Quantum Entanglement and time travel

  • #101
Demystifier said:
Thanks vanesch, now I think I understand MWI (or at least your view of MWI) much better.

But let me also present a critical "summary" of MWI. In MWI, the conscious observer plays an important role. On the other hand, MWI does not contain a theory for that conscious observer.

In comparison, the Bohmian interpretation also does not contain a theory of conscious observers, but they do not play an important role in that interpretation. (Of course, the Bohmian interpretation contains other disadvantages.)

Do you agree?

Yes! MWI is a desperate attempt to try to give ontological sense to the quantum formalism, as we know it, in a universal way, while not trying to hide behind "you shouldn't ask that question" kind of rethoric (which Copenhagen does, in a way), and without adding any formal elements. And, as you point out, you are then confronted to the relationship between "subjective experience" and "physical reality". By cleaning out the part of "physical reality" all the fuzzyness has been put in that relationship with "consciousness". One can call it a cop-out, and in a way it is so! But no other view on quantum theory does any better.
Copenhagen, with its "transition into a classical world" needs just as well preferred subspaces which correspond to classical worlds. Statistical views don't even attempt at trying to give any kind of ontological picture, but nevertheless take it for granted that the "projected states" make some kind of sense.
As to Bohmian mechanics, true, it works *slightly* better. What is clear, in BM, is the particle configurations. This is entirely Newtonian, so we "feel at home". However, what one forgets, in BM, is that there is a much fuzzier part to the ontology, namely the wavefunction. As I tried to argue, the wavefunction is an integral part of the dynamical contents of BM (and hence not just a kind of auxilliary variable introduced for convenience, which can be done away with). As, in BM, the wavefunction evolves exactly according to the Schroedinger equation, just as in MWI, part of the interpretational difficulties of MWI are in fact also inherited by BM. Indeed, why should a conscious being only be aware of its "particle" aspect, and not of its "wavefunction" aspect (which contains, remember, also all "worlds" of MWI)?
Granted, this can be solved by a simple postulate: "conscious beings are only aware of their particle positions". I will agree that of all views, BM clearly has the cleanest ontological position (although it is not so clean as one usually presents it). In fact, it is MWI + a token (the particle configuration) in a certain way, where the token indicates "the common world of experience" (namely the particle positions). The difficulty I have with BM is its relativistic non-invariance.
 
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  • #102
vanesch said:
As to Bohmian mechanics, true, it works *slightly* better. What is clear, in BM, is the particle configurations. This is entirely Newtonian, so we "feel at home". However, what one forgets, in BM, is that there is a much fuzzier part to the ontology, namely the wavefunction. As I tried to argue, the wavefunction is an integral part of the dynamical contents of BM (and hence not just a kind of auxilliary variable introduced for convenience, which can be done away with). As, in BM, the wavefunction evolves exactly according to the Schroedinger equation, just as in MWI, part of the interpretational difficulties of MWI are in fact also inherited by BM.

I know we've discussed this before but I still do not understand your position. Of course, the quantum force is a part of BM's ontology just like the coulombian, strong or gravitational force. Your point was that it cannot be deduced from the particle configuration only, OK, we need to specify the system energy as well. So what? We have a function relating the quantum potential to some well defined properties of the system evolving in 3d space + time. No need for other worlds/dimensions, no need to ascribe reality to the Hilbert space itself. If we imagine this quantum potential as a kind of space geometry, only this geometry needs to be real in BM, nothing else.
In conclusion, BM's ontology requires, beyond classical parameters, a parameter defining the "space quantum geometry". The details of how we perform the calculation are irrelevant to that ontology. MWI, on the other side, requires that the mathematical formalism maps to some existing reality, BM doesn't need that.

Indeed, why should a conscious being only be aware of its "particle" aspect, and not of its "wavefunction" aspect (which contains, remember, also all "worlds" of MWI)?
Granted, this can be solved by a simple postulate: "conscious beings are only aware of their particle positions".

This is a very strange objection, indeed. We are certainly aware of the quantum potential in the same way we are aware about any other potential, by observing how particles move in its presence. That we cannot directly access this potential is not in any way different from the fact that we cannot observe an electric field without at least a charged object being present. If you maintain that BM needs that postulate then you need to ask classical mechanics to add postulates for the non-observability of every classical potential as well.

I will agree that of all views, BM clearly has the cleanest ontological position (although it is not so clean as one usually presents it). In fact, it is MWI + a token (the particle configuration) in a certain way, where the token indicates "the common world of experience" (namely the particle positions). The difficulty I have with BM is its relativistic non-invariance.

I have some questions related to the relativity issue.

1. BM doesn't look non-local from the point of view of the universal wave-function in the sense that no interaction needs to be transmitted ftl. The quantum potential evolves deterministically, regardless of particles' motion and the particles only interact locally. So, whyle BM requires an absolute reference frame it doesn't seem to conflict directly with relativity (which could be formulated, I think, on an absolute RF).

2. Is there a fully relativistic QFT yet (without the non-local collapse or with the collapse relativistically treated)?

3. Is MWI proven to have a mathematically rigorous relativistic extension? I've read some articles claiming that problems relating to the world splitting could appear.

Thanks.
 
  • #103
vanesch said:
Both, MWI and BM are "correct" theories in the sense that they set up a logically coherent construction (at least to a level of informal rigor which is usual with physical theories)...So, logically, BM and MWI are both "correct", as is any well-constructed theory...
Perhaps, as with the dual particle-wave nature of the photon, quantum reality (whatever it may be) is the union of all the experimentally "correct" theories--that is, there never has been nor will be a "single" correct theory--is what what you are saying here ?
 
  • #104
ueit said:
OK, we need to specify the system energy as well. So what? We have a function relating the quantum potential to some well defined properties of the system evolving in 3d space + time. No need for other worlds/dimensions, no need to ascribe reality to the Hilbert space itself. If we imagine this quantum potential as a kind of space geometry, only this geometry needs to be real in BM, nothing else.

But this "geometry" needs the exact wavefunction, and can only be deduced from that wavefunction, so the wavefunction is entirely part of the "ontology" of the theory. Now, you can make extra hypotheses, which come down to specifying a specific wavefunction (like, it must be in the ground state or something), but this limits severely the applicability of BM. In short, you cannot do BM when the initial wavefunction is not given.

You can compare this with the EM field in classical physics. The fact that there are non-trivial vacuum solutions to the EM field, means that these fields have an essential existence of their own. You cannot do electrodynamics without using the EM field (or the vector potential or anything of the kind).
You could get away with it if there were purely a Coulomb interaction, because from the configuration of the charged particles, the Coulomb interaction can be derived. The E-field would then simply be a convenience, but would not be an essential part of the dynamics (and hence, of the ontology). You could, if you wanted to, eliminate the E-field in all calculations.

Even the EM field could be partly eliminated, by using the retarded potential expressions. All EM waves emitted from other charges can be eliminated that way. But what you cannot eliminate, are the initial radiative conditions. There can be initial EM waves, unrelated to any charged source. This dynamical element cannot be eliminated, and hence, the EM field has an essential dynamics to itself, which means that any theory of the EM interaction must consider that there is an ontology to the EM field, and that it is not just an intermediate variable used for convenience.

In the same way, in BM, you NEED the initial wavefunction, because it cannot be derived from the particle positions. It is not an intermediate variable which could be eliminated at leisure. It is an essential component of the dynamical formulation of BM, and hence has an ontological existence.

In conclusion, BM's ontology requires, beyond classical parameters, a parameter defining the "space quantum geometry".

Well, that's an euphemism to say that you need the wavefunction...

The details of how we perform the calculation are irrelevant to that ontology.

Not really. You cannot eliminate it, it is not an intermediate quantity just introduced by convenience but which could be eliminated entirely.

MWI, on the other side, requires that the mathematical formalism maps to some existing reality, BM doesn't need that.

yes, it does so, for exactly the same reason: it is an essential part of the dynamics.

This is a very strange objection, indeed. We are certainly aware of the quantum potential in the same way we are aware about any other potential, by observing how particles move in its presence. That we cannot directly access this potential is not in any way different from the fact that we cannot observe an electric field without at least a charged object being present. If you maintain that BM needs that postulate then you need to ask classical mechanics to add postulates for the non-observability of every classical potential as well.

Well, in classical physics, the ontology consists of particles and fields (both of them). Together they specify the configuration space (or the phase space, if you want). It is hard to say which aspect of the point in conguration space is generating a certain subjective experience: are it purely the particle states, or are it the field states, or both ? Hard to say whether it is the EM field configuration in the brain of a creature living in a classical world which is giving it his memory states, or whether it are the particle configurations ! I would say that it is the entire state which does so. But in a classical setting, this is pretty irrelevant.

1. BM doesn't look non-local from the point of view of the universal wave-function in the sense that no interaction needs to be transmitted ftl. The quantum potential evolves deterministically, regardless of particles' motion and the particles only interact locally.

No, not really. In BM, the potential is function of the wavefunction AND the positions of the remote particles. This is the non-local element: the guiding equation:
<br /> \frac{dq_k}{dt} = \frac{\hbar}{m_k}\frac{Im\left[ \Psi^* \partial_k \Psi \right]}{\Psi^* \Psi}_{q_1,q_2...,q_N}<br />

The presence, in the generalised velocity for the k-th particle, of the generalized coordinates of the other particles at the same moment, makes this an explicitly non-local (and non-lorentz-invariant) expression.

So, whyle BM requires an absolute reference frame it doesn't seem to conflict directly with relativity (which could be formulated, I think, on an absolute RF).

Well, that's a contradiction in terms: any theory requiring an absolute reference frame is in conflict with the fundamental postulate of relativity. It is always possible to make it observationally in agreement with relativity, but it means, in that case, that one has introduced unnecessary elements which break explicit Lorentz invariance. This is the same with an ether theory, or with, say, the coulomb gauge fixing condition in the canonical quantization of QED.

2. Is there a fully relativistic QFT yet (without the non-local collapse or with the collapse relativistically treated)?

You cannot treat the collapse relativistically. What is done in QFT, is the calculation of matrix elements of the unitary evolution operator which transforms initial particle states in final particle states, for "large times". It is very similar to the U(t1,t0) operator which transforms |psi(t_0)> into |psi(t1)>, but taken in the limit where t1 goes to +infinity and t0 goes to -infinity. It is only for that case that there are approximative techniques.
This unitary operator is nothing else but the solution to the schroedinger equation, as usual. These complex numbers, squared, give the transition probabilities of the corresponding initial state in the final state.

Usually, this is done by calculating an approximation to an expression which is called a "path integral". Given that we calculate in this way, the probabilities for the transition from "long ago" into the "far future", this can be interpreted in any way you like. You can continue to consider the superposition of final states (whose coefficients are nothing else but the matrix elements calculated) a la MWI, or you can decide to project one out (in which case you do something non-local), a la Copenhagen.

3. Is MWI proven to have a mathematically rigorous relativistic extension? I've read some articles claiming that problems relating to the world splitting could appear.

The mathematical part of MWI is nothing else but standard unitary quantum theory. QFT is known not to be rigorously correct, but this is just a model as any other.
 
  • #105
vanesch said:
Yes! MWI is a desperate attempt to try to give ontological sense to the quantum formalism, as we know it, in a universal way, while not trying to hide behind "you shouldn't ask that question" kind of rethoric (which Copenhagen does, in a way), and without adding any formal elements. And, as you point out, you are then confronted to the relationship between "subjective experience" and "physical reality". By cleaning out the part of "physical reality" all the fuzzyness has been put in that relationship with "consciousness". One can call it a cop-out, and in a way it is so! But no other view on quantum theory does any better.
Copenhagen, with its "transition into a classical world" needs just as well preferred subspaces which correspond to classical worlds. Statistical views don't even attempt at trying to give any kind of ontological picture, but nevertheless take it for granted that the "projected states" make some kind of sense.
As to Bohmian mechanics, true, it works *slightly* better. What is clear, in BM, is the particle configurations. This is entirely Newtonian, so we "feel at home". However, what one forgets, in BM, is that there is a much fuzzier part to the ontology, namely the wavefunction. As I tried to argue, the wavefunction is an integral part of the dynamical contents of BM (and hence not just a kind of auxilliary variable introduced for convenience, which can be done away with). As, in BM, the wavefunction evolves exactly according to the Schroedinger equation, just as in MWI, part of the interpretational difficulties of MWI are in fact also inherited by BM. Indeed, why should a conscious being only be aware of its "particle" aspect, and not of its "wavefunction" aspect (which contains, remember, also all "worlds" of MWI)?
Granted, this can be solved by a simple postulate: "conscious beings are only aware of their particle positions". I will agree that of all views, BM clearly has the cleanest ontological position (although it is not so clean as one usually presents it). In fact, it is MWI + a token (the particle configuration) in a certain way, where the token indicates "the common world of experience" (namely the particle positions). The difficulty I have with BM is its relativistic non-invariance.

I agree with you.
However, what I try to do in my research on Bohmian mechanics, is to use the disadvantages of the Bohmian approach to promote it from an interpretation (which contains negative philosophical connotations) to a physical theory. For example, in some regimes, such relativistic non-invariance might have observable consequences.
 
  • #106
Vanesch, I was thinking about the MWI and I concluded that a version of MWI that seems reasonable to me is the version which I will call
"MANY-WORLD SINGLE-MIND" interpretation!

What is this? According to this, the wave function never collapses and there are many coexisting branches of the wave function (MANY "WORLDS"). However, not all these branches enjoy the same rights. One (and only one) of them is picked up randomly as the one which corresponds to the reality percieved. There are no "paralel universes" in which other realities are realized. Only one reality, one branch, is the "right" one. In particular, this branch is subjectively perceived by our minds, but this branch has a preferred role even without our minds, so the theory is self-consistent even without a theory of mind or consciousness. It is not clear what the "mind" is, but at least it is clear that there is only one mind for each person (SINGLE MIND), not many copies with different hystories in different parallel universes.

It can also be compared with classical physics described by a deterministic equation of motion. The equation of motion containes many possible "worlds" corresponding to many solutions. They can be viewed as different "branches" of the equation of motion. But only one solution is picked up as the right one. There is no theory that predicts which solution (or which initial condition) is the right one, so, effectively, the right solution is picked up randomly.

Now in quantum mechanics we have two levels of the unpredictable. One is the choice of the right solution of the Schrodinger equation. The other is the choice of the right branch of that solution.

What do you think about such a version of MWI?
(You will probably note that this version combines some desirable features of MWI and BM and eliminates some undesirable ones.)
 
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  • #107
Demystifier said:
What do you think about such a version of MWI?
(You will probably note that this version combines some desirable features of MWI and BM and eliminates some undesirable ones.)

It is non-local, unfortunately. The "synchronisation" of the different minds associated with physical structures (bodies) at space-like intervals, would require us to do something non-local (such as projection in Copenhagen, or the particle guide equation in BM).
 
  • #108
vanesch said:
It is non-local, unfortunately. The "synchronisation" of the different minds associated with physical structures (bodies) at space-like intervals, would require us to do something non-local (such as projection in Copenhagen, or the particle guide equation in BM).
I seems to me that it is not more nonlocal than the usual original (but not yours) form of MWI. This is probably the main motivation for a relational version of MWI introduced by Rovelli and advocated by you. Am I right?

But note that I was inspired by your note on the analogy between the block-time interpretation of time and MWI. In particular, the block-time interpretation combined with the self-consistency principle (which, in fact, is nothing but a tautology) automatically resolves the time-travel paradoxes, but it also requires a sort of nonlocality in order to prevent initial conditions that do not lead to globally self-consistent solutions. What do you think about that? (Recall also that this is actually a topic on time travel.)
 
  • #109
Demystifier said:
I seems to me that it is not more nonlocal than the usual original (but not yours) form of MWI. This is probably the main motivation for a relational version of MWI introduced by Rovelli and advocated by you. Am I right?

I don't know what other versions you are thinking about. I'm not aware of any MWI version where there is a "single world" which is shared by remote observers. A "world" is an observer-dependent concept, and the "slicing up of the wavefunction in different worlds" is also an observer-dependent concept, in all MWI versions I know of.

But note that I was inspired by your note on the analogy between the block-time interpretation of time and MWI. In particular, the block-time interpretation combined with the self-consistency principle (which, in fact, is nothing but a tautology) automatically resolves the time-travel paradoxes, but it also requires a sort of nonlocality in order to prevent initial conditions that do not lead to globally self-consistent solutions. What do you think about that? (Recall also that this is actually a topic on time travel.)

I'm affraid I don't see what you're aiming at...
The analogy between block-time and MWI I had in mind was the following:
in both cases, we seem to be subjectively experience something else but the "whole". In MWI, we don't seem to experience subjectively the entire wavefunction (with all its alternatives, in the form of superpositions of classical situations, which we call "worlds"), and in block-time, we seem subjectively to experience only "now" and not the entire "time dimension". But in both cases, the relationships between observations/events (in other words, the physics) are all right. In MWI, in each branch, you have a consistent set of observations (the Alice that saw "up" will be entangled with the "up" state of the particle etc...), and in "block time" you have the correct temporal relationships (between event A and event B, the two twins have observed a certain number of rotations of the hands of their clocks, and that number is exactly what is expected etc...)

So, true, in both cases there seems to be a fundamental difficulty in explaining our subjective experience (which makes some people reject the ideas of MWI or of block time), but in both cases all relational aspects between observations are ok. In both cases, the proposed "ontology" fits close to the formalism based upon the fundamental ideas of the theory (superposition and unitary evolution for MWI, 4-dim spacetime manifold for block time).
 
  • #110
vanesch said:
I don't know what other versions you are thinking about. I'm not aware of any MWI version where there is a "single world" which is shared by remote observers. A "world" is an observer-dependent concept, and the "slicing up of the wavefunction in different worlds" is also an observer-dependent concept, in all MWI versions I know of.
Then I probably misunderstood some versions of MWI. I thought that, in some versions, observers are irrelevant, while it is the whole universe itself that splits in many branches. Since the universe is a nonlocal object, such spliting would necessarily be nonlocal.
 
  • #111
Demystifier said:
Then I probably misunderstood some versions of MWI. I thought that, in some versions, observers are irrelevant, while it is the whole universe itself that splits in many branches. Since the universe is a nonlocal object, such spliting would necessarily be nonlocal.

This is indeed an often encountered misunderstanding of MWI. If it were the case, as you point out, MWI would have no particular advantage over Copenhagen "projection" because the magical "split" would be just as unexplained and mysterious as the "projection by observation" - and would imply just as non-local a happening. But it is an often-encountered misunderstanding, leading also to an often-encountered objection to MWI, which is that each time there is an entanglement of two electrons on Andromeda, my worlds would "split".

Branching only makes sense wrt an observer.
 
  • #112
vanesch said:
This is indeed an often encountered misunderstanding of MWI. If it were the case, as you point out, MWI would have no particular advantage over Copenhagen "projection" because the magical "split" would be just as unexplained and mysterious as the "projection by observation" - and would imply just as non-local a happening. But it is an often-encountered misunderstanding, leading also to an often-encountered objection to MWI, which is that each time there is an entanglement of two electrons on Andromeda, my worlds would "split".

Branching only makes sense wrt an observer.
I think that MWI people are responsible for that misunderstanding. They should call their interpretation MOI (Many Observer Interpretion) or something like that.
 
  • #113
Demystifier said:
I think that MWI people are responsible for that misunderstanding. They should call their interpretation MOI (Many Observer Interpretion) or something like that.

The original name (by Everett) was much better: relative state interpretation.
 
  • #114
I wonder guys how you never get tired of such topics (like "time travel","exceeeding the speed of light" etc)?

-tehno
 
  • #115
tehno said:
I wonder guys how you never get tired of such topics (like "time travel","exceeeding the speed of light" etc)?
Everyone has something that never gets him/her tired. We have "time travel", "exceeeding the speed of light", and stuff like that. And you?
 
  • #116
I enjoy watching series of "Star trek" .
:smile:
 
  • #117
tehno said:
I wonder guys how you never get tired of such topics (like "time travel","exceeeding the speed of light" etc)?

If this question really needs to be answered, I'll give you my PoV. We have accumulated a certain amount of knowledge, by past experiences, by our own personal experience and so on, and from this knowledge results some model of reality. In fact, according to different categories of experiences, we extract different models of reality: we have our "common sense everyday" model of reality (I know my home, my car, my family, some animals, some weather, ... which is a certain model of reality I have set up, since I was a child, of "the world") ; scientific experiments have lead to some scientific theories which also give us some (mathematical / formal) model of reality. Now some of these models are highly counter-intuitive (in other words, don't seem to conform to our common sense model of reality we have set up based upon personal experience). They are, nevertheless, just as good (or even better) models of reality as are our "naive" views from everyday life. If you take these models completely seriously, then you arrive at sometimes very strange predictions/concepts. One of it is time travel. Of course, it is an extrapolation, far beyond the data that were gathered in order to set up the mathematical model. Nevertheless, it is an intriguing possibility. So it is fun to explore it, on the purely theoretical side.
 
  • #118
This is reply 4 vincentm:
I would have to agree with most physicist who say that time travel is impossible. But you have to be careful when you say anything like that because time is actually a relative concept. However there are some mathematical prediction of time travel but it bring a lot of questions with paradoxes that we cannot comprehend. The thing is if "time travel" as you imagine is not the same as what I have in mind. The time travel as what I understand is a possible action however there is no such thing as paradoxes of going back in my past and killing my grandfather because what most of us call time travel is actually a travel to other space-time continuum all together. By warping time we actually travel to different universe and the funny thing is we do it all the time just cannot tell the difference. If anyone familiar with atomic clock experiment when one set of clocks put on a plane and taken around the world for a trip, when plane returns and the clocks compared it is apparent that time was warped by few nanoseconds during the plane trip and hence it an evident that time travel is indeed possible. Just now we arrived to the universe which is almost identical copy of the previous one. So you see it is possible with no paradoxes but it is not a time travel as you might think. :)
 
  • #119
JesseM said:
Backwards time travel might be problematic for other reasons, but it's definitely allowed in GR (though a theory of quantum gravity may change this), and your arguments for why it's nonsensical don't work, for the reasons I tried to explain above.

So one can travel backwards in time via relativity. Sorry to ressurect this thread but i didn't understand most of the discussion here, perhaps a more laymen's type terminology is best for the purposes of my understanding.
 
  • #120
Quote Brian Greene :
"Despite years of debate, scientists still haven't completely ruled out the possibility of going back in time. "Many physicists have a gut feeling that time travel to the past is not possible," said Columbia University theoretical physicist Brian Greene. "But many of us, including me, are impressed that nobody's been able to prove that."


To me, this sounds like political double-speak as not to offend anyone


He could as well have been talking about the existence of unicorns.
 
  • #121
I'm not too sure the question really was ever answered. To put it fairly simple, we don't really know. The idea of why it is believed to violate special relativity is that entanglement means that objects that are interacting will react at the same time when something happens to one of the objects no matter how far away the two objects are. But this would mean that some sort of signal would have to be interacting with both objects and would be moving faster than the speed of light. This is where the paradox comes from, if the reaction happens instantly than the signal is moving faster than the speed of light and violated special relativity, unless the signal moves backwards through time.
 

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