Dmytry said:
Speaking of children, do you see now why i was especially riled up by the argument as of how everyone likes children and so on?
It was back before the 20msv/year playground exposure limits and that resignation IIRC. I was expecting this stuff to happen, based on Chernobyl.
For you the soviet union is something that was an enemy or what ever; for me it is a place i was born in, and i can see that a lot of things are fairly universal between governments. Before Fukushima you would never have thought that Japan was this similar to Soviet Union when it comes to nuclear accidents - whereas I would think so because I don't see the way SU handled Chernobyl as anything exceptionally bad or good - I was spared the cold war propaganda either way. We have two data points of how government handles severe nuclear disaster - one in communist country, another in capitalist country - and they are fairly similar, so it is not the economical system that matters (though I would say that socialist government could use larger amount of resources and could relocate people easier).
How can you be sure that your government could handle nuclear disaster (plus tsunami) better? For me the only reason to think so is that EU (and US) are more powerful entities than Japan and each can conceivably throw more resources at problem. Well, I do think that you have less complacent population and people would be REALLY pissed off; but i'd think government would try nonetheless; government does not deserve the credit for the love of freedom that people it governs have; people deserve credit for what government they elect.
also speaking of 20mSv/year limit for playgrounds. That is the EU limit for nuclear workers, but a lot more lax, because the nuclear workers are carrying dosimeters and are not getting any internal exposure of note (plus with ALARA principle vast majority of workers stay below 1mSv/year), whereas children are getting internal exposure and are in a messy non-uniform field and there's no ALARA, quite the opposite (don't do anything when below limit). I would guess that the distribution of actual children doses would be non-gaussian with many children going well above this limit.
I have no children of my own but work with children through several programs, and I have nephews, nieces and their children and now even grand children. I am with you a hundred percent that increasing exposure limits for children is wrong.
When I was growing up, the Red Menace of the Soviet Union and PRC were the "enemy." While I was in the military I trained to defend against those countries and that included service in Vietnam. Today I see the Russian and Chinese people as economic competitors not enemies. If I had a nickel for every immigrant and ex-patriot of a different nationality that I have worked with in the nuclear industry I might almost be able to buy a gallon of gas.
Most of those people came to the US for economic opportunity and because they thought things were better here. For some reason they want to stay here in large numbers. I have lived in ROK, Republic of China, Japan, and the UK. I have visited several other countries. I now live where I want to stay.
"How can you be sure that your government could handle nuclear disaster (plus tsunami) better?" An extended Station Blackout (even without a tsunami) is a serious challenge to any nuclear plant and I'll even guess that is 100% true for Generation IV plant designs and gas cooled pebble bed plants.
The following are some reasons that I personally feel a US plant would have been better prepared:
1. We drill and exercise severe accidents several times each year at every plant. These exercises include testing communications links to NRC, state, and local government and emergency responders. We practice making decisions about evacuation zones and even have exercised some limited evacuations.
2. Our design bases are not a one-time file and forget function. We have intrusive and detailed inspections and reviews by regulators, industry peers and organizations. We have documented design basis and used probabilistic risk evaluations to identify critical systems and manual actions. Then those areas get even more rigorous evaluations, regulation, and inspections. I believe there will be significant rework of Station Blackout after the Fukushima accident. Coastal plants are already being asked to reexamine seismic and tsunami risks.
3. In response to 9/11 plants have been evaluated for major damage due to aircraft impacts and disruption of offsite power. Equipment has been procured, installed or pre-positioned, and procedures have been developed to provide extended core cooling and makeup.
4. Actions specified in Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Monitoring Guidelines are not subject to delays waiting for government approval or because the CEO can't get a helicopter ride. Those actions are already approved and will be implemented when entry conditions are met.
5. Steps like venting containment would be implemented before exceeding containment design pressure, unlike Fukushima.
6. Anyone who has ever participated in NRC decision making and inspections will recognize that the regulatory process is not controlled by industry nor by the anti-nuclear lobby. I have been repeatedly frustrated by what I saw as over-zealous pet-peeve regulators as people like David Lochbaum (UCS) have been frustrated by NRC refusal to act on his comlaints. When everybody leaves the table frustrated, I've learned the decisions are aimed at increasing safety. What I have seen in Japan of the relationship between regulators and industry scares me. If they missed something like tsunamies what other issues could there be.
7. Until recently, most of our operators and staff were selected with experience in the nuclear navy. The one year training program, followed by qualification and training and drills and testing and on and on is probably the best preparation in the world to respond to a plant upset or accident. I am a little concerned that the cutbacks in nuclear ship numbers and an effort to start building a lot of new plants will need to find a new source for the caliber of operators and the numbers they will need.
Would these factors be enough to save the core in an extended station blackout? I don't know, and hope I never find out. That is truthful even if you don't believe any of it. If these factors are enough to save containment the results would be better than Fukushima.
And when this is all wrapped up, lessons have been learned and implemented, my confidence will be even higher and I still won't want to test it.
BTW I am still working my way through about 4 GB of references about PRA to figure out whether I believe the 1E-7 per year probability numbers. There is an assumption of a factor of 20 between the qualification of seismic equipment and the safe shutdown earthquake that I cannot yet validate, but I am okay with 1E-5 so far.
