Not exactly. This paper examines situations in which self-interested behavior does not produce Pareto-optimal outcomes; economically, these would represent markets in which the conditions of pure competition do not and cannot obtain (if they did, then self-interested behavior would produce a Pareto-optimal outcome). These might be public goods markets in which rational pricing is impossible or private goods markets in which significant externalities exist. In either case, the equilibrium point reached in the absence of cooperation is not Pareto-optimal, and introducing cooperation more often than not in the trial runs tended to produce advantageous results for all players. However, cooperation involved all players, not two ganging up to cooperate to the disadvantage of the rest.
Obviously, if you're going to apply the result to any actual policy problem, it's more complicated than a game-theoretical general case. For instance, in the provision of national defense, it isn't necessarily the best idea to have weapons manufacturers sitting on the appropriations subcommittee responsible for purchasing weapons.
I was interested more in the biological application of this result than in the economic application, though, since it related to the reasons that altruism (or really, in this case, mutualism) might be evolutionarily advantageous.