Frank Peters said:
In other words, an completed infinity makes no sense in the concept of limit.
However, the notion of infinity introduced by Georg Cantor does admit completed infinities. In Cantor's ideas, infinity does indeed exist an an actual quantity, and there are even a hierarchy of infinities.
One thing is that Cantor's notion of infinite doesn't seem to be required to do much of "usual" mathematics. Apparently, there has been much work on it. Obviously trying to pursue/understand the exact detail (which I don't know very well) requires time commitment ... (not to mention that there are good number of variations on this). But still,
I can include a number of pointers if someone is interested.
For example, it seems to be generally favoured (apparently with good reasons) that FLT is provable in PA.
You can search for it and you will find good number of links.
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One thing though that is rarely talked about and, I feel, "might" be a point of concern. Consider the following proposition:
p: "There is no bijection between ℕ and ℝ"
Now one of the problems that I feel is that when we conclude (in ZFC) that:
q: "There is a bijection between ℝ and ω
1"
The jump from p to q just seems a bit too much to me. I don't know whether it leads to some kind of actual "syntactic" issues or not though. Now it seems that some mathematicians do believe that ω
1 shouldn't be considered a set (
ref. if needed). So there seem to be two different conceptual lines of thinking here.
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And even the plausibility that ZFC is incorrect about some number theory statements (more specifically, incorrect about halting of some programs) is also expressed sometimes (
ref. if needed). Note that this can also imply ~con(ZFC) (see next sentence). But even if one is wrong about halting and it is detectable via purely finite calculations (in the sense that we say a program loops when it actually halts), it might not be possible to detect it in any reasonable time scale (notably this also doesn't cover consistency doesn't imply soundness issue anyway).
For example, consider the abstract "possibility" that some statement (with comparable description length to FLT) is incorrect (but we consider it to be correct). If we express it as a reasonably small program (say around 100 lines), then in the "worst-case scenario" we would have to wait till a time-scale BB(100) to find out that the statement was actually wrong.
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Regarding my own opinion about this, I think something like con(PA) is true (because of its proof). If we find a similar proof for con(ZFC) ... after enough verification ... that would decisively settle its consistency at least. But ofc people who are expert on this say that this seems to be very far away (
ref. if needed). But I don't really know. This is just what I have read.
There is something important (with regards to this topic) that I have quite recently learned. Consider the following two problems:
A-- There is a "path of natural notations" below ω
CK
B-- con(ZFC)
Of course both are very old problems (from a purely mechanical viewpoint, one is a conceptual "problem" ... if it is one ... and the other is a syntactic problem). A is closely related to "natural notations" problem and it seems that Godel has explicitly mentioned (
will describe the specific quote if someone is interested) both A and its related problem (I read this about an year ago and mentioned this in one of threads I made here).
Now what I have learned quite recently (based on some discussion on mathSE ...
will provide link if someone is interested), about a month ago, is that if we consider the following possibilities/combinations:
p1-- A is not a "real" problem and B is true
p2-- A is not a "real" problem and B is false
p3-- A is a real problem (with a solution) and B is true
p4-- A is a real problem (with a solution) and B is false
Then the possibility p3 is unlikely (but still possible apriori). The (informal) reason is that, for p3 to exist, any method for A would quite likely somehow have to draw a "boundary line" at identifying ω
CK ... and failing after that (still apriori possible but hard to see for me). Otherwise, without a distinguishing boundary line, such a method just seems to show that ω
1 should not be considered a set.
And the sound of it does appear too fictional/fantastic admittedly. Possibly that also (partly) explains the pessimism around problem A?
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P.S.
As I have mentioned before, I had tried A (without even realising that I was trying the same problem ... because I wasn't even aware of existence of absurd recursive notations at that time) about 5 years ago. But after realising that the methods at that time didn't work, I didn't think about it again until 2 years ago. Now after a break of many months, I finally had the time to look at my method (which I had thought of an year ago) again (in last 2 months).
In hindsight, in my own approach (which didn't really work) for A, if they did work hypothetically, possibility p4 would have existed instead of p3. This is also true for my current approach (and the current specific method might be the last one I try ... since I can only think of few potentially meaningful modifications).
In a way, this does bring down my enthusiasm quite a bit (since I wasn't aware of this implication until a month ago). I have never heard of conception of ω
1 not being a set bringing up a purely syntactic issue. Since I had finally time to look upon the current method in last two months, it does work better than I expected. Since the underlying method is concrete (and fully specified) I probably need to test it more.
Currently I would rate the optimism level regarding the working of this specific method at 5% (part of the reason I am assessing it low is because possibility p3 doesn't seem to exist in this method). In a timeline of one year (if I do keep working on it) I think I can get a very good idea ... either it comes down to 0% (95% chance?) or goes up by around 30--60% (5% chance?).