StatusX said:
I don't pretend to know what's at the bottom of everything. All I'm saying is that god does not help explain anything, because simply postulating his existence still leaves the question "Why is there a god?" But this is just another way of saying "Why is there a universe?", which was the original question, and we've gotten nowhere.
I don't think this is the most effective way to approach ontology. I think a more effective way is to first ask the implications of the possibilities that you can conceive of, and then try and deduce the limitations of that approach, etc. I agree that a material universe is a first option since, obviously, we know that we have that before us. The problem, though, is that nobody is saying that chairs, tables, computers, etc, are fundamental objects, so we already move to a more abstract materialism than any of us experiences. Add to this that we must contend with mathematical-like laws in our physics equations, issues of causation, and a myriad of other issues, and soon we are really at the stage where that 'first option' is not something that we should be married to any longer.
Of course, that doesn't give us automatic license to believe in God, but we can't dismiss it out of hand either. As I said in my posts, I think most of our focus should be on modal aspects versus material aspects. As it turns out, I think modal aspects do entail a God, so it just happens to be like that. But, I don't think this is really a coincidence at all. Many of the well thoughout approaches to religion were based on modal considerations, so it is possible that modal considerations fueled the acceptance of God in terms of the ease by which it won over those who were really interested in such questions (e.g., Greek philosophers, medieval theologians, etc).
StatusX said:
By universe I mean all that exists, including any "mother universes" and including any super powerful beings. Causation applies to things that already exist, but there is no reason to assume that the set of all things that exist, ie, the universe, was caused. What could have caused it?
I'm not hung up on a cause for whatever you want to cite as your primitive. I understand that you have to start somewhere. The problem I have is that your primitive is the whole material universe. I expect that your primitive should be primitive in that we can easily imagine the world evolved from that simple point. Of course, there's no law that requires such, but all of our experiences point to this. If it were otherwise, then we might as well as believe anything that suits our fancy.
harvey1 said:
In that case, there is no first event unless you are prepared to say the first event was an infinitestimal, in which case the whole 3+1 timeline must be considered a collection of infinitestimal moments. In that case, all of these infinitestimal moments are uncaused, not just the first moment.
StatusX said:
But I thought you said time and causation were two different things?
Time and causation have certain things in common (e.g., asymmetry of events in terms of the arrow of time), but they certainly may not be the same things. Causality might have something to do with the arrow of time, but it might be just a coincidence. More science might help to understand the arrow of time (I'm not so confident science will solve the causal issues of the universe).
With regard to my argument here, the situation is a little different. I'm not saying time and causality are the same. Rather, I'm saying that any temporal beginning with a 'first uncaused moment' must be infinitestimal due to a similar argument that Zeno put forth. This argument is still valid and it raises a perplexing problem for materialists suggesting a finite beginning to the universe. I won't repeat my argument.
StatusX said:
Ok, now I think I understand your position. You are saying there are certain "truths" that existed before we were here. For example, even 10 billion years ago, 5 was greater than 4, and addition was commutative. For such statements to have been true, there must have been some kind of mind to comprehend them. Do I have this right?
Basically true. Truth is language based, and if you are going to say that modal statements (e.g., Peano's axioms) have some kind of ontological existence, then you must also say that those axioms have no meaning unless there is an aspect to the Universe (big U includes all ontology even God in my usage of the term...) which can comprehend the meaning of modal statements. Otherwise they exist without interpretation and are as meaningless as null statements.
StatusX said:
Truth is only a valid concept for a mind. We cannot imagine a universe without a mind because all that we know is our minds projection of the universe. Before we were here, there were no truths. There was no structure to the universe, no atoms, no planets. There was just matter. We find structure in what we see, and we assume that structure is real, but it is not. And true statements can only relate the structures we have created.
Well, you are concluding your premise here. If your premise is that materialism is valid, then you cannot conclude competing ontologies are wrong because they disagree with your premise.
harvey1 said:
The difference in the way you use the term 'truth' and the way that I use it in an ontological sense is that truth is an emergent property in a materialist worldview, whereas in an ontological view of truth, it is a primitive.
StatusX said:
Well this is what I was talking about when I said your notion of truth presupposes a god.
An ontological notion of truth doesn't necessarily presuppose a God. As I mentioned above, the statements of truth could be held to be meaningless or the comprehension needed can be argued as not tied to a God. Another poster had already quipped about this point. Thus, I don't think its a co-premise of my argument. Rather, it is one of the conclusions of my premise.
StatusX said:
We think in terms of cause and effect. Is this the only valid way to think? All that is happening is matter is interacting, and we label causes and effects. But like I said, this is all in our minds, and even though it seems a consistent reasoning in everyday life, there is no reason to assume it applies to the universe itself.
Well, I don't want to limit the universe by saying I am responding to your post because you disagreed with my point, but in general, the first to go in trying to develop a believable theory are those theories which make no sense whatsoever. There's always potential that theories that make no sense were right, but fair or unfair they usually do not get that kind of serious consideration. If materialism fails to provide a suitable account for causation, then you have to junk it. Materialism's main selling point is that we only encounter material things, so it is commonsense to start off by posing it as the preferred ontology. But, as I mentioned above, as science pushes us to extreme abstract things (e.g., virtual particles, wave-particle duality, wavefunctions, mathematical physics, etc), then materialism starts to lose its appeal. If materialism fails to account for causation, I would say that it isn't viable any longer.