Arguments Against Superdeterminism

[ueit]

In the context of Bell's Theorem, a superdeterministic theory would negate the statistical independence between the source generating the entangled particles and the detectors. IMHO there is nothing absurd about this. There are plenty of examples in physics where the motion of two distant objects presents correlations (this includes all objects that are accompanied by long-range fields).

Nevertheless, superdeterminism (SD) is seldom even mentioned as a possibility and usually dismissed. I would like to see a clear statement of the arguments against SD and see how founded they are.

 

[WaveJumper]

I think Superdeterminism invites the "Supernatural". There is similar talk in the philosophy forum, so i'll copy-paste what i stated there:

"A purely deterministic "mind" as a determinite consequence of a brain in a determinite universe requires the Supernatural. If we do not have free will, who willfully created my celluar phone, if it was not the will of the engineers at Nokia? Whose will was that? Who created the LHC collider and the beer I've just opened? How could any of those things exist if "we" did not willfully created them? How would we provide explanation who did?"

And Superdeterminism involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will.

 

[ueit]

I think Superdeterminism invites the "Supernatural". There is similar talk in the philosophy forum, so i'll copy-paste what i stated there:

"A purely deterministic "mind" as a determinite consequence of a brain in a determinite universe requires the Supernatural. If we do not have free will, who willfully created my celluar phone, if it was not the will of the engineers at Nokia? Whose will was that? Who created the LHC collider and the beer I've just opened? How could any of those things exist if "we" did not willfully created them? Who did?"

What is the difference between a cell phone and a rock at a fundamental level? There are the same type of particles following the same physical laws. The question "Who created the LHC collider...", and all other, are loaded, they presuppose the necessity of an entity with free will. My answer is that, all objects (including a cell phone and a rock) appear in the same way, through interactions between the same type of particles following the same physical laws. I have seen no evidence for the contrary. If you know of such evidence I'd like to see it.

A difference only exists at the macroscopic level because some objects have significance for us. To make an analogy, do you think there is any fundamental difference between a group of stars resembling a lion or a fish and any other random group of stars?

What is supernatural about a cell phone?

 

[WaveJumper]

What is the difference between a cell phone and a rock at a fundamental level? There are the same type of particles following the same physical laws. The question "Who created the LHC collider...", and all other, are loaded, they presuppose the necessity of an entity with free will. My answer is that, all objects (including a cell phone and a rock) appear in the same way, through interactions between the same type of particles following the same physical laws. I have seen no evidence for the contrary. If you know of such evidence I'd like to see it. A difference only exists at the macroscopic level because some objects have significance for us.

Thought provoking theory, really. True but incomplete IMO. It does not even begin to address the reason for the illusory existence of a classical world(even if it makes sense only to us). And why is there the illusion of "us", superdeterminism cannot explain this and neither can QM. A purely quantum picture of the universe cannot explain everything that we've found to exist, because a large ensemble of particles do not always behave in the same way as the individual ones that comprise them. Hence a TOE is supposed to account for both the quantum and the classical level of bahaviour.

To make an analogy, do you think there is any fundamental difference between a group of stars resembling a lion or a fish and any other random group of stars?

Yes of course. If the group that resembles the lion begins to collectively behave like a Lion and starts hunting for zebras made up of other stars(i.e. the atoms of the stars that are considered to be a lion move intentionally all the way to the atoms that comprise zebras).
The classical level exists even if it's just a shadow and it needs an explanation. Without free-will this explanation screams "Supernatural".

What is supernatural about a cell phone?

The idea of a cell phone in a superdeterministic universe with no free will or some form of higher intelligence is mind-bending.

 

[ueit]

Thought provoking theory, really. True but incomplete IMO. It does not even begin to address the reason for the illusory existence of a classical world(even if it makes sense only to us). And why is there the illusion of "us", superdeterminism cannot explain this and neither can QM.

I see no evidence that the human brain does not obey QM. IMHO there is only a computational problem. I doubt that QM is even required as I don't buy Penrose's theory about microtubules. AFAIK the brain is fully into the classical regime. What is your evidence that the brain somehow eludes QM? Also, this is not an argument against SD as SD is supposed to explain why QM works as it does.

A purely quantum picture of the universe cannot explain everything that we've found to exist, because a large ensemble of particles do not always behave in the same way as the individual ones that comprise them.

Of course, the behaviour of a composite object is different from the behaviour of its parts. However, in theory you can calculate the evolution of a complex object if you know its constituents. It is a computational problem.

Hence a TOE is supposed to account for both the quantum and the classical level of bahaviour.

Sure, as long as the computational power permits it.

Yes of course. If the group that resembles the lion begins to collectively behave like a Lion and starts hunting for zebras made up of other stars(i.e. the atoms of the stars that are considered to be a lion move intentionally all the way to the atoms that comprise zebras).

Well, this is another type of lion. One that doesn't hunt.

The classical level exists even if it's just a shadow and it needs an explanation. Without free-will this explanation screams "Supernatural".

I failed to see how the classical world requires "free-will" in order to be explained. Again do you have some evidence for this assertion? To be a little constructive, animals are genetically programmed to react in certain ways. You do not need "free-will" to explain their behaviour.

The idea of a cell phone in a superdeterministic universe with no free will or some form of higher intelligence is mind-bending.

Sorry, but this is not an argument at all.

 

[WaveJumper]

I failed to see how the classical world requires "free-will" in order to be explained.

I am putting great efforts into seeing the world as you see it and my head is spinning. What is "we" in this "universe" of yours? Your theory does not answer the question - if everything is an illusion, what causes it? Or is the existence of illusion also an illusion? I assume you see the classical world as a movie embedded in dumb quantum fields, where fields interact to produce the illusion of self. If this is so, what makes us try and explain this weird reality(why would a robot try and explain itself if it didn't have free will or wasn't programmed to do so?

Again do you have some evidence for this assertion? To be a little constructive, animals are genetically programmed to react in certain ways.

Yes, right! Genetically programmed is the right term for your vision of the universe. If there is no randomness, even the theory of evolution must abandon the idea of random mutations. If they are not random, i think you know where that leads...

You do not need "free-will" to explain their behaviour.

Why are we explaining anything in a superdeterministic universe at all? Was the Big Bang preprogrammed so that our shadow classical reality would appear out of quantum fields interactions, where we would have the illusion of asking questions about our illusiory existence? How is this supposed to work without a creator? Simply put, what causes the appearance of existence of cell phones in superdeterministic universes? What could explain our personal subjective experience of reality? Some event in the past? What is this event?


How do you explain the fact that you don't have free will, yet you've come to realize that you never had free will? Was this event(the realisation) pre-programmmed?

 

[ThomasT]

In the context of Bell's Theorem, a superdeterministic theory would negate the statistical independence between the source generating the entangled particles and the detectors.

It's not clear to me what you mean by this.

Considering a simple optical Bell setup (emitter, two polarizing filters, and two photon detectors), I assume that you mean "the source generating the entangled particles" to refer to the polarizers.

There's a predictable relationship between joint polarizer settings and joint detection rates -- and the pairing process produces statistical dependence between the sets of separately accumulated detection attributes.

What statistical independence are you referring to?

... superdeterminism (SD) is seldom even mentioned as a possibility and usually dismissed. I would like to see a clear statement of the arguments against SD and see how founded they are.

As far as I can tell, the term, superdeterminism, is semantically equivalent to the term, determinism.

All of physical science, whether one is searching for dynamical rules/laws specific to an emergent regime/scale or fundamental to and pervading everything, is based on the assumption of determinism.

Unfortunately, by itself, it doesn't explain anything.

Or am I completely missing your point?

What might superdeterminism, or absolute determinism, etc. refer to that determinism doesn't already refer to?

 

[DrChinese]

In the context of Bell's Theorem, a superdeterministic theory would negate the statistical independence between the source generating the entangled particles and the detectors. IMHO there is nothing absurd about this. There are plenty of examples in physics where the motion of two distant objects presents correlations (this includes all objects that are accompanied by long-range fields).

Nevertheless, superdeterminism (SD) is seldom even mentioned as a possibility and usually dismissed. I would like to see a clear statement of the arguments against SD and see how founded they are.

SD is not science anymore than belief in God is.

Unless of course you postulate a specific theory which shows how different forces - let's say the weak and the electromagnetic - have heretofor unknown connections. Let's say we use radioactive decay to make the decision to set polarizar settings in a Bell test in which the detectors are separated (sufficiently that they are outside of each other's light cones). The superdeterministic theory will require that the decay be coordinated so that the results can be properly correlated per Malus. That's a tall order! Ditto for any possible selection mechanism. You need all experimental apparati - regardless of setup - to conspire.

So where is the science here?

 

[ThomasT]

John Bell on the BBC:

There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds and spooky action at a distance. But it (Superdeterminism) involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will. Suppose the world is super-deterministic, with not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork, but with our behavior, including our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment rather than another, absolutely predetermined, including the "decision" by the experimenter to carry out one set of measurements rather than another, the difficulty disappears. There is no need for a faster than light signal to tell particle A what measurement has been carried out on particle B, because the universe, including particle A, already "knows" what that measurement, and its outcome, will be.

The only alternative to quantum probabilities, superpositions of states, collapse of the wave function, and spooky action at a distance, is that everything is superdetermined. For me it is a dilemma. I think it is a deep dilemma, and the resolution of it will not be trivial; it will require a substantial change in the way we look at things.

From this I think it's clear that superdeterminism, absolute determinism, universal determinism and determinism are synonymous.

How does the assumption of determinism, which underlies physical science anyway, obviate the assumption of nonlocality?

How is determinism an alternative to quantum probability, quantum superposition, and quantum state vector reduction?

 

[Descartz2000]

I think if Superdeterminism could possibly be a loophole, I think it should be looked at more closely, if only as a way around FTL communication. In certain respects it makes sense: why should the experimenter (or any human for that matter) be free or separate from which he/her came. I mean don't we develop and make our way in the world through our biology, genetic make-up, physiology, bio-physics, evolution of brain, etc... If true, then it seems our behavior is a result of all of these variables as well. Where exactly does the human brain separate itself from all of these factors, and become "free" to conduct whatever set up he chooses in experiments. Some of the Eastern religions take on this Superdeterminism approach to understanding the world. If nothing else, it should at least be considered and discussed.

 

[Fra]

To me, the question is not wether I can 100% disproove determinism or superdeterminism - I can't, the question is what predictive advantages does it give us?

As I see it, the determinism attemps are more motivated by secret desires to restore more realism. But I do not see any motivation for this from the point of view of scientific inquiry.

I only see disadvantages since it's encourages to a particular realistic type of reasoning, that I personally find inhibiting.

/Fredrik

 

[ueit]

I am putting great efforts into seeing the world as you see it and my head is spinning. What is "we" in this "universe" of yours?

We are large groups of (mainly) quarks and electrons.

Your theory does not answer the question - if everything is an illusion, what causes it? Or is the existence of illusion also an illusion? I assume you see the classical world as a movie embedded in dumb quantum fields, where fields interact to produce the illusion of self. If this is so, what makes us try and explain this weird reality(why would a robot try and explain itself if it didn't have free will or wasn't programmed to do so?

I didn't say that "everything is an illusion". How exactly our brain works is not a QM question. On the other hand I have seen no evidence that the brain should deserve a different treatment than any other object.

We try to explain the world around us because we are genetically programmed to do so (it enhances survival).

Yes, right! Genetically programmed is the right term for your vision of the universe. If there is no randomness, even the theory of evolution must abandon the idea of random mutations. If they are not random, i think you know where that leads...

Evolution does not require that mutations are fundamentally random (unpredictable in principle). The term "random mutation" refers to our lack of knowledge regarding the exact conditions at the time that mutation occurred. So there is no conflict between a deterministic universe and evolution.

Why are we explaining anything in a superdeterministic universe at all? Was the Big Bang preprogrammed so that our shadow classical reality would appear out of quantum fields interactions, where we would have the illusion of asking questions about our illusiory existence? How is this supposed to work without a creator? Simply put, what causes the appearance of existence of cell phones in superdeterministic universes? What could explain our personal subjective experience of reality? Some event in the past? What is this event?

Those questions can be also put in a probabilistic universe. The fact that some quantum events might be unpredictable do not explain any of your above questions therefore I think they have no relevance to our topic. Give me a good account of how "our personal subjective experience of reality" appears in a universe that is not superedetrministic.

How do you explain the fact that you don't have free will, yet you've come to realize that you never had free will? Was this event(the realisation) pre-programmmed?

The existent evidence pointed me into that direction. I don't think it was "pre-programmed". It could be predicted by someone with infinite knowledge but this is different.

 

[ueit]

It's not clear to me what you mean by this.

Considering a simple optical Bell setup (emitter, two polarizing filters, and two photon detectors), I assume that you mean "the source generating the entangled particles" to refer to the polarizers.

No, I refer to the emitter (PDC crystal for example). Bell's theorem requires that the properties of the entangled particles (say spin) do not depend on the state of the detectors. A superdeterministic theory would deny this. As an example, assume that the emission is "stimulated" by a field coming from the detectors and the spin of the entangled particles is related to the value of this field. But because the evolution is deterministic, this field uniquely determines the future state of the detectors, therefore the spin of the entangled particles and the detector settings at the time of detection are not independent variables.

As far as I can tell, the term, superdeterminism, is semantically equivalent to the term, determinism.

I agree. I use the term (invented by Bell, I think) in order to point out that a separation between the system and observer is not possible. Such a separation might be possible in certain deterministic theories.

All of physical science, whether one is searching for dynamical rules/laws specific to an emergent regime/scale or fundamental to and pervading everything, is based on the assumption of determinism.

I also agree.

Unfortunately, by itself, it doesn't explain anything.

Or am I completely missing your point?

It can explain a lot of things. Correlations that are supposed to appear as a result of non-local effects can be explained by a past common cause + deterministic evolution. A probabilistic theory wouldn't allow for that.

What might superdeterminism, or absolute determinism, etc. refer to that determinism doesn't already refer to?

See above.

 

[ueit]

SD is not science anymore than belief in God is.

Unless of course you postulate a specific theory which shows how different forces - let's say the weak and the electromagnetic - have heretofor unknown connections. Let's say we use radioactive decay to make the decision to set polarizar settings in a Bell test in which the detectors are separated (sufficiently that they are outside of each other's light cones). The superdeterministic theory will require that the decay be coordinated so that the results can be properly correlated per Malus. That's a tall order! Ditto for any possible selection mechanism. You need all experimental apparati - regardless of setup - to conspire.

So where is the science here?

The separation of the weak and electromagnetic forces is AFAIK not believed to be fundamental anymore. A Nobel price has been given for contribution to the unification of the two forces (see the Wiki article for "Electroweak interaction"). So your comments are about 30 years outdated. If you agree that string theory is science (not a belief in a god) then you would also agree that, at a fundamental level all known physics is based on a single object, a string, and a unique set of laws. Seen from this perspective there is really not much of a difference between different types of experimental setups (computer random generators, brains, radioactive decay, etc). If the time evolution of a string is deterministic then all known objects have a predictable behavior as well, regardless of their macroscopic appearance.

About the "conspiracy" accusations you should also claim that the energy conservation principle is not scientiffic because it applies to all systems (involving any known forces or mixtures of them).

 

[ueit]

To me, the question is not wether I can 100% disproove determinism or superdeterminism - I can't, the question is what predictive advantages does it give us?

As I see it, the determinism attemps are more motivated by secret desires to restore more realism. But I do not see any motivation for this from the point of view of scientific inquiry.

Deterministic hidden variable theories are a class of theories that has not been explored. They might lead to a better understanding of QM, possibly to new experimental predictions.

I only see disadvantages since it's encourages to a particular realistic type of reasoning, that I personally find inhibiting. /Fredrik

I think the science as we know it exists because of this "inhibiting type of reasoning". I see no disadvantage in restoring a well mathematical defined, deterministic and local theory at a fundamental level.

 

[Fra]

If you have the motivation to explore that, I see no good reason why you shouldn't of course. But to me, searching for deterministic and realist type theories isn't consistent with my own view of the serching process which isn't deductive, but I am open for changing my mind whenever convincing evidence is at hand, like always.

/Fredrik

 

[Demystifier]

Either
a) humans do not have free will, or
b) humans are not completely described by the known (either classical or quantum) physical laws.
Period.

Personally, I vote for physical laws.

 

[Fra]

I don't quite see a clean connection between the question of free will of humans and the structure of physical law.

My only opinions is that a human is just as much a physical system as is an atom. The difference is the complexity, there is no divine distinction anywhere.

What does it even mean from the point of view of measurement, wether object A has "free will"?

The only sensible interpretaiton I can come up with is that free refers to "not constrained by the knowledge of the observer". In that case, free will seems to be related to unpredictability of the outside, as in "freedom of action", or "unpredictable action".

If that's not what's mean, then what does it mean?

I think we need a measure, or interaction scheme, from which to infere with some degree of certainty that object A has free will or not, otherwise it seems to be mainly some philosophy of mind, rather than philosophy of science or physics.

/Fredrik

 

[Demystifier]

What does it even mean from the point of view of measurement, wether object A has "free will"?

The only sensible interpretaiton I can come up with is that free refers to "not constrained by the knowledge of the observer". In that case, free will seems to be related to unpredictability of the outside, as in "freedom of action", or "unpredictable action".

By your definition, free will is not an objective property of an object, because it is defined by knowledge of some observer. Two observers may disagree on whether object A has or has not free will. But in my language, only an objective property is a property. For example, beauty of an object is not a property of an object. So, with your definition of free will, the free will does not exist, just as beauty does not exist.

I know, you will say that not only beauty and free will are subjective, but that EVERYTHING is subjective. Well, as you know, I do not agree with such a radical attitude. Nevertheless, if I would accept that everything is subjective (which indeed might be the case), then, in my language, nothing exists (except me, which brings us to the Descartes "Cogito ergo sum", but that's not science any more).

 

[DrChinese]

The separation of the weak and electromagnetic forces is AFAIK not believed to be fundamental anymore. A Nobel price has been given for contribution to the unification of the two forces (see the Wiki article for "Electroweak interaction"). So your comments are about 30 years outdated.

Absurd, this is 100% backwards. Precisely because of what we know about these forces, the kind of SD you describe is RULED OUT. They don't conspire to support Bell test results.

 

[Fra]

I know, you will say that not only beauty and free will are subjective, but that EVERYTHING is subjective. Well, as you know, I do not agree with such a radical attitude.

You predicted my response quite well Yes I know you don't agree. I'm still fascinated by theyour apparently solid view.

Nevertheless, if I would accept that everything is subjective (which indeed might be the case), then, in my language, nothing exists (except me, which brings us to the Descartes "Cogito ergo sum", but that's not science any more).

To me the fact that "everything is subjective", does not mean that I think everything is arbitrary or out of control, far from it. To me there is only a difference of degrees of subjectivity. Objectivity is when a lot of subjects are tuned and then there is an effective objectivity. This is what is the case with the laws of physics for example as we currently know them. Objectivity is emergent as subjective views interact, what takes place is a kind of negotiation. My quest, is to understand and describe the process which has produced the remarkable stability without any reference to external realist type objectivity.

I probably mentioned before but I think our disagreements trace all the way down to our view of science as well.

The fact that there is no deductive description of the scientific method, doesn't mean that there is no sufficiently good inductive type of inference.

/Fredrik

 

[ueit]

Absurd, this is 100% backwards. Precisely because of what we know about these forces, the kind of SD you describe is RULED OUT.

This is pure circular reasoning. We do not know what mechanism, if any, stays at the basis of quantum interactions (be it EM, weak or strong). This is what we are debating, remember? By the same reasoning you would say that BM must be rejected because the current description of the weak and EM fields does not include a non-local force.

If you accept, for the sake of the argument, that radioactive decay is a deterministic process then it must be related to the particle configuration of the nucleus. But the configuration of the nucleus is a configuration of charged particles (quarks) and this configuration is in principle predictable.

They don't conspire to support Bell test results.

Prove it!

 

[Demystifier]

. Objectivity is when a lot of subjects are tuned and then there is an effective objectivity. This is what is the case with the laws of physics for example as we currently know them. Objectivity is emergent as subjective views interact, what takes place is a kind of negotiation.

This corresponds to my option b), because it means that current physical laws are not completely correct, but only to "some degree".

I probably mentioned before but I think our disagreements trace all the way down to our view of science as well.

Yes, that's true.

 

[Doc Al]

Prove it!

Right back at you! Your entire argument seems to be that "it's possible" that the configuration of things at the Big Bang were arranged so that the seemingly "free" choice of polarizer settings in a Bell experiment are somehow pre-arranged (despite efforts to "randomize" them) just to preserve the expected correlations. While I certainly don't believe that the choice of polarizer settings for Alice and Bob are "free" in any ultimate (contra-causal) sense, until you produce a real physical explanation as to why those choices are not at least proximately "free" (and thus statistically independent), the claim is rather empty.

 

[Fra]

This corresponds to my option b), because it means that current physical laws are not completely correct, but only to "some degree".

Yes you might put it like that. I partially might buy option b - the the difference is that I don't what is has to do with free will or no free will. I argee to some of your standpoints and criticts on QM, but for completely different reasons I think.

When you say the laws aren't correct, I think you imply that there are some other laws that ARE exactly correct, in some objective way - right?

I do not think that. The phrase incorrect is not what I would use, I would just say that we have inferred the laws we have for a good reason, but this inference process is still ongoing and so the laws are still evolving and this process is not predictable to me, all we can do is "play the game".

I try to study the evolving rules of this game. Even IF there was some objective laws like you think, we don't get around the at hand problem is howto FIND those laws, is still a GAME. It's the game of science, and what is the structure of that game? In particular how do we describe the origin of hypothesis withing Poppers scheme? Popper ignored this.

From my point of view, your standpoint is like a vision of a scientific result, but without similarly scientific strategy on howto get there. This is how I see realist structures - it's some specific set of information - that is introduced without prior inference process. It sometimes bysteps the critical reasoning.

Well I'm probably as stubbron in my radical solipsism as you are with deterministic realism

/Fredrik

 

[Tac-Tics]

Doesn't this belong on the philosophy board?

Free will is a total cop out. Randomness is useful, but it's still a cop out. The true interpretation of QM is almost certainly beyond the limits of science to deduce.

 

[Count Iblis]

Right back at you! Your entire argument seems to be that "it's possible" that the configuration of things at the Big Bang were arranged so that the seemingly "free" choice of polarizer settings in a Bell experiment are somehow pre-arranged (despite efforts to "randomize" them) just to preserve the expected correlations. While I certainly don't believe that the choice of polarizer settings for Alice and Bob are "free" in any ultimate (contra-causal) sense, until you produce a real physical explanation as to why those choices are not at least proximately "free" (and thus statistically independent), the claim is rather empty.

The correlations themselves are not a problem. It is the way the correlations depends on some "free parameters", like the settings of the polarizers that seems to imply a contradiction with local deterministic theories.

It is not clear to me why these violations of Bell's inequality cannot also be interpreted to imply that no counterfactual choice of one of the polarizers exists that would not affect the outcome of the measurement at the other polarizer, despite the theory being locally deterministic. A present state in which the setting of a polarizer is different would, under inverse time evolution, have to evolve back to some other low entropy initial state of the universe.

This means that there are always nonlocal correlations in the present state, as the present state has a far larger entropy than the initial state (assuming that there is a one to one mapping from the set of initial states to the set of present states). Choosing a different present macrostate is then no problem, but choosing a different present microstate that one could specify by taking the original microstate and then specify only a few changes (a few bits of information), looks impossible to me.

 

[DrChinese]

This is pure circular reasoning. We do not know what mechanism, if any, stays at the basis of quantum interactions (be it EM, weak or strong). This is what we are debating, remember? By the same reasoning you would say that BM must be rejected because the current description of the weak and EM fields does not include a non-local force.

If you accept, for the sake of the argument, that radioactive decay is a deterministic process then it must be related to the particle configuration of the nucleus. But the configuration of the nucleus is a configuration of charged particles (quarks) and this configuration is in principle predictable.

You are arguing both sides of the same argument! Either a) electroweak theory is accurate, and there is no room for SD in it currently; or b) SD is completely outside our current Physics.

I pointed out that a) contradicts your hypothesis. So clearly SD is outside of what we know. That makes it 100% as speculative as the existence of God, so where is the science in any of this?

Yes, we all know that every physical theory we currently have - relativity, QM, evolution, the big bang, etc. could be a giant SD illusion intended to trick us all into believing we know something about the universe around us. And this is similar to those who say God created the Earth 4000 years ago and placed the fossil record there - and so that evidence should be disregarded.

Well, I and most others will not so easily ignore the repeatable evidence that local realism (of which you are a proponent) must be dropped per Bell's Theorem. It is clear to me that if you can get someone to agree in SD, then you can also get that person to also agree that Bell is wrong. But SD is not science and Bell is.

 

[compton]

I don't quite see a clean connection between the question of free will of humans and the structure of physical law.

In order to believe that physical determinism poses a threat to free will, you also have to believe that laws of nature are equivalent to inviolable prescriptions. Although proponents of such a view may not consciously believe in a Prescriber, they still persevere with the view that laws of nature 'are' prescriptions.

However, if one adopts a view that natural laws are descriptive, the problem of free will disappears. In this view, all the choices made by conscious beings are not forced upon them by the laws of nature. Rather, Indeed, it is the reverse. The laws of nature are the true descriptions of the world. For example, although it is true that you cannot 'violate' a law of nature, it is not because laws of nature 'force' you to behave as such, but because the laws are true descriptions of what we do or have done.

The truthfulness of a propositions is determined by nature. The reverse is not true and amounts to the modal fallacy of reasoning.

On the other hand, it is not possible to toss out determinism and still maintain a consistent concept of physical law whether your view is descriptive or prescriptive.

 

[ThomasT]

It can explain a lot of things. Correlations that are supposed to appear as a result of non-local effects can be explained by a past common cause + deterministic evolution. A probabilistic theory wouldn't allow for that.

There's no compelling reason to assume nonlocality. It remains a possibility. That's all.

The mere assumption of determinism doesn't tell us how things are happening, and it doesn't obviate probabilistic theories.

Deterministic hidden variable theories are a class of theories that has not been explored. They might lead to a better understanding of QM, possibly to new experimental predictions.

They've been, and are still being, explored. Together, lhv and nlhv theories constitute the entire class of deterministic hidden variable theories. Lhv models of entangled states are ruled out, but for reasons that don't imply anything about the underlying reality. Nlhv models of entangled states are allowed, but there are good reasons to believe that they don't actually describe reality. And, afaik, neither of these has revealed anything about standard qm that wasn't already apparent from standard qm.

 

[denisv]

In order to believe that physical determinism poses a threat to free will, you also have to believe that laws of nature are equivalent to inviolable prescriptions. Although proponents of such a view may not consciously believe in a Prescriber, they still persevere with the view that laws of nature 'are' prescriptions.

However, if one adopts a view that natural laws are descriptive, the problem of free will disappears. In this view, all the choices made by conscious beings are not forced upon them by the laws of nature. Rather, Indeed, it is the reverse. The laws of nature are the true descriptions of the world. For example, although it is true that you cannot 'violate' a law of nature, it is not because laws of nature 'force' you to behave as such, but because the laws are true descriptions of what we do or have done.

So, inviolable prescriptions vs. inviolable descriptions, the objective difference being...?

 

[Fra]

So, inviolable prescriptions vs. inviolable descriptions, the objective difference being...?

I didn't get comptons point either.

Here is another personal view of this.

IMHO, the whole motivation for physical law is neither invioable prescriptions nor inv. descriptions. It's used in predictive strategies, inferred from nature by evolutionary processes. The utility of a rule to infere the future from the current, is justified with a context where sometime depends on this rule, and there can be variation and selection.

Thus the justification of any rule of inference, is that it does in fact exists in nature since this rule has a self-preserving trait. This doesn't mean that bad inferences are banned, it's just that they not like make it through the competition.

So my view of physical law, is that it is a rule for helping inference of the future, given the present, and thus rule has been formed in the past. It is manifested in the microstructure of matter around us. The laws of physics are IMHO mplicit in the makeup of matter. Thus, the microstructure and interaction properties of matter ENCODE physically, a view of law. If you consider this matter indefinitely stable in all ways, then so ar the laws. But if the evolving material content is not in equilibrium, then the encoded laws are still evolving IMO.

Thus to me, a law is effectively a state, but due to information capacity constraints, there is no embedding state space. So we can not apply ordinary statistics to these states. Only a evolving logic like in biology would work.

The information capacity constraint, is the exploit I imagine to turn this into predctions. If you ponder how possibly encodable distinguishable laws scale with the complexit of matter, then the _observable_ (ie. inferrable) laws of physics are bound to get simpler (ie. unification).

That might provide a somewhat unique starting point, and then see how new laws emerge as the "symmetry" if we call it that is broken by the observers growing larger and larger.

/Fredrik

 

[WaveJumper]

We are large groups of (mainly) quarks and electrons.

No, that's a rather narrow and misleading view. Life is an emergent property of quarks and electrons. There is very Big difference between a dead person and an alive person, though they are made up of the same quarks and electrons.

I didn't say that "everything is an illusion".

Without free-will, everything is an illusion.

How exactly our brain works is not a QM question. On the other hand I have seen no evidence that the brain should deserve a different treatment than any other object.

Why didn't you say consciousness instead of brain? Brain is not consciousness, though they are obviously related.

We try to explain the world around us because we are genetically programmed to do so (it enhances survival).

This explanation, along with all explanations of anything are completely senseless in a superdeterministic universe.

Evolution does not require that mutations are fundamentally random (unpredictable in principle). The term "random mutation" refers to our lack of knowledge regarding the exact conditions at the time that mutation occurred. So there is no conflict between a deterministic universe and evolution.

True, but if you posit that everything is a consequence of a pre-determined configuration of exteremely low entropy at the Big Bang, it raises more questions than it answers.

Those questions can be also put in a probabilistic universe. The fact that some quantum events might be unpredictable do not explain any of your above questions therefore I think they have no relevance to our topic. Give me a good account of how "our personal subjective experience of reality" appears in a universe that is not superedetrministic.

How about "Free will(and Life) is an emergent property in our universe, because there are infinite number of universes".

The existent evidence pointed me into that direction. I don't think it was "pre-programmed". It could be predicted by someone with infinite knowledge but this is different.

I think your idea is radical(that's generelly a good thing when applied to reality), but it degrades science, understanding, knowledge and logic and as such is absurd. If free will is an illusion, how is your theory not another illusion/delusion?

 

[Demystifier]

Well I'm probably as stubbron in my radical solipsism as you are with deterministic realism

Well, I wouldn't call myself stubborn, but yes, that is my preferred viewpoint, especially the realism.

 

[ueit]

Right back at you! Your entire argument seems to be that "it's possible" that the configuration of things at the Big Bang were arranged so that the seemingly "free" choice of polarizer settings in a Bell experiment are somehow pre-arranged (despite efforts to "randomize" them) just to preserve the expected correlations. While I certainly don't believe that the choice of polarizer settings for Alice and Bob are "free" in any ultimate (contra-causal) sense, until you produce a real physical explanation as to why those choices are not at least proximately "free" (and thus statistically independent), the claim is rather empty.

The way a SD theory might explain entanglement has nothing to do with a specific configuration at the Big-Bang. The correlations are not a result of fine-tuning of the original conditions but a result of source-detector interaction. The mechanism is as follows:

1. The detector is described by some particle configuration (it doesn't matter what, no conspirational fine-tuning required).
2. Each particle has an associated classical-like local field. This field is not one of the known fields (EM, weak, etc.) but those fields are assumed to arise as an effective description of the assumed fundamental field. This field has also infinite range so that it can communicate the particle configuration anywhere, at light speed.
3. A particle is only emitted when the detectors' field has a certain, "favorable", value, corresponding to a certain detector configuration.
4. The properties of the emitted particle is a function of the above field.

The result of the above proposed mechanism, both the properties of the emitted particle (spin for example), and the future detector configuration depend on the detector's configuration in the past, therefore they cannot be assumed to be statistical independent, hence the possible violation of Bell's inequalities by a local theory.

 

[octelcogopod]

The only problem I can see that could argue against superdeterminism is consciousness.
If we were talking about anything else in the world I would have no problem believing that they were all things controlled by the quantum forces.
I do however see a gap between quarks and electrons, and qualia.
So far there has been no way to bridge the mental with the physical, and if you think about it, it becomes increasingly harder to do so.
This is not a question about free will (although it's related) but rather how the subjective conscious states can emerge from physical matter and energy.
You can measure and scrutinize the brain all you want, but never are you able to capture the actual subjective experience.
And the only way to do so seems to be to translate neuron relations into known subjective states, if we were able to know every possible neuron configuration. But even in that scenario the magical property of the consciousness is gone.

Consciousness is not just a property of the brain, it is a property of the senses, and the environment around those senses perceive.
But if superdeterminism was true, we should be able to pick up this experience directly in the brain, because the brain would have to be the carrier of all such information.
There's also the free will question of course. If superdeterminism is true, how can we make a choice? No matter on what level the choice is, I can choose to pick up the apple or not, so that would mean deterministic events would control all my emotions and thoughts, but how could I be aware then? Am I really aware?

 

[ueit]

You are arguing both sides of the same argument! Either a) electroweak theory is accurate, and there is no room for SD in it currently; or b) SD is completely outside our current Physics.

I pointed out that a) contradicts your hypothesis. So clearly SD is outside of what we know. That makes it 100% as speculative as the existence of God, so where is the science in any of this?

1. Please substantiate your first statement (a). Where exactly did you provide evidence for your assertion that electroweak theory is incompatible with SD ?

 

[DrChinese]

1. Please substantiate your first statement (a). Where exactly did you provide evidence for your assertion that electroweak theory is incompatible with SD ?

Read any of the Weinberg/Salaam work and follow-on work, and you will see that there is no mention of a superdeterministic mechanism. Yet there would need to be for there to be a violation of Bell Inequalities when the angle setting is determined by radioactive decay (i.e. randomly as far as we know). The mechanism you propose (which is not really a specific proposal at all) requires that either the electromagnetic properties are "right" for emission, which requires that the source knows the detector settings in advance. But they won't be selected until AFTER the photon pair is in flight.

I really must point out that anyone can postulate a non-falsifiable hypothesis (which is completely useless in all respects) regarding any existing physical theory. Hey, maybe oranges are really tiny solar systems but they simply act like edible fruit due to superdeterminism!

Why don't you own up to the true purpose of your question, which I believe is to find a back-handed way to keep local realism in play? If you were serious about superdeterminism per se, you would start by looking for evidence IN FAVOR of SD (of course there is none currently) rather than asking for evidence AGAINST (as you have done).

 

[Doc Al]

The way a SD theory might explain entanglement has nothing to do with a specific configuration at the Big-Bang. The correlations are not a result of fine-tuning of the original conditions but a result of source-detector interaction. The mechanism is as follows:

1. The detector is described by some particle configuration (it doesn't matter what, no conspirational fine-tuning required).
2. Each particle has an associated classical-like local field. This field is not one of the known fields (EM, weak, etc.) but those fields are assumed to arise as an effective description of the assumed fundamental field. This field has also infinite range so that it can communicate the particle configuration anywhere, at light speed.
3. A particle is only emitted when the detectors' field has a certain, "favorable", value, corresponding to a certain detector configuration.
4. The properties of the emitted particle is a function of the above field.

The result of the above proposed mechanism, both the properties of the emitted particle (spin for example), and the future detector configuration depend on the detector's configuration in the past, therefore they cannot be assumed to be statistical independent, hence the possible violation of Bell's inequalities by a local theory.

(1) I see no justification in your model for your statement that future detector positions depend on past detector positions. I don't see anything in your model that prevents detector positions from being chosen "randomly", determined perhaps by the polarization of some cosmic microwave background photon.

(2) If I understand your model properly, it satisfies Bell's locality conditions and thus cannot agree with experiment in all situations. Even if the "field" from the detector communicates with and influences the emission of the particles, the actual detector positions can be randomly chosen at the very last instant (as in double delayed choice experiments) just before the already-emitted particles reach the detectors.

 

[ThomasT]

The way a SD theory might explain entanglement has nothing to do with a specific configuration at the Big-Bang. The correlations are not a result of fine-tuning of the original conditions but a result of source-detector interaction.

The correlation is between the angular difference of the crossed polarizers and the rate of joint detection. The detectors placed after the polarizers are always both set the same. The polarizer settings are varied. So, I assume that by detector you mean polarizer.

Keeping that in mind:

The mechanism is as follows:

1. The detector is described by some particle configuration (it doesn't matter what, no conspirational fine-tuning required).
2. Each particle has an associated classical-like local field. This field is not one of the known fields (EM, weak, etc.) but those fields are assumed to arise as an effective description of the assumed fundamental field. This field has also infinite range so that it can communicate the particle configuration anywhere, at light speed.
3. A particle is only emitted when the detectors' field has a certain, "favorable", value, corresponding to a certain detector configuration.

What about when the polarizer settings are varied while the particles are in flight?

4. The properties of the emitted particle is a function of the above field.

If this were true, then wouldn't it be possible to predict the sequences (and not just the rates) of both individual and joint detections?

The result of the above proposed mechanism, both the properties of the emitted particle (spin for example), and the future detector configuration depend on the detector's configuration in the past, therefore they cannot be assumed to be statistical independent ...

They're dependent due to the pairing process, which is based on the assumption that the polarizers are analyzing the same (or a related) property wrt any given pair of detection attributes. The problem is that it's unknown where the relationship between the entangled particles is produced. The standard assumption is that it's happening via the emission process, and that everything is happening according to the principle of locality via transmissions less than or equal to c. But the precise qualitative charactaristics of the emitted disturbances is unknown. So, standard qm can't give a realist, or explicitly local, account. However, from optics, and the conservation laws, and the known statistical dependencies, etc., standard qm gives an accurate statistical account of the joint state in a nonfactorable form -- which doesn't rule out the possibilities of locality, or nonlocality, or ftl transmissions. And, locality and light speed limit remain the defacto standard assumptions.

... hence the possible violation of Bell's inequalities by a local theory.

I think that the Aspect experiment with time-varying analyzers, as well as the demonstrated independence between polarizer orientation and individual detection in every Bell experiment, make your proposal unacceptable.

 

[ueit]

No, that's a rather narrow and misleading view. Life is an emergent property of quarks and electrons. There is very Big difference between a dead person and an alive person, though they are made up of the same quarks and electrons.

The "big" difference boils down to a difference in the particle configuration, nothing else. Do you have evidence for the existence of something else?

Without free-will, everything is an illusion.

I don't see how this follows.

Why didn't you say consciousness instead of brain? Brain is not consciousness, though they are obviously related.

Consciousness is an emergent, macroscopic property of the particle configuration of the brain. It has no relevance at fundamental level.

This explanation, along with all explanations of anything are completely senseless in a superdeterministic universe.

How is a fundamentally probabilistic universe different in this aspect?

True, but if you posit that everything is a consequence of a pre-determined configuration of exteremely low entropy at the Big Bang, it raises more questions than it answers.

Those questions being...?

How about "Free will(and Life) is an emergent property in our universe, because there are infinite number of universes".

I do not see how this answers what I've asked you:

"Give me a good account of how "our personal subjective experience of reality" appears in a universe that is not superedetrministic."?

How does the number of universes change anything?

I think your idea is radical(that's generelly a good thing when applied to reality), but it degrades science, understanding, knowledge and logic and as such is absurd. If free will is an illusion, how is your theory not another illusion/delusion?

Free will is an assumption we make, not an empirical observation. The fact that this particular assumption is wrong does not imply that our direct observations are delusional.

 

[ueit]

Read any of the Weinberg/Salaam work and follow-on work, and you will see that there is no mention of a superdeterministic mechanism. Yet there would need to be for there to be a violation of Bell Inequalities when the angle setting is determined by radioactive decay (i.e. randomly as far as we know). The mechanism you propose (which is not really a specific proposal at all) requires that either the electromagnetic properties are "right" for emission, which requires that the source knows the detector settings in advance. But they won't be selected until AFTER the photon pair is in flight.

Look, tell me which of the following assumptions you find incompatible with the papers you refer to:

1. Each particle (electron, quark, neutrino, etc.) has a well defined trajectory.
2. Each particle is accompanied by an infinite range, local field.
3. The trajectory of each particle is determined by the structure of this field.

I really must point out that anyone can postulate a non-falsifiable hypothesis (which is completely useless in all respects) regarding any existing physical theory. Hey, maybe oranges are really tiny solar systems but they simply act like edible fruit due to superdeterminism!

SD refers to a class of possible theories (like the class of non-local theories like BM or GRW), it is not a unique theory. Therefore it is too soon to say if those theories are falsifiable or not. I see no a-priori reason to assert that they are not. I see no relevance of your "orange" analogy to SD. SD does not claim that we are deluded. Our observations are correct. SD only imposes some additional constraints on what experimental results are possible to be observed.

Why don't you own up to the true purpose of your question, which I believe is to find a back-handed way to keep local realism in play? If you were serious about superdeterminism per se, you would start by looking for evidence IN FAVOR of SD (of course there is none currently) rather than asking for evidence AGAINST (as you have done).

SD is usually dismissed because of various reasons ('t Hooft is an exception). For now I want to evaluate how strong the arguments against the idea are. Also, I do find EPR experiments as pointing towards SD because the other explanations are very close to a belief in god as you have mentioned (non-locality, unfalsifiable many worlds, etc). While SD may seem counter-intuitive it doesn't contradict (at least in an obvious way) no well established scientific result.

 

[WaveJumper]

The "big" difference boils down to a difference in the particle configuration, nothing else. Do you have evidence for the existence of something else?

I think you have misunderstood my statement. I said that a particluar particle configuration does not mean a living entity. This same configuration can also mean a dead entity(person, animal, etc.). It's not only the configuration that is at play, in fact it's the configuration that causes the emergence of a totally New phenomenon - that of Life. It's still a mistery what it really is that causes a particluar dumb quantum particles configuration to "come alive". Your guess that this emergent phenomenon is a deterministic process is a speculative unfalsifiable guess.

I don't see how this follows.

If every event in the universe is pre-determined by an awful long chain of reactions(incl. your free will), how can we ever know anything for sure? There may be no universe at all, how would we tell if a deterministic process isn't causing us hallucinations of an objectively existent universe? We can't say anything with certainty about anything. We can only say - "A deterministic process is causing/forcing us to believe there is A, B or C".

Consciousness is an emergent, macroscopic property of the particle configuration of the brain. It has no relevance at fundamental level.

What do you mean by "fundamental level"? There are good arguments to believe that at the most fundamental level, something and nothing are one and the same and that all known concepts from our experience are squeezed into non-existence.

How is a fundamentally probabilistic universe different in this aspect?

True randomness(whatever that is) is a pre-requisite for probabalistic genetic occurences. I don't think our observations point to there being a particlular chain of events in the past that lead to particular genetic mutations.

Those questions being...?

If you are putting forward the Simulation Argument, do say so. I find it rather thought provoking and i think it makes much more sense than a "bare" superdeterministic universe that has no first cause. If you had said from the onset that that's what you believe, i think your worldview would have met even more recognition(but maybe that's just me).

I do not see how this answers what I've asked you:

"Give me a good account of how "our personal subjective experience of reality" appears in a universe that is not superedetrministic."?

True Randomness in the quantum vacuum. Wait infinity. Infinity is a long time. Vacuum fluctuations come and go, constantly creating particle-antiparticle pairs. Occasionally whole atoms are created. emember, you have infinity on your side. After 10^5678 "years" - there goes BOOM, a giant quantum fluctuation gives birth to a whole universe like ours(Bolzmann brains). This of course pre-supposes the existence of a spacelike medium. It sounds somewhat abstract, but what we perceive as reality is already abstract enough.

How does the number of universes change anything?

It's the existence of true randomness that counts. Infinite universes, or infinite random quantum fluctuations(some of which create whole atoms and are theorized to be able to create even universes) all rely on randomness as a pre-requsite.

Free will is an assumption we make, not an empirical observation.

How can we make the assumption that we have free-will if we don't have the free-will to make assumptions? This is circular reasoning, not much different than the liar's paradox - The liar said - "I am a liar".

Generally speaking, it sounds like you have the virtual reality argument in mind. If it is so, i have nothing against it, as i see reasons to believe that this might be plausible.

The fact that this particular assumption is wrong does not imply that our direct observations are delusional.

How are we not delusional? We believe we are making our own choices, we believe we live our own lives in our own ways, we believe we are not "pre-programmed" cause-effect robots. How is this not a delusion in a Superdeterministic universe?


I am surprised you didn't invoke the block view of the universe(as per GR) and its all-at-once existence of past, present and future. You could make a strong case on determinism there.

 

[ThomasT]

ueit, I'm still not sure what the distinguishing characteristics of a superdeterministic theory are.

Anyway, here's a good article by Ghirardi for those who haven't read it:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-collapse/

 

[SW VandeCarr]

If arguments against SD are wanted, it seems one the most obvious is that it negates the concepts of entropy and information. SD would imply the entropy of any system anywhere at any time is zero since there is never any objective uncertainty as to a system's state or evolution. Then we are dealing with subjective uncertainty only. However subjective uncertainty would also be predetermined, as our "subjective" state is also a function of a system with zero entropy. (Note: I'm using 'subjective' and 'objective' as if there were a fundamental difference. However,I agree with others here that our notion of 'objectivity' is related to issues of consistency and clarity of descriptions).

EDIT: What happens to "the arrow of time" if thermodynamic entropy is always zero?

 

[ueit]

The correlation is between the angular difference of the crossed polarizers and the rate of joint detection. The detectors placed after the polarizers are always both set the same. The polarizer settings are varied. So, I assume that by detector you mean polarizer.

By "detector" I mean the device or group of devices that measure the spin. It might be polarizer + photon detector, or a Stern-Gerlach device or something else. What is important is that the "detector" also includes whatever is used to change its orientation (be it an electric engine, a human, a monkey pressing a button, etc.). Everything that has a contribution to the decision regarding the measurement axis is included in the generic name of "detector".

What about when the polarizer settings are varied while the particles are in flight?

As I have said, "a particle is only emitted when the detectors' field has a certain, "favorable", value, corresponding to a certain detector configuration." Because the evolution of the detector is deterministic, its future orientation is "fixed". The "change" while the particle is in flight is nothing but the detector's deterministic evolution which is "known" by the particle since emission. In other words, you cannot "fool" the particle. The particle "knows" what will happen because it knows the value of the field in the past + deterministic evolution law.

If this were true, then wouldn't it be possible to predict the sequences (and not just the rates) of both individual and joint detections?

Sure, but only if you know the exact value of the field at particle's place.

I think that the Aspect experiment with time-varying analyzers, as well as the demonstrated independence between polarizer orientation and individual detection in every Bell experiment, make your proposal unacceptable.

It doesn't, see above.

 

[ueit]

ueit, I'm still not sure what the distinguishing characteristics of a superdeterministic theory are.

See my answer above.

Anyway, here's a good article by Ghirardi for those who haven't read it:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-collapse/

Thanks!

 

[Doc Al]

By "detector" I mean the device or group of devices that measure the spin. It might be polarizer + photon detector, or a Stern-Gerlach device or something else. What is important is that the "detector" also includes whatever is used to change its orientation (be it an electric engine, a human, a monkey pressing a button, etc.). Everything that has a contribution to the decision regarding the measurement axis is included in the generic name of "detector".

Including the polarization of the cosmic microwave background photon that was used to "choose" the detector setting, right?

As I have said, "a particle is only emitted when the detectors' field has a certain, "favorable", value, corresponding to a certain detector configuration." Because the evolution of the detector is deterministic, its future orientation is "fixed". The "change" while the particle is in flight is nothing but the detector's deterministic evolution which is "known" by the particle since emission. In other words, you cannot "fool" the particle. The particle "knows" what will happen because it knows the value of the field in the past + deterministic evolution law.

So basically the emitter knows the state of the entire universe and thus certainly can predict the detector settings at any future time and choose to emit or not emit particles accordingly. Good one! Of course the detector is no dummy--it also knows the state of the entire universe and can predict the behavior of the emitter and act accordingly. (I assume the behavior of the emitter is just as deterministic as is that of the detector.)

All I see is some vague handwaving that somehow everything works out in the end. Where is the physics?

 

[ueit]

Including the polarization of the cosmic microwave background photon that was used to "choose" the detector setting, right?

Right.

So basically the emitter knows the state of the entire universe and thus certainly can predict the detector settings at any future time and choose to emit or not emit particles accordingly.

Indeed.

Good one! Of course the detector is no dummy--it also knows the state of the entire universe and can predict the behavior of the emitter and act accordingly. (I assume the behavior of the emitter is just as deterministic as is that of the detector.)

Sure, but as we are not interested in the particles emitted from detectors I've let them out.

All I see is some vague handwaving that somehow everything works out in the end. Where is the physics?

Can you show that there is something inconsistent in the above assumptions? Can you show mathematically that such a behavior is not possible? If you can, it is great. Rejecting a possible mechanism is good science. But maybe, such a mechanism works and leads to testable predictions (for example one may find out that only a small class of fields lead to predictions that are consistent with QM).

 

[Doc Al]

Can you show that there is something inconsistent in the above assumptions? Can you show mathematically that such a behavior is not possible? If you can, it is great. Rejecting a possible mechanism is good science. But maybe, such a mechanism works and leads to testable predictions (for example one may find out that only a small class of fields lead to predictions that are consistent with QM).

I stated up front that it's "possible" (meaning: not immediately self-contradictory), as I think Bell did as well. So what? It's also "possible" that you (and all of PF) are just a figment of my imagination.

You have not provided or described any mechanism. What experiment would you propose to falsify your proposed "mechanism"? To get anywhere, you need a specific physical mechanism.