ophecleide,ophecleide said:I hate reading really lengthy posts, so I'll try to keep this one brief.
4.Iraq was not about preventing the spreading of nuclear weapons. Please tell me why you think it was.
First - because Iraqi scientists knew how to design a nuclear weapon - they
came VERY close previous to the first Gulf War. Check out the scientific
journal "Physics Today" published by the American Institute of Physics -
the July 1992 edition. [The library of any university with a Physics
Department should have that journal] There is an article starting on
page 20 by Dr. David Kay - chief nuclear weapons inspector, and
Dr. Jay Davis, then Associate Director of Lawrence Livermore National
Or to quote from Dr. Kay's Senate testimony in January 2004:
"KAY: Yes. You have to realize, this was a country that had designed and
had gone through a decade-long nuclear program. They knew the secrets."
The only question was whether Iraq could get the material. Dr. Kay
also addressed this in his testimony. There is a "black market" in
nuclear weapons material because of the Soviet Union. [ We are
attempting to secure this material:
Or read the book "One Point Safe" by Andrew and Leslie Cockburn
You will find it most authoritative and well researched ]
However, there's weapons material out there. Dr. Kay was concerned
that Iraq could just buy the material it needed - in the words of his
opening statement -that "...a willing buyer would meet a willing seller".
In the Senate testimony, Senator Cornyn referred to this portion of
Dr. Kay's statement:
"CORNYN: You said something during your opening statement that
intrigues me, and something that I'm afraid may be overlooked in all of
this back and forth; and that has to do with proliferation.
You said that there was a risk of a willing seller meeting a willing buyer
of such weapons or weapon stockpiles, whether they be large, small or
programs, whether it's information that Iraqi scientists might be willing
to sell or work in cooperation with rogue organizations or even nations.
But do you consider that to have been a real risk in terms of Saddam's
activities and these programs -- the risk of proliferation?
KAY: Actually, I consider it a bigger risk. And that's why I paused on the
preceding questions. I consider that a bigger risk than the restart of his
programs being successful.
KAY: I think the way the society was going, and the number of willing
buyers in the market, that that probably was a risk that if we did avoid,
we barely avoided."
To reiterate Dr. Kay's final point above; in his testimony, Dr. Kay stated
that we "barely avoided" the risk of proliferation by Iraq.
To me, that speaks volumes!!!
I wonder why the news media failed to pick up on this point - they only
picked up Dr. Kay's comments about "we were all wrong" about chemical and biological weapons.
Dr. Gregory Greenman