Fukushima Fukushima Management and Government Performance

[Astronuc]

New report shows early chaos at Japan nuke plant
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110619/ap_on_re_as/as_japan_earthquake

TOKYO – A new report says Japan's tsunami-ravaged nuclear plant was so unprepared for the disaster that workers had to bring protective gear and an emergency manual from distant buildings and borrow equipment from a contractor.

The report, released Saturday by plant operator Tokyo Electric Power Co., is based on interviews of workers and plant data. It portrays chaos amid the desperate and ultimately unsuccessful battle to protect the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant from meltdown, and shows that workers struggled with unfamiliar equipment and fear of radiation exposure.

. . . .

 

[etudiant]

The lack of preparation and clarity of thought within the Japanese government is equally striking.
When the disaster hit, there was no clarity as to who was in charge, the government or TEPCO. That ambiguity persists to this day, even though TEPCO is clearly entirely unable to bear the financial and technical burdens of the accident.
For example, the government on the one hand points the people who have been displaced from their homes towards TEPCO for compensation, thereby minimizing any payout, as TEPCO has nothing like enough resources. Simultaneously the Industry Minister Mr Kaieda wants people to believe that the other nuclear plants are safe and that people should vote to allow them to reopen. Given that people see the reality of disastrous loss without fair compensation, why would they agree?
So a logical policy would have recognized that this disasters victims should be treated generously, because everybody near a nuclear plant could envisage the same happening to them. Instead, the penny wise policy pursued risks sealing the fate of the Japanese nuclear industry.

 

[zapperzero]

The lack of preparation and clarity of thought within the Japanese government is equally striking.
When the disaster hit, there was no clarity as to who was in charge, the government or TEPCO. That ambiguity persists to this day, even though TEPCO is clearly entirely unable to bear the financial and technical burdens of the accident.
For example, the government on the one hand points the people who have been displaced from their homes towards TEPCO for compensation, thereby minimizing any payout, as TEPCO has nothing like enough resources. Simultaneously the Industry Minister Mr Kaieda wants people to believe that the other nuclear plants are safe and that people should vote to allow them to reopen. Given that people see the reality of disastrous loss without fair compensation, why would they agree?
So a logical policy would have recognized that this disasters victims should be treated generously, because everybody near a nuclear plant could envisage the same happening to them. Instead, the penny wise policy pursued risks sealing the fate of the Japanese nuclear industry.

It's double bind. The gov't can't take responsibility, because it would then be blamed for every earless rabbit, forever. So it prefers to wash its hands in public, let TEPCO take the fall then maybe resurrect it through public receivership or some stupid deal like that. But TEPCO must fail, and fail hard, first. They are the sacrificial goat.

The rest of the Japanese nuclear plant operators may get in economic trouble too? So electricity will be somewhat more expensive in Japan? So what? How does that affect the chances of the current governing party to remain in power?

 

[NUCENG]

It's double bind. The gov't can't take responsibility, because it would then be blamed for every earless rabbit, forever. So it prefers to wash its hands in public, let TEPCO take the fall then maybe resurrect it through public receivership or some stupid deal like that. But TEPCO must fail, and fail hard, first. They are the sacrificial goat.

The rest of the Japanese nuclear plant operators may get in economic trouble too? So electricity will be somewhat more expensive in Japan? So what? How does that affect the chances of the current governing party to remain in power?

Interesting speculation. So pull out the crystal balls. Based on what we know about TEPCO Mangement and Government Performance take a stab at predicting the furure:

1. Will the government fall? Within 6 months? Or Longer than 6 months?
   
2. Will Japan vote to phase out nuclear power?
   
3. Will Nuclear Power plants in Japan be ordered to be shutdown without a phaseout?
   
4. Will TEPCO default on compensation Claims?
   
5. Will other Nuclear Utilities bail out TEPCO?
   
6. Will TEPCO be nationalized with the Government taking over compensation?

1. Yes within 6 months
2. Maybe, but I don't believe it will happen.
3. No
4. Yes
5. Yes
6. No

 

[etudiant]

Interesting speculation. So pull out the crystal balls. Based on what we know about TEPCO Mangement and Government Performance take a stab at predicting the furure:

1. Will the government fall? Within 6 months? Or Longer than 6 months?
   
2. Will Japan vote to phase out nuclear power?
   
3. Will Nuclear Power plants in Japan be ordered to be shutdown without a phaseout?
   
4. Will TEPCO default on compensation Claims?
   
5. Will other Nuclear Utilities bail out TEPCO?
   
6. Will TEPCO be nationalized with the Government taking over compensation?

1. Yes within 6 months
2. Maybe, but I don't believe it will happen.
3. No
4. Yes
5. Yes
6. No

Seems too cute by half.
Kan is going, but will not say when because he is dead the moment he gives a date.
The government looks safe though, because the opposition is even more in disarray.
Likewise, a vote to shut down or phase out nuclear power seems quite un Japanese. However, refusing approval for restarting shut down plants is already a fact. Industry will have to make serious concessions to win back the local governments approval.
A TEPCO default is quite unlikely, imho, simply because the firm is so closely intertwined with the balance of Japan Inc. It would be Lehman on an industrial scale. Instead, there will be both government as well as industry support, because everyone knows that all are in the same boat.
My $0.02.

 

[zapperzero]

Interesting speculation. So pull out the crystal balls. Based on what we know about TEPCO Mangement and Government Performance take a stab at predicting the furure:

1. Will the government fall? Within 6 months? Or Longer than 6 months?
   
2. Will Japan vote to phase out nuclear power?
   
3. Will Nuclear Power plants in Japan be ordered to be shutdown without a phaseout?
   
4. Will TEPCO default on compensation Claims?
   
5. Will other Nuclear Utilities bail out TEPCO?
   
6. Will TEPCO be nationalized with the Government taking over compensation?

1. Kan will go the minute the accident phase at Fukushima is over. His party stays in power.
2. No. Japan will do the Japanese thing and set so many conditions that it will be politically impossible to restart some/most reactors. No new builds in the next twenty years either.
3. No.
4. Yes.
5. Yes, in the sense that they will be paying "solidarity money" to the gov't.
6. Those are two questions to which I reply:

6.1 Yes (but it will be catch-and-release, it will get a cash injection (the aforementioned solidarity funds) and be sent back into private ownership, perhaps via an IPO after some nasty investor compensation scheme, dimes to the dollar etc etc).

6.2 No, the Government will NOT compensate anyone. The way they see it, it's not the Government's fault, so why take the blame and make the amends? Money will be given, but only via TEPCO.

When I say "some reactors" I am thinking especially about Monju. What if they fail a second time at removing the fueling machine? The first time around, the plant manager committed suicide (or so I heard). This time, the central gov't will cut and run. They don't need another Fukushima PR disaster on their hands.

 

[SteveElbows]

IAEA Director Generals speech to the ministerial conference is here:

http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/2011/amsp2011n013.html

The random checking of nuclear plants is a good idea.

 

[etudiant]

IAEA Director Generals speech to the ministerial conference is here:

http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/2011/amsp2011n013.html

The random checking of nuclear plants is a good idea.

My guess is that a random check at Fukushima would have passed the site with flying colors.

Random checks are useful to ensure ongoing adherence to standards, but do not help if the standards are inadequate. I had hoped for greater insight from the IAEA.

 

[joewein]

1. Will the government fall? Within 6 months? Or Longer than 6 months?
   
2. Will Japan vote to phase out nuclear power?
   
3. Will Nuclear Power plants in Japan be ordered to be shutdown without a phaseout?
   
4. Will TEPCO default on compensation Claims?
   
5. Will other Nuclear Utilities bail out TEPCO?
   
6. Will TEPCO be nationalized with the Government taking over compensation?

1. Yes and No. There will be a grand coalition within 6 months. "It is the Democratic Party, Jim, but not as we know it."
2. No. The Japanese voters would, but not yet their elected politicians. It might take another serious accident before that changes.
3. No. It will be more like a game of attrition on existing sites that are refused new units, or won't be allowed to restart after accidents.
4. Effectively yes. I have not actually heard any clear terms what they've promised, other than some deals with farmers' representatives. Whoever expects to be fully compensated will have a rude awakening.
5. They will help, but ultimately the public will bail out TEPCO, through raised electricity prices and new government bonds to make sure TEPCO does OK, whatever happens.
6. TEPCO's shareholders will not be wiped out. They are too politically well connected. Even if the government were to become a shareholder for a while, it will do so only to inject enough borrowed cash to nurture TEPCO back to health. TEPCO going under is not like the Lehman Brothers crash, it would be like Goldman Sachs failing. The system is too corrupt to let that happen.

The bureaucrats have never forgiven Kan for how he embarrassed them as Minister of Health, when he forced them to come clear about the HIV blood product scandal. The bureaucrats want someone who will do their bidding, rather than who mistrusts them. As Prime Minister he is now being made to pay for the sins of previous administrations, who left the "nuclear village" to regulating itself. Kan is now talking about breaking up the power monopolies and switching to renewables on a a large scale. I don't see the DPJ push hard for that after they drop him. It's open season on Kan now. We'll probably see one short administration with the LDP as junior partner, then new elections and them back in the driver's seat again.

Hardly anyone has been talking about onshore or offshore wind so far, even though wind power is much closer to competing with coal on a cost basis than any other renewable energy source. The power monopolies don't want to be forced to buy power from independent power investor who could challenge their supply monopolies.

Japan's public policies are controlled by ministerial bureaucracies far more than by politicians and it doesn't have a Green Party. These bureaucracies are a formidable enemy: Look no further than the Monju FBR, which after a major accident and over 15 years of de-factor shutdown and reported idling costs of hundreds of millions of dollars per year still has not been killed off yet, or the nuclear waste factory in Rokkasho that cost $25 billion dollars to build and yet couldn't process 1/10 of the new annual waste. It will still take decades for these 1973 oil shock-era monster plans to gradually wind down.

It's going to be politically very difficult to cut power usage to a level that would be necessary to permanently shut down more nuclear power stations soon, but in the short and medium term we will see more cases like Fukushima Daiichi units 7 and 8 whose construction plans have been cancelled.

Japan's nukes will become like its aging population: Increasingly geriatric, with increasing health problems, difficult to pay for and no young ones to replace them. Meanwhile, conservation, cogeneration, combined cycle gas turbines, on and offshore wind, geothermal and solar will gradually eat into nuclear's share here, not as quickly as I'd like to see, but inevitably anyway.

 

[SteveElbows]

My guess is that a random check at Fukushima would have passed the site with flying colors.

Random checks are useful to ensure ongoing adherence to standards, but do not help if the standards are inadequate. I had hoped for greater insight from the IAEA.

True. On their own random checks don't solve everything, but if they beef up everything else then they should be useful.

Id like to talk about something that was raised on the main thread:

It's good to see the IAEA is as committed to transparency as ever. The 151 IAEA member states will meet this week in Vienna for 5 days.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-20/fukushima-disaster-failures-kept-behind-closed-doors-at-un-atomic-meeting.html

That article does a reasonable job of highlighting some of the big issues.

The Fukushima meetings will be closed “because of the highly detailed and technical nature of the drafting work,” IAEA spokeswoman Gill Tudor said in a June 17 response to e- mailed questions. Summaries of the sessions will be made public, she said.

This is an excuse which attempts to completely avoid other reasons this stuff is private. Generally speaking, these sorts of meetings (and I don't just mean nuclear ones) are conducted in private because it gives participants an opportunity to speak frankly. Unfortunately we live in a world where there are many barriers against speaking frankly in public. Some are complex and somewhat understandable, others are a disgrace and really can be dealt with if the will is there.

The IAEA report is a great example of what you get when you are not free from these pressures. Barriers towards blunt truth telling include the desire to promote the industry, not wishing to upset national governments, a lack of funding & independent investigative capabilities, commercial sensitivities, and people with very different roles within the industry (commercial operator, regulator) being too chummy. I though it was quite ironic that one of the criticisms the IAEA was able to make of Japan was that the regulator there was too close to the industry - the IAEA itself seems to suffer from the very same problem, albeit on a different level.

 

[PLG]

Hi all,

I am not a physicist, but an economic historian with some training in business history, and have been trying to get info on Fuku1 for personal reasons (Japanese friends). I stumbled on your thread in the process, and I was a bit surprised, reading the posts on this forum, at the seemingly widespread notion that the Japanes Govt could have chosen to take over from Tepco -and generally at what seems to me a mistaken view of Gvt possibilites in Japan, so much so that I take the liberty of adding my 2 cents.

There was an org chart of the nuclear emergency response earlier on this thread, and it was pointed out that no link pointed to Tepco. Indeed... As far as I understand, the Japanese govt does not have the human resources, know-how, and even legal tools to take over from Tepco. This is a result of the peculiar interplay of the Japanese State apparatus and large Japanese companies since the 1950s, with the State apparatus being purposefully designed as a tool to further the efficiency and profits of the companies, to which it is effectively a servant, even though it may look like a master (I am not being judgemental here, just descriptive -one can be technical about such matters as well, to a certain extent, I think).

The result is that the Govt is absolutely, utterly incapable to take over from Tepco -it has never been ready to do so. When Japanese banks failed in the 1990s, it took almost 8 years for the Ministry of Finance to set up a 2000-persons strong State organ able to take over management of failed bank. There is nothing even close to that in the Japanese "nuclear village" at this point, and such organisations cannot appear magicallly out of thin air. Bottom line: the Japanese Govt is forced to let Tepco manage, with disastrous results.

Why disastrous? Lesson 2: Private firms are fine in a normal market situation, but the free market does not operate well in the midst of Apocalypse. What you want then is indeed the Soviet Union -clear chains of command, masses of disciplined troops ready to give their lives, complete unconcern for costs, stores of expensive equipment designed for nuclear war, etc. Chernobyl was a major mistake, but the response to it, when it finally got under way, was impressive -and on the whole reached its goal, avoiding an even bigger disaster.

Tepco people cannot do that. They have employees, not soldiers; they are cost-conscious, and have to be; they are untrained anyway. The NEW President of Tepco is a finance and marketing guy, who knows about engineering about as much as I do. The result: a nightmare. Large corporations are very bad at managing disasters, not because they are nasty, but because that's not what they are designed to do, and what they are designed to do mostly interferes with the job at hand. Again, I am not being judgemental, just descriptive -saying that fighting a Martian invasion would probably be better done by the U.S. Army than by Blackhawk style mercenaries, or for that matter scrappy Montana minutemen, is not politics, but technical fact. Yes, the 101st Airborne has more firepower.

Nucgen was asking for a root cause. While (full disclosure) I do not believe nuclear energy is a good solution in the long run, for various reasons, there is certainly a basic rule to follow when dealing with such a dangerous industry (and yes, it is true for other industrial branches -just ask the people over at Bhopal): free market operations must be strictly kept within narrow institutional bounds, watched over hawk-like by large bodies of independent, well-paid regulators, and Govts mut be ready to stop them any time, and step in with a fully prepared, Soviet-style central planning, militarized approach (which, by the way, is very costly indeed, and should be factored in when we talk about energy costs). So, possible root cause: lack of a State apparatus strong enough to step in, and prepared to do so (an don't even get me started about the Japanese Defense Forces).

Well, at least that's what some of us tend to think over here on our side of the scientific field; not hard science, more jell-O science, I guess, but still. And by the way, yes I am implying that there are things to learn from the former USSR, and to top it all I am French, so I am fully expecting the stream of abuse us yellabellied commie froggies obviously deserve. Go for it!

Pierre

 

[Calvadosser]

Hi all,
[snip]

Well, at least that's what some of us tend to think over here on our side of the scientific field; not hard science, more jell-O science, I guess, but still. And by the way, yes I am implying that there are things to learn from the former USSR, and to top it all I am French, so I am fully expecting [snip]

Pierre

Pierre,

Maybe this is not the place to discuss the question but I would be interested to know how you think EDF would measure up to handling a major nuclear accident.

Amicalement,
Martin

 

[PLG]

Hi,

Keep in mind that I am no expert. However, I believe EDF would simply not be allowed to rule the show. Prefects would step in right away, and so would the Govt, and probably the Army as well.

In fact a few weeks back AREVA and EDF put out an "emergency" plan of their own which was met with widespread silence, and disappeared from the scene soon after, I believe because disaster management and civil preparednes people over at ASN, IRSN and the Interior Ministry quietly told them to stuff it. These organizations would never even dream of handing out disaster management to EDF or AREVA. I have not researched this, and probably should, but the (inadequate) emergency contingency plans I have heard of are all centered on the Prefects, as far as I know.

So the real question in my view is whether the Prefecture of Loir-Et-Cher would handle Saint-Laurent des Eaux blacking out and melting down better than Tepco did Fukushima. Honest answer: I don't know for sure. I can't prove (experiments are hard to come by in the non-hard sciences) that it would be closer to the organized Chernobyl response than to the haphazard Fukushima response. It should be better in theory, because Prefects don't have to contend with management or stockholders or think about the balance between their Company's position and a possible political intervention. That's one less distraction.

Granted, I have known some pretty dim Prefects who should be able to mess things up pretty badly as well. Still, I would stick with my original assessment that prospects for a reasonable response would be better. And apparently the nuclear apparatus in France agrees with me: neither AREVA nor EDF are supposed to be in charge in case of a major incident, and all civil preparedness resources are to be found in prefectoral hands. NPP operators are to advise, not decide, at least for everything going on outside the plant. So the responsibility is squarely put on the State -something which was much less clear in Japan.

Pierre

P

 

[PLG]

Addendum: you could reply that EDF will still be in charge within the plant, so a Tepco-like circus could take place, with EDF messing up inside and Prefects lollygagging outside. That is true, but I have a very hard time believing the French State apparatus would tolerate a performance like Tepco's for a whole 3 months. At any rate, the balance of power would be much less unequal, with local Govt representatives having at their disposal at least as many resources as EDF itself; that in itself would be a massive difference with Fukushima. And in fact I suspect that even within a damaged plant, disaster management would eventually be handed over to teams including governmental experts, with ASN and the Army playing a major role.

Pierre

 

[NUCENG]

Hi all,

I am not a physicist, but an economic historian with some training in business history, and have been trying to get info on Fuku1 for personal reasons (Japanese friends). I stumbled on your thread in the process, and I was a bit surprised, reading the posts on this forum, at the seemingly widespread notion that the Japanes Govt could have chosen to take over from Tepco -and generally at what seems to me a mistaken view of Gvt possibilites in Japan, so much so that I take the liberty of adding my 2 cents.

There was an org chart of the nuclear emergency response earlier on this thread, and it was pointed out that no link pointed to Tepco. Indeed... As far as I understand, the Japanese govt does not have the human resources, know-how, and even legal tools to take over from Tepco. This is a result of the peculiar interplay of the Japanese State apparatus and large Japanese companies since the 1950s, with the State apparatus being purposefully designed as a tool to further the efficiency and profits of the companies, to which it is effectively a servant, even though it may look like a master (I am not being judgemental here, just descriptive -one can be technical about such matters as well, to a certain extent, I think).

The result is that the Govt is absolutely, utterly incapable to take over from Tepco -it has never been ready to do so. When Japanese banks failed in the 1990s, it took almost 8 years for the Ministry of Finance to set up a 2000-persons strong State organ able to take over management of failed bank. There is nothing even close to that in the Japanese "nuclear village" at this point, and such organisations cannot appear magicallly out of thin air. Bottom line: the Japanese Govt is forced to let Tepco manage, with disastrous results.

Why disastrous? Lesson 2: Private firms are fine in a normal market situation, but the free market does not operate well in the midst of Apocalypse. What you want then is indeed the Soviet Union -clear chains of command, masses of disciplined troops ready to give their lives, complete unconcern for costs, stores of expensive equipment designed for nuclear war, etc. Chernobyl was a major mistake, but the response to it, when it finally got under way, was impressive -and on the whole reached its goal, avoiding an even bigger disaster.

Tepco people cannot do that. They have employees, not soldiers; they are cost-conscious, and have to be; they are untrained anyway. The NEW President of Tepco is a finance and marketing guy, who knows about engineering about as much as I do. The result: a nightmare. Large corporations are very bad at managing disasters, not because they are nasty, but because that's not what they are designed to do, and what they are designed to do mostly interferes with the job at hand. Again, I am not being judgemental, just descriptive -saying that fighting a Martian invasion would probably be better done by the U.S. Army than by Blackhawk style mercenaries, or for that matter scrappy Montana minutemen, is not politics, but technical fact. Yes, the 101st Airborne has more firepower.

Nucgen was asking for a root cause. While (full disclosure) I do not believe nuclear energy is a good solution in the long run, for various reasons, there is certainly a basic rule to follow when dealing with such a dangerous industry (and yes, it is true for other industrial branches -just ask the people over at Bhopal): free market operations must be strictly kept within narrow institutional bounds, watched over hawk-like by large bodies of independent, well-paid regulators, and Govts mut be ready to stop them any time, and step in with a fully prepared, Soviet-style central planning, militarized approach (which, by the way, is very costly indeed, and should be factored in when we talk about energy costs). So, possible root cause: lack of a State apparatus strong enough to step in, and prepared to do so (an don't even get me started about the Japanese Defense Forces).

Well, at least that's what some of us tend to think over here on our side of the scientific field; not hard science, more jell-O science, I guess, but still. And by the way, yes I am implying that there are things to learn from the former USSR, and to top it all I am French, so I am fully expecting the stream of abuse us yellabellied commie froggies obviously deserve. Go for it!

Pierre

Excellent post and spot on discussion of the disserence between a company trying to make a profit and the roll of a stong leader/governmentr that can step in and manage a crisis. Your criticism of precture and government response is also inciteful. I have spent a great amount of time trying to figure out the chain of command with NISA, METI, MEXT, NSC, and the rest of the alphabet, but I gave up trying to figure out who was in charge.

Thank you for your contribution..

 

[joewein]

Large corporations are very bad at managing disasters, not because they are nasty, but because that's not what they are designed to do, and what they are designed to do mostly interferes with the job at hand.

Your comment reminded me of something that's been going around my mind for a while, and that is how differently another major corporate (and local near monopoly) managed a disaster that was watched by the whole world not too long ago.

I am talking about the 2010 Copiapó mining accident in Chile, which was handled in a truly exemplary manner by the national copper company Codelco. The government realized that the small mining company that ran the mine was totally out of its depth and put Codelco in charge of the rescue operation, who brought the 33 back to the surface alive.

It can be argued that mining disasters are more common in the mining industry than nuclear meltdowns are in the nuclear power industry, so there was more experience to draw on, but still it shows how well some large corporations can manage disasters if they have their priorities right.

Maybe Tepco is like the Compañía Minera San Esteban, but no oner ever found and put in charge its Codelco equivalent. I wonder if Toshiba / Hitachi / GE had been put in charge from the start, would they have handled it any better?

 

[PLG]

I should have been more specific: contrary to popular wisdom, corporations can indeed be quite good at protecting their employees (no wonder, they control the work process, and should know how to go about things) -even though they don't always choose to do so. However, I was referring to a wholesale disaster involving the population at large, not just one's employees, and that's when you really want the Red Army -or at least some sort of army.

Tepco, by the way, is also terrible at protecting its own employees. GE would certainly have done a much, much better job (1 dosimeter per team! honestly...). Toshiba or Hitachi I am not so sure: I have met quite a few Japanese managers who seem utterly indifferent to the little people, I wonder sometimes if these managers really consider them as human beings at all. At any rate, the callousness toward lower-rung- and contract employees at Fukushima is absolutely sickening. If you can believe it, a number of workers eat and sleep on the premises until they reach their maximum dose. Now, would renting a few buses and setting up a base camp 40 kilometers out in an area all but emptied be so difficult?

PG

 

[SteveElbows]

I don't know the exact procedure but they have a base at J-Village which is used by workers, and is about 20km away from the plant. There are probably some practical reasons for minimising the amount of travel in & out of the evacuation zone, but I am sure more could have been done. Although some of it may be down to corporate nature, there are aspets to Japanese society which have shaped the response in all sorts of ways, but because I am an outsider looking in with relatively low level of understanding of Japanese culture I don't think its fair for me to attempt to get into detail on this.

When it comes to issues of the population at large, the role of a corporation is fairly limited, government departments are always going to have to get involved with that stuff, potentially including the use of army.

Unfortunately we see with Fukushima that the usual reasons governments have for not fully disclosing information in a timely manner still exist, for governments have as many if not more reasons to cover stuff up as corporations do. As I understand it, from a government mindset the control of information is one of the tools they have available with which to try to influence public behaviour. Sometimes its almost the only tool they have, and they cannot resist using it. In their minds, this can be fully justified on the basis that panic can cause unnecessary harm to people, and to economy, in theory it can cause more harm than the original threat which has scared people. Unfortunately I think the balance between these factors and the duty of care that they have towards their populations, is way too easy for them to get wrong.

In the case of Fukushima at least they did not hesitate for too long about the initial evacuations, or try to pretend that nothing serious was wrong at the plant at all. It was later, when evidence started to come in about the contamination to the north west, that I started to get angry at the long delays between this picture being formed, and people in these areas being evacuated. This stuff was sort of criticised by IAEA in a gentle way under the related topic of the longer-term shelter areas - areas where people were told to try and stay indoors, which was probably reasonable advice to start with, but should have changed to a proper evacuation as soon as relevant data emerged, instead of dragging their feet for a month like the Japanese actually did. The IAEA did not quite say this in as explicit a way as I am doing here, but I think this is what they were getting at.

Another mistake which emerged quite clearly in this weeks IAEA conference, is related to iodine pills. It seems that instructions were issued on a local level that people should take these pills to protect them during their evacuation from the area in the early days. But this order came too late, most people had already evacuated before these instructions were relayed. Its not at all clear at this stage how much harm this may have exposed people too that could have been prevented if the order had arrived on time.

 

[Calvadosser]

(snip)
At any rate, the callousness toward lower-rung- and contract employees at Fukushima is absolutely sickening. If you can believe it, a number of workers eat and sleep on the premises until they reach their maximum dose. Now, would renting a few buses and setting up a base camp 40 kilometers out in an area all but emptied be so difficult?

PG

I agree.

For at least a couple of weeks after the melt-downs, the on-site employees were being fed on just about nothing but crackers and bottled water according to reports at the time.

I assume all that some high-level manager in Tepco had to do was pick up a phone and give someone at Tepco HQ the job of keeping the workers on the hot-site supplied with steak dinners, pizza, sushi, beer and whatever else they desired - but it had not happened.

Tepco's inability to supply the basic needs of their workers convinced me that level of incompetence was something unprecedented.

 

[SteveElbows]

I expect there are actually some legitimate reasons why providing nice accomodation and food for workers is not quite as easy to setup under Fukushima conditions as some suggest. I expect more could have been done though, especially after the first week.

 

[joewein]

There's a http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20110627a2.html" in today's Japan Times. Some quotes:

The electric power industry in Japan has such strong political clout that nobody, not even the government, seems capable of liberalizing the generation and distribution of electricity, let alone making a dent in the regional monopoly currently enjoyed by each of the 10 utilities.
(...)
On May 6, Kan surprised the nation and the power industry when he asked Chubu Electric Power Co. (Cepco) to suspend the operation of its Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant, saying the plant is in an area that has a very high probability of being hit by a major earthquake in the near future, is very close to the ocean, does not have walls high enough to protect it from tsunami and, therefore, could be vulnerable to the same disaster as Tepco's Fukushima No. 1. After deliberating for three days, Cepco acceded to the request.

This came as a stunning shock to the FEPC, whose members had long had no doubt whatsoever that they controlled politicians, bureaucrats and journalists and that the government could not possibly decide on any national policy related to the power industry without the consent of the industry.
(...)
An observer has pointed out that not a single politician survives after acting against the will of the power industry. In 1997, for example, then Minister of International Trade and Industry Shinji Sato suggested that liberalization of power generation and transmission be studied. Even though he was a son of former Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, his remarks enraged the power industry, and he lost in the subsequent Lower House elections in 2000 and 2003 to an FEPC-supported Democratic Party of Japan candidate.
(...)

Worth a read in my opinion.

 

[zapperzero]

I expect there are actually some legitimate reasons why providing nice accomodation and food for workers is not quite as easy to setup under Fukushima conditions as some suggest. I expect more could have been done though, especially after the first week.

None, zero, zip, nada. There is no legitimate reason for which people should live on-site, instead of doing shifts there. In fact, it is beyond stupid, as it exposes people to more radiation and thus drains the already-shallow pool of available skilled workers at least twice as fast as needed.

There is no legitimate reason for which people should not have access to showers and full decon, even while on site. There is no legitimate reason whatsoever for the lack of proper food, water and clothes. No legitimate reason for the lack of dosimeters, no legitimate reason for outgoing workers to not get a full body scan. No legitimate reason for people to be walking in 1 Sv/h water with no boots on.

There are reasons, but they are not of the legitimate kind: cost control, information control, liability limitation, sheer incompetence. This, from TEPCO. From the government, incapacity and unwillingness to assume and carry responsibility.

Shameful does not begin to cover it. I thought, prior to this, that Japan is a civilized nation, one of a few. Seems it's not so civilized. The lack of reaction from the Japanese civil society to this current unpleasantness is simply incredible to me.

 

[NUCENG]

There's a http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20110627a2.html" in today's Japan Times. Some quotes:



Worth a read in my opinion.

Thanks JoeWein, more confirmation that the tail (industry) in Japan is wagging the dog (regulatory bodies).

 

[NUCENG]

None, zero, zip, nada. There is no legitimate reason for which people should live on-site, instead of doing shifts there. In fact, it is beyond stupid, as it exposes people to more radiation and thus drains the already-shallow pool of available skilled workers at least twice as fast as needed.

There is no legitimate reason for which people should not have access to showers and full decon, even while on site. There is no legitimate reason whatsoever for the lack of proper food, water and clothes. No legitimate reason for the lack of dosimeters, no legitimate reason for outgoing workers to not get a full body scan. No legitimate reason for people to be walking in 1 Sv/h water with no boots on.

There are reasons, but they are not of the legitimate kind: cost control, information control, liability limitation, sheer incompetence. This, from TEPCO. From the government, incapacity and unwillingness to assume and carry responsibility.


Shameful does not begin to cover it. I thought, prior to this, that Japan is a civilized nation, one of a few. Seems it's not so civilized. The lack of reaction from the Japanese civil society to this current unpleasantness is simply incredible to me.

You may be right zapperzero, but SPECULATION FOLLOWS:
If they moved rest areas off site and outside of the exclusion zone, workers going to and from the site would be receiving external and inhalation doses during transit. In addition roads may still be unrepaired from earthquake and tsunami damage, making that trip longer than you might think. At least the filtration of the rest huts means they wouldn't be inhaling as much. Is there any information about the external dose rates in these shelters? In short, could it be that they are doing this to reduce worker doses and reducing their "burnout rate"?

Another sneaky possibility is that the workers on site are not available to the press. Has anyone seen any interviews with the workers about the arrangements?

 

[PLG]

Hi,

I have a hard time believing any advantage would accrue from staying put. While there is some risk of inhaling particles during the trip, I am sure this could be mitigated with the proper equipment. On the other hand, the dose rate from radioactivity on the premises is most certainly at least one order of magnitude higher than 20 or 30 miles North or South along the coast.

http://www.nnistar.com/gmap/fukushima.html

gives more than 5µSv/h when getting close to the plant, and that's not even on the premises, as against 0.5 µSV outside of the zone -isn't it a significant difference? Of course, as you say, Nuceng (got your pseudo right this time, apologies for garbling it earlier), these huts may be designed to prevent exposure to ambiant RA (not sure of the English term, BTW), but I have never heard of such a contraption, which would be I suppose very hight tech (air filters, special coating, etc.), not quite in keeping with the rather makeshift nature of the operation. Then again, I have no technical expertise here... Also, external dose rates play a role in the long run, and none of these workers are supposed to stay long, so it may be that the difference it makes over a few weeks is marginal.

Still, for morale reasons, if I was in charge, I would insist on taking them away when their shift is over. Plus maybe a few of them are informed enough to wonder what will happen if the SFP of reactor 4 gets out of hand while they sleep...

PG

 

[zapperzero]

You may be right zapperzero, but SPECULATION FOLLOWS:
If they moved rest areas off site and outside of the exclusion zone, workers going to and from the site would be receiving external and inhalation doses during transit. In addition roads may still be unrepaired from earthquake and tsunami damage, making that trip longer than you might think. At least the filtration of the rest huts means they wouldn't be inhaling as much. Is there any information about the external dose rates in these shelters? In short, could it be that they are doing this to reduce worker doses and reducing their "burnout rate"?

Another sneaky possibility is that the workers on site are not available to the press. Has anyone seen any interviews with the workers about the arrangements?

Of course they're unavailable to the press, for as long as they are in the exclusion zone. That's got to be a god-send for TEPCO PR and legal.

Filtration is fine, but a site like this should have decon facilities. I will never forgive TEPCO for that picture I saw, with the workers sleeping and resting in their Tyvek overalls. That's wholly unneeded.

I don't see why a 30-km journey would last more than half an hour. We saw the IAEA team arrive on a bus. Surely the same can be done for workers? If you decon the workers on-site at the end of each shift, insulate the buses properly and install additional filtering to their AC, it isn't even necessary for the insides of the buses to become contaminated.

I don't think they could pick up lots of gamma in transit, do you?

 

[NUCENG]

Of course they're unavailable to the press, for as long as they are in the exclusion zone. That's got to be a god-send for TEPCO PR and legal.

Filtration is fine, but a site like this should have decon facilities. I will never forgive TEPCO for that picture I saw, with the workers sleeping and resting in their Tyvek overalls. That's wholly unneeded.

I don't see why a 30-km journey would last more than half an hour. We saw the IAEA team arrive on a bus. Surely the same can be done for workers? If you decon the workers on-site at the end of each shift, insulate the buses properly and install additional filtering to their AC, it isn't even necessary for the insides of the buses to become contaminated.

I don't think they could pick up lots of gamma in transit, do you?

I don't know. In the US one of the analyses we have to do for design basis radiological consequences is the dose received by operators entering and leaving the plant and performing manual safety actions outside the control room. Operator doses in the filtered and shielded control rooms were only larger because of assumed 8 or 12 hour shifts.

 

[zapperzero]

I don't know. In the US one of the analyses we have to do for design basis radiological consequences is the dose received by operators entering and leaving the plant and performing manual safety actions outside the control room. Operator doses in the filtered and shielded control rooms were only larger because of assumed 8 or 12 hour shifts.

I don't really understand what you are saying. How is this relevant, in context? No-one is entering the reactor buildings, these days, save a few scout teams.

 

[NUCENG]

I don't really understand what you are saying. How is this relevant, in context? No-one is entering the reactor buildings, these days, save a few scout teams.

The discussion was why they are keeping cleanup crews on site, and I speculated that it might actually be to lower RA dose to the workers compared to transporting them back and fort through the exclusion zone on damaged roads. It was topical because it concerns how TEPCO was treating the workers. I have done calculations of this nature for American plants to support emergency plants and know the Entry/Exit dose can be substantial.

 

[NUCENG]

For anyone interested in NRC contacts with Japan in the early days

FYI NRC has responded to FOIAs

FOIA/PA 11-0118, 0119, and 0120

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/foia/japan-foia-info.html

Rough count is way over 1000 pp.

 

[NUCENG]

interesting Reuters story that indicates Fukushima had warning signs.

http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/11/07/JapanNuclearRadiation.pdf

 

[swl]

interesting Reuters story that indicates Fukushima had warning signs.

http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/11/07/JapanNuclearRadiation.pdf

How could this be considered a warning of the Fukushima disaster?

 

[NUCENG]

How could this be considered a warning of the Fukushima disaster?

After I read the article, the thought process was like this:

First, keeping worker dose ALARA is a key indicator in safety conscious work environments.

From the Reuters story (p1):

“For five years to 2008, the Fukushima plant was rated the most hazardous nuclear facility in Japan for worker exposure to radiation and one of the five worst nuclear plants in the world on that basis.”

Second, Safety consciousness is a process of continuing improvement: Contrary to this on p5.

““We had largely reached our target by 2009,” said Tokyo Electric’s Sakai. At that point, some of the urgency behind the safety campaign appeared to drain. “We’ll continue to try to reduce occupational exposures by every possible measure after cost performance evaluations,” Shunsuke Hori, a Tokyo Electric safety manager, said at a September 2009 conference in Aomori, Japan." In other words they declared victory and went back to business as usual. They achieved their goal of improving to below average.

At that point they were just under their goal of 2.5 Sv total exposure to their workforce.

Compare that with reports of US plant doses reported in NRC NUREG-0713.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0713/v31/

in 2009 the Average BWR (out of 35 BWRs) total workforce dose was 151 Rem or 1.51 Sv. Less than half the dose in 1994 while production increased from 22 GW/yr to over 30 GW/yr. US plants have worked at Cobalt reduction, zinc injection, hydrogen injection, and noble metal chemistry to reduce corrosion and activation of plant systems. The result is clear evidence of continuous improvement.

As Reuters points out the TEPCO promises of a new safety culture after the shroud cracking coverup scandals were not kept. Further it points out the differences in the way the Japanese regulators ignored the Fukuahima performance while NRC came down on the US Perry plant for similar poor performance.

In a short 5 page story, Reuters has pointed out a TEPCO culture of cost over safety, regulatory collusion and neglect. They wrote this in a factual style without a lot of fear-mongering, but didn't pull any punches either. That is one of the better reports I have seen.

 

[Luca Bevil]

...
In a short 5 page story, Reuters has pointed out a TEPCO culture of cost over safety, regulatory collusion and neglect. They wrote this in a factual style without a lot of fear-mongering, but didn't pull any punches either. That is one of the better reports I have seen.

Agreed, completely

 

[swl]

...First, keeping worker dose ALARA is a key indicator in safety conscious work environments.

From the Reuters story (p1):

“For five years to 2008, the Fukushima plant was rated the most hazardous nuclear facility in Japan for worker exposure to radiation and one of the five worst nuclear plants in the world on that basis.”...

Thank you for explaining http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/11/07/JapanNuclearRadiation.pdf" .

So if I take a look at their list (top p3) of the "five worst plants in the world", what should I think about the number 1 worst plant in the world being the Perry, Ohio BWR?

So, the Perry, OH BWR is the most dangerous plant in the world? <doubting>

Would that indicate anything regarding the state of nuclear safety in the USA, or Ohio?

 

[Astronuc]

So, the Perry, OH BWR is the most dangerous plant in the world? <doubting>

Would that indicate anything regarding the state of nuclear safety in the USA, or Ohio?

The article is a bit sensational and misleading in terms of 'dangerous'. It's comparing particular plants to the global fleet. Someone has to be on the top in terms of expsoure, but that doesn't mean that the environment is necessarily dangerous. Generally, exposure at plants is well below industry safety standards, but certainly above levels that one would find outside the plant. Those rankings reflect those particular plants cited. All facilities strive to reduce exposure to employees, and some do a better job than others.

 

[NUCENG]

Thank you for explaining http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/11/07/JapanNuclearRadiation.pdf" .

So if I take a look at their list (top p3) of the "five worst plants in the world", what should I think about the number 1 worst plant in the world being the Perry, Ohio BWR?

So, the Perry, OH BWR is the most dangerous plant in the world? <doubting>

Would that indicate anything regarding the state of nuclear safety in the USA, or Ohio?

Perry has had a significant negative performance issues since Davis Besse took the attention of FENOC management in 2002. Their ALARA planning and performance were poor and resulted in at least four near overexposure events right about the beginning of the period researched by Reuters. They still are averaging about 2.8 Sv total occupational dose over the last 3 cycles, although they did have some moisture separator repairs in their last outage that didn't help. However in the last few years they have had "White" Performance indicators for ALARA and mitigating systems, and Human Performance issues that have not yet been solved. They have made progress moving from "Multiple Degraded Cornerstones" to "Regulatory Response" and now "Licensee Response" which bring less regulator attention as improvements are made. They are currently all green in performance indicators, but their human performance issues persist. Since this is considered a "Substantive Cross-Cutting Theme" that could affect multiple safety cornerstones.

If you want to explore performance for a specific plant start here:

http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html

Performance Indicators give a Graphical summary of performance and other links allow you to read the Assessment Reports for each plant. Finally the Inspection Reports link allows you to read all inspection reports performed by NRC except those related to security.

So is Perry the worst plant in the world? As Astronuc pointed out the Reuters Report looked at Occupational Dose and Perry was high on that list. They still have performance improvements to make and they are still getting a lot of expensive "help" to get there. Based on what we've learned lately the "worst" plant may be another TEPCO plant.

Edit: Another way to look at this is that the most dangerous plant in the world may be the one at the top of the performance list. One of the surest ways for performance to degrade is complacency or an attitude that you don't need to continue to improve.

 

[tsutsuji]

The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency said the operator informed it just four days before Japan's massive March 11 earthquake and tsunami that waves exceeding 10 meters (33 feet) could hit the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant.
[...]
In 2009, TEPCO notified NISA of a separate calculation showing that a six-meter (20-foot) tsunami could hit the plant, based on studies of a tsunami that occurred in the year 869.
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110825p2g00m0dm050000c.html

TEPCO says it didn't mean to disclose the assessment since it was a tentative calculation for research purposes based on a simulation.
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/24_36.html

Why wasn't this story told in the Japanese government's report to IAEA in June ? The tsunami safety design story in that report ends with

At the 32nd Joint Working Group for Earthquake, Tsunami, Geology, and Foundations
under the Seismic and Structural Design Subcommittee (June 24, 2009) held in order to
conduct examination related to earthquake, it was pointed out that although the
investigation report about tsunami by the Jogan earthquake in 869 was made by National
Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology and Tohoku University, the
earthquake causing the tsunami was not dealt with. Regarding this, NISA requested
TEPCO at the 33rd Joint Working Group (July 13, 2009) to take into account the Jogan
earthquake for evaluating design tsunami height when new knowledge on the tsunami of
the Jogan earthquake is obtained.

III-31 http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/topics/201106/pdf/chapter_iii-2.pdf

Was Mr Makoto Takao of Tepco aware of the "over 10 m" estimate when he presented his O.P. + 5.7 tsunami, "we assessed and confirmed the safety of the nuclear plants" http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/3_sessionB/B-11.pdf page 14 slide at the November 24-26, 2010 Kashiwazaki international symposium on seismic safety of nuclear installations (http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/content.html ) ? Isn't this kind of symposium a place where people are supposed to talk about the latest available research ?

http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=soc_30&k=2011082500390 On 25 August, Junichi Matsumoto insisted that Tepco's earlier comment that the March 11 tsunami is beyond expectations/assumptions ("想定外" sotei-gai) is not a problem. "I want to consistently maintain that it was a trial calculation. It was not something that could cause a change in the design assumptions (想定 sotei)". When the Earthquake Research Promotion Division of the government announced in July 2002 the probability of an earthquake off the coast of the Boso Peninsula and off the coast of Sanriku, Tepco made a trial calculation based on the hypothesis of an earthquake of the same level as the 1896 Meiji Sanriku earthquake occurring off the Fukushima coast, concluding that there is a risk that a tsunami might surge with a maximum of 15.7 meters. The trial calculation assuming an earthquake of the same level as the 869 Jogan earthquake concluded with the possibility of a maximum of 9.2 meters. After receiving these results, Tepco asked the Society of Civil Engineers to revise the tsunami evaluation criteria, and at that time the officers in charge of nuclear power in the top management knew about these estimates. Former president Masataka Shimizu learned about them after the disaster at the latest.

29 March Reuters :

Over the past two weeks, Japanese government officials and Tokyo Electric Power executives have repeatedly described the deadly combination of the most powerful quake in Japan’s history and the massive tsunami that followed as “soteigai,” or beyond expectations.
(...)
The tsunami research presented by a Tokyo Electric team led by Toshiaki Sakai came on the first day of a three-day conference in July 2007 [2006 (1)] organized by the International Conference on Nuclear Engineering [in Miami].
(...)
Sakai's team determined the Fukushima plant was dead certain to be hit by a tsunami of one or two meters in a 50-year period. They put the risk of a wave of 6 meters or more at around 10 percent over the same time span.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/29/us-japa-nuclear-risks-idUSTRE72S2UA20110329

The research disclosed yesterday seems to be different from the one presented in Miami in 2006(1), as it was made in the Autumn of 2008, according to http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110824005905.htm

(1) Reuters was wrong about the year. The Sakai presentation was made in Miami in 2006 :

It is meaningful for tsunami assessment to evaluate phenomena beyond the design basis. Because once we set the design basis tsunami height, we still have possibilities tsunami height exceeds the determined design tsunami height due to uncertainties regarding the tsunami phenomena. It is apparent that probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) gives us an effective clue. PRA is enlarging its usage for seismic design, but rarely used for tsunami risk evaluation due to its underdevelopment.

Sakai et al. Abstract available by clicking "expand all sessions in track" after "TRK 6 Safety and Security" and then the "ICONE14-89183 Development of a Method for Probabilistic Tsunami Hazard Analysis in Japan" link below "Monday, July 17, 2006 10:30 AM-12:30 PM" at http://archive.asmeconferences.org/ICONE14/TechnicalProgramOverview.cfm

 

[NUCENG]

Why wasn't this story told in the Japanese government's report to IAEA in June ? The tsunami safety design story in that report ends with



Was Mr Makoto Takao of Tepco aware of the "over 10 m" estimate when he presented his O.P. + 5.7 tsunami, "we assessed and confirmed the safety of the nuclear plants" http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/3_sessionB/B-11.pdf page 14 slide at the November 24-26, 2010 Kashiwazaki international symposium on seismic safety of nuclear installations (http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/content.html ) ? Isn't this kind of symposium a place where people are supposed to talk about the latest available research ?

http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=soc_30&k=2011082500390 On 25 August, Junichi Matsumoto insisted that Tepco's earlier comment that the March 11 tsunami is beyond expectations/assumptions ("想定外" sotei-gai) is not a problem. "I want to consistently maintain that it was a trial calculation. It was not something that could cause a change in the design assumptions (想定 sotei)". When the Earthquake Research Promotion Division of the government announced in July 2002 the probability of an earthquake off the coast of the Boso Peninsula and off the coast of Sanriku, Tepco made a trial calculation based on the hypothesis of an earthquake of the same level as the 1896 Meiji Sanriku earthquake occurring off the Fukushima coast, concluding that there is a risk that tsunami might surge with a maximum of 15.7 meters. The trial calculation assuming an earthquake of the same level as the 869 Jogan earthquake concluded with the possibility of a maximum of 9.2 meters. After receiving these results, Tepco asked the Society of Civil Engineers to revise the tsunami evaluation criteria, and at that time the officers in charge of nuclear power in the top management knew about these estimates. Former president Masataka Shimizu learned about them after the disaster at the latest.

29 March Reuters :


The research disclosed yesterday is different from the one presented in Miami in 2007, as it was made in the Autumn of 2008, according to http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110824005905.htm

During the earthquake design review following the Kashiwazaki Karawa earthquake the issue came up about the tsunami in 869. See the referenced article in post #125

 

[tsutsuji]

During the earthquake design review following the Kashiwazaki Karawa earthquake the issue came up about the tsunami in 869. See the referenced article in post #125

Thank you.

Found this about evaluation of tsunami and earthquake at Fukushima:

http://msquair.wordpress.com/2011/04/28/common-cause-at-daiichi-fukushima/

That March 28 blog page refers to a "2011/03/22" URL, "Published: March 24" Washington Post article:

The Daiichi panel wrapped up its review and, on June 24, 2009, presented its findings to a larger working group of 40, which included just two tsunami experts.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world...t-of-tsunami/2011/03/22/AB7Rf2KB_story_1.html

which is not very different from what is said page III-31 of http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/...pter_iii-2.pdf and where we understand that some non-Tepco people like seismologist Yukinobu Okamura raised the 869 tsunami issue. What we learn from the 29 March Reuters news and from the 24 August NISA announcement is that Tepco had developed research internally on the tsunami issue which concluded that the risk existed with some non-negligible probability. We can no longer summarise the story by saying that while some non-Tepco people were aware of the risk, Tepco was unaware of the risk or dismissing the claims: the blogger, Matthew Squair, talks about "symptoms of a collective view or ‘groupthink‘ that denied the possibility of a hazard to the plant from a tsunami event". The story seems now to be more complicated than that.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20110825/0430_iaea.html Tepco vice-president Ichiro Takekuro was communicated the above 10 metres tsunami assessment results at the time when a study was commissioned to the Society of Civil Engineers. Junichi Matsumoto said: "The estimate was a calculation resulting from an accumulation of hypotheses, therefore it had no concrete basis, which is why we did not publicly release it". Yoshinori Moriyama, senior NISA official in charge of measures against nuclear disasters [the NISA spokesman in Fukushima Daiichi press conferences], said: "Even if it is a trial calculation, it constitutes material for [safety] evaluation. Tepco should have reported it early. In hindsight, I think the tsunami countermeasures were not sufficient".

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_110825_01-e.pdf Tepco press release with a time-line of tsunami research from H14.2 (February 2002) to H23.3 (March 2011). [It includes the Toshiaki Sakai presentation at the ICONE-14 Miami conference in 2006, but it is not saying a word about Makoto Takao's presentation at the November 24-26, 2010 Kashiwazaki international symposium]

I found the links to the following research papers :

* Sawai et al. (2008) : "Marine incursions of the past 1500 years and evidence of tsunamis at Suijin-numa, a coastal lake facing the Japan Trench" The Holocene 18,4 (2008) pp. 517–528 http://www.fsl.orst.edu/wpg/events/S11/Sawai et al 2008 .pdf (in English)

* Satake et al. (2008) : "Numerical simulation of the AD 869 Jogan tsunami in Ishinomaki and Sendai plains" by Kenji Satake, Yuichi Namegaya and Shigeru Yamaki, Annual Report on Active Fault and Paleoearthquake Researches, 8, 71-89, 2008 http://unit.aist.go.jp/actfault-eq/seika/h19seika/pdf/03.satake.pdf (in Japanese, with English abstract and English translations of figure captions).

* Namegaya et al. (2010) : "Numerical simulation of the AD 869 Jogan tsunami in Ishinomaki and Sendai plains and Ukedo river-mouth lowland" by Yuichi Namegaya, Kenji Satake, and Shigeru Yamaki, Annual Report on Active Fault and Paleoearthquake Researches, 10, 1-21, 2010 : http://unit.aist.go.jp/actfault-eq/seika/h21seika/pdf/namegaya.pdf (in Japanese, with English abstract and English translations of figure captions).

 

[NUCENG]

Thank you.


That March 28 blog page refers to a "2011/03/22" URL, "Published: March 24" Washington Post article:


which is not very different from what is said page III-31 of http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/...pter_iii-2.pdf and where we understand that some non-Tepco people like seismologist Yukinobu Okamura raised the 869 tsunami issue. What we learn from the 29 March Reuters news and from the 24 August NISA announcement is that Tepco had developed research internally on the tsunami issue which concluded that the risk existed with some non-negligible probability. We can no longer summarise the story by saying that while some non-Tepco people were aware of the risk, Tepco was unaware of the risk or dismissing the claims: the blogger, Matthew Squair, talks about "symptoms of a collective view or ‘groupthink‘ that denied the possibility of a hazard to the plant from a tsunami event". The story seems now to be more complicated than that.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20110825/0430_iaea.html Tepco vice-president Ichiro Takekuro was communicated the above 10 metres tsunami assessment results at the time when a study was commissioned to the Society of Civil Engineers. Junichi Matsumoto said: "The estimate was a calculation resulting from an accumulation of hypotheses, therefore it had no concrete basis, which is why we did not publicly release it". Yoshinori Moriyama, senior NISA official in charge of measures against nuclear disasters [the NISA spokesman in Fukushima Daiichi press conferences], said: "Even if it is a trial calculation, it constitutes material for [safety] evaluation. Tepco should have reported it early. In hindsight, I think the tsunami countermeasures were not sufficient".

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_110825_01-e.pdf Tepco press release with a time-line of tsunami research from H14.2 (February 2002) to H23.3 (March 2011). [It includes the Toshiaki Sakai presentation at the ICONE-14 Miami conference in 2006, but it is not saying a word about Makoto Takao's presentation at the November 24-26, 2010 Kashiwazaki international symposium]

I found the links to the following research papers :

* Sawai et al. (2008) : "Marine incursions of the past 1500 years and evidence of tsunamis at Suijin-numa, a coastal lake facing the Japan Trench" The Holocene 18,4 (2008) pp. 517–528 http://www.fsl.orst.edu/wpg/events/S11/Sawai et al 2008 .pdf (in English)

* Satake et al. (2008) : "Numerical simulation of the AD 869 Jogan tsunami in Ishinomaki and Sendai plains" by Kenji Satake, Yuichi Namegaya and Shigeru Yamaki, Annual Report on Active Fault and Paleoearthquake Researches, 8, 71-89, 2008 http://unit.aist.go.jp/actfault-eq/seika/h19seika/pdf/03.satake.pdf (in Japanese, with English abstract and English translations of figure captions).

* Namegaya et al. (2010) : "Numerical simulation of the AD 869 Jogan tsunami in Ishinomaki and Sendai plains and Ukedo river-mouth lowland" by Yuichi Namegaya, Kenji Satake, and Shigeru Yamaki, Annual Report on Active Fault and Paleoearthquake Researches, 10, 1-21, 2010 : http://unit.aist.go.jp/actfault-eq/seika/h21seika/pdf/namegaya.pdf (in Japanese, with English abstract and English translations of figure captions).

Wow! I just skimmed those articles and I want you on my team for research!

Here is another challenge. Back in the early days I saw some references to another earthqauake/tsunami in the area of Fukushima that left a geological record that was dated back to around 200 BCE. I looked for that when I wrote my previous reply, but didn't find it. I do know that the scientists raised the 869 event with TEPCO, but have no idea if they discussed the earlier event.

Going back that far, there also may be differences in where the coastline was, but that would give three events with about a 1000 to 1100 year recurrence rate. In any case that information was known at least in the scientific community.

There was a clear opportunity to question the 5.7 m design basis tsunami. But that brings me back to NISA's statement to the Convention on Nuclear Safety that they didn't review design basis information unless a utility wanted to build a new plant.

 

[clancy688]

Did anyone of our japanese speaking forum members notice http://www.stippy.com/japan-life/155-days-earthquake-tsunami-and-nuclear-disaster-fuji-tv-documentary/" Fuji TV documentary about the earthquake disaster?

The report about the nuclear part of the disaster is starting around 1:09h, they're showing many pictures and images I haven't seen before, for example workers handling 40tons of ice (?). Perhaps there are informations we haven't had before? Unfortunately I don't speak japanese, so I don't know what they're talking about...

 

[NUCENG]

Here is a link to a story about one of the robot operators at Fukishima. This is a summary because a blog the operator was writing has been deleted. Perhaps another example of trying to prevent communication in a world where the internet makes that impossible and foolish.

http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/industrial-robots/fukushima-robot-operator-diaries

 

[tsutsuji]

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20110821/t10015043651000.html 21 August : a Hokkaido University team found geological strata near Kesennuma, Miyagi prefecture, providing evidence of 5 large tsunamis in the past over more than 5000 years. In Miyako, Iwate prefecture, 6 tsunami strata have been found. With the 2011 tsunami, this is roughly one large tsunami every 1000 years. Evidence of the Jogan tsunami had not been previously found as far in the North. If some of the strata found by the Hokkaido University team are confirmed to belong to the Jogan tsunami, the Jogan tsunami's magnitude could be revised to 9 instead of 8.3 as was previously thought. See also http://www.kahoku.co.jp/news/2011/08/20110822t75007.htm (with photograph) and http://channel6newsonline.com/2011/08/massive-tsunamis-hit-japans-eastern-coast-every-1000-years/ (in English)

http://www.fsl.orst.edu/wpg/events/bbagS11.htm Oregon State University, Geomorphology Brown Bag - Spring 2011 "Geomorphology of Tsunamis" is a gold mine of tsunami research literature.

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/science/news/20110824-OYT1T00991.htm Tepco's claim that that the tsunami was beyond expectation "has collapsed".

http://www.bloomberg.co.jp/apps/news?pid=90920019&sid=as3_8zR_CaQs In the 25 August joint press conference, the confrontation of points of views between Tepco and the NISA "has sharpened". Although the NISA says it orally instructed Tepco to perform back checks upon receiving the tsunami estimate on 7 March, in the morning press conference, Junichi Matsumoto denied that the NISA provided Tepco any oral instruction. Concerning the discrepancy between Tepco and the NISA, Yoshinori Moriyama said that the NISA provided documents for the investigation panel to review.

http://www.nikkei.com/news/category...E7E2E2938DE0E7E2EAE0E2E3E39790E0E2E2E2;at=ALL Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano expressed regret concerning the fact that the over 10 metres tsunami risk at Fukushima Daiichi was not publicly released by Tepco and the NISA, and was finally found by the investigation panel: "The cabinet's position is that we want to inspect by which process, and where [the information] was stopped".

 

[tsutsuji]

August 4:

Most recently, it was revealed that NISA, the nuclear watchdog, asked utilities to stage supportive questions at a METI-hosted symposium on the controversial use of plutonium-uranium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in an apparent attempt to manipulate public opinion in favor of nuclear power.
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110804x1.html

August 13:

Chubu Electric Power Co. and Shikoku Electric Power Co. said they were ordered to do so by the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, ostensibly the government's chief nuclear watchdog. Economy, Trade and Industry Minister Banri Kaieda, who oversees the agency, admitted to, and apologized for, those actions by officials. At a parliamentary hearing where he was berated by opposition lawmakers for his handling of the mushrooming scandal, Mr. Kaieda broke down in tears.

The disclosures prompted Prime Minister Naoto Kan last week to label NISA a "lobby" of the utilities, and spurred the government to propose breaking up NISA by removing its nuclear industry oversight responsibilities and handing them over to the environment ministry.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904823804576499942442007306.html

August 30:
http://www.47news.jp/CN/201108/CN2011083001000703.html Independent panel releases interim report on the involvement of top level NISA officials in recruitments of NPP personnel to attend and influence public opinion in symposiums on the future of Genkai NPP and Hamaoka NPP.

http://mainichi.jp/select/jiken/news/20110831k0000m040063000c.html NISA director-general Hiroyuki Fukano apologises.

http://www.mbs.jp/news/jnn_4814083_zen.shtml The independent panel will release its final report at the end of September after conducting further hearings about what happened concerning Onagawa and Sendai NPPs.

 

[tsutsuji]

http://www.asahi.com/national/update/0902/TKY201109020749.html It was revealed by the NISA on 2 September that after receiving from JNES at 01:57 AM, 12 March 2011, the Emergency Response Support System (ERSS) results for Fukushima Daiichi unit 1 containing predictions about water level, pressure, and when meltdown and reactor damage would occur, the NISA failed to communicate those results to the Kantei (Prime minister residence).Yoshinori Moriyama (NISA) commented that he "does not know the reason" why. The SPEEDI data received at 06:07 AM on the same day were not communicated to the Kantei either.

http://mainichi.jp/select/today/news/20110903k0000m040137000c.html The ERSS results have been disclosed by the NISA on 2 September. Those for units 2 and 3 were sent to Kantei, but they were not used to build evacuation plans. Those for unit 1 failed from being sent.
The ERSS data for unit 2, predicting fuel rod exposure at 22:50 and meltdown at 24:50 were received by NISA on 11 March at around 9:30 PM and given by hand to a cabinet staff member at 10:45 PM, 11 March and after midnight on 12 March. Those for unit 3 were received by NISA at 6:30 AM on 13 March and sent to Kantei 20 minutes later. At the 2 September press conference, Yoshinori Moriyama explained that these data were not exploited to build evacuation plans because they were not based on real facts.

http://www.47news.jp/CN/201109/CN2011090201001046.html No detailed explanation was provided to the Kantei together with the unit 2 ERSS data. Yoshinori Moriyama explained that, as they are not based on real facts, they were provided to the Kantei only as a reference/footnote. The 11 March around 10 PM data predicted fuel damage 2 hours later, meltdown 3 hours later, and the necessity to perform venting with radiation release at 3:20 AM, 12 March.

 

[zapperzero]

Yoshinori Moriyama explained that, as they are not based on real facts, they were provided to the Kantei only as a reference/footnote. The 11 March around 10 PM data predicted fuel damage 2 hours later, meltdown 3 hours later, and the necessity to perform venting with radiation release at 3:20 AM, 12 March.

Fantastic. So, there is no actual data, but we have these simulations. They are the best we have, but we'll just go ahead and ignore them, basing our decisions on gut feeling instead.

 

[tsutsuji]

Copies of the documents sent by the NISA to the Kantei are available in http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/09/20110902005/20110902005-6.pdf (13 pages, 6MB)

 

[tsutsuji]

From the September issue of ATOMOΣ　:

That the information about the core status was not released until mid-May, is highly deplorable, he [a former head of American Nuclear Society] says. Everybody in Japan feels the same.
(...)
He says the meltdown of units 1 ~ 3 could be predicted out of a simple heat balance, and it was supported by the evidence of radioactive substance releases, so he felt considerable despair over the fact that although considerable damage had been done to the citizens, Tokyo Electric and the public authorities admitted meltdown for the first time two months after the accident. To stretch it a little, the citizen's confidence has been betrayed, and this could be an important factor damaging the use of nuclear energy in Japan in the future, he warns.

Hisashi Ninokata, "The Reception of the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident by the ANS: How key members of the ANS perceived accident information", ATOMOΣ, vol. 53 No.9 (September 2011) p.602.
http://www.aesj.or.jp/atomos/tachiyomi/2011-09mokuji.pdf (my translation)

 

[tsutsuji]

http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201109060244.html "In his first interview since leaving office (...) Kan offered new insights into the stresses at the top of government as it struggled to cope with the March 11 earthquake, tsunami and the nuclear disaster".

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110906004963.htm "Kan revealed that the off-site emergency response center near the plant, though supposed to serve as a front-line command center in the event of a crisis, was vacated soon after the accident" (...) Kan: "All the crisis-management arrangements that had been made prior to the accident failed to function properly."

http://sankei.jp.msn.com/region/news/110906/fki11090602100002-n1.htm (Fukui regional page)　A committee working on the revision of Fukui prefecture nuclear emergency manual which is planned to be completed by the end of this year, had a meeting on 5 September discussing issues such as the cooperation from surrounding prefectures with personnel and equipments to help with people radiation screening operations (Fukushima prefecture had to rely on surrounding prefectures' help), and whether to use a separate front-line base (like J-Village) in addition to the off-site centre.

(TBS news) & http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110908p2a00m0na022000c.html "TEPCO submits heavily redacted copy of Fukushima nuke accident manual"