Originally posted by M. Gaspar
A PORTION of the above is what I've been POSTING since I found the Physics Forum 6 weeks ago: that consciousness is a fundamental "substance" of the Universe...existing in EACH elementary particle -- and, collectively, in large, dynamic, coherent systems...like dogs, cats, cockroaches, humans, planets, stars, galaxies and the Universe ITSELF.
While it's great to get some SUPPORT...it's also a "bummer" realize that I've been "scooped"...as evidenced by the wealth of links you've directed us to. I'll be getting to them soon -- and also answering some of your other posts -- but for now I have a few questions re the above:
I noticed some of your earlier posts. Panpsychism is not a new idea, its just that its only recently been taken seriously at an academic/scientific level. I had a similar experience when I read this stuff too, because it was close to, but not identical to, some ideas I already had.
Originally posted by M. Gaspar
1st paragraph: say more about the "quantum eraser" and the "basic two-slit experiment" (about photons?). Also, what is a "bit channel" and what do you think Seager means by "a SEMANTIC sense of information"?
I suggest you read the original article (or at least the authors descriptions of these terms) instead of my hacked paraphrasing. A semantic sense of information means a correlation between two systems without the establishment of a 'bit stream' which is what is usually involved with 'information transfer' - an example of two systems where there was information transfer in a semantic sense would be quantum entanglement.
Originally posted by M. Gaspar
2nd paragraph: what is meant by "the principle of causal grounding"? It is clear that I ALIGN with the statement that "consciousness is a foundational feature of the world..." ...and of the Universe as well.
I'm just pulling this from the article. You should refer to it yourself:
A pernicious problem of explanatory exclusion7 arises from the aligning of consciousness with functional description. Any functionally described system must be actually instantiated by some assemblage of physical parts, if it is to take any part in the workings of the world. The causal efficacy of the system depends entirely upon the causal efficacy of its physical instantiation. Thus when we say such things as 'the thermostat turned on the furnace' the efficacy of the thermostat is entirely explained by the particular physical instantiation of this thermostat (say by the physical details of its thermocouple, or whatever else let's it serve its function). Perhaps a better example would the power of water to dissolve salt: this is entirely explained by the interactions of individual H20 molecules with the NaCl molecules that constitute salt, and these interactions are in turn entirely explained by the ultimately quantum mechanical properties of hydrogen, oxygen, sodium and chlorine. There is no room for water to have any causal powers, save those grounded in its constituents. The principle of causal grounding states that the causal efficacy of any complex, whether functionally or mereologically described, is entirely dependent upon the causal efficacy of the basic constituents of its physical instantiation.
Originally posted by M. Gaspar
In fact, what I generally say is "The Universe is a living, conscious Entity that's responsive to all of Its parts"...and, believe me, my "speculations" have been "trammelled" ...as Chalmers feared.
I think I will go searching for prior posts I've written, to save me the trouble of re-stating same. Not a ton of time to do so. Likewise your many recommended links. HOWEVER, I will get to each and every one of them... and soon.
On this rare occasion, I agree with Alexander that we need to define our terms, and so am giving due thought to a definition of "consciousness" that I can live with. Will be back with my attempt.
Alexander seems to be trying to incorporate the explanationn for consciousness into the definition. By accepting that, we will not only be accepting an assumption but the debate will be meaningless. What is it that we are seeking to explain? What about Nagel's definition - that for something to have consciousness means it is 'like something' to be that thing, in other words the thing has (or IMO
is) a point of view.
The way I would explain this in terms of panpsychism is that the universe is full of information and informational perspectives, mostly of a fleeting and one-dimensional nature.
Originally posted by M. Gaspar
Meanwhile, how does one pronounce "Panpsychism"? With an long-i-sounding "y"...or short. Also, I'd prefer a hyphen, such as: pan-psychism...and may USE one whether it's accepted or not. Also, does the word always have an initial capital letter? Finally, who coined the word...and when?
pan'sii'kizm AFAIK
'-psych-' just like 'psyche' or 'psychology'. But as you are American you'll probably want to pronounce it in some weird way anyway
.
Some have reservations with the term, including myself, because to some it might imply, for example, that bricks think. I've also come across pan-protopsychism - the qualifier helps but it does not seem to be in common use, partly because it is a bit ungainly. Panexperientalism is another:
The word 'panpsychism' is often used to describe Whitehead's position, even though he did not use the word himself. The word can be problematic. For some, 'psyche', which usually pertains to the human mind, suggests that this position would hold that low-grade individuals like bacteria, or even electrons, are conscious. This certainly is not the case and David Ray Griffin suggests that 'pan-experientialism' is a more appropriate term. (Griffin 1988) One should not expect all of the characteristics of mentality we observe at the macro-scale to be evident at the micro-scale, just as we no longer expect the physicality to be the same at both levels. For instance, the atoms in a sponge aren't expected to be 'spongy', themselves. The word 'pan' should also not be misconstrued. Meaning 'all', it can imply that everything has some mentality, which again, is certainly not true. Things like tables, teapots, thermostats and tetraflop computers, are regarded as uncoordinated aggregates of low-grade occasions and have no mental properties in themselves. Whitehead distinguishes them from things like cells and organisms:
--Whitehead's Even More Dangerous Idea, by Peter Farleigh
Originally posted by M. Gaspar
Questions, question, questions...but I think I've got a few answers , too.
Let's hear 'em.
More links here:
http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/online1.html#panpsychism