Logical Entailment: Understanding F $\models \omega$

  • Thread starter Thread starter gnome
  • Start date Start date
AI Thread Summary
The discussion centers on the distinction between logical entailment and implication, particularly in the context of the statement F \models ω, where F has no interpretations that are true. It highlights that while F \implies ω is always true due to the principle that falsehood implies anything, entailment (F \models ω) is a different concept, indicating that ω is true in all interpretations where F is true, which is trivially satisfied since there are no such interpretations. Participants explore whether the relationship between P ∧ Q \models P and P ∧ Q \implies P holds true only because the latter is a tautology, and they discuss the relevance of the truth values of P and Q. The conversation also touches on a theorem that connects entailment and implication, emphasizing the need for clarity in formal logic definitions. Overall, the participants seek to deepen their understanding of these logical concepts and their implications.
gnome
Messages
1,031
Reaction score
1
Please help me understand this:

F \models \omega \:\text{(where}\: \omega\: \text{is any wff!)}

(That comes from Nilsson's "Artificial Intelligence, A New Synthesis", pg 225)

How does that make any sense? There is no interpretation for which F is true.
 
Physics news on Phys.org
False implies anything is a standard law of logic.
 
Yes, clearly, if it said
F \implies \omega
that would always be true.

But apparently there is a distinction between implication and entailment, and I'm trying to understand what that distinction is.

This is how he defines entailment:
If a wff ω has value True under all of those interpretations for which each of the wffs in a set Δ has value True, then we say that Δ logically entails ω and that ω logically follows from Δ and that ω is a logical consequence of Δ.
 
Consider this:

There are no interpretations in which F is true.

Thus, it is trivial that ω is true for all interpretations in which F is true.
 
Thanks Hurkyl. It's taking me a long time to respond because I'm trying to figure out what possible use there is to a statement like that \text{F}\:\models \omega

Can you explain the distinction between
\text{P} \wedge \text{Q}\: \models \text{P}
and
\text{P} \wedge \text{Q}\: \implies \text{P}

Edit: added a related question:
Is
\text{P} \wedge \text{Q}\: \models \text{P}
true only because
\text{P} \wedge \text{Q}\: \implies \text{P}
is a tautology?
 
Last edited:
You would like

P \wedge Q \models P

to be true right? What if P and Q are both false statements? ...


I'm a little fuzzy in the formal logic department, but if I recall correctly, \Rightarrow and \models work out to be roughly equivalent.
 
I don't think "what if P and Q are both false statements" is relevant. As I read that definition, (P and Q) logically entails P because P is true whenever (P and Q) is true.

Unfortunately, "roughly equivalent" doesn't cut it on a final.

Thanks anyway. I'll post back if I find out anything to clarify the difference.
 
P and Q can be any statements. It would be awkward (and somewhat redundant) to state "Whenever P and Q is satisfiable, P \wedge Q \models P," would it not?


I don't have my reference at the moment, so I may be wrong, but I seem to recall there being a theorem that says A \wedge B \wedge \ldots \Rightarrow P if and only if A, B, \ldots \models P. I don't remember it precisely, which is why I said "roughly" as a qualification. :smile:
 
This is probably the theorem you were thinking of:

{\phi_1, ... \phi_n} \models \phi \:\textrm{iff} \:\models (\phi_1, ... \phi_n) \Rightarrow \phi

(where
\models \omega
by itself means \omega is a tautology)
 
Back
Top