"Classical Physics Is Wrong" Fallacy - Comments

[Orodruin]

True and false, right and wrong are by their nature global. It is about the existence of an error, not about the size of the error.

No, this can only be correct in a philosophical sense and that has absolutely nothing to do with what is being discussed. Unless you are afraid that a bridge will break down because the engineers building it did not account for relativistic corrections you really have no case here because that is what the article is about. You are building a strawman argument. Empirical science is not about being right or wrong, it is about finding as good of a description of how nature behaves as possible.

If we would not accept that not only classical mechanics, but even GR and QFT are wrong (which follows from the infinities and singularities they have), there would be no point searching for a theory of quantum gravity.

This statement is just absurd. You are essentially saying that if wehad accepted Newtonian mechanics as false there would have been no point in developing relativity.

But you have no chance to find a domain of applicability of Newtonian theory, without acknowledging that Newtonian theory is wrong. Before 1905 where was no such animal as a domain of applicability of Newtonian theory, because it was not known that Newtonian theory is wrong. It appeared only after it was clarified that Newtonian theory is wrong, that means, that there exist regions outside the domain of applicability.

Again. Strawman and a failure to understand what the article is about.

 

[Maximilian]

If this is what you mean by "wrong", then you are using the word in a very different sense from its usual sense.

Given that I'm not a native speaker, this is imaginable. I know that there is also a moral meaning, right or wrong, which is not present for true and false, but in a physics discussion and in particular in the article this plays no role. The google translator gives "falsch" as the main translation, which backtranslates into "wrong, false, incorrect, counterfeit, mistaken, erroneous". This does not look like my use would be "a very different sense".

The word "error" has a precise technical meaning when speaking of approximations. That meaning does not have the implications you are claiming here.

Explain the difference. If I use an approximation instead of the correct theory, the consequence is a difference between my computation and the value the correct theory would give. This difference is part of the error I make, not? There are, of course, also other sources of error, but this error is the one relevant if one discusses an approximation.

Nobody is arguing that the Newtonian approximation is "correct". Nor is anyone arguing that it is "wrong". The whole point is that "correct" and "wrong", binary categories, are not useful categories to use when talking about scientific theories and approximations. Much more useful are "less accurate" and "more accurate", which again have precise technical meanings in terms of how much error (using the technical meaning of that term, as above) there is in your predictions vs. the actual data.

I disagree. I think these binary notions, which distinguish the theories as a whole, are very important.

If you have not read the Asimov essay that @Nugatory linked to in post #2, I strongly suggest that you do so, because it does a great job of discussing exactly this point and dispelling the kind of common confusion you are displaying here.

I have read it, and even quoted it in one of the many deleted postings.
To quote again: "John, when people thought the Earth was flat, they were wrong. When people thought the Earth was spherical, they were wrong. But if you think that thinking the Earth is spherical is just as wrong as thinking the Earth is flat, then your view is wronger than both of them put together."

This statement is using "wrong" in the same sense I have used it. What I argue against is to name "When people thought the Earth was spherical, they were wrong" a fallacy.

No, this can only be correct in a philosophical sense and that has absolutely nothing to do with what is being discussed. Unless you are afraid that a bridge will break down because the engineers building it did not account for relativistic corrections you really have no case here because that is what the article is about. You are building a strawman argument. Empirical science is not about being right or wrong, it is about finding as good of a description of how nature behaves as possible.

First, I completely disagree philosophically. Science is about right and wrong (better true or false, to avoid the moral aspects which are not present). Empirically falsified theories are rejected because they are false. That they may be nonetheless used for approximate computations is fine and useful, but the scientific problem to find a theory which is not falsified remains.

This statement is just absurd. You are essentially saying that if we had accepted Newtonian mechanics as false there would have been no point in developing relativity.

What is absurd is your interpretation, because I'm saying exactly the opposite. If we had accepted Newtonian mechanics as true, and therefore ignored the open problems which had the potential to cause doubt (like MMX, Mercury perihelion) there would have been no point in developing relativity.

Again. Strawman and a failure to understand what the article is about.

No. The argument of the article simply fails to prove what is claimed to be proven, namely that "classical mechanics is wrong" is a fallacy.

All what it shows is that "There is somehow a notion that SR, GR, and QM have shown that classical physics is wrong, and so, it shouldn’t be used." But this is very different from "classical physics is wrong" being a fallacy. Classical physics is wrong, as any approximation, but it can be used as an approximation whenever the approximation error is sufficiently small.

 

[Dale]

it is clear that the approximation itself has to be wrong.

I disagree completely. What justification do you have for calling an approximation “wrong” when many experiments clearly show that the approximation is valid? You are not the judge of right and wrong in science: experiment is. In the domain where the approximation matches experiment it is scientifically validated. It is demonstrably not wrong.

 

[Ibix]

Classical physics is wrong, as any approximation, but it can be used as an approximation whenever the approximation error is sufficiently small.

Special relativity is only valid where gravitational effects are negligible. So it is wrong by your definition.

General relativity breaks down somewhere on the way to the inside of a black hole. So it is wrong by your definition.

Quantum theory breaks down somewhere on the way to cosmological scales because the cosmological constant is tiny. So it is wrong by your definition.

The same will be true of a successor theory. Either it will predict its own breakdown (like relativity) or it won't (like Newton). And there will always be a regime we've never tested it in. So it will be wrong by your definition. Or so we will have to suppose.

In fact, all of scientific theory is wrong by your definition. This does not seem like a helpful definition to me.

 

[Maximilian]

I disagree completely. What justification do you have for calling an approximation “wrong” when many experiments clearly show that the approximation is valid? You are not the judge of right and wrong in science: experiment is. In the domain where the approximation matches experiment it is scientifically validated. It is demonstrably not wrong.

It is demonstrably wrong, because else it would not be named an approximation but a viable physical theory. If it is not, but only useful as an approximation of some other viable physical theory, that means that it has been falsified by some empirical observation.
That it may be used, under some circumstances, as an approximation does not make a wrong theory true. And even in cases where the approximation is good as an approximation, one can compute (at least in principle) the difference between the approximation and the viable theory. This is, according to the viable theory, the error made by the approximation. It is non-zero, else it would not be named approximation, but exact solution. So we can be sure that we have a non-zero error.
We use the approximation because we know (or have estimated) that the error is below the accuracy we need in the application in question.
I judge the use of language. The words used have a meaning, and the meaning clearly gives some information about what experiments have told. Namely, that a theory which is used only as an approximation, and which is not named a viable theory, has been falsified by observation (or is not viable for other reasons, like internal inconsistency, as QFT on curved background, or because of infinities like GR.)

Special relativity is only valid where gravitational effects are negligible. So it is wrong by your definition.
General relativity breaks down somewhere on the way to the inside of a black hole. So it is wrong by your definition.

Correct.

Quantum theory breaks down somewhere on the way to cosmological scales because the cosmological constant is tiny. So it is wrong by your definition.

In my interpretation, it does not have to extend to cosmological scales, but breaks down for other reasons, but this is off-topic here, so correct too.

The same will be true of a successor theory. Either it will predict its own breakdown (like relativity) or it won't (like Newton). And there will always be a regime we've never tested it in. So it will be wrong by your definition. Or so we will have to suppose.

No. The existence of regimes not tested is irrelevant, because this does not make a theory wrong. Anyway we cannot prove by observation that it is true. But it is quite probable that theories like QG or TOE people think about developing now will be theories which can be easily seen to be false.

In fact, all of scientific theory is wrong by your definition. This does not seem like a helpful definition to me.

No. Only our actual scientific theories are wrong. That's why we have to search for better theories. Which is what many physicists are doing.

If one, instead, cares only about making sufficiently accurate predictions for observable things, there is certainly no need for quantum gravity or a GUT or TOE, and all that research is simply throwing away money.

 

[PeterDonis]

If I use an approximation instead of the correct theory, the consequence is a difference between my computation and the value the correct theory would give. This difference is part of the error I make, not?

No. You have two mathematical machines that generate predictions. You compare each prediction with the actual data. The difference between the prediction and the actual data is the error. That difference will never be zero; but if one theory is more accurate than another (such as General Relativity being more accurate than Newtonian gravity), then the more accurate theory will have a smaller error. No theory ever has a zero error.

these binary notions, which distinguish the theories as a whole

But they don't. No theory makes predictions which exactly match the data. So there is no way to sort them into binary categories. The best you can do is rank them along a continuum of how accurate their predictions are.

This statement is using "wrong" in the same sense I have used it

No, it isn't, because you are using "wrong" as a binary category. Asimov is using "wrong" as a continuum; he is saying some people are more wrong or less wrong than others. A binary category doesn't work like that; the only two possibilities are "wrong" and "not wrong". That's not what Asimov is describing.

Empirically falsified theories are rejected because they are false.

Some theories are rejected because all of their predictions are so different from the actual data that they are not useful at all. But Newtonian gravity and Newtonian mechanics are not like that. Once again, there is no sharp boundary where a theory becomes "false". There are no binary categories here.

If we had accepted Newtonian mechanics as true, and therefore ignored the open problems which had the potential to cause doubt (like MMX, Mercury perihelion) there would have been no point in developing relativity.

You are correct that Newtonian mechanics was not accepted as "true". But it also was not deemed "false" when relativity was discovered. You are mistakenly assuming that those are the only two possibilities. They're not.

else it would not be named an approximation but a viable physical theory

Then in your terminology, all theories are approximations. General Relativity is an approximation. Quantum field theory is an approximation. All of these theories make predictions which do not exactly match the data. They just make predictions which are closer to the data (smaller error). The only reason we don't commonly refer to GR and QFT as approximations is that we don't have any other theories that are more accurate than they are. But that is not expected to be true forever.

one can compute (at least in principle) the difference between the approximation and the viable theory. This is, according to the viable theory, the error made by the approximation.

No, it isn't; "error" means something else. See above.

 

[Maximilian]

No. You have two mathematical machines that generate predictions. You compare each prediction with the actual data. The difference between the prediction and the actual data is the error.

That means you use the word "error" simply for something very different and irrelevant here. This is what is done if we want to find out which theory is better. This has been (for the theories discussed here) long ago, during the last millennial. What is discussed here is the question if a theory which is known to be wrong in many different domains can be nonetheless used as an approximation in some other domains. To find out the answer it is reasonable to compare its predictions with those of a theory known to be better everywhere.

But they don't. No theory makes predictions which exactly match the data.

Of course, there is a measurement error. But you cannot use the measurement error to compute if a theory which is already falsified can be nonetheless used in some domain as an approximation. See the article itself. There was no list of experimental data. There was a computation of the error made by classical physics using not experiment, but SR.

So there is no way to sort them into binary categories. The best you can do is rank them along a continuum of how accurate their predictions are.

Sorry, you can. For the best theory, the one which is not yet falsified, you have no information about how accurate it is. All what you have is information about the accuracy of particular experiments, or particular measurement devices. But it is not yet falsified, that means it is as true as possible for a physical theory, which anyway remains hypothetical forever. An information how accurate the predictions of the theory are you have only for theories which have been already falsified. And then the accuracy of the theory is defined by comparison with a theory not yet falsified.

Ok, if you are not sure if certain experiments have falsified which theories, you can also assign degrees of plausibility to theories, using Bayesian probability. But these probabilities are also only probabilities if the theory is true or not. So, this gives only a continuous degree of our knowledge if the theory is true or not. The basic subdivision remains binary.

No, it isn't, because you are using "wrong" as a binary category. Asimov is using "wrong" as a continuum; he is saying some people are more wrong or less wrong than others. A binary category doesn't work like that; the only two possibilities are "wrong" and "not wrong". That's not what Asimov is describing.

But this is nice playing with words, which is what one can expect from a writer. So, I agree with the part where he uses "wrong". And the use of "wronger" is a nice word game, not more, but is about something different, namely the error made by the approximation. If there is an error, one is wrong. But of course it matters a lot how big this error is. And in this part I also agree with him.

Some theories are rejected because all of their predictions are so different from the actual data that they are not useful at all. But Newtonian gravity and Newtonian mechanics are not like that.

Indeed. You have to add to the reasons for rejection that using them instead of the true theory would not give any advance in computation. And this is, essentially, the main point the old theories are used yet - they define mathematically, computationally much simpler ways to compute the results.

You are correct that Newtonian mechanics was not accepted as "true". But it also was not deemed "false" when relativity was discovered. You are mistakenly assuming that those are the only two possibilities. They're not.

No. A theory is either true or false. It may be unknown if it is true, but usually it is known to be false. And if it is false, the question appears if it nonetheless useful for approximations. It is that simple.

Then in your terminology, all theories are approximations. General Relativity is an approximation. Quantum field theory is an approximation. All of these theories make predictions which do not exactly match the data. They just make predictions which are closer to the data (smaller error). The only reason we don't commonly refer to GR and QFT as approximations is that we don't have any other theories that are more accurate than they are. But that is not expected to be true forever.

Not all theories are approximations, but those we have today are. This is not expected to be true forever. There maybe, in principle, theories where we don't know that they are false. But I think the TOE - that hypothetical quantum theory which unifies GR and SM - will not yet be of this type. Simply because a continuous field theory has no chance. So, during the rest of my life it will remain so.

To find true theories is the aim of science.

 

[russ_watters]

Explain the difference. If I use an approximation instead of the correct theory, the consequence is a difference between my computation and the value the correct theory would give. This difference is part of the error I make, not? There are, of course, also other sources of error, but this error is the one relevant if one discusses an approximation.

I disagree. I think these binary notions, which distinguish the theories as a whole, are very important.

I don't understand how you can hold these two positions simultaneously. You seem to get that an error is quantifiable and "wrong" as you are using it is binary, so they can't be the same thing, can they? Unless your usage is that all non-zero "error" is "wrong", in which case the word "wrong" has no value because it is covered by the much more useful word "error".

I suppose definitions are conventions, so people can agree or agree to disagree. For all this arguing it is tough to see why this matters; why you couldn't just say "I understand how the words are being used but prefer a different way" and leave it at that?

Maybe your issue is a philosophical issue with the goal of science? The search for an ultimate Truth? [edit: per your previous post, it appears so] Perhaps what you may be missing is that even if scientists believe they are searching for an absolute Truth, that belief is of no relevance. Why? Because it is inherently impossible to know if they've found it. So it doesn't alter the practical assumption that all theories are wrong. Which - again - means you may as well use "wrong" in a relative sense so that the word is useful. Otherwise a statement like "that theory is wrong" is pointless/redundant.

 

[Dale]

It is demonstrably wrong, because else it would not be named an approximation

Nonsense. The naming convention doesn’t demonstrate anything. The experimental results are the relevant demonstration, and in the classical domain the approximation is experimentally valid. You can call it an approximation, a limit, or a flubnubitz, and what you call it does not change the experimental facts that validate it.

That it may be used, under some circumstances, as an approximation does not make a wrong theory true.

What makes a theory valid is whether or not it matches the result of experiments. Not whether or not it approximates some other theory.

And even in cases where the approximation is good as an approximation, one can compute (at least in principle) the difference between the approximation and the viable theory.

You have the purpose of this calculation backwards. The purpose of computing the difference between Newtonian mechanics and relativity in the classical domain is to establish the validity of relativity. Newtonian mechanics is already validated by experiments in that domain, and therefore relativity must show that any disagreements between it and Newtonian mechanics are less than the experimental precision.

 

[atyy]

Yes, they are. Did you not read the article?

Also, approximations are not inherently wrong in science.

If this is what you mean by "wrong", then you are using the word in a very different sense from its usual sense.

I disagree. And this is just a question of semantics. It is completely standard to say that Newtonian physics is demonstrably wrong.

 

[atyy]

Maybe your issue is a philosophical issue with the goal of science? The search for an ultimate Truth? [edit: per your previous post, it appears so] Perhaps what you may be missing is that even if scientists believe they are searching for an absolute Truth, that belief is of no relevance. Why? Because it is inherently impossible to know if they've found it. So it doesn't alter the practical assumption that all theories are wrong. Which - again - means you may as well use "wrong" in a relative sense so that the word is useful. Otherwise a statement like "that theory is wrong" is pointless/redundant.

So if one finds a conceptually complete and coherent theory in complete agreement with all experimental evidence, is it wrong? If you claim it is wrong, how can you prove that it is wrong?

 

[russ_watters]

So if one finds a conceptually complete and coherent theory in complete agreement with all experimental evidence, is it wrong? If you claim it is wrong, how can you prove that it is wrong?

Other side of the coin: there is no way to know if it is Ultimate Truth or not, so scientists will assume it is not and keep looking.

 

[atyy]

Here is an example from Rindler: https://www.amazon.com/dp/0198567324/?tag=pfamazon01-20 (p108)

"Applied to such situations, Newtonian mechanics is not just slightly wrong: it is totally wrong."

 

[atyy]

Other side of the coin: there is no way to know if it is Ultimate Truth or not, so scientists will assume it is not and keep looking.

But it is quite different from the present situation when the motivation for new theories is driven by known deficiencies in currently accepted theories.

 

[russ_watters]

But it is quite different from the present situation when the motivation for new theories is driven by known deficiencies in currently accepted theories.

Yes, I suppose if some scientists believe they have found the Absolute Truth, they might decide there is no need to keep looking. Others might decide to keep chasing that next order of magnitude of precision.

Here is an example from Rindler: https://www.amazon.com/dp/0198567324/?tag=pfamazon01-20 (p108)

"Applied to such situations, Newtonian mechanics is not just slightly wrong: it is totally wrong."

Was that directed at me? I'm not sure what the purpose of that is.

 

[atyy]

Was that directed at me? I'm not sure what the purpose of that is.

Not specifically.

 

[PeterDonis]

That means you use the word "error" simply for something very different and irrelevant here.

No, it's not irrelevant, since it's what everyone in this discussion except you is talking about.

Of course, there is a measurement error.

Measurement error is not what I was talking about.

For the best theory, the one which is not yet falsified, you have no information about how accurate it is.

I'm sorry, but you are not making sense. The difference between the theory's predictions and the actual data is information about how accurate the theory is.

this is nice playing with words

No, it isn't. Asimov wasn't playing with words. He meant exactly what he said. What he said is simply something that you are apparently unwilling to accept.

A theory is either true or false

By your definition, all theories are false. Which makes your definition useless.

Not all theories are approximations, but those we have today are.

Every theory we have ever had has been an approximation. On what basis would you expect some hypothetical future theory to not be?

This is not expected to be true forever.

What basis do you have for any such expectation?

 

[Dale]

Applied to such situations, Newtonian mechanics is not just slightly wrong: it is totally wrong

But we are not talking about such situations. We are talking about classical situations where it is demonstrably not wrong.

 

[russ_watters]

Here is an example from Rindler: https://www.amazon.com/dp/0198567324/?tag=pfamazon01-20 (p108)

"Applied to such situations, Newtonian mechanics is not just slightly wrong: it is totally wrong."

Ok, then rather than stating, I'll ask: what is your point? Yes, there are situations where Newtonian mechanics performs very poorly (and of course others where it performs quite well). So what?

 

[atyy]

But we are not talking about such situations. We are talking about classical situations where it is demonstrably not wrong.

Then why use word "approximation"?

 

[Dale]

Then why use word "approximation"?

I didn't, except to respond to someone else talking about approximations. I still don't understand the reasoning that "approximation" is the same as "wrong". I think that it is incorrect reasoning, and I have asked a couple of times for people to justify it, but nobody has. I don't think that it is justifiable because in the classical limit Newtonian physics and relativity are approximately equal and both are experimentally validated. So "approximation" is not the same as "wrong".

 

[atyy]

I didn't, except to respond to someone else talking about approximations. I still don't understand the reasoning that "approximation" is the same as "wrong". I think that it is incorrect reasoning, and I have asked a couple of times for people to justify it, but nobody has. I don't think that it is justifiable because in the classical limit Newtonian physics and relativity are approximately equal and both are experimentally validated. So "approximation" is not the same as "wrong".

As far as I can tell, the discussion is mostly semantics. An approximation is wrong in the sense that an approximation contains an error. For example, for an analytical function, if we approximate the function in a small region by low order terms of the Taylor series, then the omitted terms give us an estimate of the size of the error.

So for example, ZapperZ wrote in the Insight of the OP "There is somehow a notion that SR, GR, and QM have shown that classical physics is wrong, and so, it shouldn’t be used."

I agree that the notion mentioned in his sentence is wrong. However, I would say it is not "SR, GR and Qm have shown that classical physics is wrong" that is wrong, since it is true that SR, GR and QM have shown Newtonian physics to be wrong. I would locate the error in the second part of the sentence "and so, it shouldn't be used", since it is still not wrong to use Newtonian physics for purposes where it is an excellent approximation.

 

[Maximilian]

I suppose definitions are conventions, so people can agree or agree to disagree. For all this arguing it is tough to see why this matters; why you couldn't just say "I understand how the words are being used but prefer a different way" and leave it at that?
Maybe your issue is a philosophical issue with the goal of science? The search for an ultimate Truth? [edit: per your previous post, it appears so] Perhaps what you may be missing is that even if scientists believe they are searching for an absolute Truth, that belief is of no relevance. Why? Because it is inherently impossible to know if they've found it. So it doesn't alter the practical assumption that all theories are wrong. Which - again - means you may as well use "wrong" in a relative sense so that the word is useful. Otherwise a statement like "that theory is wrong" is pointless/redundant.

Conventions do matter, and why they matter has been nicely described in Orwell's 1984. Of course, I see no politics here. But the point of Newspeak is something which can appear in changing language conventions in physics too. And the point is that some unwanted theories are left without words to talk about them, because the words normally used to talk about them have been redefined.
The theory which obtains here such a status is a standard theory of truth, truth as correspondence with reality. You seem to prefer another theory of truth, one where to talk about truth is useless, because we have no criterion of truth so that we appear unable to prove that our statements are true. Ok, if you don't like to talk about truth, don't talk about it. But, please, don't try to redefine the language, so that people who follow the classical theory of truth as correspondence with reality become unable to say that a given theory is not true.

Ok, then rather than stating, I'll ask: what is your point? Yes, there are situations where Newtonian mechanics performs very poorly (and of course others where it performs quite well). So what?

The point is that there exists a well-defined notion, truth, and the point is that Newtonian mechanics is not true. There is a difference. Performing badly is a criterion for the theory being false. But there are other criteria for this. GR is not performing poorly. But it is nonetheless false. It produces singularities, and theories with singularities are wrong too, independent of how nicely they perform. Reducing the notion of truth from science, or replacing it with performing nicely in observations, has serious consequences for science itself. So, it makes it impossible to criticize GR as being wrong. There are regions, near singularities, where one may guess that it may perform poorly, but such regions are not in our Solar system, so we do not have to care. The search for quantum gravity is a loss of time, the guys would better improve computations in Newtonian theory.

No, it's not irrelevant, since it's what everyone in this discussion except you is talking about.

First, this is wrong. Then, you want science by majority decisions?

I'm sorry, but you are not making sense. The difference between the theory's predictions and the actual data is information about how accurate the theory is.

No. According to some theory, $u=2\pi r$. I measure u and r for some circle and get agreement in the region of 1%. Does this tell me how accurate $u=2\pi r$ is? Obviously not. It tells only something about my measurement.

Asimov wasn't playing with words. He meant exactly what he said. What he said is simply something that you are apparently unwilling to accept.

No. I see the only difference between his "wronger" and my "greater error" in the words used to describe the same thing, and I accept this thing.

By your definition, all theories are false. Which makes your definition useless.

First, it is wrong that all theories are false. Only all our actual theories are false, for various reasons. Then, no, it does not make it useless at all. Because to say that a particular theory is false requires justification. (Which makes the difference to your "all theories are false".) Any particular justification why even our best theories are wrong point to a particular problem related with these theories. A problem which lead to attempts to solve it, finding a better theory which does not have this problem. And, even if this theory may have other problems, this will be an improvement.

Every theory we have ever had has been an approximation. On what basis would you expect some hypothetical future theory to not be?
What basis do you have for any such expectation?

The basis is that one classical problem of all of the theories of the past as well as of our actual theories - that they are not universal - is close to being solved.

 

[Orodruin]

However, I would say it is not "SR, GR and Qm have shown that classical physics is wrong" that is wrong,

It is a clearly wrong statement. Experiment is what has shown that classical mechanics is wrong in some settings. A theory can never prove another theory wrong. That is the job of experiments.

Besides, it is not what the insight is talking about. It is addressing the ”so it should not be used” issue. Discussing anything else here would seem off topic to me.

 

[atyy]

It is a clearly wrong statement. Experiment is what has shown that classical mechanics is wrong in some settings. A theory can never prove another theory wrong. That is the job of experiments.

Besides, it is not what the insight is talking about. It is addressing the ”so it should not be used” issue. Discussing anything else here would seem off topic to me.

I disagree. It is perfectly standard English, and you are splitting hairs.

 

[atyy]

It is a clearly wrong statement. Experiment is what has shown that classical mechanics is wrong in some settings. A theory can never prove another theory wrong. That is the job of experiments..

That is wrong. A theory can prove another theory wrong. For example, if a theory is found to be logically incoherent, then it is wrong by virtue of theory alone.

 

[Orodruin]

You seem to prefer another theory of truth, one where to talk about truth is useless, because we have no criterion of truth so that we appear unable to prove that our statements are true.

Any talk of a ”true” theory is useless and ultimately not constructive or scientific as you can never prove that your theory is ”true” in some deeper meaning. Thus, talking about it in that manner is just philosophy. Again, this is not what the insight article is about and you are therefore continuing to veer off topic.

I disagree. It is perfectly standard English, and you are splitting hairs.

It is not clear what part you disagree with. If a theory can prove another theory wrong, then many crackpots will be very very happy, but it is not how science works. Newtonian mechanics was proven to make faulty predictions long before relativity and QM came along. This is why relativity and QM were developed. This is a fundamental corner stone in empirical science so I don’t think you can brush it off by saying that it is splitting hairs. What determines whether a theory is applicable in a scenario is if it accurately describes that scenario or not.

Looking at it another way. Imagine that you are a physicist in a universe where there is no perihelion precession of Mercury and you are given GR and Newtonian gravity. In that case would you say Newtonian mechanics disproved GR? If so, keep in mind that the only thing that changed was the empirical data. Thus, taking away observation, one theory cannot disprove another. On the other hand, it is certainly possible for a theory to be proven unapplicable in some limits without having a more accurate one so it is also clear that you do not need another theory to show that a theory is not applicable.

 

[Orodruin]

That is wrong. A theory can prove another theory wrong. For example, if a theory is found to be logically incoherent, then it is wrong by virtue of theory alone.

This is different, this is a theory proving itself logically inconsistent. Not a new theory proving an old one wrong. It has absolutely nothing to do with what we were discussing.

 

[PeterDonis]

The theory which obtains here such a status is a standard theory of truth,

The point is that there exists a well-defined notion, truth

This is philosophy, not physics. Philosophy is off topic in this forum.

Then, you want science by majority decisions?

No. That's not what I said.

I see the only difference between his "wronger" and my "greater error" in the words used to describe the same thing

What do you mean by "my greater error"? You have been treating "wrong" as a binary category. Asimov isn't.

it is wrong that all theories are false. Only all our actual theories are false

Since actual theories are the only ones we have any evidence about, I have no idea how you propose to justify your claim here.

to say that a particular theory is false requires justification

Okay, then please justify the claim I just quoted above, that "all our actual theories are false".

one classical problem of all of the theories of the past as well as of our actual theories - that they are not universal - is close to being solved

It is? What is your basis for this extremely strong claim?

 

[Asymptotic]

First, it is wrong that all theories are false. Only all our actual theories are false, for various reasons.

Can you provide examples of non-actual theories that are true?