russ_watters said:
The statement "no normative moral statements exist" is not a normative moral statement. You are confusing a structural basis of the science/philosophy with the philosophy itself. It's like confusing the scientific method with a scientific theory. The scientific method is not a theory.
The statement by itself may indeed not be a normative moral statement, but the moment you put forward the statement in a discussion in an attempt to convince me of its truth, you are in reality claiming that I
ought to hold that said statement is correct (why else would you put forward an argument in the first place if not in an attempt to convince me of its correctness?). Of course, it cannot be the case that you think it is your mere opinion that the statement ought to be considered correct, because then your justification for putting forward the argument would then be arbitrary.
Perhaps an example would help me to explain the idea. The moment you try to convince me of something, you must explicitly presuppose that truth ought to be preferable over falsehood. For if it is not the case that truth ought to be preferable over falsehood, the justification for making an argument is again undermined, because holding its negation would be equally justified. If it is instead the case that falsehood ought to be preferable over truth, then you cannot hold that the statement "falsehood ought to be preferable over truth" ought to be considered true, since falsehood ought to be preferable over truth. If it is the case that truth or falsehood is equally preferable, then the statements "falsehood ought to be preferable over truth" and "truth ought to be preferable over falsehood" are equally, which of course is a logical paradox. I see no other option other than the universal truth of the statement that "you ought to prefer truth over falsehood". Naturally, the moment someone attempts to argue against this statement, he or she must implicitly accept it as true (because otherwise your equally justified in holding its negation), therefore undermining all attempts to counter the statement that you ought to prefer truth over falsehood.
If i say that blue is a better color than green, there you have no moral obligation to accept that, since color preferences are almost entirely subjective. However, if i say that the current President elect of the United States is Obama, then you have a moral obligation to accept that statement if it is the case that truth is preferably over falsehood. Now, it cannot be my mere opinion that truth is preferable over falsehood, because arguing that is as rational as arguing that blue is better than green in that you have no moral obligation to accept it. Similarly, if it is not the case that truth ought to be preferable over falsehood, then you have no moral obligation to accept anything and the entire reason or point behind rational argumentation, which i take as convince the person you are discussing with of the truth of your arguments, is undermined.
If the moral relativist claims that no normative moral statements exists, then i would simply respond asking "Why ought i hold that no normative moral statements exists?". The moral relativists would be forced to argue that "you ought to hold that no normative moral statements exists because of fact x, fact y and fact z", which surely by definition would be a normative moral statement?
That is most definitely untrue. How many times have you heard people say "who are we to tell them what is right and wrong?"? Heck, international politics is dominated largely by the conflict beteween these concepts, in determining whether the international community can intervene in countries to right wrongs.
Yes I agree, I made a poorly formulated statement. Let me rephrase. Most people live their personal everyday life as moral realists, because they are forced by reality to take facts into account when making moral decisions about their personal life in various situations. I certainly agree that the utter failure of humanity to understand morality has plagued humanity and led to horrible situations and most likely the murder of millions of people.
I seem to have been expressing myself a bit vague before. You wrote
Yes, you are. You are taking the view of moral relativists, assuming it to be true, then applying it to determine if it is true.
responding to
I further take moral relativism to mean that morality is just subjective and in the end arbitrary or even nonexistent because there is, according to moral relativists, no empirical basis for morality. Naturally, i could be completely mistaken here.
What I mean here is that I could be completely mistaken concerning the definition of moral relativism that i put forward, not about morality having an empirical basis. I do not support or subscribe to moral relativism in any shape or form. I apologize for the misunderstanding.
I seem to have expressed myself a bit odd later on in my post as well. What I am arguing is that i) the innate means to come to true moral conclusions and ii) that some cultures are, in fact, morally better than others, are incompatible with the ideas of the far left (blank slate, noble savage) whereas iii) morality is empirical, rather than supernatural is incompatible with the far right (I'll explain why i think this below). Naturally, the right rejects the blank slate (because of original sin, for instance) and the noble savage (since they are not cultural relativists).
The last issue I will address is what I perceive as an incompatibility between moral realism, which I here take to mean the a) notion that morality has an empirical basis that b) morality is contingent on reality and that c) true moral statements can be discovered and supported by various empirical investigations of the natural world, and essentially all forms of supernaturalism. If you can accept this definition of moral realism, we can begin to investigate if this notion is compatible with supernaturalism, which I take to mean that there exists something or someone beyond the natural, material world.
Most supernatural entities are often considered to be both
extremely powerful as well as
fundamentally unpredictable. They must be extremely powerful, because if they where not, there would not be anything particularly extraordinary about them. If something that is labeled as supernatural could not, for instance, rise above the laws of physics then it would not make much sense to apply such a label. Now, supernatural entities must be fundamentally unpredictable, because if they where predictable, then such investigations would immediately be incorporated into scientific methodology and it would again cease to be supernatural. If you can accept these two attributes as necessary constraints on supernatural entities, we can soon begin to see why supernaturalism and moral realism are incompatible. These two constraints apply to entities such as gods, ghosts, demons, spirits, souls, witches and most other supernatural entities, at least in popular imagination and as I have argued, they must apply to all supernatural entities.
Now, moral realism is based on, and indeed depends on, the fabric of reality. The problem for supernaturalists is of course that they must hold that there exists something extremely powerful and fundamentally unpredictable in addition to the material world. Now these entities thus have the power to change the fabric of reality, and thus morality
at any given time, which is fundamentally unpredictable. This would mean that no action could be considered truly moral or immoral. If Bob hits his wife Alice over the head with a baseball bat for no apparently reason, most people would consider that an immoral action. However, what if the facts of reality has the ability to change unpredictably? What if hitting Alice over the head with a baseball bat does not harm her in any way, but puts 1M$ into her bank account? Would the action still be immoral? However, Bob could not predict what the outcome of his action would be, since putting a supernatural entity into the mix makes such estimations invalid, since you have an enormous and unpredictable factor in the form of one or more supernatural entities. Thus, these supernatural entities become Cartesian demons. Even worse, if Bob regularly use to hit Alice with a baseball bat and every time he does it 1M$ is deposited into her bank account, he cannot be sure that the next hit will have the same outcome. After all, it might actually kill Alice. In other words, all forms of induction breaks down the moment you attempt to introduce any form of supernatural entities. Thus, we cannot say that any action is moral or immoral, because the facts of reality are no longer available to us or that they can arbitrarily change at any time.
In summary, the problems with the idea that moral realism is compatible with any form of supernaturalism is that supernatural entities would be Cartesian demons and that induction would be completely invalid. Coincidentally, the same sort of argument can be made in favor of the position that science, or for that matter organized knowledge of any form, is incompatible with all forms of supernaturalism. The atomic theory of matter might represent a valid approximation to reality today, but if Casper the Ghost exists and can arbitrary and unpredictably manipulate reality according to his whims, surely we cannot hold the atomic theory of matter in the same regard as we did before? For materialists or naturalists who hold that predictable matter, that is, matter acting according with its identity, is all that exists would not have such a problem.
If mass shootings lead to economic stability instead of mass deaths, would the genocides in Darfur be immoral? If you cannot know whether or not the conservation of energy is valid at this precise moment (Casper would have altered it just a second ago), how can one hold that a free lunch is impossible?