery or problem which cannot be explained in a straightforward way by this model except the single mystery of how that first little man came to exist. But you have to start somewhere and every theory will have an equivalent mystery.

After re-reading this, I must make one correction. Rather than go back to the top and fix it, I think it is better to wait and fix it now after you have read this far. At the beginning when I agreed to use the symbol 'little man' I said I would take it to mean "the thing that experiences consciousness". That's not exactly correct. I should have said that it means the thing that *seems to* experience consciousness. The experience of consciousness in all but the top little man is really an illusion. It is only the top little man who can experience consciousness and when he is vicariously experiencing the experiences of lower level little men, he has the illusion that it is the little man that is having the experience. In other words, the top little man is having the illusion that he *is* the lower level little man. That way, the lower level little man goes around acting as if, and claiming that, he is conscious.

So this final mystery is the answer to your question of why such a thing as consciousness "cannot be contemplated" for any higher level. That top little man is the only thing that can do any contemplating at all.

Any other questions? Thanks for reading.

Oh, BTW it seems to me that all these little men qualify as individuals in Gregg Rosenberg's sense.

Paul

 

[moving finger]

If consciousness essentially involve a little man who has the experience, then what about that little man; how does he have that experience? Why he must be conscious! And if conscious, since you hold the little man theory of consciousness, he must have a little man inside him. And by induction every little man must have another little man inside. The induction step depends on the fact that you explain consciouness in general on the little man theory. If the series can stop, it can only be because we have encountered some other theory of consciousness. And if we can contemplate such a thing at step n, why can not we contemplate it at step 1?

Agreed
MF

 

[moving finger]

I think it is a mistake to jump to the conclusion of "infinite regress" whenever a recursive function is encountered.

Did I suggest infinite regress? You are making a bold leap. My post was simply to illustrate that “trying to identify just what is having the experience” can be answered either by accepting that “the experience creates the experiencer”, or by postulating that “there is some separate entity having the experience”, but the latter does not actually answer the question it simply moves the question.

And I think it helps clarify the discussion to talk separately about the “something having the experience” and the experience itself.

This is exactly where your confusion comes in.

Maybe in actuality one can't exist without the other but we can certainly identify each of them for purposes of discussion.

IMHO I do not think they each can be "indentified" where by identified we mean in the sense of “separating one from the other”

Think of a Yin-Yang symbol. The two halves are intertwined, each defines the other, and you can't have one in isolation without either obliterating the one (in case the background is the same color) or dragging the other along anyway (in case the background is different). Yet it is perfectly plausible and useful to talk about each half separately. .

Simple picture, but not applicable here. I can think one half of the Yin-Yang symbol in isolation, the definition of this symbol is not strictly interdependent with the other half.

But let's go with your suggestion. Instead of talking about “something having the experience”, let's suppose that the “experience ... creates the something” and talk about that. Let's see... The experience creates the something. Hmmmm. What could that something be? Could it be the "something having the experience"?... No, we are taking your suggestion and abandoning that idea for the moment.

You misread the post. I did not say one “cannot” talk about something having the experience. Clearly one can talk about it. But IMHO there is no solution to be found in trying to isolate (ie isolate the something from the experiences) what this “something” is, because this “something” exists only in combination with its experiences.
Thus (as I said in the original post but you chose to ignore) the “experiences create the something”.

The remainder of your post is thus (with respect) not relevant to what I actually stated.

MF

 

[Paul Martin]

Hmmmm, but that means there must be another little man inside him, “having his experience”….and another…. And another…… ohhhhh dear…….
(3rd person objective scientist's problem)

Did I suggest infinite regress?

Yes, you suggested it to me. I don't know what a "3rd person objective scientist" is, or what they think, nor do I know what their problem might be, but " ohhhhh dear……." suggested exasperation of the type I sense when people jump to the conclusion that a particular sequence leads to infinite regress.

You are making a bold leap.

Did I suggest that you made the mistake of jumping to the "infinite regress" conclusion? My comment was simply to point out that IMHO we should not give up too early when analyzing a sequence that might look to some as if it would lead to infinite regress.

“trying to identify just what is having the experience” can be answered either by accepting that “the experience creates the experiencer”, or by postulating that “there is some separate entity having the experience”, but the latter does not actually answer the question it simply moves the question.

First of all, “trying to identify just what is having the experience” is not a question requiring an answer. In my view, and in this case, “trying to identify just what is having the experience” is postulating that there is some (not necessarily separate) entity having the experience and choosing a symbol to represent that entity. When this is done, we can proceed to talk rationally about it and try to understand one another.

Your suggestion that this attempt somehow implies a question which can be answered leaves me wondering just what that question is. Working backward from the two answers you provide, and which you seem to imply are the only two possible answers, I try to uncover the question.

Your first answer, "accepting that “the experience creates the experiencer”" seems to suggest a question of the origin of an "experiencer". Yet it seems you are opposed to defining or identifying the term "experiencer" because somehow that would entail separability.

Your second answer, "postulating that “there is some separate entity having the experience”" suggests a question like, "How might we approach a rational discussion of the notion of an "experiencer"?" But no. You say that this "does not actually answer the question it simply moves the question". Postulating an entity does not "move the question" of how to proceed with a discussion. I give up. What was the question you had in mind?

On second thought, I am going to stop here, make a confession, and edge slowly away from this discussion.

I am somewhat embarrassed to admit that when I first read your post #230 I found it patronizing and offensive. And I am sorry that I composed my response while I was still feeling a little incensed and huffy. That attitude clearly shows through in my response about the "Infinite regress straw man" and I apologize for it. I can understand if this struck you as patronizing and offensive and thus would explain the present non-sensical debate.

I thoroughly enjoy our more sensible discussions, MF. I'll see you there. Sorry about this one.

Paul