So you're saying that if Iran truly wants peaceful reactors and has nothing to hide, then they should accept and adhere to the NPT? And if they want weapons, they should pretend to adhere to the NPT but actually violate it. Since we know they don't adhere to the NPT, aren't you arguing against your own point? They are acting exactly as you say they would if they were really trying to produce nuclear weapons.
No, what I'm saying is that the present behavior of Iran is consistent with Iran developing their nuclear program for the purpose of using nuclear energy, not for nuclear weapons. Whether or nor Iran "adheres to the NPT as judged of the West" is irrelevant, as the West is not a neutral observer here, it is part of the dispute.
Instead of arguing whether or not Iran has violated any treaty, which is a subjective judgement, we should look at what Iran actually has done, and what they have not done. We can do the same for the West and then find out what the motivations of both sides are by assuming that both sides are making their moves in a rational way.
If you look at the moves the West has made, it is quite clear that these moves are not really motivated by the small details of whether or not Iran's actions are violations of safeguard agreements. E.g. not notifying the IAEA about Natanz, was not a violation of any safeguard agreement because only some months before a facility is going to come on line do you have to report it.
Iran did violate a safeguard agreement when they acquired uranium from China and failed to notify the IAEA.Iran says tat this violation was caused by the fact that Iran could not obtain that uranium via the normal routes, because the US imposes sanctions on any company that deals with Iran on nuclear matters (which is a violation of the NPT on the part of the US).
Now, the West is not motivated to act against Iran on the point where they violated the NOT at all. The West is motivated by the facility at Natanz, which is not a violation of the NPT. So, what the West wants is to prevent Iran from obtaining the technology to enrich uranium on an industrial scale because that technology can also be used to make nuclear weapons. Even if Iran were to agree to many intrusive inspections, the West doesn't trust Iran to possesses this technology, because, hypothetically Iran could leave the NPT, kick out the inspectors and then make nuclear weapons.
Nicholas Burns, when interviewed oin BBC's HardTalk a few years ago, has made exactly this argument: Iran can never be trusted with the technology to enrich uranium. Then, if you have this mindset, then not only are you not interested in a neutral assessment of Iran's alleged violations of the NPT, you actually don't want such an assessment at all, because it could lead to a ""not guilty verdict" which would be disastrous for you.
So, this all explains why the US wanted to get Iran referred to the UNSC asap. The longer it would take, the more evidence about Iran's behavior would surface and then the US would have lost control over the issue. By getting Iran referred on the basis of speculations (e.g. the infamous powerpoint presentation at the IAEA boards of governments meeting) the US could get resolutions passed against Iran. Later when the speculations were debunked, Iran was already convicted and that conviction cannot be revoked without the consent of the US.
So, the West succeeded in this attempt to get Iran referred. The motivation being that they don't trust Iran to enrich uranium. That in turn is motivated by the hostile nature of US/Iranian relations. It would be absurd to assume that violations of the small print in the NOT are the key here. They are no more than munition used by the West in its dispute with Iran.
What about Iran's behaviour, what could be the motivations behind that? I think this can be most clearly understood by considering two hypothetical case:
1) How would you act if you were an Iranian leader who wants to make nuclear weapons?
2) How would you act if you were an Iranian leader who wants to have access to nuclear power?
Let's start with 2) first. Iran has a long history of making deals with the West in which the West did not stick to its part of the deal. E.g., In the early 1990s there were negotiations with the Bush adminstration and Iranian officials to get hostages released from Lebanon. Iran agreed to exert pessure on Hezbollah to get the hostages released. The US had agreed to release frozen Iranian funds held in the US. After Iran had complied with its part of the deal, the US cited anti-terror laws to not go ahead with its poart of the deal.
Another example is how a deal in which Iran suspened enrichment for two years pending negotiations with the EU-3 ended. After the EU-3 made the their final proposals which to Iran were unacceptable, Iran stopped with the suspension of enrichment activities. During the negotiations, Iran always made clear that they would negotiate about more transparency, more inspections, but not about suspending enrichment and that the suspension they currently were observing was pending the negotiations, as agreed before the negotiations started.
But as soon as the Iran started to enrich uranium again, the West considered that to be a breach of that temporary deal. Sucjh a statement by te West which is contradicst any deal signed with Iran will have dne nothing to convince Iran that the West can be trusted to stick to any future deal.
There are many similar examples (like e.g. the US blocking Iran's access to nuclear fuel onder the NPT). The bottom line is then that if iran is going to spend billions to build nuclear powerplants it better make sure it will have access to fuel to power those plants. Any deal signed with the West on such a matter isn't worth the paper it is written on.
Therefore, it is wise move for Iran to first master the technology to enrich uranium on an industrial scale and then go ahead with building powerplants.
Then let's consider 1). If I were the Iranian leader who is intent on making nuclear weapons, I would not feel confortable having a nuclear program that is open to inspections. Leaving the NPT is not a good option either because then Iran would come under even greater scrutiny. I would like to make nuclear weapons in a secret location. The world should look should not look at Iran. Iran should disapeear from the headlines.
How do I minimize the number of inspections? If I insist on having the right to enrich uranium and I ultimately win then it is realistic to assume that any such deal would include me having to to agree to many intrusive inspections. Then withdrawing from the NPT at that stage is going to be even more alarming to the world.
Since under Hypothesis 1) I'm less honest about my intentions than under Hypothesis 2), I can easily do the following: I sign the incentives deal with the West and then I secretly violate it.Under the incentives deal I have to close down Natanz. Economic sanctions are lifted. Everyone is happy and the West looks the other way.
Since I still have the knowledge to produce centrifuges, I can do that in a secret location. Since no intrusive country wide inspections with short notice have been agreed under the deal with the West, the World will be none the wiser.
Then Russ did make some objections about the centrifuges you need. However, it has been confirmed that Iran has already produced the amount of uranium it needs for abomb, albeit enriched to low levels. To enrich it to higher levels Iran could simply use their existing centrifuges, although that will take while. The point is that if you only want to make a bomb there is no time limit unlike if you produce fuel for powerplants.
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