Here is another testimony from a firsthand eyewitness published in "Nezavisimaya gazeta".
This guy is a Russian official, so you can dismiss his words as a Kremlin propaganda, but something
tells me that his description of events is authentic.
http://www.ng.ru/courier/2008-09-01/13_razlom.html
"On the Caucasian faultline"
Yuri Popov: "We never set the goal to conquer Georgia"
2008-09-01/ Marina Perevozkina
Events in the Caucasus is one of major themes discussed today by politicians, journalists and
other citizens, and not only in our country. Therefore, the opinion of an eyewitness of the events is especially
interesting. One such eyewitness is the special task envoy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Yuri Popov, who answered questions posed by "NG".
-- Yuri Fedorovich, on the August 7th, just on the eve of tragic events in South Ossetia, you went to Tbilisi and
Tshinval for negotiations. Apparently, they were successful, because after your visit a moratorium on military
actions was declared, and negotiations were scheduled to take place the next day with you as an intermediary between
the state minister of Georgia on reintegration Temuri Jacobashvili and the vice-premier of South Ossetia Boris Chochiev.
How did the events develop on that, without doubt, historic day?
Y.P.: On the August 7th at 2:00 pm I went from Tbilisi to Tshinval to discuss with South Ossetian partners the
agenda of the meeting that has been planned for the Friday [August 8th]. I drove in the car of Russian Embassy.
On the way I got a flat tire, and the spare tire was not good either, and I was waiting for another car for two
hours. During my wait (it was 10 kilometers from Gori) I watched with great interest as Georgian armored vehicles
and transports with soldiers passed me in the direction of Tshinval. I reached my destination point after 6 p.m.
-- Some say that Jacobashvili also came to Tshinval on that day?
Y.P.: He went there on his own program separate from me. Before that we had a contact in Tbilisi, discussed the forthcoming
three-side meeting. Then, after arranging all issues with the Georgian side I went to discuss them with
South Ossetian leadership, because earlier they expressed their doubts about the usefulness of such a meeting.
-- What was the reason for you arrival in Georgia, which was, as I understand, unexpected - you flew at night?
Y.P.: I arrived in Tbilisi early in the morning of August 7th. The Russian side was very worried about increased
tensions in the conflict zone. It was necessary to break this trend immediately. For this reason, though we
remained principal backers of the continuation of negotiations in the framework of SKK [joint Georgia-Russia-South Ossetia
commission for peace], the decision was taken to assist an urgent meeting between Georgians and South Ossetians.
We started to prepare the agenda at the end of July, however a massive mortar-artillery shelling of residential
blocks in Tshinval on August 1st has hardened the negotiating position of the South Ossetian side.
-- When did you leave Tshinval?
Y.P.: I left the city after 10 p.m. after reaching the final agreement with both Georgian and South Ossetian partners about
three-party Georgian-Ossetian-Russian meeting planned for the next day in Tshinval. The talks were supposed to start
at 1 p.m. on August 8th in the headquarters of SSPM[?] with the participation of Boris Chochiev, Temuri Jacobashvili,
the commander of peacekeeping forces general Marat Kulahmetov and myself. By the way if I hadn't have some urgent
tasks for the morning of August 8th in our Embassy [in Tbilisi], I would have remained to spend the night in Tshinval.
Interesting, if that would deter the Georgian attack on the city? I doubt very much, but still I have a bad feeling.
-- But the facts confirm that the operation was well-thought and prepared. The choice of the day was not accidental - the
beginning of Olympic games. Apparently everything was decided long before...
Y.P.: The preparation for the aggression was conducted methodically and long in advance. Though, there is a version that
Saakashvili took this decision impulsively under the influence of something, which scared him very much. I.e., the decision
about the military operation could be induced from outside. At the same time it is obvious that the strike was planned
for the night August 7-8, when the attention of the whole world was focused on the opening of Olympic games. By that time
a striking military group of Georgian army was already pulled to the southern outskirts of Tshinval.
-- Did you have any doubts about the reliability of your partners? Were you sure that negotiations will take place?
Y.P.: There was an absolutely clear agreement about the place, time and the format of the meeting. On the other hand,
the Georgian partners never firmly stuck to their promises. But their unwillingness to negotiate grew into betrayal.
When I drove from Tshinvali late at night I saw opposite movement of Georgian military columns entering the conflict zone.
There were tanks, artillery, multiple rocket launchers, trucks and buses with soldiers. First, I reported this to the commander
of SSPM on the cell phone, then I lost the count. I called Jacobashvili and asked what is the reason to move such hugh forces to Tshinval?
My Georgian colleague calmed me down - this is a defensive measure and the President who promised not to open fire will
never break his word. An half an hour later, when I approached Tbilisi, general Kulahmetov called me and told that
Georgia has declared a war on South Ossetia and Tshinval is being bombarded from land and air.
-- There is an impression that Georgian aggression took Russian leadership off guard, though it was not so difficult to
predict this development of events.
Y.P.: We were caught off guard not by the aggression itself but by the choice of time of the attack. Perhaps this was
pre-calculated in Tbilisi, because, in principle, we expected this line of development. We all saw the military
preparations of Georgia. I can't understand another thing: how could Georgians agree with South Ossetians about the meeting
if they new that the war is going to start in an hour? This is incomprehensible from the ethical point of view.
I don't want to believ that my negotiations partner Mr. Jacobashvili lied to me on purpose. I am inclined to think that
he was not aware about the coming attack on South Ossetia. It is interesting that when in the evening of August 7th I told
Jacobashvili about the reached agreement with Boris Chochiev and the South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity about tomorrow's
meeting in Tshinval, he immediately contacted Saakashvili and informed myself that "President has approved" this idea.
I can admit the possibility that the invasion was planned for the near future, but something forced Saakashvili to speed it up
and to give the order to start in the night of August 7-8. Here again a thought comes to mind about an external influence.
-- Did you see Georgian peacekeepers in the headquarters?
Y.P.: When I arrived to Kulahmetov, the headquarters of Georgian peacekeepers were empty. I was told that they left
SSPM during the day of August 7th.
-- You are saying the leadership of Russia was informed about military preparations by Georgia. Was there any reaction
plan in the event of attack? Why peacekeepers were so slow to respond?
Y.P.: Georgians were preparing for the war. They pulled in striking groups from the South. At the same time Georgian troops
tried to occupy strategic heights in the conflict zone. Set up new checkpoints equipped by all rules of military-engineering
science. South Ossetians, naturally, reacted and this led to the avalanche of military stand-off. Our peacekeepers, due to
their small numbers, could not quell these problems physically. There were only 500 peacekeepers most of whom were on
stationary positions. They did what they could: separated sides which entered in armed contact, stood between them. We reserved
the right to increase the sizes of Russian and South Ossetian batallions to 800 people each in the case if the situation
goes out of control. However, we didn't expect that it would go out of control and end up in such a bloodshed.
-- Just before the war started, a serious military force was concentrated on the Russian territory near the border with Georgia.
Previously, army came close to the border in times of increased tensions, but such an armada with a lot of armament has not
been seen there before.
Y.P.: Georgians also have not pulled so much forces and weapons to Tshinval before. The action creates counteraction. The question
is different - why Saakashvili's friends, first of all in Washington, decided to put in hands of such an impulsive leader
this deadly machinery? The quantity transforms to quality, sooner or later. The shotgun hanging on the wall is destined to shoot.
It is true that our American partners tell us that Saakashvili didn't discuss with them his decision to attack South Ossetia.
-- Many analysts now say that the operation was not finished. Why did our troops stop so abruptly? Why didn'd we force
Saakashvili to sign a capitulation act?
Y.P.: We never set the goal to conquer Georgia, remove Saakashvili, enter Tbilisi, hang the Russian flag there and put our
general-governor. We have conducted a peace-enforcing operation. The peace is restored, the aggressor retreated, the justice
prevailed. Nobody wanted to force proud Gergian people on their knees. Russians and Georgians are not enemies.
Regarding Saakashvili and his political career, I don't have the right to give recipes. I can only tell one thing: if I was
guilty in deaths of thousands of people, I would act according to my conscience.
-- What are further prospects for negotiations?
Y.P.: To renew the negotiations right now is very problematic. It is not clear, with whom? what is the purpose? The peacekeeping
operations will be conducted by enhanced Russian contingent without participation of Georgians. We will also change the
configuration of the peacekeeper's responsibility zone.