Are Qualia Real? Debate & Discussion

[selfAdjoint]

It seems that you're saying step 1 is:
The human body is conscious... so the little man theory of consciousness=> there's a little man inside the human body that is experiencing and is conscious etc...

But I'd say this first step is wrong. My belief is that the human body is not conscious or experiencing... but the "little man" is conscious and experiencing... There is no need to say there's another "little man" inside the first one. If there is such a need, then please explain it. The reason we hypothesize a "little man" is because the body itself (the matter of the body) is not experiencing and not conscious.

ie: I'm not saying that the little man exists because the body is conscious... on the contrary, I'm saying the "little man" exists because the body is NOT conscious. So the process ends right there. There's no need to say there's another "little man".

I don't see the infinite regress.

My belief is that there's a substance not made up of any parts... call it a soul if you will... that has experience. The experiences have a correspondence with the physical changes of the body.

Hypnogue... I'll try to read "A Place for consciousness" and see the other option.

I wasn't saying ANYTHING about the human body being conscious. The homunculus or little man theory of consciuness is classical, and mostly now abandoned. But it seems to have acqiuired a new life on these boards. So I was pointing out that contrary to what had been posted, you do not have the option of stopping the regress without abandoning the little man theory.

 

[learningphysics]

So I was pointing out that contrary to what had been posted, you do not have the option of stopping the regress without abandoning the little man theory.

What regress? Here's what you said in a previous post:

And if conscious, since you hold the little man theory of consciousness, he must have a little man inside him.

I do not understand this step above. Why must I hold that if something is conscious he has a little man inside him?

I never used the reasoning that "if something is consciouss he has a little man inside him". So how I have created any type of regress?

 

[StatusX]

Experiences have to be experienced by something. We can't coherently talk about experiences that are mine and not yours if experiences are just out there, not tied to an experiencing subject. If you ever tried to imagine what it'd be like to be someone or something else, or wondered what happens after you die, you know what I'm talking about. If you think its silly to talk about a "soul" (obviously without the religious connotations), then as I suggested before, sign up to be the first to jump in a teleporter. But you won't see me using one.

 

[Picklehead]

I sort of agree, Scotty was, in a way, a mass murder.

 

[selfAdjoint]

What regress? Here's what you said in a previous post:



I do not understand this step above. Why must I hold that if something is conscious he has a little man inside him?

I never used the reasoning that "if something is consciouss he has a little man inside him". So how I have created any type of regress?

Can YOU say If.. Then?

IF someone, anyone, holds that consciousness necessarily involves a little man viewing the "theater of consciousness", and if they agree as Paul does that the little man has to be conscious himself, THEN they must necessarily believe the little man in THEIR heads has a little man in HIS head, and so on ad infinitum.

 

[learningphysics]

Can YOU say If.. Then?

IF someone, anyone, holds that consciousness necessarily involves a little man viewing the "theater of consciousness", and if they agree as Paul does that the little man has to be conscious himself, THEN they must necessarily believe the little man in THEIR heads has a little man in HIS head, and so on ad infinitum.

There exists consciousness... there exists something that is experiencing consciousness... This is about all I've said. I'm simply calling that being "little man" because you chose those words. One "little man". One "theatre".

This one "experiencer" is viewing the one "theatre of consciousness". You keep saying that I'm required to now believe that there is another "experiencer" inside the first. Why? You seem to take it as an axiom.

If you clearly demonstrate the first step of this infinite regress, I think we'll avoid a lot of confusion.

 

[moving finger]

Did I suggest infinite regress? .

Yes, you suggested it to me. I don't know what a "3rd person objective scientist" is, or what they think, nor do I know what their problem might be, but " ohhhhh dear……." suggested exasperation of the type I sense when people jump to the conclusion that a particular sequence leads to infinite regress. .

Sorry, PM, but IMHO “you suggested it to yourself” (or maybe “your experience of my post suggested it to something in PM”) in the way that you interpreted my post. The idea I was trying to convey (obviously not successfully) was that answering the question “what is having the experience” by suggesting that “some X is having the experience” does not provide an answer, it only moves the same question one level down. If PM wishes to interpret this as meaning an “infinite regress” then that is PM’s choice. The intent was not to show infinite regress, but to show that “some X is having the experience” is not in itself an answer.

Your first answer, "accepting that “the experience creates the experiencer”" seems to suggest a question of the origin of an "experiencer". Yet it seems you are opposed to defining or identifying the term "experiencer" because somehow that would entail separability. .

With respect, PM, it seems to me that you are not attempting a rational critique of the ideas presented, but simply (IMHO) taking arbitrary phrases and sentences from my posts and trying to analyse them out of context. This to me seems a waste of both your and my time, sorry.

The idea I am trying to convey is summed up very nicely by Antonio Damasio in “The Feeling of What Happens” as follows :

The core “You” is only born as the story is told, within the story itself. “You” exist as a mental being when primordial stories are being told, and only then. “You” are the music, while the music lasts.

I thoroughly enjoy our more sensible discussions, MF. I'll see you there. Sorry about this one.

Me too.

MF

 

[moving finger]

There exists consciousness... there exists something that is experiencing consciousness... This is about all I've said. I'm simply calling that being "little man" because you chose those words. One "little man". One "theatre".

This one "experiencer" is viewing the one "theatre of consciousness". You keep saying that I'm required to now believe that there is another "experiencer" inside the first. Why? You seem to take it as an axiom.

If you clearly demonstrate the first step of this infinite regress, I think we'll avoid a lot of confusion.

The idea I am trying to convey is summed up nicely by Antonia Damasio in “The Feeling of What Happens” as follows :

The core “You” is only born as the story is told, within the story itself. “You” exist as a mental being when primordial stories are being told, and only then. “You” are the music, while the music lasts.

MF

 

[learningphysics]

The idea I am trying to convey is summed up nicely by Antonia Damasio in “The Feeling of What Happens” as follows :

MF

That's all well and good. Like I said previously, whether or not the experiencer exists without experience, has never been an issue in this thread. All I've been saying is that there is an experiencer... and asking what exactly is this experiencer?

 

[moving finger]

That's all well and good. Like I said previously, whether or not the experiencer exists without experience, has never been an issue in this thread. All I've been saying is that there is an experiencer... and asking what exactly is this experiencer?

The core “You” is only born as the story is told, within the story itself. “You” exist as a mental being when primordial stories are being told, and only then. “You” are the music, while the music lasts.

What more do you want to know?

MF

 

[loseyourname]

That's all well and good. Like I said previously, whether or not the experiencer exists without experience, has never been an issue in this thread. All I've been saying is that there is an experiencer... and asking what exactly is this experiencer?

Adjoint is correct to call your hypothesis question begging and paradoxical in that it leads to an infinite regress. That has actually been accepted and is the reason that the idea of a 'homunculus' sitting inside of a Cartesian theatre has been long abandoned. You coming in here and proposing this is like a man posting in the classical mechanics forum proposing a theory of 'impetus.'

The problem lies exactly where you've been told it lies. If you postulate an experiencer inside of the mental world of humans, you've simply begged the question: Well, how does this 'experiencer' experience? To use your original line of reasoning, there must be a second experiencer inside of the first
experiencer's mental theatre. Presumably you can see how this leads to a regress. It has to be cut off at some point. You don't seem to have any idea of how or why it cuts off at any certain point, but you do seem to want to cut it off at the first homunculus. Some mysterious process takes place in this 'experiencer' that allows him to view the contents of the human mental world. Well, that hypothesis is superfluous. If you can postulate some mysterious process inside of your homunculus to avoid an infinite regress, that same mysterious process can be postulated to occur inside of your brain, making the human body itself the experiencer.

 

[learningphysics]

The core “You” is only born as the story is told, within the story itself. “You” exist as a mental being when primordial stories are being told, and only then. “You” are the music, while the music lasts.

What more do you want to know?

MF

Well... nothing really... the importance of this is that there is some substance that experiences... this substance isn't matter... This substance may go in and out of existence as experiences begin and end.

 

[learningphysics]

Adjoint is correct to call your hypothesis question begging and paradoxical in that it leads to an infinite regress. That has actually been accepted and is the reason that the idea of a 'homunculus' sitting inside of a Cartesian theatre has been long abandoned. You coming in here and proposing this is like a man posting in the classical mechanics forum proposing a theory of 'impetus.'

I don't know what a 'homunculus' is. But I can't simply reject theories because they have lost popularity.

The problem lies exactly where you've been told it lies. If you postulate an experiencer inside of the mental world of humans, you've simply begged the question: Well, how does this 'experiencer' experience? To use your original line of reasoning, there must be a second experiencer inside of the first
experiencer's mental theatre.

I have never asked the question "how does it experience". I've asked the question "what is experiencing".

My reasoning is like this: Atoms of the body and brain are being replaced... so it isn't literally matter that is having experience unless we presume that experiencers live and die as atoms get replaced. So something else has to be this single experiencer that is maintained as atoms are replaced.

I haven't asked how this "something else" is having an experience. All I know is that something is having an experience... if it isn't matter... well then there's something else there.

Presumably you can see how this leads to a regress. It has to be cut off at some point. You don't seem to have any idea of how or why it cuts off at any certain point, but you do seem to want to cut it off at the first homunculus. Some mysterious process takes place in this 'experiencer' that allows him to view the contents of the human mental world. Well, that hypothesis is superfluous. If you can postulate some mysterious process inside of your homunculus to avoid an infinite regress, that same mysterious process can be postulated to occur inside of your brain, making the human body itself the experiencer.

Except that there is no permanent human body. We don't possesses the same body as time passes... atoms are replaced... the body changes... the brain changes. If the body is the experiencer... then experiencers are constantly living and dying as atoms get replaced...

This dynamic nature of the brain and body is the only reason that I postulate something else that must be there. It's the only way I can see a single experiencer coupled with a dynamic physical body. We wouldn't be talking about this if the body was static.

 

[moving finger]

Well... nothing really... the importance of this is that there is some substance that experiences... this substance isn't matter... This substance may go in and out of existence as experiences begin and end.

Why do you feel there needs to be a "substance that experiences", and what evidence is there that such a substance exists?
MF

 

[learningphysics]

Why do you feel there needs to be a "substance that experiences", and what evidence is there that such a substance exists?
MF

There's "something" that experiences. You've agreed with this. I don't know what else to say. Maybe substance is the wrong word. By substance... I mean thing... object... There is some "thing" that is experiencing.

 

[moving finger]

There's "something" that experiences. You've agreed with this.

With respect, “something” that experiences is not the same as a "substance that experiences".

I don't know what else to say. Maybe substance is the wrong word. By substance... I mean thing... object... There is some "thing" that is experiencing.

This (with respect) is the problem. You are thinking that this “something” must be an “object”. Let me repeat again the words of Antonio Damasio :

The core “You” is only born as the story is told, within the story itself. “You” exist as a mental being when primordial stories are being told, and only then. “You” are the music, while the music lasts.

In other words, the “you” is not an object in the normal 3rd person objective sense, it is not something that can be “isolated” and “put into a box” – the “you” is created, and exists, only in the context of the stories being told, it is not an objective “thing” which can be isolated and studied, it exists as part of the music, as part of the experience. Silence the music, take away the experience, and the “you” is gone.

MF

 

[learningphysics]

With respect, “something” that experiences is not the same as a "substance that experiences".


This (with respect) is the problem. You are thinking that this “something” must be an “object”. Let me repeat again the words of Antonio Damasio :

The core “You” is only born as the story is told, within the story itself. “You” exist as a mental being when primordial stories are being told, and only then.

And the above is not a thing? Things can go in and out of existence.

“You” are the music, while the music lasts.

If "I" am the music... then going with this analogy, what is the "experience"... "music" also?

In other words, the “you” is not an object in the normal 3rd person objective sense, it is not something that can be “isolated” and “put into a box” – the “you” is created, and exists, only in the context of the stories being told, it is not an objective “thing” which can be isolated and studied, it exists as part of the music, as part of the experience.

Which part of the experience?

So a "part of the experience" is experiencing the "whole experience"?

Why can't I isolate this part and call it the "object that is experiencing"?

Silence the music, take away the experience, and the “you” is gone.

Ok so "music" refers to "experience"... and above "music" also refers to "I". So it is your position that "part of the experience" ("I") experiences the "whole experience"?

 

[moving finger]

The core “You” is only born as the story is told, within the story itself. “You” exist as a mental being when primordial stories are being told, and only then.

And the above is not a thing? Things can go in and out of existence.

I never said that the “You” was not a “thing”.
What I object to is calling the “You” a “substance” (which normally implies something “material”)

“You” are the music, while the music lasts.

If "I" am the music... then going with this analogy, what is the "experience"... "music" also?

The experience is part of the music.

In other words, the “you” is not an object in the normal 3rd person objective sense, it is not something that can be “isolated” and “put into a box” – the “you” is created, and exists, only in the context of the stories being told, it is not an objective “thing” which can be isolated and studied, it exists as part of the music, as part of the experience.

Which part of the experience?

An integral part of the experience, not a “part” that can be extracted and studied in isolation.

So a "part of the experience" is experiencing the "whole experience"?

No, the experience creates the experiencer.

Why can't I isolate this part and call it the "object that is experiencing"?

Because the object does not exist in isolation. It exists only as part of the experience.

Silence the music, take away the experience, and the “you” is gone.

Ok so "music" refers to "experience"... and above "music" also refers to "I". So it is your position that "part of the experience" ("I") experiences the "whole experience"?

“I” is an integral part of the experience. The “I” cannot exist without the experience, and the experience has no meaning without the “I”.
With respect, you seem to want to isolate the “I” from the experience, to separate the “I” and to study it in absence of all experience. IMHO, this is not possible. Experiences create the “I”; the “I” cannot exist in isolation.
MF

 

[loseyourname]

I don't know what a 'homunculus' is. But I can't simply reject theories because they have lost popularity.

You certainly can study up on some history of philosophy so that you can understand that homunculus theories have been abandoned for a good reason without all of us having to come in and list these reasons for you.

My reasoning is like this: Atoms of the body and brain are being replaced... so it isn't literally matter that is having experience unless we presume that experiencers live and die as atoms get replaced. So something else has to be this single experiencer that is maintained as atoms are replaced.

Emergent properties. They needn't even be the strongly emergent, irreducible, spooky kind. Just simple emergence. Think color. No atom or molecule has any particular color, yet macroscopic collections of atoms do. In fact, following your line of reasoning, the atoms and molecules in a blade of grass are constantly being replaced, so it cannot be the matter that has color. Presumably you can see the flaw in the reasoning here. This argument is non-sequitur:

Atoms of entity X are constantly being replaced.
Therefore, any continuing property of X cannot be a property of matter.

The first reason your conclusion doesn't follow from your premise (aside from the fact that no conclusion can follow from a single premise unless the argument is circular) is emergent properties. Collections of atoms can have properties that individual atoms do not have. The second reason is that continuity of individual atoms is not necessary for continuity in the properties of collections of atoms. The color of a blade of grass is just one simple example, but there are many others. The properties of Microsoft Word, for instance, are continuous and hold through time, no matter where the software is installed.

I haven't asked how this "something else" is having an experience. All I know is that something is having an experience... if it isn't matter... well then there's something else there.

You don't have to ask the question yourself. It is this question that generates the incoherency of the homunculus theory and, for this reason, it would do you well to know it. Again, you should read up on pet theories of yours. You'll likely find that many have already been proposed and abandoned because of difficulties that could not be overcome. That is the way good philosophy is carried out and is the reason that philosophers more than persons in any other line of work absolutely must study up on the history of their discipline.

Except that there is no permanent human body.

You're again mistaking individual atoms for collections of atoms. The individual atoms may not endure long within anyone body, but you do only have one body for all of your life.

We don't possesses the same body as time passes... atoms are replaced... the body changes... the brain changes. If the body is the experiencer... then experiencers are constantly living and dying as atoms get replaced...

No they aren't, because the experiencers aren't the atoms. When we replace rivets on an automobile assembly robot, do we say that one arm died and another took its place? Of course not. In fact, over the next 20 years or so, all of the metal will be replaced on the Golden Gate bridge. It will still be the same bridge with exactly the same properties that it had before, except that it will be somewhat stronger.

Also, you seem to be forgetting the important note that matter in the brain is not replaced. Ions and nutrients in the cytosol come and go, but the infrastrucure is set once you reach maturity.

 

[learningphysics]

In fact, following your line of reasoning, the atoms and molecules in a blade of grass are constantly being replaced, so it cannot be the matter that has color.

No. At any moment in time the particular blade of grass has color. The particular collection of atoms has the property of color.

If you're comparing 'color' to the 'ability to experience' then yes... there is no problem in saying that matter can experience even as atoms are being replaced. So 'ability to experience' remains. But there is a serious problem in saying that the experiencer is the same as atoms are replaced.

You can't compare 'color' to 'experiencer'... the first is a property, the second isn't. You can compare 'color' to 'ability to experience'.

Presumably you can see the flaw in the reasoning here. This argument is non-sequitur:

Atoms of entity X are constantly being replaced.
Therefore, any continuing property of X cannot be a property of matter.

If the atoms of entity X are being replaced... then X has no referrent. What are we referring to? Define entity X.

The first reason your conclusion doesn't follow from your premise (aside from the fact that no conclusion can follow from a single premise unless the argument is circular) is emergent properties. Collections of atoms can have properties that individual atoms do not have.

As I said above we aren't talking about continuity in the properties of collections... we are talking about continuity in the identity of the collections themselves. If the experiencer is a 'collection of atoms', and if an atom is replaced... then the collection is different... hence the experiencer is different.

The second reason is that continuity of individual atoms is not necessary for continuity in the properties of collections of atoms.

We aren't talking about continuity of properties. We are talking about continuity of identity... continuity of the experiencer.

The color of a blade of grass is just one simple example, but there are many others. The properties of Microsoft Word, for instance, are continuous and hold through time, no matter where the software is installed.

I don't see the relevance of the Microsoft Word example. Besides we are not talking about properties here. We're talking about identity.

You're again mistaking individual atoms for collections of atoms.

How does it change the argument? How can a collection of atoms remain the same collection if even a single atom in the collection is replaced?

No they aren't, because the experiencers aren't the atoms. When we replace rivets on an automobile assembly robot, do we say that one arm died and another took its place? Of course not.

If you define the arm by a specific set of parts, and one of those parts is replaced then no... it is not the same arm, by definition.

If the experiencers aren't the atoms, then what are the experiencers? If they are 'collections of atoms', then please explain how continuity of identity can be maintained if atoms are replaced.

In fact, over the next 20 years or so, all of the metal will be replaced on the Golden Gate bridge. It will still be the same bridge with exactly the same properties that it had before, except that it will be somewhat stronger.

No, I wouldn't call it the same bridge if all the metal is replaced. If you define Golden Gate Bridge as a 'collection of atoms in a particular configuration' then by that definition it is certainly not the same bridge when the metal is replaced. Does the "entity being referred to" continue to exist as time passes? If the entity is a particular 'collection of metal atoms' then as you said, if the atoms are replaced then that particular 'collection of metal atoms' is gone, and we have a new collection... hence a new bridge, by definition.

Just as with the bridge and the arm, if you wish to refer to experiencers as 'collections of atoms' then you cannot simply say that they remain the same as atoms are replaced.

Also, you seem to be forgetting the important note that matter in the brain is not replaced. Ions and nutrients in the cytosol come and go, but the infrastrucure is set once you reach maturity.

Then I see merit in the argument that it is the matter forming the infrastructure that experiences.

 

[loseyourname]

No. At any moment in time the particular blade of grass has color. The particular collection of atoms has the property of color.

If you're comparing 'color' to the 'ability to experience' then yes... there is no problem in saying that matter can experience even as atoms are being replaced. So 'ability to experience' remains. But there is a serious problem in saying that the experiencer is the same as atoms are replaced.

Nobody has said that. You're arguing with a strawman here.

You can't compare 'color' to 'experiencer'... the first is a property, the second isn't. You can compare 'color' to 'ability to experience'.

That's exactly what I'm doing. What is an experiencer if not some entity with the ability to experience? Just as the blade of grass is an entity of color green.

If the atoms of entity X are being replaced... then X has no referrent. What are we referring to? Define entity X.

Entity X can be any number of things. This is an abstraction of your argument. This 'problem' you are raising has been raised for hundreds of years at least and receives a pretty clear formulation in Descartes. His example is a ball of wax. We can change its shape, its color, even its chemical makeup by various reactions, both physical and chemical, yet it remains the same ball of wax. Philosophers from Russell to Rosenberg, here in the book discussion subforum, have defined the identity of an entity by causal contiguity. Entity X is the causal world-line occupied at various times by various material substances. It is defined by its properties and its history, which taken together are unique and distinguish it from all other individual entities.

There are other theories of identity as well. The literature is literally thousands upon thousands of pages long and you would do yourself well to read some of it before you start coming to conclusions and telling us that we must come to the same conclusions. You'd also do much better to read the material first-hand rather than continuuing to interrogate me. I'm no expert on this matter and you should not trust me to give you a full and adequate account of these theories.

As I said above we aren't talking about continuity in the properties of collections... we are talking about continuity in the identity of the collections themselves.

Identity in some cases is limited by a continuity of a collection of properties. In the case of the ball of wax, it is limited by the necessary and sufficient properties that any material substance must possesses to be considered wax; that is, malleability and the ability to burn slowly and such. As soon as these properties are gone, it is no longer the same ball of wax. Indeed, it is no longer a ball of wax at all. In the same way, the causally contiguous world-line comprised of the neural substrate responsible for your unique phenomenal world will cease to be learningphysics when it ceases to have the necessary and sufficient properties for continuuing phenomenal experience. The world-line will live on, in the form of a rotting corpse, but it will no longer be identified as the person that is you.

If the experiencer is a 'collection of atoms', and if an atom is replaced... then the collection is different... hence the experiencer is different.

Sure, it's difference, but it still has the same identity. Take the Amazon river. The water that is flowing through it is never the same from moment to moment. As long as it occupies the same causal world-line, it remains the Amazon river, the same river, albeit a little different, always in flux.

I don't see the relevance of the Microsoft Word example. Besides we are not talking about properties here. We're talking about identity.

The identity of the program Microsoft Word does not depend on material substrate, does it? You can upload it onto any number of hard drives composed of different atoms. In principle, you can even upload it onto hard drives that are not built from the same material, so long as they use the same logic language and conduct electricity at a high enough speed. In any case, it maintains its identity as Microsoft Word. Many theories of consciousness equate personal identity with software. loseyourname is not the material substrate on which the software of his consciousness operates; he is the software itself. In this way, it is the specific neural architecture and functional causal lines that are established within this architecture, that comprises loseyourname, not the material itself from which these things are built. In fact, the architecture can even change, the functionality can be altered, and as long as the causal world-line being occupied is the same world-line and the necessary and sufficient conditions (read: properties of the neural system) for this world-line to be a continuuing experiencer remain, loseyourname remains.

How does it change the argument? How can a collection of atoms remain the same collection if even a single atom in the collection is replaced?

I would hope at this point that this question has been answered. You should be able to see by now that the identity of the collection of atoms is not defined by the identities of its constituent parts. If you continue to not see this, I'm not going to respond any further.

If you define the arm by a specific set of parts, and one of those parts is replaced then no... it is not the same arm, by definition.

Sure, but again, hopefully you can see by now that the arm is not defined by a specific set of parts. In fact, your very argument proves that it cannot be. The skin on learningphysics' right arm remains the skin on learningphysics' right arm as long as that arm is intact and you are alive, even though the cells are being replaced every couple of days. Therefore, it must be something other than the identities of the constituent cells that defines the identity of your arm.

If the experiencers aren't the atoms, then what are the experiencers?

Beats the heck out of me. I can tell you one thing, though. The simple fact that you don't know the answer to a question does not give you license to propose theories (like the homunculus theory, which is what your theory is, whether you are familiar with the term or not) that have been discredited for hundreds of years. Be content, for the time being, not to know, and then investigate. Don't come to conclusions when conclusions aren't warranted.

If they are 'collections of atoms', then please explain how continuity of identity can be maintained if atoms are replaced.

Again, I hope that I have at least given a cursory once-over of a particular theory of identity that I find to be workable at least. Whether or not it truly explains personal identity I don't know, but I'm confident at least that it can explain how a collection of atoms maintains its identity despite having its constituent parts continually replaced. If this isn't good enough for you, look elsewhere. There are many other theories out there. In fact, as far as I can tell, you have made absolutely no effort to answer your own question. Saying simply that there exists some entity or 'experiencer' in which the identity inheres, without saying what this mysterious thing is, answers nothing. You're essentially answering the question "What is X?" By saying "Well, the being that is defined as X is X." You've ruled out one possibility: the fundamental particles of the material substratum that compose X are not X. Nobody is going to dispute that. Perhaps it is time to move on then.

 

[learningphysics]

You've ruled out one possibility: the fundamental particles of the material substratum that compose X are not X. Nobody is going to dispute that. Perhaps it is time to move on then.

If nobody is going to dispute it, then what is it that you have been disputing in the first place? All I've been arguing against is the identification of an experiencer as matter. I've made no other points. I wouldn't have gone on with this if there wasn't disagreement.

Given the premise:
Experiencer A = {atom 1, atom 2, atom 3, atom 4}
Experiencer B = {atom 1, atom 2, atom 3, atom 5}
atom 4 does not equal atom 5

we know that...
{atom 1, atom 2, atom 3, atom 4} does not equal {atom 1, atom 2, atom 3, atom 5}. They are not the same sets.

Therefore
Experience A does not equal Experiencer B. Changing a single atom changes the experiencer.

If the premise is true the conclusion is true. If the conclusion is false the premise is false.

The solutions you have proposed... experiencer as a causal worldline... experiencer as software... work fine, but neither are collections of atoms. You've proposed that the entities are associated with collections of atoms but not the collections themselves.

Sure, but again, hopefully you can see by now that the arm is not defined by a specific set of parts. In fact, your very argument proves that it cannot be.

Then by the very same argument the experiencer cannot be a "collection of atoms".

The collection of atoms by definition is the set of constituent parts. If you mean something other than the set of consitutent parts, then it makes no sense to use the words "collection of atoms". That's just what a collection is.

Beats the heck out of me. I can tell you one thing, though. The simple fact that you don't know the answer to a question does not give you license to propose theories (like the homunculus theory, which is what your theory is, whether you are familiar with the term or not) that have been discredited for hundreds of years. Be content, for the time being, not to know, and then investigate. Don't come to conclusions when conclusions aren't warranted.

What exactly is the conclusion that you think I've reached? All I've said from the start is that the experiencer is not matter. You've proposed theories that agree with this assessment. As I've made no other points, and as you continue to say that I'm proposing a 'homunculus' theory, I'm forced to conclude that the theories you've proposed are also 'homunculus' theories.

 

[loseyourname]

Perhaps it's just a mishap in the language you used. Speaking of an experiencer that is separate from matter and which views the theater of experience is a homunculus theory. That is different from what I've proposed. Not being identified with a specific set of atoms doesn't mean being separate from matter. Take the example of the Golden Gate Bridge, again. Though it is not identical with the specific set of matter that happens to compose it an anyone time, it is identical with a causal world-line that lies in material conformity to what is referred to by Golden Gate Bridge. The only real necessary condition is spatio-causal contiguity with what was originally built as the Golden Gate Bridge. If the entire thing was dismantled and destroyed, there would cease to be a bridge. Its existence is dependent on matter and there is nothing that is the bridge aside from its matter. You're making an unfounded leap from the premise that a being cannot be identical with the specific set of matter that composes it at anyone time to the conclusion that it is not material. If you can't make the argument from lack of identity with a bridge, you cannot make it with anything. It is not a valid argument.

 

[learningphysics]

Though it is not identical with the specific set of matter that happens to compose it an anyone time, it is identical with a causal world-line that lies in material conformity to what is referred to by Golden Gate Bridge.

I'm confused by the above. "Golden Gate Bridge" is identical with "a causal world-line that lies in material conformity to what is referred to by 'Golden Gate Bridge'"? There is self reference here.

The only real necessary condition is spatio-causal contiguity with what was originally built as the Golden Gate Bridge.

Ok. However the original set of matter that was built is not "Golden Gate Bridge" as "Golden Gate Bridge" is a causal wordline.

If the entire thing was dismantled and destroyed, there would cease to be a bridge. Its existence is dependent on matter and there is nothing that is the bridge aside from its matter.

So a "causal worldline" is matter or material?

 

[loseyourname]

I'm confused by the above. "Golden Gate Bridge" is identical with "a causal world-line that lies in material conformity to what is referred to by 'Golden Gate Bridge'"? There is self reference here.

Of course. It's only the Golden Gate Bridge because we call it that. All names are going be defined self-referentially.

Ok. However the original set of matter that was built is not "Golden Gate Bridge" as "Golden Gate Bridge" is a causal wordline.

I guess I haven't explained very clearly what a 'causal worldline' is. Actually, I'm not going to right now. I'll be back later. Suffice it to say that the original set of matter was part of that worldline called "Golden Gate Bridge;" in fact, it was the beginning of it.

So a "causal worldline" is matter or material?

It doesn't have to be.

 

[learningphysics]

Of course. It's only the Golden Gate Bridge because we call it that. All names are going be defined self-referentially.

I don't understand. Are you saying it is impossible to define the entity being referred to as "Golden Gate Bridge" without using "Golden Gate Bridge" within the definition?

Entity A: "The causal worldline that is in material conformity to Entity A"

Entity A doesn't refer to anything in the above. It is meaningless.

 

[loseyourname]

It's impossible to define it as the Golden Gate Bridge without making reference to the fact that 'Golden Gate Bridge' is its name. How are you going to explain the fact that I'm Adam without making mention of the fact that my parents named me 'Adam?'

 

[Doctordick]

Since we have no idea what the limits of communication are, we
are in no position to assert that qualia are *absolutely* ineffable.

If you have no idea what the limits of communication are, how does a pair of individuals ever come to know they are communicating? Where does the evidence for such a conclusion come from?

I would very much appreciate a well thought out response to that question.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Doctordick]

Surely the idea that qualia have a high degree of independence from their physical basis would weigh in favour of their reality.

That being the case, how would you respond to the idea that "qualia" constitute the only true reality? Think about that for a while before you respond.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Les Sleeth]

That being the case, how would you respond to the idea that "qualia" constitute the only true reality?

You didn't ask me, but my answer would be that qualia have nothing to do with "constituting" reality outside being part of the constitution of consciousness. They might truly represent aspects of reality to consciousness, but if anything other than consciousness exists, then I can't see how qualia are any more "true reality" than anything else.

 

[Doctordick]

The point was that the connection between qualia and reality is not a determinable issue

Why is that ?

Probably because I was not paying attention to what you were saying. I am beginning to think qualia is a very important issue and am almost ready to define reality as the collection of all qualia.

I would like your response to that suggestion.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Tournesol]

That being the case, how would you respond to the idea that "qualia" constitute the only true reality?

It's extremely anthropocentric and contradicts most of science.
Which is not to say there are no qualia.

Think about that for a while before you respond.

no!

 

[Tournesol]

Probably because I was not paying attention to what you were saying. I am beginning to think qualia is a very important issue and am almost ready to define reality as the collection of all qualia.

Define what you like , FWIW. The question is what you can prove.

 

[Tournesol]

FYI, 'qualia' does not even cover everything mental -- abstract concepts such as numbers are generally considered not to be qulia.

 

[Doctordick]

You didn't ask me, but my answer would be that qualia have nothing to do with "constituting" reality outside being part of the constitution of consciousness. They might truly represent aspects of reality to consciousness, but if anything other than consciousness exists, then I can't see how qualia are any more "true reality" than anything else.

But what else do you have to go by when you think about reality? From my understanding, the term "qualia" stands for some fundamental thing which we experience and qualia themselves cannot "represent" anything. Lastly, I have no idea what you mean by the term "true reality". Please explain to me how one is to determine if something is a member of the set "true reality".

Think about that for a while before you respond.

no!

Well, I guess that is a response which leads to little room for discussion. I really don't understand your adamant refusal to think about anything I say. I have been reading your posts and you seem to be quite rational in dealing with others. Does my perspective upset you that much?

Define what you like , FWIW. The question is what you can prove.

You apparently like being vague when you talk to me. I have utterly no idea what "FWIW" is supposed to stand for. And finally, "what you can prove" depends very much on where you start. No one can prove anything in the absence of a starting point. That is exactly the fundamental problem behind any philosophical position; what defense is there for the starting point itself?

I merely proposed "qualia" as a start point seeing that there seemed to be a strong consensus that "qualia" existed. Most people here would probably agree that a "brain in a vat" if conscious, would experience "qualia". It seems even Canute would agree that "qualia" are the one thing he "knows" for certainty.

FYI, 'qualia' does not even cover everything mental -- abstract concepts such as numbers are generally considered not to be qulia.

Did I say "qualia"was to cover everything mental? I suggested that I would accept "qualia" as the definition of what "really exists" and would exist in the absence of a brain. The brain merely becomes a mechanism capable of developing "mental constructs" based on the qualia available to it. Under that perspective abstract concepts need not be "qualia", they are mere mental constructs of exceedingly great value.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Les Sleeth]

But what else do you have to go by when you think about reality?

I think about reality plenty, and I don't trust what I think much unless I have experienced what I am thinking about. So if you are saying that qualia gives us the best information with which to think, then we might for once be in agreement!

I have no idea what you mean by the term "true reality". Please explain to me how one is to determine if something is a member of the set "true reality".

Well that's funny because you were the one who used it above. You said: ". . . how would you respond to the idea that "qualia" constitute the only true reality?"

By "true reality" I was trying to interpret what you meant. To me reality is that which exists (and I usually include -- that which has the potential to exist). When I added "true" to reality, I was trying to distinquish what exists from what we only imagine to exist, and to say that qualia in particular might be linked to what truly exists (I'll explain below).

From my understanding, the term "qualia" stands for some fundamental thing which we experience and qualia themselves cannot "represent" anything.

As consciousness, qualia give a sense of quality of something we perceive, that's why it is purely experiential. Different things produce different qualia. The quale of a delicious peach could be considered reflecting something about the peach itself, and therefore it doesn't seem improper to say qualia can represent aspects of reality in consciousness.

However, that is a different idea altogether than qualia constituting reality, which is what you said in the post I responded to. I hate nitpicking, so if all you meant was that in consciousness qualia represent reality best to us, then I suspect you are right. But if you meant that qualia somehow are actually the make up (constitution) of all reality, then I can't see that at all.

 

[Tournesol]

Well, I guess that is a response which leads to little room for discussion. I really don't understand your adamant refusal to think about anything I say. I have been reading your posts and you seem to be quite rational in dealing with others. Does my perspective upset you that much?

well, I don't like your style, for the usual reasons, and I don't like your content (solipsism) either.


and I don't refuse to think about certain subjects so much as refuse to waste any more time on them.

You apparently like being vague when you talk to me. I have utterly no idea what "FWIW" is supposed to stand for.

http://www.livinginternet.com/i/ia_text_abbr.htm

And finally, "what you can prove" depends very much on where you start. No one can prove anything in the absence of a starting point. That is exactly the fundamental problem behind any philosophical position; what defense is there for the starting point itself?

the point is that you were doing something you criticize others for --making unsupported claims.

I merely proposed "qualia" as a start point seeing that there seemed to be a strong consensus that "qualia" existed. Most people here would probably agree that a "brain in a vat" if conscious, would experience "qualia". It seems even Canute would agree that "qualia" are the one thing he "knows" for certainty.
Did I say "qualia"was to cover everything mental? I suggested that I would accept "qualia" as the definition of what "really exists" and would exist in the absence of a brain.

that is *much* more than a "starting point", and very contentious.

The brain merely becomes a mechanism capable of developing "mental constructs" based on the qualia available to it. Under that perspective abstract concepts need not be "qualia", they are mere mental constructs of exceedingly great value.

I mean there is stuff going on mentally which is arguably not constituted bt qualia. If they are not adequate to found mentallity, they are not adequate to found the whole of reality.

 

[Faust]

there is stuff going on mentally which is arguably not constituted bt qualia

I seem to be one of those people who have trouble understanding exactly what "qualia" means. I see all those discussions about qualia and I'm often left with the feeling that my perception of the world is different, that there's no room in it for whatever it is the word qualia refers to.

I understand qualia is supposed to be the sensations we consciously experience, such as images and sounds, but for the life of me I can't understand why the concept "sensation" isn't enough, or in what way qualia is different from sensation. For instance, I'm currently looking at a notebook, and I think of the notebook as an object existing outside my mind, and its image existing inside my mind. I suppose qualia would refer to the image in the mind's eye, but can anyone explain why we can't talk about "image" in the particular case of vision, or "sensation" in the general case of any sensory input?

I think this is an important question; it seems to me philosophers have introduce the notion of qualia as a novel way to think about the mind, when in truth it's really the old notion of sensation, and any perception of a difference would be artificial and therefore misleading.

I may, of course, be mistaken as I admitted right at the beginning.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Faust, some philosophers make a distinction between the sensation, which can be studied objectively (perhaps by EEGs or fMRIs) and described, and the "feeling of what it is like" to have that sensation, which is not observable. If you don't think there is anything solod in that distinction, then you are on the same page with me, and those philosophers will try to back you into a corner and prove you must believe all sorts of nasty things you don't, since you don't accept their teaching.

 

[Faust]

Faust, some philosophers make a distinction between the sensation, which can be studied objectively (perhaps by EEGs or fMRIs) and described, and the "feeling of what it is like" to have that sensation, which is not observable.

I think I get it. So, for instance, the image of an object in my mind's eye is an image, but "the feeling of seeing an image of an object in my mind's eye" is qualia. Is that correct? If it is, then I'm back to square one, for I have no idea what that feeling is, apart from the image itself. But perhaps I'm still missing something

 

[Doctordick]

I think about reality plenty, and I don't trust what I think much unless I have experienced what I am thinking about. So if you are saying that qualia gives us the best information with which to think, then we might for once be in agreement!

Les, I don't think we have ever not been in agreement on much of anything. What I think has been going on is that you are misunderstanding what I am trying to communicate: i.e., I have a major communication problem because there are no words with which to refer to what I am thinking.

Well that's funny because you were the one who used it above. You said: ". . . how would you respond to the idea that "qualia" constitute the only true reality?"

That is because you misunderstood what I was saying. You used the term "true reality" without informing me what you meant; so I asked you to explain to me how one is to determine if something is a member of the set "true reality". So far, the term is, between you and I, undefined. I was merely proposing a possiblity.

By "true reality" I was trying to interpret what you meant. To me reality is that which exists (and I usually include -- that which has the potential to exist). When I added "true" to reality, I was trying to distinquish what exists from what we only imagine to exist, and to say that qualia in particular might be linked to what truly exists (I'll explain below).

I think we are struggling with exactly the same problem: trying to get an exact definition of reality.

As consciousness, qualia give a sense of quality of something we perceive, that's why it is purely experiential. Different things produce different qualia. The quale of a delicious peach could be considered reflecting something about the peach itself, and therefore it doesn't seem improper to say qualia can represent aspects of reality in consciousness.

However, that is a different idea altogether than qualia constituting reality, which is what you said in the post I responded to. I hate nitpicking, so if all you meant was that in consciousness qualia represent reality best to us, then I suspect you are right.

We may be getting close to what I am trying to express. Let's see if the following makes any sense to you.

We all have a very strong feeling that we know what reality is; however, none of us can really make what I would call an exact specification which cannot be misinterpreted. Any words you come up with to lay out exactly what you mean by reality must have their meaning established before what you mean can be communicated and that process itself is so extensive that an exact logical analysis is impossible. Let us look at the statement, "if all you meant was that, in consciousness, qualia represent reality best to us, then I suspect you are right". Essentially, I think that's it; but, before I make a commitment, let me lay out to you why I want to use that term (which I had never heard of before running into it on this forum). As used, it apparently embodies some very important aspects of what we know and how we know them which are central to my presentation.

It has been said, several times in this thread and elsewhere, that the quale is not the sensation itself but is something else only perceived by the perceiver. For example "red" is a label attached to a particular quale for communication purposes and does not communicate the actual quale the perceiver perceived. The issue here is that the fact that we both use the same label can not be taken to prove we both experience the same quale. Being uncommunicable allows it to exist in the absence of communication and thus gives me a tag name for the phenomena on which the communication tags are built.

When it comes to the general set of words we use to communicate, we all think (on an emotional level) that we know what the words mean and the idea that we might be wrong is an unacceptable logical proposition (unacceptable because, on a logical level, we don't know how to handle that circumstance). However, when I put the same idea in the form of qualia, people don't seem to be bothered at all (at least that is the impression I get): i.e., people here appear to be very ready to accept the idea that the label (the word we attach to a specific quale) does not imply that another using the same label is experiencing the same quale. In a manner of speaking, they are willing to admit of a possibility of an extant communication problem (if "impossible to communicate" can be thought of as a communication difficulty).

Let me put it another way. Your experience of reality consists of the collection of all qualia you have ever experienced. From those experiences, you have constructed a set of labels or references which make those experiences make sense to you. The presumption is that your neighbor has done the same thing. Through the use of those labels your neighbor and you have done a very good job of eliminating inconsistencies in your descriptions of reality. However, you seem to agree that the success cannot be taken to mean you are experiencing exactly the same qualia. In fact, if you think about it for a moment, you should be willing to admit that, as you gain experiences, you yourself might change the labels on what you before considered to be the same quale. Different peaches might generate different quale. On the other hand, no matter how you change your world view or your understanding of reality, it cannot discard quale you have experienced.

But if you meant that qualia somehow are actually the make up (constitution) of all reality, then I can't see that at all.

Why not? From your understanding of qualia, what other contact with reality do you have? Exactly why do you feel that the qualia themselves do not constitute reality? If you know they exist and your experience of them (or at least the relationships you recognize between them) is what you are trying to communicate, why can't you consider them the fundamental foundation of reality?

Qualia have a second significant characteristic in common with reality: we know what we are talking about but we certainly cannot refer to it as well understood. Finally, what is more real, a peach or the profound collection of qualia you have come think indicate a peach: the quale of it's image, the quale of it's feel, the quale of it's taste, the quale of it's texture as you swallow...

Let me know what you really think -- Dick

 

[Les Sleeth]

What I think has been going on is that you are misunderstanding what I am trying to communicate: i.e., I have a major communication problem because there are no words with which to refer to what I am thinking.

Well, I have to say I followed and enjoyed your analysis this time. I’ll focus on the points where either I think I have something to add, or where I disagree.

Let me know what you really think

Okay, you asked for it!

It has been said, several times in this thread and elsewhere, that the quale is not the sensation itself but is something else only perceived by the perceiver. For example "red" is a label attached to a particular quale for communication purposes and does not communicate the actual quale the perceiver perceived.

I would just make a small distinction here to ensure we are talking about the same things. Red, as a label, can be attached in two different ways. One could be the mere recognition of red as a particular wave length of EM. That’s something a computer or the hypothetical zombie could do. In other words, the ability to label something red doesn’t have to mean a quale has occurred.

Then there is my personal experience, what red “is like” to me. A computer or zombie doesn’t have this second level of awareness, it only has the first.

I have often stated that I don’t like the qualia method of defining consciousness. It is awkward and difficult for people to grasp. I think a better way to describe consciousness is to say some more central part of us is aware of sensations that take place in a more peripheral part of us. As far as I can tell, the main reason for the qualia approach was to avoid the philosopher’s paranoia of being attacked for homuncular regress. That is, if there is something aware of being aware, then there must be something more central to that which is aware of being aware of being aware . . . ad infinitum.

But that fear of philosophers stems from not understanding their own consciousness very well, IMO. It’s too bad they don’t take Socrates’ advice. A little reflection on oneself reveals there is a part of us that’s “integrated.” Experience is like that. It is a sort of conscious singularity which cannot be disintegrated without losing it. That’s why, IMO, we have difficulty communicating our experiences.

Communication is a thing of the intellect, which is compound, multifaceted, complex, and works best with “parts.” But all experience is whole, singular in nature, and doesn’t lend itself to the complex operations of mentality. So what we end up doing is searching for ways to give “impressions” of our experiences (unless one is talking purely conceptually/mathematically) to others to see if they can find memories of their own experiences which will help them relate to what we are trying to say.

Anyway, my point is that this singular, integrating aspect to us solves the homuncular regress problem. Part of us is multifaceted, like sensation and intellect, and part of us integrates all of that into the “me” that feels (i.e., experiences) what “it’s like” to detect or think things. So if you ask me, the better definition of consciousness is that is the awareness of being aware.

Your experience of reality consists of the collection of all qualia you have ever experienced. From those experiences, you have constructed a set of labels or references which make those experiences make sense to you. The presumption is that your neighbor has done the same thing. Through the use of those labels your neighbor and you have done a very good job of eliminating inconsistencies in your descriptions of reality. However, you seem to agree that the success cannot be taken to mean you are experiencing exactly the same qualia. In fact, if you think about it for a moment, you should be willing to admit that, as you gain experiences, you yourself might change the labels on what you before considered to be the same quale. Different peaches might generate different quale. On the other hand, no matter how you change your world view or your understanding of reality, it cannot discard quale you have experienced.

Yes, that is pretty much what most qualia advocates are saying. There is a personal, inner realm to consciousness. The accumulation of each of our experiences is what creates the “me” of consciousness.

Why not? From your understanding of qualia, what other contact with reality do you have? Exactly why do you feel that the qualia themselves do not constitute reality? If you know they exist and your experience of them (or at least the relationships you recognize between them) is what you are trying to communicate, why can't you consider them the fundamental foundation of reality?

Yes, but just because qualia are the means for my contact with reality doesn’t mean they are all of reality, except for me.

Some of my friends and I have had that old debate about if there is one reality or many realities. My opinion of anyone who says there are many realities is that they are being too subjective. Reality is what is real, and what is real is what exists or can exist. It has nothing to do with me except I am one small part of the whole of existence.

Now if you were to say qualia are the means by which I, as consciousness, know reality, and therefore to ME qualia “constitute” my sole link to reality . . . then yes, I could agree to that.

… what is more real, a peach or the profound collection of qualia you have come think indicate a peach: the quale of it's image, the quale of it's feel, the quale of it's taste, the quale of it's texture as you swallow...

Being objective I’d say neither is more real. A peach is as real as my experience of a peach. Being subjective I’d say, as consciousness, that qualia are everything and a peach is nothing (unless I'm starving).

 

[Fliption]

I think I get it. So, for instance, the image of an object in my mind's eye is an image, but "the feeling of seeing an image of an object in my mind's eye" is qualia. Is that correct? If it is, then I'm back to square one, for I have no idea what that feeling is, apart from the image itself. But perhaps I'm still missing something

I'm not sure what you mean by 'sensation'. But for now let's accept Selfadjoint's point that sensation is all the objective and measurable aspects of seeing the color blue, for example.

Are you saying that you believe a scientist could hook you up to a machine and actually "see" the same color you are seeing? Could a scientist ever feel what you are feeling when a needle gets stuck in your arm? These are not the sensations. These are what it "feels like" to have the sensations.

Now, if you are lumping all of these things into the term "sensations", then we will have to reject selfadjoint's definition. If this is the route you're going, just know that when philosophers use the term qualia, they are referring to the subjective, unmeasurable aspects of "sensations".

 

[Faust]

I'm not sure what you mean by 'sensation'. But for now let's accept Selfadjoint's point that sensation is all the objective and measurable aspects of seeing the color blue, for example.

That is not what I meant by "sensation"; I thought the standard dictionary definition was commonly understood and accepted. Here's one from answers.com:

Sensation:

a) A perception associated with stimulation of a sense organ or with a specific body condition: the sensation of heat; a visual sensation.

b) The faculty to feel or perceive; physical sensibility: The patient has very little sensation left in the right leg.

c) An indefinite generalized body feeling: a sensation of lightness.

I fail to see how "qualia" is not synonymous with that standard definition of sensation. Can anyone explain it to me?

 

[Les Sleeth]

That is not what I meant by "sensation"; I thought the standard dictionary definition was commonly understood and accepted. Here's one from answers.com:


I fail to see how "qualia" is not synonymous with that standard definition of sensation. Can anyone explain it to me?

I elaborated on it somewhat to DoctorDick in my last post. Qualia are qualities associated with subjectivity. You could stick a device into an orange, for example, and have it measure temperature, acidity, sweetness, etc. But would that measuring device say "I liked that orange"? It does not appreciate, one way or another, any of the qualities it detects -- it just senses them.

Similarly, we detect or sense information (that's what's being defined as a sensation), AND we have a subjective experience of that sensation, which some thinkers have characterized as what "it's like" for a particular person (that's qualia experience).

There are things we sense but don't pay attention to, such as ambient noise while we are working. If I try really hard, I can recall some of that, the fact that birds were chirping all morning, for example. So it seems to me sensation can occur to my being without associated qualia, and that my attentiveness to sensation is required for the subjective experience.

The functionalist claim that there is no subjective experience in human beings, that we are just a collection of sensations and thoughts, doesn't make sense. I've pointed out many times that I know it's possible to completely still the mind through meditation (even it only temporarily). If subjectivity is nothing but collections of sensations and thoughts, then what is it that remains conscious in that stillness?

 

[Fliption]

I fail to see how "qualia" is not synonymous with that standard definition of
sensation. Can anyone explain it to me?

Well I could accept that the word sensation means the same thing but I think to many, sensation also implies the objective aspect of sensing. It can be said that the device Les refers to is "sensing" acidity of the orange. But this device isn't really experiencing subjective aspects of the orange the way you and I do. It is this subjective aspect of sensing that philosophers reserve the word "qualia" for.

 

[Tournesol]

I understand qualia is supposed to be the sensations we consciously experience, such as images and sounds, but for the life of me I can't understand why the concept "sensation" isn't enough, or in what way qualia is different from sensation. For instance, I'm currently looking at a notebook, and I think of the notebook as an object existing outside my mind, and its image existing inside my mind. I suppose qualia would refer to the image in the mind's eye, but can anyone explain why we can't talk about "image" in the particular case of vision, or "sensation" in the general case of any sensory input?

Because a lot of people will take "sensation" to mean "neural processing"
and thereby bypass the subjective aspect.

 

[Faust]

Because a lot of people will take "sensation" to mean "neural processing" and thereby bypass the subjective aspect.

That's interesting. So I guess it's only a matter of time until they do the same with qualia, after all they don't believe there's more to qualia than neural processing.

But then, all philosophers have to do is come up with yet another word. A better-sounding one, hopefully

 

[Fliption]

That's interesting. So I guess it's only a matter of time until they do the same with qualia, after all they don't believe there's more to qualia than neural processing.

But then, all philosophers have to do is come up with yet another word. A better-sounding one, hopefully

Unlike the word sensation, qualia is specifically designed to refer to an aspect that cannot be attributed to neural processing. That really is the whole point of the philosophical topic. Sensation is a word that is used outside of philosophy so it's easy to see why it would have multiple meanings.

 

[Faust]

Unlike the word sensation, qualia is specifically designed to refer to an aspect that cannot be attributed to neural processing.

Sure enough, but still one has to accept such a thing exists. If one believes the mind can be reduced to neural processes, then qualia thus defined cannot possibly exist. Indeed, notice how functionalists will often argue that the perception of qualia is an illusion. (which usually raises eyebrows from people who don't understand exactly what is meant by "illusion" in that context - but that is another subject)