Japan Earthquake: Political Aspects

[zapperzero]

Here's a nice example of regulator capture
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0933/sec3/108.html

Executive summary:

The NRC is telling the industry "There was this safety rule that was supposed to prevent the pressure suppression pool from cracking, but we're going to go ahead and waive it because, umm, if we do you'll save some money on unplanned outages. So yeah."

Before you ask, yes, I know the NRC is regulating American plants, but the industry is global and "lessons learned/ best practices" have an amazing tendency to spread.

 

[tsutsuji]

Asahi is asking :

A column on "the current status," which existed in the initial timetable released in April, is not present in the revised timetable released May 17.

Could the company have been reluctant to change the former phrase "partial damage to fuel" to "core meltdown"?

http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201105180362.html

Yomiuri is proposing :

The government should encourage the development and practical application of robots and other sophisticated remote-control technologies that could be used in such places. If technologies developed by universities and manufacturers are used in tandem at the accident site, work to stabilize the reactors will be accelerated. In addition, it will improve the nation's technological capability in this field.

The government also should set up a contact point where a wide spectrum of people can submit ideas so expertise from Japan and abroad could be harnessed to bring the crisis under control.
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/T110518004597.htm

Tsuneo Futami, former superintendent of the plant, from 1997 to 2000 told IEEE Spectrum :

I think we should never discharge highly contaminated water to the ocean, because there is no border in seawater.
http://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/...ale-of-the-accident-was-beyond-my-imagination

, which leaves open the question of discharging "low contaminated" water into the Ocean.

The Japanese government's envoy to South Korea, Oriza Hirata, said to his South Korean audience that the seawater discharge was a request of the US government : http://jp.ibtimes.com/articles/18754/20110517/1305641051.htm. That statement was then rebutted by Yukio Edano and Goshi Hosono, and Oriza Hirata finally retracted and apologized : http://www.j-cast.com/2011/05/18095925.html?p=all

 

[gmax137]

Well I finally had time to view the show, and it was pretty interesting. One thing that continues unabated is the repeated juxtaposition of (admittedly dramatic) weapons test films with discussion of nuclear power. Just because Weinberg and Seaborg et al worked on the Manhattan project doesn't mean that a power plant is a bomb factory. This 'journalistic' fantasy has been a staple of the anti-nuclear-power movement ever since the US and USSR began negotiating down the weapons stockpiles. Many well-meaning people have fallen for this story. See, for example:

... there was as second reason why these leading countries wanted to build a profitable civil nuclear industry: the race they were involved in was also a military one, and as i mentionned already in some previous posts, they needed PLUTONIUM in larger quantities for the bombs and missiles... And one way to get it was through civil reactors, where PU is a byproduct of the nuclear fission in used cores. This is a know fact that civil nuclear birth happened as a close brother of military nuclear.

Nobody has ever used a BWR to produce weapons grade plutonium. Why? Because a BWR is operated for 12 to 18 months between refuelings, and this ensures that the spent fuel contains large amounts of Pu-240 in addition to the Pu-239. If you wanted to make a bomb out of the fuel, you'd need to separate out the 240, a profligate source of neutrons that would ruin any attempt to make a weapon with the material. And, if you have the technology to separate the Pu-240 from the Pu-239, then you can just as well make a uranium bomb and skip the BWR step.

Reactors run to create Pu-239 for bombs are run for short times between refueling, or have the ability to add and remove fuel while operating. To refuel a BWR, you need to remove the vessel closure head, and then remove all of the steam separator/dryer components before you can even see the fuel. There is no connection between a BWR and the weapons.

 

[jlduh]

Did workers at Fukushima ingested much more than what has been measured and announced?

I cross reference this post on the other thread:

https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3314875&postcount=7933

Whoa, NISA comes clean about isotope ingestion resulting in considerable exposures to thousands who were involved early on at Dai-ichi.

http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110521p2a00m0na021000c.html

Some dose calculations these poor guys got, or are expected to get:

http://www.falloutphilippines.blogspot.com/

I always suspected that they were understating potential exposures, but i still find this a bit unsettling. Information is constantly subject to change out of the Japanese agencies, and most often, for the worse.

Drakkith, could you explain us how this is possible with what you asserted some pages ago when we were discussing the assessment of internal exposures?

Nuceng, if I quote your answer to my question:

Originally Posted by jlduh
thanks, so can you just answer this question (if possible by a no or yes answer as a minimum, but you can then elaborate of course):

do the measurements in mSv/h used by Japanese government, which are then compared to certain "limits" (like the 20 mSv /year for children now) to inform people (through the press for example) about "risks" and take decisions (eg evacuating, or removing soil, or whatever), do these specific measurements, the way they are done, with the equipment they use, take ALSO into account internal exposures through inhalation and ingestion of the various isotopes (mainly I-131 and CS-137 of course, but also Strontium as it appeared recently this one is also a concern?

Nuceng: Yes, IF they are doing it correctly

https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3298312&postcount=98

do you conclude that "they didn't do it properly" for these many workers?

And if the answer confirms this, what are the implications for the other citizens around in exposed areas?

Please don't consider my comment as personal attacks, but I, as many other people, would like do understand all those apparent important contradictions between communications and facts and reality...

 

[Luca Bevil]

Well I finally had time to view the show, and it was pretty interesting. One thing that continues unabated is the repeated juxtaposition of (admittedly dramatic) weapons test films with discussion of nuclear power. Just because Weinberg and Seaborg et al worked on the Manhattan project doesn't mean that a power plant is a bomb factory. This 'journalistic' fantasy has been a staple of the anti-nuclear-power movement ever since the US and USSR began negotiating down the weapons stockpiles. Many well-meaning people have fallen for this story. See, for example:



Nobody has ever used a BWR to produce weapons grade plutonium. Why? Because a BWR is operated for 12 to 18 months between refuelings, and this ensures that the spent fuel contains large amounts of Pu-240 in addition to the Pu-239. If you wanted to make a bomb out of the fuel, you'd need to separate out the 240, a profligate source of neutrons that would ruin any attempt to make a weapon with the material. And, if you have the technology to separate the Pu-240 from the Pu-239, then you can just as well make a uranium bomb and skip the BWR step.

Reactors run to create Pu-239 for bombs are run for short times between refueling, or have the ability to add and remove fuel while operating. To refuel a BWR, you need to remove the vessel closure head, and then remove all of the steam separator/dryer components before you can even see the fuel. There is no connection between a BWR and the weapons.

I disagree.
The point being made is about the overall cultural interrelation of civil use of nuclear power and military use.
It is historically true that military use came first, and that the era of first diffusion of civil nuclear plants was also a period of cold war and military weapons proliferation.

The technical fact that a BWR reactor may not be the best reactor to breed military grade plutonium does not undermine, I think, the cultural point being made.

Even recently when IRAN was supposedly building plants for claimed civil use, the international comunity was suspicious to say the least.

By the way if a nation is determined to produce military grade plutonium and can only get his hands on a BWR could it be possible to make a shorter run with a core of fuel just to obtain better chances of extracting military grade plutonium from it ?

 

[Drakkith]

Drakkith, could you explain us how this is possible with what you asserted some pages ago when we were discussing the assessment of internal exposures?

Could you elaborate? Did I say or imply somewhere that it was impossible for that to happen? I went back several pages, but I'm not sure what you are referring to exactly.

 

[jlduh]

Could you elaborate? Did I say or imply somewhere that it was impossible for that to happen? I went back several pages, but I'm not sure what you are referring to exactly.

Well, we were discussing the fact that the officials (government, Tepco, etc.) were only communicating with measurements in mS/h or mSv to set the limits over which it was considered to be safe for the various people involved (citizens, children, workers, etc.).

Some of us were saying that this was an oversimplification because it could not take into account all the specific factors especially all the ones related to what the individuals would ingest by inhalation, food, drink...

For Tepco workers, until now, we only heard about the facts that the doses they got was below a certain level (250mSv) and that consequently, except for 2 or 3 isolated cases, everything was safe for them.

But now, it seems (but I'm sure that we will have more infos on that in the future) that their internal contamination could be also a problem...

My question is concerning this apparent contradiction: the readings (i guess based on their dosimeters) were under the limits but they may be internally more contaminated than expected?

One (partial) explanation could be that as we know, the first workers in the plant, during one months, didn't have all a dosimeter because Tepco didn't have enough (which is in itself criminal), and that they had one for two based on what Tepco finally recognized.

But, is it the only explanation or is it link also to the way the limits and measurements are set, not assessing the specificities of internal contamination from the various isotopes?

 

[Drakkith]

My question is concerning this apparent contradiction: the readings (i guess based on their dosimeters) were under the limits but they may be internally more contaminated than expected?

I believe that is true.

But, is it the only explanation or is it link also to the way the limits and measurements are set, not assessing the specificities of internal contamination from the various isotopes?

The different isotopes will have very different effects on the body depending on which ones they are. The full body measuring thing cannot take this into account, it only measures Full Body Dose I believe. The actual effects could differ greatly from person to person.

 

[Astronuc]

I disagree.
The point being made is about the overall cultural interrelation of civil use of nuclear power and military use.
It is historically true that military use came first, and that the era of first diffusion of civil nuclear plants was also a period of cold war and military weapons proliferation.

The technical fact that a BWR reactor may not be the best reactor to breed military grade plutonium does not undermine, I think, the cultural point being made.

The military certainly made use of such an effective energy source. The civilian side wanted to use "atoms for peace" to use the phrase that Eisenhower used. The civilian uses were quite independent of the nuclear weapons program. The civilian power reactors essentially evolved from the naval nuclear propulsion reactors, not nuclear weapons program. There were several Pu production reactors in various countries, and they were different than power reactors. The form in which Pu is produced is different than that used for commercial fuel.

Even recently when IRAN was supposedly building plants for claimed civil use, the international comunity was suspicious to say the least.

By the way if a nation is determined to produce military grade plutonium and can only get his hands on a BWR could it be possible to make a shorter run with a core of fuel just to obtain better chances of extracting military grade plutonium from it ?

There is the concern that any nuclear reactor could be used to produce Pu for weapons. One could certainly run a reactor in short cycles if the primary goal is isotope production instead of power. The more frequent the outage, the much lower capacity factor - and isotope production. That's why isotope production reactors are designed to have isotope targets inserted and removed while operating.

I wanted to mention here this documentary that was made by a famous documentarist, Adam Curtis, whose films have been widely shown and awarded especially at the BBC (more on him: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adam_Curtis )

http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/adamcurtis/2011/03/a_is_for_atom.html

very interesting because it goes back to old times and history of BWR reactors and GE...

That's an excellent documentary - and spot on!

 

[tsutsuji]

And if the answer confirms this, what are the implications for the other citizens around in exposed areas?

The opinion developped by Mito Kakizawa at the House of Representatives Budget Committee on May 16th (see http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/national/news/20110521p2a00m0na021000c.html ) is that if no internal contamination surveys are conducted now among the general citizens, it will be more difficult for them to make their case in court, should they suffer from cancer later, years from now. It will be more difficult to assess the causality between NPP troubles and cancer.

Mito Kakizawa had to rely on the data for workers at nuclear power plants because until that day (May 16th) no such internal contamination survey had been performed among the general population.

 

[tsutsuji]

Fukushima prefecture announced the launching in July of a medical survey of 150,000 people from 12 villages and cities around the plant. The long term survey will be conducted over at least a 30 year span, and will study white blood cell count, cancer occurrence and genetic impact. Experts from the National Institute of Radiological Sciences in Chiba will be invited :

 

[yakiniku]

Below text copied from http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/24/japan-tepco-reactors-idUSL3E7GO04420110524

Some analysts said the delay in confirming the meltdowns at Fukushima suggested the utility feared touching off a panic by disclosing the severity of the accident earlier.

"Now people are used to the situation. Nothing is resolved, but normal business has resumed in places like Tokyo," said Koichi Nakano, a political science professor at Tokyo's Sophia University.

Nakano said that by confirming the meltdowns now, Tepco may be hoping the news will have less impact. The word "meltdown" has such a strong connotation that when the situation was more uncertain more people would likely have fled Tokyo, he said.

 

[jlduh]

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/23_34.html

Parents demand lower radiation limit for children

A group of parents of school children is calling for lowering the government-set radiation limit for children.The group is from Fukushima Prefecture, where a crippled nuclear power plant is posing the danger of nuclear contamination.On Monday, members of the group visited the education ministry and submitted a petition bearing more than 15,000 signatures.

After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant accident, the government set the yearly limit for accumulated external radiation for children undertaking outdoor activities at 20 millisieverts.
The parents have been pointing out that the government safety level is too high for children and are demanding that it be lowered to 1 millisievert per year.

[...]

A ministry official admitted that the 20-millisievert yearly level is not necessarily an appropriate limit for children. The official told the group that the ministry wants to consider all possible measures to reduce radiation risk.
Monday, May 23, 2011 21:29 +0900 (JST)

 

[AntonL]

Japan to Set Up Panel to Probe Fukushima Nuclear Accident
http://jen.jiji.com/jc/eng?g=eco&k=2011052400126

Tokyo, May 24 (Jiji Press)--The Japanese government decided Tuesday to set up an independent panel to probe the ongoing crisis at Tokyo Electric Power Co.'s <9501> Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant.
Yotaro Hatamura, professor emeritus at the University of Tokyo, will head the panel. Hatamura, 70, is known as the author of "Learning from Failure" and other famous books.
The panel, comprising some 10 members including legal and nuclear experts, is expected to be launched by the end of the month. It will investigate the cause of the nuclear crisis and study ways to prevent similar accidents.
The nuclear power plant in Fukushima Prefecture, northeastern Japan, was badly damaged by tsunami triggered by the March 11 earthquake, and continues releasing radioactive substances into the environment in the country's worst nuclear accident.

Why does one need legal experts on a panel to probe the accident.

I can think of only one and that is to advise on how to word the report to limit any liabilities resulting from the findings, thus overthrowing the independence of the scientific findings.

 

[zapperzero]

Why does one need legal experts on a panel to probe the accident.

There needs to be a feeling that the accident phase is over. Of course, this is far from true, yet, but no matter. Those who have lied and dissembled and censored news about three nuclear meltdowns surely have no qualms in misleading the public some more.

The other main reason is to set an agenda. It is the findings of the commission that must (and will) be hotly debated, so that other facts may slip by largely ignored. You will see talk about institutional paralysis at TEPCO, about the tsunami and the earthquake and what the prime cause of the accidents was and whether it was beyond design basis or not.

You will NOT see any discussion of regulator capture, design failures, the real costs of the nuclear industry, dual-use technologies, the role of France and Areva, the unholy alliance between Hitachi and GE...

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/24/japan-tepco-reactors-idUSL3E7GO04420110524

Here's the money shot: "<<I am very sorry that the public is mistrustful of the various disclosures made by the government on the accident," Prime Minister Naoto Kan said in parliament on Monday.>>

The trust must be regained.

 

[Bandit127]

It also sits on water's edge. The US Navy was able to provide a barge full of fresh water upon request. It was used without any trouble... only much later. Anyway, the reluctance itself is grounds enough for more than just sarcasm. I'd say some prison terms are in order for those who put their money above public safety.

We should remember that the Tepco engineers that are making the calls are doing so with woefully inadequate data, and what they did get was unreliable.

Data has improved, but is still woefully inadequate for sound and reliable decision making. And making conclusions of what did or didn't happen.

To call for prison terms when management might have been 'optimistic' in interpreting such sparse and unreliable data is short sighted I think. More likely (and quite rightly), they will not make a conclusion with serious consequences until they have sound data to support it.

That is good management. Any other way is speculation to pander to sensationalism.

One of the biggest failures in all of this is the failure of reliable data.

You can't blame Tepco for that, it is a function of the system of reactor design and risk assessment. That system has to improve. We should be fitting transducers, signal processing equipment and transmission in a way that can handle the same level of equipment failure in future.

My guess is that you could cut the total emissions from any possible future accident by half if you did that.

 

[turbo]

You can't blame Tepco for that, it is a function of the system of reactor design and risk assessment. That system has to improve. We should be fitting transducers, signal processing equipment and transmission in a way that can handle the same level of equipment failure in future.

My guess is that you could cut the total emissions from any possible future accident by half if you did that.

Not if plant-siting is allowed using the most optimistic (low) tsunami-surge estimates, low sea-walls, and locating emergency equipment and controls within the (overly optimistic) levels that could be flooded. Putting emergency diesel generators, battery banks, control rooms, and other critical systems where they can be flooded is a recipe for disaster, as we have seen. All the extra sensors in the world could not help mitigate such a disaster.

 

[zapperzero]

We should remember that the Tepco engineers that are making the calls are doing so with woefully inadequate data, and what they did get was unreliable.

Data has improved, but is still woefully inadequate for sound and reliable decision making. And making conclusions of what did or didn't happen.

To call for prison terms when management might have been 'optimistic' in interpreting such sparse and unreliable data is short sighted I think. More likely (and quite rightly), they will not make a conclusion with serious consequences until they have sound data to support it.

That is good management. Any other way is speculation to pander to sensationalism.

One of the biggest failures in all of this is the failure of reliable data.

You can't blame Tepco for that, it is a function of the system of reactor design and risk assessment. That system has to improve. We should be fitting transducers, signal processing equipment and transmission in a way that can handle the same level of equipment failure in future.

My guess is that you could cut the total emissions from any possible future accident by half if you did that.

I think you're trolling. Instrumentation matters very little here, if at all.

The laws of physics involved are known and they do not change. Such accidents were being modeled since the seventies, TMI even produced a nice case study to validate the models.

For a given core configuration, where starting parameters (water level, temps, pressures) are known, one can find out if and when the core melts. The process does not take days, for a reactor as big as those at Fukushima. The calculation can be done literally on the back of a napkin by anyone in possession of freshman year physics. So many MW of heat, so much fuel, so many tons of water, so much steel in the vessel that could melt. Easy.

There is no need for further measurements.

Good crisis management is the uncanny ability to make good decisions without having all the data. Take a pilot in a stalled fighter jet with an engine flameout, at low altitude. Does he try to determine the cause of his engine flameout and whether a recovery might be possible?

Smart pilots pull the ejector handle and generally live to find out the results of the post-accident inquiry. Brave pilots try something, anything. Sometimes it works. Bad pilots get confused and flustered trying to decide what to do. Bad pilots end up dead.

 

[SteveElbows]

Smart pilots pull the ejector handle and generally live to find out the results of the post-accident inquiry. Brave pilots try something, anything. Sometimes it works. Bad pilots get confused and flustered trying to decide what to do. Bad pilots end up dead.

This argument seems to be getting political enough to belong in the other thread, but really I have to say something about this point. I do not want people who manage nuclear emergencies to 'try something, anything'. Dealing with nuclear incidents is a complex and sometimes almost impossible balancing act, depending on the exact details, and it is actually possible to do all sorts of things that would make matters worse. So whilst I do not want people to be paralysed by fear that their decisions may make things worse, I don't want them to take certain risks just for the sake of acting.

 

[zapperzero]

This argument seems to be getting political enough to belong in the other thread, but really I have to say something about this point. I do not want people who manage nuclear emergencies to 'try something, anything'. Dealing with nuclear incidents is a complex and sometimes almost impossible balancing act, depending on the exact details, and it is actually possible to do all sorts of things that would make matters worse. So whilst I do not want people to be paralysed by fear that their decisions may make things worse, I don't want them to take certain risks just for the sake of acting.

Me neither. That's why you need smart, even-keeled people in charge of nuclear reactors. Jocks are fine for fighter jets only. They make awful airliner pilots.

 

[jlduh]

some facts:
1. Reactor http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110517x1.html" after the quake and before the tsunami (Tepco should publish their official findings regarding this soon as instructed by NISA)

2. http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110516a3.html" at unit 1 well before the explosion indicating a possible breach in containment caused by earthquake.

So for a change, Gunderson statements are (part) true.

Since day 1, i tried to keep informed about this accident, and i managed to do it, thanks to this forum, pretty well, even if sometimes it's difficult to keep up with all the datas, facts, assumptions, errors, lies, that are around this disaster since the very beginning.

So i think I'm informed on this subject probably 2000% more than most of my french fellows, which have anyway no more info on the Fukushima disaster which has totally disappeared from the radars of the french medias (don't know if it's the case in other countries?).

And even if I'm pretty well informed, I confess it to you, I TOTALLY MISS this info that you mention AntonL: Tepco just admitted one week ago that the containment and the reactor at N°1 Unit was damaged BEFORE tsunami hit! I don't know why and how i missed it, but I missed it... And if i missed it, i think many people in the world may have missed it also (was it the goal?)

A source at Tepco admitted it was possible that key facilities were compromised before the tsunami.

"The quake's tremors may have caused damage to the pressure vessel or pipes," the official said.

The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency has so far said the reactor withstood the shaking and that the unexpectedly large tsunami caused a station blackout, which led to explosions.

So, let's summarize a little bit, in this jungle of information/communication:

1) Since March 11th, Tepco has good reasons to think that the reactor N°1 was damaged by the earthquake, before tsunami hit. BUT: Tepco kept saying that the desaster was only the result of the tsunami and that the installations resisted the earthquake, until one week ago.

2) Tepco only released logs of the parameters from the reactors (since March 11) about 10 days ago. Then they admitted that core N°1 melt very quickly in fact in the first day. BUT: during these two months, Tepco kept saying that N°1 reactor fuel was 70% "damaged", revised 55% some weeks after (!).

3) Once they did this for N°1, Tepco did it again for N°2 and N°3: they just recognized that the cores melt very quickly after tsunami. BUT, during these two months, they kept saying that these cores were "damaged" at a percentage lower than 30 or 40%!

4) For one month, Tepco released various analysis of isotopes (mainly the "big ones": I, Cs mainly, but not the complete list of nucleides that they analyzed). BUT finally they revealed one month after that they were all wrong, because of a software error...

5) At the end of March, Tepco did a complete survey (including additional elements, like Sr for example) of the water inside the basements of each reactor. They announced that they would disclose the results as soon as possible. BUT Tepco released them 2 months after the sampling!

Now the question is: do you really believe we can trust this company?

I was adviced not to criticized Tepco to quickly because "i was not in their shoes".

With all i have seen in the first two months and summarized above (and i didn't mention the lie about the fact that workers were sent on the site with one dosimeter for 2 for several weeks, and I may add some more elements, but let's keep synthetic), i just want to say that I HAVE NO WILL TO JUMP IN THEIR SHOES BECAUSE I REALLY THINK, AND MORE AND MORE, THAT THEIR SHOES STARTS TO HAVE A VERY BAD SMELL...

An other question is deeply in my mind: ok they lied (but they did it before, so is it a surprise?), but did they lie only to the general public or did they lie also to official organisations and government? In other words, what in the list above was known by the government, even we didn't know it?

For example, I'm wondering if KAN knew about this fact concerning N°1 reactor being damaged by the quake (the workers entered the building the 11th of March and got their dosimeters beeping, 300 mSv it seems...) when he arrived at the plant on March 12, being pissed off by the fact that Tepco didn't vent yet?

And as a matter of fact, was it because Tepco management knew already something was already really bad from the containment standpoint that they spent 3 more hours to discuss before venting (or trying to vent)? Were they scared by this venting because of what they knew? Did the government knew it also?

This is a very important point. Because that kind of deliberate lie by not telling what they know or believe to know is kind of criminal when you consider the kind of subjects we are talking about, where the state of a reactor being breeched or not can imply different decisions for safety and health standpoint.

So I'm wondering: they lied, but to whom?

I'm also wondering: what will be their next move? Will they reveal that N°2 and N°3 got also hit by earthquake?

 

[jlduh]

I reply to myself and put an example of lie that becomes obvious when re-reading some news from March 12 on N°1 unit (the web keeps archives fortunately!):

http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20042410-503543.html

The plant operator, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), has confirmed that the integrity of the primary containment vessel remains intact.

Ok, so we know that a few hours after the tsunami, March 11, some workers entered the reactor building (http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110516a3.html )

Workers entered the No. 1 reactor building during the night to assess the damage only to hear their dosimeter alarms go off a few seconds later, sources at Tokyo Electric Power Co. said. Since they thought the building was filled with highly radioactive steam, the workers decided to evacuate.

Based on the dosimeter readings, the radiation level was about 300 millisieverts per hour, the source said, suggesting that a large amount of radioactive material had already been released from the core.

So Tepco knew this but we have read this sentence in many articles:

The plant operator, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), has confirmed that the integrity of the primary containment vessel remains intact.

They didn't say that they BELIEVE it's still iintact, or that they think it could be damaged but have to be confirmed. No they CONFIRMED IT WAS INTACT.

There is one word to describe this: this is a LIE. Period.

 

[rowmag]

I'm also wondering: what will be their next move? Will they reveal that N°2 and N°3 got also hit by earthquake?

As a matter of fact, yes, at least for Unit 3. From this morning's paper:

http://www.asahi.com/special/10005/TKY201105240733.html

Summary: Unit 3 ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System?) may have been damaged by the earthquake, before the tsunami arrived.

 

[AntonL]

...

And as a matter of fact, was it because Tepco management knew already something was already really bad from the containment standpoint that they spent 3 more hours to discuss before venting (or trying to vent)? Were they scared by this venting because of what they knew? Did the government knew it also?

This is a very important point. Because that kind of deliberate lie by not telling what they know or believe to know is kind of criminal when you consider the kind of subjects we are talking about, where the state of a reactor being breeched or not can imply different decisions for safety and health standpoint.

So I'm wondering: they lied, but to whom?

I'm also wondering: what will be their next move? Will they reveal that N°2 and N°3 got also hit by earthquake?

Japanese are a nation of honor, they do not lie; however not divulging facts to them is not lying and if not asked directly they will not reveal voluntary. Japanese (as a matter of fact all Asians) in their mentality will aways try and give a better scenario and more pleasing story than actually is. If this mindset is correct for nuclear managers that I doubt very much.

(It is known that co-pilots at Korean Air would say to the captain: "It is fine weather out there today, is it not captain?" actually meaning "Captain, it is dangerous to fly through that massive thunder storm ahead!")

Having said that and noting the resources spent in arranging a close looped cooling system by flooding reactor 1, I can only conclude that the radiation reports of the 11th evening were ignored, not considered or even not known to the planners of unit 1 cooling. Only once their flooding preparation started, only then they noticed things are not as expected which resulted in going through all the available data and brain storming sessions and new insight was found.

 

[zapperzero]

There is one word to describe this: this is a LIE. Period.

Keep a copy of that article.

 

[zapperzero]

So I'm wondering: they lied, but to whom?

To each other, to the public, to the shareholders (you would do well to remember that TEPCO still is a publicly traded company, one that has lost 80% in (shares) value since the beginning of the crisis) and to the international media.

The only truly serious bit is "lying to each other". That has hampered decision-making.

 

[Astronuc]

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/23_34.html

Parents demand lower radiation limit for children

It really is inappropriate to have any radiation exposure limit on children much above background + normal X-rays.

Children 18 and younger should not be exposed to elevated anthropogenic radiation levels beyond those of medical diagnostics. Because of illness or injury, some children may require exposure to radiation (X-rays, CAT-scan, radiotherapy, . . . ) above that of the norm.

When I studied health physics and radiation protection, we learned that children under 18 should not be exposed to elevated levels of radiation.

 

[tsutsuji]

TEPCO is apparently being careful in stating it may have been damaged in the earthquake,

I think you know the technicalities of nuclear power plants much better than I, so if you think that the published data are consistent with the "shut down manually" analysis, I am not going to refute this.

But, from a "more political" perspective, I think that the careful way for Tepco, if some uncertainty is remaining, consists in emphasizing the "Worker error may have led to meltdown" thesis (as the Japan Times title at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110517x1.html is saying) rather than the "Our NPPs's design can't resist earthquakes" thesis.

It is the same problem as for aircraft manufacturers whenever an airliner disaster occurs. It is better and "more careful" for them to assume that the pilot made a mistake than to assume that their design is wrong. In the first case they don't have anything to do. In the other case they have to recall all their airliners and apply retrofits to all of them. The second hypothesis is more costly.

Oops, that is right! Great point. They had cooling and AC power and expected to be able to control cooldown.

Also, generally speaking, earthquakes are something "normal" in Japan :

According to the JMA earthquake catalogues, over 100 thousand events have been recorded in every year, which roughly means that we have about 300 earthquakes per day in Japan.
http://www.koeri.boun.edu.tr/eew/abs/20100910Abstract_YAMAMOTO.pdf

 

[sp2]

Japanese are a nation of honor, they do not lie; however not divulging facts to them is not lying and if not asked directly they will not reveal voluntary. Japanese (as a matter of fact all Asians) in their mentality will aways try and give a better scenario and more pleasing story than actually is. If this mindset is correct for nuclear managers that I doubt very much.

(It is known that co-pilots at Korean Air would say to the captain: "It is fine weather out there today, is it not captain?" actually meaning "Captain, it is dangerous to fly through that massive thunder storm ahead!")

Having said that and noting the resources spent in arranging a close looped cooling system by flooding reactor 1, I can only conclude that the radiation reports of the 11th evening were ignored, not considered or even not known to the planners of unit 1 cooling. Only once their flooding preparation started, only then they noticed things are not as expected which resulted in going through all the available data and brain storming sessions and new insight was found.

Anyone with extensive experience of Japanese people and culture know that this idea

<<Japanese are a nation of honor, they do not lie>> is utter nonsense.

They lie all the time --just like every other people on Earth. They just work harder at spinning it, and rationalizing it, so they can pretend to themselves and each other that they're *not* lying.
The simple truth of 'saving face' is that it's all *about* lying.

AFAICT, the greatest effect of this tradition is that it tends to make bad problems worse, and more difficult to fix.

Fukushima, TEPCO, the regulators, and the Japanese government have given us so many prime examples of this effect in the last few months that it might be absurdly funny --if it weren't so utterly tragic.

 

[rowmag]

Also, generally speaking, earthquakes are something "normal" in Japan :

According to the JMA earthquake catalogues, over 100 thousand events have been recorded in every year, which roughly means that we have about 300 earthquakes per day in Japan.
http://www.koeri.boun.edu.tr/eew/abs...t_YAMAMOTO.pdf

Sure, though this was not a normal one. I can easily imagine the operators being in a state of confusion as to which procedures to follow, which instruments to trust, not knowing what's broken, etc. Especially being on the coast with tsunami warnings coming in.

 

[ThomS]

Earthquakes are everyday here - definitely. Generally speaking, people "feel" safer here if there is a small shaker regularly. Specifically, once or twice every 1-2 weeks and strong enough to gently sway one's chair (say Shindo 2 or little 3). In general, when we haven't had an earthquake like above in a while, people begin to worry and wonder if a big one is near.

 

[NUCENG]

I think you know the technicalities of nuclear power plants much better than I, so if you think that the published data are consistent with the "shut down manually" analysis, I am not going to refute this.

But, from a "more political" perspective, I think that the careful way for Tepco, if some uncertainty is remaining, consists in emphasizing the "Worker error may have led to meltdown" thesis (as the Japan Times title at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110517x1.html is saying) rather than the "Our NPPs's design can't resist earthquakes" thesis.

It is the same problem as for aircraft manufacturers whenever an airliner disaster occurs. It is better and "more careful" for them to assume that the pilot made a mistake than to assume that their design is wrong. In the first case they don't have anything to do. In the other case they have to recall all their airliners and apply retrofits to all of them. The second hypothesis is more costly.


Also, generally speaking, earthquakes are something "normal" in Japan :

TEPCO should never get away with blaming this on the reactor operator.

First, Isolation of the Isolation Condenser only applies to Unit 1. Units 2,3, and 4 are also significantly damagesd, and there may have been some damage to units 5 and 6 as well. Second, I have found clear evidence that Japan had not considered geological evidence and even historical earthquakes and tsunamies. That poor operator was following his guidance in accordance with his or her training, procedures, and the information available. Because there was a single point failure (tsunami) the operator was set up to fail.

Only in 2008 did Japan finally reevaluate seismic risk at the plants and then, for reasons totally inconceivable, they ignored tsunami risk which was available and actually discussed by one of their science consultants. That is a management failure, and engineering failure, and a regulatory failure. Add in the Fukuoka condenser tube failure, Kashiwazaki Kariwa, earthquake damage, Tokaimura criticality event, resistance to Probabilistic Risk Analysis, TEPCO coverups of test data, and possible collusion between industry and regulatory agencies, and it makes me wonder if they have just been lucky until the last couple of years. I have just started reading about the history of problems at the Monju breeder reactor.

As to your airline reference, Air France is apparently ready to toss their pilots under the bus (if they can recover the bodies) because they were unable to find the right answer while they were experiencing multiple alarms and control failures they had not been trained on. This forum can help ensure that doesn't happen in the Fukushima Daiichi case.

 

[NUCENG]

Sure, though this was not a normal one. I can easily imagine the operators being in a state of confusion as to which procedures to follow, which instruments to trust, not knowing what's broken, etc. Especially being on the coast with tsunami warnings coming in.

And imagine being on watch while tsunami waters are destroying your car, threatening to collapse the building you are in, and wondering if you still have a home or whether your family got to high ground in time. Not to mention that one of your colleagues is stuck in a crane and probably injured severely, but you can't get to him. Then you count noses and find out two other workers are missing,

 

[rowmag]

Earthquakes are everyday here - definitely. Generally speaking, people "feel" safer here if there is a small shaker regularly. Specifically, once or twice every 1-2 weeks and strong enough to gently sway one's chair (say Shindo 2 or little 3). In general, when we haven't had an earthquake like above in a while, people begin to worry and wonder if a big one is near.

There is a qualitative difference between a Shindo 2 or 3, and a Shindo 6 or 7. The latter is more akin to being in a car wreck: adrenaline, daze, you try to be logical and think you are, but in retrospect realize you were just lucky with the decisions you end up making (or not, as the case may be). Plus the factors NUCENG mentioned, in this case.

Which, on reflection, means humans should ideally not have to be counted on to handle an emergency shut-down. How well could the plant have shut itself down automatically once the SCRAM signal was sent by the seismic interlock, if the operators had been incapacitated, and assuming no power loss, or earthquake or tsunami damage to the plant itself?

 

[NUCENG]

There is a qualitative difference between a Shindo 2 or 3, and a Shindo 6 or 7. The latter is more akin to being in a car wreck: adrenaline, daze, you try to be logical and think you are, but in retrospect realize you were just lucky with the decisions you end up making (or not, as the case may be). Plus the factors NUCENG mentioned, in this case.

Which, on reflection, means humans should ideally not have to be counted on to handle an emergency shut-down. How well could the plant have shut itself down automatically once the SCRAM signal was sent by the seismic interlock, if the operators had been incapacitated, and assuming no power loss, or earthquake or tsunami damage to the plant itself?

I used to joke that the first step in emergency operating procedures should be to shoot all the operators. TMI2 and Chernobyl were made worse by operator actions that defeated automatic protection systems. Unfortunately the automatic protection systems are never intended to deal with severe accidents because they are beyond the design basis by definition. Containment venting, adding boron, using fire systems to inject water, bringing in alternative generators and repairing offsite power were all manual actions beyond the capability of the automatic systems.

 

[rowmag]

Unfortunately the automatic protection systems are never intended to deal with severe accidents because they are beyond the design basis by definition. Containment venting, adding boron, using fire systems to inject water, bringing in alternative generators and repairing offsite power were all manual actions beyond the capability of the automatic systems.

Ok, then suppose it had just been a Shindo 4 -- enough to trip the interlock, say, but not enough to do any damage? (But let's suppose it somehow creates a nitrogen leak in the control room or something that knocks out the operators.) Could the system bring itself safely down unassisted?

 

[Drakkith]

Ok, then suppose it had just been a Shindo 4 -- enough to trip the interlock, say, but not enough to do any damage? (But let's suppose it somehow creates a nitrogen leak in the control room or something that knocks out the operators.) Could the system bring itself safely down unassisted?

I thought that the automatic systems were the ones that immediately shut down the reactors when the quake was detected?

 

[NUCENG]

I thought that the automatic systems were the ones that immediately shut down the reactors when the quake was detected?

Generally there are automated systems to control reactivity (scram), isolate leakage (PCIS), initiate reactor water level control (ECCS), RPV pressure control (SRVs and ADS), and supply power (batteries and diesel generators and pneumatic systems). These systems take the plant to a hot shutdown status. Safely taking the plant from there to cold shutdown requires operator action.

 

[Drakkith]

Generally there are automated systems to control reactivity (scram), isolate leakage (PCIS), initiate reactor water level control (ECCS), RPV pressure control (SRVs and ADS), and supply power (batteries and diesel generators and pneumatic systems). These systems take the plant to a hot shutdown status. Safely taking the plant from there to cold shutdown requires operator action.

Ah ok.

 

[rowmag]

Thanks, NUCENG. So it should hold for a few hours at least until the operators are needed?

 

[andybwell]

Anyone with extensive experience of Japanese people and culture know that this idea

<<Japanese are a nation of honor, they do not lie>> is utter nonsense.

They lie all the time --just like every other people on Earth. They just work harder at spinning it, and rationalizing it, so they can pretend to themselves and each other that they're *not* lying.
The simple truth of 'saving face' is that it's all *about* lying.

AFAICT, the greatest effect of this tradition is that it tends to make bad problems worse, and more difficult to fix.

Fukushima, TEPCO, the regulators, and the Japanese government have given us so many prime examples of this effect in the last few months that it might be absurdly funny --if it weren't so utterly tragic.

Why is it that Fukushima and fallout risk/data is not on any national news on TV?

"We have a Supreme court that has given the "corporation" status equal and greater than the ordinary citizen. GE and Comcast are partners in NBC...and certainly all media companies need chips and other technology from Hitachi and Toshiba, the corporate connections are everywhere."
http://www.nuc.berkeley.edu/node/3118

 

[andybwell]

Why is it that Fukushima and fallout risk/data is not on any national news on TV?

"We have a Supreme court that has given the "corporation" status equal and greater than the ordinary citizen. GE and Comcast are partners in NBC...and certainly all media companies need chips and other technology from Hitachi and Toshiba, the corporate connections are everywhere."
http://www.nuc.berkeley.edu/node/3118

"Stochastic effects are those that occur by chance. Stochastic effects caused by
ionizing radiation consist primarily of genetic effects and cancer. As the dose to an
individual increases, the probability that cancer or a genetic effect will occur also
increases. However, at no time, even for high doses, is it certain that cancer or
genetic damage will result. Similarly, for stochastic effects, there is no threshold
dose below which it is relatively certain that an adverse effect cannot occur."

Truly terrifying.

http://140.194.76.129/publications/eng-manuals/em385-1-80/c-3.pdf

 

[tsutsuji]

A long and detailed Asahi article on the impact of top-level US-Japan diplomacy on Fukushima decision making : http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201105200150.html

 

[jlduh]

new picture of unit 3 with iaea team: http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/110311/images/110527_3.jpg
On the left we can see 2nd fuel machine, and big crane in center

One is Philippe Jamet, Head, Division of Nuclear Installation Safety at IAEA.
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/multimedia/videos/safety/npp/jamet/index.html

By the way everything he is saying in this video is a premonition, several month before, of what occurred at Fukushima...

The analysis is perfect. Not sure the actions were (or will be) as effective.

 

[andybwell]

SWITZERLAND!

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/13556283

 

[turi]

SWITZERLAND!

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/13556283

Uh, that's just the government. Parliament will discuss this too and then it's quite certain that there will be referendums and initiatives to be decided by the citizens. Quite possible that the voters will approve a plan to phase out nuclear energy, but it's certainly too early to say.

 

[zapperzero]

Here's a new political angle for you to chew on: the summer winds are blowing towards China.

 

[AntonL]

new picture of unit 3 with iaea team: http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/110311/images/110527_3.jpg

Can someone please explain to me the added value of this huge IAEA teem in Japan. They said their study will be based on data provided by TEPCO, they are not collecting anything of their own. To my mind the IAEA delegation is nothing more than a international show at great cost to the international community and host. Looking at the IAEA site and at their http://www.flickr.com/photos/iaea_imagebank/sets/72157626815913418/" I have the impression it is a Mike Weightman promotion, we see MW in many poses and picture always titled "MW this and that" but all other team members do not have names. Oops, sorry I am being unfair to Greg Webb who operated the camera and is mentioned in small print.

Analysing IAEA latest report (my comments added):

The IAEA's Fact-Finding Mission in Japan visited the tsunami-damaged Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant on 27 May 2011, the final site visit of the team's programme to identify lessons from the Japanese nuclear accident that could help improve global nuclear safety.
what the team did and the justification thereof. Did they learn anything new?

The team's international experts from 12 nations held discussions with top plant operating officials and toured the six-reactor facility.
keeping the top plant operating officials from doing their job, of the 40+ tepco staff possibly only 2 or 3 addressed the meeting

"Visiting Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant was a once-in-a-lifetime experience - once in 10 lifetimes, I suspect. Our team left with great admiration for the extraordinary workers who have been undertaking such immensely difficult tasks," said team leader Mike Weightman, the United Kingdom's chief inspector of nuclear installations.
what else should he say after that visit and witnessing the power of nature which man will never tame

Next for the team are continuing discussions with Japanese officials from a variety of agencies as part of an exchange of technical data that will assist the mission in drafting its report, which will be presented to the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety at IAEA headquarters in Vienna on 20 to 24 June
and wasting more time of Japanese officials and in the end they will repack the data and findings that they received from the Japanese and present it proudly as their own findings. Will there be anything new? No, in my opinon just a rehash what has already been said by various observers and analysts

Without hands-on work no new insight will be obtained!

or am I just being to hard?

 

[Godzilla1985]

Since unit 4 fuel pool fears receded to some extent, reactor 3 is the only likely candidate where images from outside the building could tell us much. And the area of real interest is going to be hard to see unless they actively decide to get a camera closer to that area when lighting conditions are at their best.

Uh, if they can get a camera in the debris-filled spent fuel pool of #3, surely they've already captured the area where the reactor resides on high definition film from just about every angle imaginable and know for a fact whether it's covered or not. TEPCO knows. Everyone else is in the dark. That's another example of a "cover-up", whether for better or worse, no matter how TEPCO would like to redefine it. Maybe they're still a "private" entity in the eyes of the law, but perhaps they should reconsider now that this is a "public" problem of epic proportions.

I mean, c'mon, that Putzmeister dangled a camera right above the spent fuel pool - which is right next to the reactor. They have photos of that whole area. Why haven't they showed them, especially if they're inconclusive?

Go easy on Jim, he's a nice old man who's been around the industry and knows his instruments.

Moderators, feel free to move post to other thread as it's probably more appropriate in the "political" one.

Just one more question: are we 100% sure here that the core resides underneath the crane? That seemed to be the consensus view earlier on (I've read all ~8,000 posts), but is there still any doubt?

 

[Danuta]

Can someone please explain to me the added value of this huge IAEA teem in Japan. They said their study will be based on data provided by TEPCO, they are not collecting anything of their own. To my mind the IAEA delegation is nothing more than a international show at great cost to the international community and host.

Seeing as the IAEA has become nothing more than a bunch of door-to-door nuclear sales people they are probably there to see what nuclear-related "stuff and services" TEPCO will require for the ongoing and future cleanup so as they can hook them up with the right suppier/s.

Sales reps aren't going to collect technical disaster data and re-analyse it. Not their job.

Or, am *I* the one being too hard?