Dmytry said:Well that's the attitude I'd want safety experts to have, except even more so. If we only worry about problems that are proven to emerge for sure, well, that'll be extremely unsafe. I'd rather safety was based on murphy's law rather than on optimism.
More on topic of LNT... the point is, the death toll of coal is very visible. The death toll of nuclear is hidden - it is in the rare accidents, and even then, it is a small percentage of a large group of people dying. It is very easy to understate it. You can read more on the topic. Read what LNT is, read about single cell studies, form your opinion.
You are 100% correct that the responsibility is with the customer who specify and not with the contractor. Do we know who the consultants were? Also, in the 1960 Japan was glad that it could buy nuclear know how and would not have questioned GE or EBASCO designs. I still believe that no tsunami analysis was done in 1960, and the break water at O.P+5.6m one would also need in areas that have no tsunamis. As a comparison the break water for Dubai's Palm Island has a crest height of 4.25 metres above mean sea level which translates to around 5m above low tide or O.P.+5m In the shallow Persian gulf there are no tsunamis just wind swept waves.Astronuc said:It was and has been TEPCO's duty and responsibility to ensure the FK I plant design was and is safe, and is operated safely. If EBASCO performed the tsunami analysis and designed the seawall, then they do bear some responsibility for the results. That does not remove responsibility from TEPCO.
An interesting and relevant article in the NY Times - Culture of Complicity Tied to Stricken Nuclear Plant
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/world/asia/27collusion.html
Can also clone Murphy, it's the Murphy's law after all. Or not even clone anyone. Probably all you need is not to select for optimism.NUCENG said:Based on your previous posts, Dmytry, just where are you going to find safety experts that are better than the ones you already don't trust? Do we need to start mass production of Dmytry clones to be sure they have that attitude? How are you going to be sure they don't get corrupted like you believe all of us are?
TEPCO boss wanted use of SDF plane / Minister nixed March 11 plan to rush to HQ
The Yomiuri Shimbun
Tokyo Electric Power Co. President Masataka Shimizu tried to fly to Tokyo from Aichi Prefecture on an Air Self-Defense Force airplane on March 11 after the massive earthquake that struck that day, but his permission to use the aircraft was revoked shortly after it took off, it has been learned.
About 20 minutes after takeoff, the ASDF C-130 Hercules transport plane carrying Shimizu was ordered by Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa to change course and return to Komaki Air Base in the prefecture.
...
Upon being informed of the disaster, Shimizu went from Nara to Nagoya by train in a bid to reach Tokyo, the sources said.
He had hoped to fly to Tokyo in a helicopter owned by a TEPCO affiliate, but was forced to abandon the idea because the Civil Aviation Law forbids private-owned helicopters flying after 7 p.m.
With all land routes in chaos, the TEPCO president inquired about using an SDF plane to get to Tokyo, the sources said.
The defense minister's intervention meant Shimizu did not arrive in Tokyo until about 10 a.m on March 12.
(Apr. 27, 2011)
Dmytry said:Well I don't think public would complain about such stuff until something blows.
It's not exactly unpredictable that if you have compressed aluminium powder, not watertight, it's long term (or even short term) stability would be highly questionable. It is great that the issue is being worked on. Great to see that the issue was not swept under carpet. But it remains WTF use the highly reactive low melting point metal when long term stability is required? Yes, aluminium is stable due to formation of oxide - when it is not powder. And non-powdered aluminium can be damaged if there's hydroxide ions in the liquid.
"The degradation mechanisms and deformation rates of any of the neutron-absorbing materials
in the SFP are not well understood. Therefore, for licensees that credit the use of a
neutron-absorbing material to maintain subcriticality in their SFP, knowing the condition of the
neutron-absorbing material in the SFP and monitoring the SFP for any indications that
degradation of the material may be occurring can prevent noncompliance with SFP criticality
requirements.
"
You can't say i am having some sort of hindsight thing about it. Someone mentioned boral somewhere a while back, i researched the issue, it just doesn't seem to make sense to use compressed aluminium powder, then I looked - indeed there are issues, big surprise. Great to see that issues weren't swept under carpet, would've preferred though some better foresight, e.g. higher melting point neutron absorber would be better in case of loss of coolant at spent fuel pool. I couldn't find a lot about loss of coolant in spent fuel pool. I don't even know for sure if Fukushima is using boral, I hope it is something else, but when not knowing i'd rather expect worst. The plant is rather old.
AntonL said:And would this have made any difference? http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110426005409.htm
Dmytry said:Can also clone Murphy, it's the Murphy's law after all. Or not even clone anyone. Probably all you need is not to select for optimism.
But that's extras... first of all, need not to be getting the numbers and/or math wrong to confirm preconceptions. The greater problem is when there is an issue but everyone involved goes into denial and can't even calculate anything.
Dmytry said:Well yea, that post i agree with.
Other thing to add... some failure of the reviewing process that is there to ensure lack of those many failures, as well as the failure to recognize the failure of reviewing process, et cetera. Possibly over optimistic expectations about reviewing, not enough critical thinking along the lines of "how do we know it is safe?", possibly too much trust that people would do the right thing (despite numerous historical examples to the contrary).
edit: that's my software experience. When you find bugs in the code that supposedly have been reviewed and tested (to the point of those bugs not being expected), in addition to fixing those bugs, the review/testing process itself has to be reviewed, as well as you need to reconsider why you overestimated efficacy of the review&testing process, and beware that may apply to the other divisions of the company.
Dmytry said:Well that's the attitude I'd want safety experts to have, except even more so. If we only worry about problems that are proven to emerge for sure, well, that'll be extremely unsafe. I'd rather safety was based on murphy's law rather than on optimism.
More on topic of LNT... the point is, the death toll of coal is very visible. The death toll of nuclear is hidden - it is in the rare accidents, and even then, it is a small percentage of a large group of people dying. It is very easy to understate it. You can read more on the topic. Read what LNT is, read about single cell studies, form your opinion.
Dmytry said:Well that's the attitude I'd want safety experts to have, except even more so. If we only worry about problems that are proven to emerge for sure, well, that'll be extremely unsafe. I'd rather safety was based on murphy's law rather than on optimism.
More on topic of LNT... the point is, the death toll of coal is very visible. The death toll of nuclear is hidden - it is in the rare accidents, and even then, it is a small percentage of a large group of people dying. It is very easy to understate it. You can read more on the topic. Read what LNT is, read about single cell studies, form your opinion.
Drakkith said:What temperature will waste in these containers reach if cooling is lost near the start of their storage? Any idea?
Dmytry said:I just found something very interesting when researching LOCA at spent fuel pools:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0933/sec3/082r3.html
what is most interesting, is the risk estimates in that table... one in 45 000 000 years, one in 13 000 000 years, one in 714 000 years... wonderful, simply wonderful. Then from those wonderful numbers the importance of issue is calculated, and the cost benefit analysis is performed.
Dmytry said:Well, you can read about TEPCO's standards in the past. Covering up core shroud cracks lol, literally.
The situation was resolved on paper. Pretty much the same way as o-ring erosion was 'resolved' by NASA before Challenger.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0933/sec3/196.html
Furthermore, the behaviour of boral in the event of loss of coolant was not ever addressed.
I am referring to it as example of this sort of fault. Feynman explains why it is wrong much better than I can.
Well, it would be more like - I am not sure benefits outweight the costs. And I strongly disagree with those who are absolutely sure that benefits outweight the costs.
The problem with natural disasters is... that is plant failure when you are least ready to handle it. That's simultaneous plant failure. It is OK (bad but doesn't kill a lot of people) when you make 25..30% of electrical power with nuclear. It is not OK when you are approaching 80%. Simultaneous failures are very bad.
Drakkith said:Of course I agree that things are the way they are because of saving money! From the most miniscule decision that has no effect on safety to monumental disregards in safety, these things DO happen. That is the nature of business. The key is to recognize when something is legitimately an accident and when it is negligence. Which things are which in the Fukushima incident? I have no idea. That WILL be looked into.
I looked at that study you linked and I didn't see anywhere where they said it was OK. They identified the problem, proposed solutions, and in the end it said that the situation was resolved. Since I don't know how, I can't say on that. What exactly did you have a problem with in that article?
Yes, that was a tragedy. One that did not have to happen. But in almost all cases, nothing bad HAS to happen. It's a simple fact of life that they do though.
Well, you do come off as quite untrusting of MANY people. If I were to sum up your position, I would say that you do not think the benefits of nuclear power outweigh the costs due to inadequate safety procedures and other related things. Is that about right?
AntonL said:I can only think of two managerial mistakes
Mistake 1: Was the tsunami assessment study's http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/3_sessionB/B-11.pdf"
[PLAIN]http://k.min.us/in4bqs.JPG
Do we know historical heights for the area? The Tepco document does not make any references to these!
yes we do: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/27/fukushima-tsunami-plan-japan_n_841222.html
Mistake 2: By not admitting that NPP could be in danger of being hit by a tsunami using historical run ups, thus no extra precautions were taken and working out various scenarios and how to deal with them.
Dmytry said:I'd guess that it was gross negligence. We'll see after they have investigation and trial.
Dmytry said:Well, I would like to think that I would do the right thing in the similar situation. But I know how easily people do the wrong/selfish thing - by convincing themselves that it is the right thing, not because they are inherently 'evil'.
Well, it's not that I totally don't trust the people, it's that I don't trust people I do not know to act against self interest.
I do not think you trust them so much either.
Consider NUCENG. He had consistently gotten numbers wrong in his favour. Can I trust him to do the math? No I can't. Can i trust 100 or 1000 people like him? No I can't, because the error is systematic rather than random, it won't average out to zero.
Do I think he just sits, and thinks consciously, machiavelli style, "how can i mix up the numbers in my favour" - no, of course not! He may even honestly think he's trying to get numbers right.
Now he had been trying to portray me as paranoid, equating awareness of that sort of bias - and it's consequences - to some deep distrust and fear of everyone. Where did I ever admit fear of everyone? Distrust of everyone? Well i guess so, do you trust random person on the street to return the money they borrow? I don't, and probably you neither, but watch out, I am going to be quoted on this to show how I'm paranoid and delusional and full of distrust and fear.
I may not see what is the 'right thing' or my idea of right thing may be incorrect. There is such thing as bias. For example, before this entire fukushima thing, I was rather pro nuclear, considering that most of energy in my house was supplied by nuclear for a while. That was bias and ignorance of the problems. Spent fuel pools on the top floor, etc, etc.
The plant here was better than most, I still think so, spent fuel not on top floor, gradual in-operation refuelling so no rush to refuel as fast as possible, no complete fresh core in spent fuel pool, etc. I was ignorant of situation at foreign plants though.
Dmytry said:In those 200 posts there wasn't a lot of doing numbers with outcome relevant to the issue, unfortunately... need a larger sample size yes.
It's typical really. The one in 700 000 years probability of beyond the design seismic event uncovering the SFP, well that was someone else.
Dmytry said:I think it is entirely unfair to put it all on TEPCO and Japanese. There is just as much criminal negligence in this NRC report as in any data I've seen from TEPCO so far. The report ignores cascading failures, source data uncertainty, human factor... things that you cannot ignore when doing cost benefit analysis. Just as you can't ignore tsunami risk when you're on Japan coast. The only difference is that with tsunami, the negligence is more likely to come in the open (or they were simply unlucky).
I think I understand why you're so keen on calling those who disagree with you paranoid/delusional. Figures like "one in 700 000 years" (nevermind the one in 13 millions years and one in 45 millions years) are entirely incompatible with even the slightest mistrust. Or a slightest trace of humility; to believe in such figure you have to assume very low probability that something important was missed.
Dmytry said:I'm referring to "Resolution of Generic Safety Issues: Issue 82: Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools (Rev. 3) ( NUREG-0933, Main Report with Supplements 1–33 ) "
which is an example of gross negligence and incompetent risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis of the potential solutions, on par with Japanese negligence. As result of this incompetent analysis, no new requirements were established for US plants.
I'm not saying that this NRC report is directly responsible for Fukushima. I'm only saying that Japanese de-facto situation in the cost benefit analysis does not seem to differ substantially from that of US. Indeed, the geography differs greatly.
For example (just an example to illustrate the point), when you understate 1/1000 years risk as 1/1000 000 years, you can get away with it for a while, whereas if you understate 1/100 years risk as 1/100 000 years, you won't get away with it for very long. In a geography with 1/100 years events, thus, the negligence is more likely to result in actual loss.
Well, the report I had linked includes risk calculation, and it totally neglects cascading failures, as well as the possible scenarios are very incomplete. I don't think you need to buy anything to conclude that the report is utter BS. Even if you take on faith the input data, the stuff contained in the report is BS enough by itself.NUCENG said:I haven't been able to obtain the reports that came up with those numbers. (Trying not to spend $31.00 for information which should be public domain since it was paid for by US tax dollars.)
But I can probably explain the biggest difference between those numbers an Fukushima. In the US we are required to justify our design bases in every team inspection we receive which is several times a year, based on current performance. Problem plants get lots more attention, but everybody gets some. I have seen inspectors ask about the maximum flooding events, and maximum tornado wind speeds and hundreds of other numbers before looking at how we design for those events. Apparently that doesn't happen in Japan. As a result the 1:1000 year tsunami led to a 1:1 event of loss of all AC power and Loss of All decay heat and a severe accident. Just because in nearly 40 years nobody has questioned how big the tsunami wall should have been.
At Robinson and VY the 1:1000 year initiating event may not be able to cause loss of both trains of every decay heat removal event. We just experienced major storms at the US Browns Ferry and Surry plants with no problems. But I can guarantee that both of those plants are watching what is being learned in Japan so they can be sure it doesn't happen here.