bhobba said:
Being a Hilbert space the basis is countably infinite.
I think in quantum mechanics one can have a finite dimensional Hilbert space, but in Bohmian Mechanics I think it isn't possible. I'm not sure how to prove it, but the heuristic is that if a precise position measurement is possible and the state collapses to a delta function, then clearly Bohmian Mechanics will fail, since we will have localized the particle exactly for the subsequent measurement, which would contradict the uncertain initial condition that Bohmian Mechanics needs. So Bohmian Mechanics here relies on the delta function being unphysical, and really insisting that the state be square integrable. While I don't know how to turn that into hard mathematics, there are some "excess baggage" theorems in this spirit, for example, Hardy's "Ontological Excess Baggage Theorem" and Montina's
http://arxiv.org/abs/0711.4770.
It would actually make a lot of sense if in general hidden variables could exist, and they required much more information to specify than quantum mechanics, to achieve the same amount of predictability. Hidden variables should exist 'in principle' so that we can have naive reality (which is totally justified from the FAPP point of view, since naive reality is just a tool to help us make predictions, and if we are going to be wrong, we might as well pick the simplest viewpoint*). However, the quantum formalism would make sense if the hidden variable theory is in general unwieldy (and not unqiue for our given experimental resolution) - the quantum formalism would be like a simple "fixed point of the renormalization group" effective theory. Of course that's just heuristic, and I have no renormalization flow for which quantum mechanics is a "fixed point". But Hardy's, Chiribella et al's work about reasonable axioms are in this spirit, I think.
*Here's the justification for naive reality in the Copenhagen spirit. In Copenhagen we make a classical/quantum cut, so we believe in naive reality on one side of the cut. The cut can be shifted, and so anything can be part of some naive reality, just like everything can be part of something quantum. The usual Copenhagen spirit is to be agnostic whether everything can be quantum, because of the problem of definite outcomes. Noting that definite outcomes are on the naive reality side of the cut, agnosticism about whether everything can be quantum is equivalent to privileging naive reality.