John Bell wrote a short article about the relationship between Bohmian mechanics and Many-Worlds that was kind of interesting. But here's my take on it:
Many-Worlds starts with the not-too-radical assumption that quantum mechanics (or rather, the Schrodinger equation) applies to arbitrarily large systems, such as the entire universe. So there is no "wave function collapse" if you include the entire universe as your "system". That means that there is no obvious way to interpret the wave function as giving probabilities (via the Born rule), because for the universe as a whole, there are no measurements performed.
Bohmian mechanics, in a way of looking at it, starts in the same place, with a wave function for the universe that evolves unitarily. But it doesn't consider this universal wave function to be "the world". Instead, the world is basically a point in 3N-dimensional configuration space (configuration space being the set of simultaneous positions of each of the N particles in the universe --- this description might only make sense nonrelativistically, where we can think of the number of particles in the universe as a constant). The role of the wave function, then, is to give a probability distribution for the location of the world in phase space.
As an aside---something that's aesthetically unpleasing to me about Bohmian mechanics is the fact that it lacks the symmetry of standard quantum mechanics. The way that standard quantum mechanics is formulated using Dirac's abstract bra-ket notation, there is a kind of "coordinate independence"; the formalism has the same form in any basis. So you don't have to consider configuration space to be primary, you can work in momentum space, or you can work in a basis of harmonic oscillator eigenstates, or you can assume the existence of abstract internal variables such as spin that have no translation into configuration space. In contrast, Bohmian mechanics insists that configuration space is what's "real". The Born probability rules applied to observables besides position are not considered fundamental; if the observable does not relate to position, then it has no direct physical meaning.
Here's where Bell departs from the usual Bohmian mechanics. For the usual formulation of Bohmian mechanics, the relationship between the wave function and a probability distribution in configuration space is dynamic: You assume that that is true initially, and you propose equations of motion for configuration space that preserves this relationship. What Bell pointed out is that trajectories in configuration space are not (directly) observable. The only thing you know about the past history of the universe is whatever is recorded in persistent records. But those persistent records are part of the present state of the universe. So there is a sense in which trajectories are redundant. In light of this, Bell proposed an interpretation of quantum mechanics that was a kind of unification of the Bohmian and Many-Worlds interpretations. In his unified interpretation, the only dynamics is the unitary evolution of the universal wave function. There is no secondary equations of motion for configuration space. Instead, he proposed that at each moment, the world had a probability of being at any point in configuration space, according to the Born rule. So there are no trajectories, the universe just hops from point to point in configuration space randomly.