tAllan said:
I don't follow. If information derived from a physical process doesn't flow into the system, then how does it affect the way the system calculates? Besides, all input to any computer is physical at the lowest level anyways. In fact, your argument implies that mathematical functions don't exist at all in the physical world, which might be an interesting metaphysics topic, but is a hard concept to incorporate into a discussion about mathematical models of computation.
Pure mathematical functions are independent from the constrains of physical reality. When considering whether the random number generator is a function, it comes down to whether it is a deterministic process. If it is, then you can certainly model the process as a function. All of this doesn't depend on syntax and code, how the process is expressed in a programming language, or in what form information is stored or transferred.
@tAllan,
Your question about the relationship between mathematical functions and the physical layer which gives rise to them is challenging because it rests on some philosophically challenging ideas. In the most general sense, yours is a question about how what we perceive as physical is interlinked to what we perceive as abstract; I specifically using perceive because in fact what we discuss about the universe is subject to infinite regress since as biological computers, essentially we are trying to model how we ourselves function. (See
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gödel,_Escher,_Bach). I'm stating this as a preface because it has become somewhat chic to view the physical universe as information itself or some large simulation (See
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_the_Universe) which gnaws at me the wrong way since it is not a falsifiable hypothesis, and I consider Lloyd's book an imaginative piece of science fiction until someone otherwise persuades me I'm a simulation. I also see such navel gazing as mistaking introspection about our thoughts which represent the physical universe for the physical universe itself, and I personally draw a very sharp line between what is symbol and what is medium because I believe abstraction to be an emergent property and information to be irreducible to the medium it is encoded in. This makes me a dualist, but not one who believes there is no interaction between the physical and the abstract. So let's get into my response now that you understand where I come from.
First, functions are a very specific type mathematical construct which is by definition a symbol to represent relationships between symbols in a very specific way. A function is a relation or rule between sets, the domain and codomain, where each informational input is mapped to exactly one output. Note well that this is a very specific set of words whose meaning deals in abstract entities (See
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Meaning_of_Meaning). In other words, 'function' is a symbol which we as thinkers (reference) use to name the definition above (referent). You say that my denial of your potential characterization of a function as allowing for physical inputs creating informational outputs might preclude functions from existing, but the opposite is true. I oppose the definition of a function to include physical inputs precisely because it muddies the definitions of what is physical and what is informational, and it is such a definition that would lead to contradictions. Follow me along if you please to see why.
Let us say we are aware of physical and abstract entities and that each are subject to stasis and dynamics. In fact, they exist as in parallel forms. Let's examine form one, the 'physiochemical processing system'. The car is an easy instantiation of this whereby gasoline can be added (physical and chemical input) to a gas tank (physical and chemical storage) where a fuel pump moves it to the cylinders for combustion (chemical processing) which moves the pistons (physical processing) which ultimately results in the circular motion of the flywheel and tires (physical output) and exhaust (chemical output). This entire system is understood very well by automotive engineers who are expert in the physics and chemistry and the applied sciences (materials, e.g.) to prototype and perfect a reliable car. Now, form two, the 'information processing system' is analogous. As I set here typing away at my keyboard, the physical keystrokes are converted to electrical signals (input) and are fed by a satellite microprocessor into the laptop's RAM (storage) where they are eventually packaged and sent through the IP protocol stack down to the physical layer (processing), and transmitted out my Wi-Fi card to the switch/firewall/router (output) via EM waves. Both of these systems, or in the abstract cycles, have a basic conceptual symmetry to them, that which we 'change' (processing) and 'stasis' (storage) in regards to the boundaries of a system. But as a dualist, I have to call attention to a fundamental difference in their nature. I cannot put gasoline into a car and get information as a direct output (though I could measure and gather data on the process), and I cannot put keystrokes into my computer and get a laptop to move (though I could use a computer to control the car). More simply put, cars deal in physical inputs (gasoline, air, electrons for ignition) and the arithmetic, logical, and control unit of my CPU deals in '1's and '0's as encoded by electrons. The first system deals with a medium, but the second system deals with a medium and an encoded message!
So, if you now accept the dualist premise that the abstract is more than just physical, that it somehow emerges from the physical, and is not reducible in the sense that it has the same meaning (a positive voltage may represent a '1', but it is not a '1' because '1' is an abstract idea that our brains have evolved to use for communication), then you're ready to see my object to blurring the definitions of the two to consider physical inputs into a computer actual 'symbols' for output. Not to sound contrarian to McCluhan's political statement, but the medium (the physical stuff) is not the message (the informational stuff). If it were, cryptologists wouldn't be needed, right? Capture the encrypted disc (medium) would yield the contents (message) because they're really the same thing! Fortunately for privacy's sake, this is not true. In fact, the practicalities of encoding information onto a medium have been mathematized quite nicely by Claude Shannon and others. (See
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_theory). Now, let me address your idea that physical inputs into an information system is possible but contradictory to the ontology which undergirds information theory.
Some may not appreciate the extent that information theory and work on noise in channels has influenced computer science, but the modern digital computer is predicated on ideas that come from it, primarily in the form of encoding and error-correcting codes (ECC). Were we not able to move the bits (the word coined by Shannon) around inside the computer reliably, then we wouldn't be able get reliable output of a digital computer at all. Bits are moved around inside a machine quickly and large volumes, so even small amounts of error in the input, storage, process, and output of bits would be disastrous for even a primitive OS. Remember that even a single wrong bit in an opcode in a short assembly of instructions would cause a system to crash. But what is that the ECC does exactly? It fights informational entropy, or the tendency of physical entropy and other irregularities to spontaneously change the medium and thereby alter the message against our wishes. Communication theorists call this 'noise'. Noise is nothing more than physical perturbations in a medium which affect the encoded information.
So, at last we come to the mechanics of my objection. Your conception of physical characteristics of the medium which encodes a function are intuition-wise accurate. Yes, all information is embodied by a
physical phenomena (encoding). Yes, those physical phenomena are responsible for the input, storage, processing, and output of information (physical processing underlies information processing). Yes, even without physical input, information can be created or changed (noise). True random number generators use physical processes (such as thermodynamic changes) to generate information, so an entire industry already exists in using physical inputs to generate informational outputs, and yes, the uniqueness of the state of the system could be used to output a single output, but it appears to me to be a semantic issue insofar as it is a violation of the
definition of a function. "A function is a relation or rule between sets, the domain and codomain, where each informational input is mapped to exactly one output." The inputs have to be
informational, that is to say, the inputs have to be encoded
before they enter the system and not created
within the boundaries of the system. It may seem hair-splitting, but I think it goes to the question of intentionality of design and the definitions of noise and message.
If you start considering
all physical perturbations of a system as informational inputs, then all sorts of semantic contradictions begin to arise. If physical entities are information, then information is the same as the physical and no difference exists between physical and information. All stuff is idea, and all idea is stuff, and that invalidates the analytical definitions of everything pertaining to the physical and abstract, and renders all sorts of reasoning meaningless, contradictory, and/or tautological. It muddles the logical edifice that all of these disciplines are built on because fundamentally it
ignores the phenomenon of encoding.
To wit, examine the following claims: The quantity of mass of a rock isn't encoded by measurement, but it exists inherent in the rock itself. The temperature of the granite isn't something measured, but just exists and is self-evident. The length of the rock is part of the rock, and not a number derived from comparison with a standard such as a meter stick. And it's hard for people who believe in an external reality not to object to these ambiguous statements, because we say quantity, temperature, and length are objective measures constantly in science, but if they are part of the object, if the temperature Das Ding-an-Dich (thing-in-itself) is inherent, how is it possible to have two people measure it and get different numbers? It is better to shed such certainty and realize that external reality comes to us through a perceptual filter itself built of external reality and not accessible to introspection. It's better to model external reality by realizing that our measurement of 'temperature' is an internal process, that labeling it 'temperature' is an informational process, and that what we perceive as 'temperature' is a symbol for a referent which is the average kinetic velocity of molecules in a mass; 'temperature' is a practical abstraction liable to errors in measurement (hence the concepts of accuracy and precision). Everything you might think you observe, taste, feel, and touch are nothing more than psychological perceptions subject to distortion and bias, and that is
precisely why science, empiricism, skepticism, and related ilk are recent and highly fruitful innovations. They recognize this. The whole scientific method is built around the dichotomy of physical (external) and abstract (internal), and the moment you blur them together by theory and practice, you set thinking back to magic.
So, I hope you see that I object to your characterization not because it is immediately far-fetched or contradictory. It actually seems like a pragmatic way to conceptualize a function, but the problem is, it puts a small leak in the hull of thinking that eventually sinks the ship. In principle when you start muddling the nature of that which is physical from what is abstract, you undermine the intersubjective process by which STEM arrives at reliable knowledge.