I Regarding consciousness causing wavefunction collapse

  • #51
stevendaryl said:
The frequentist approach to giving uncertainties is just wrong. It's backwards.

Let me illustrate with coin flipping. Suppose you want to know whether you have a fair coin. (There's actually evidence that there is no such thing as a biased coin: weighting one side doesn't actually make it more likely to land on that side. But that's sort of beside the point...) What you'd like to be able to do is to flip the coin a bunch of times, and note how many heads and tails you get, and use that data to decide whether your coin is fair or not. In other words, what you want to know is:
  • What is the probability that my coin is unfair, given the data?

But the uncertainty that frequentists compute is:
  • What is the probability of getting that data, if I assume that the coin is unfair?
By itself, that doesn't tell us anything about the likelihood of having a fair or unfair coin.

(Note: technically, you would compute something like the probability of getting that data under the assumption that the coin's true probability for head, P_H, is more than \epsilon away from \frac{1}{2})
When I was in College, in my very first physics class, we decided to do a simple experiment. We constructed a device to flip a coin, and then recorded the output. It came up heads, the first 87 times. Our professor carefully examined the device, and was unable to repeat the results. He got a fairly random set, which reflected our subsequent data. We have no explanation of the original data, nor is there any reason to believe it will recur. This type of result goes to the crux of the question, I believe. We have no way of determining whether the data we obtain reflects a random series of results, or is an anomaly. Only by repeated examinations of the same experiment, can we hope to determine what is 'normal' and what is a result that cannot be repeated. We also, and this is crucial, cannot, ever, remove the human element from the data we collect. There is no way to be human and analyze the results of our efforts, without coloring those self-same results. That having been said, we can expect a closer approach to neutral results by having a separate set of data, collected in another series of experiments, by a separate group of researchers. Errors will still occur, and you can probably point to many such, but we must never simply 'assume' that what we believe to be the 'norm' is not subject to revision.
 
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  • #52
PeterDonis said:
Do you see the contradiction between these two statements?

I differ and could explain why; however at this point civility has broken down so there is little point. Instead I will bring up a matter of considerably greater importance going forward; which is that to ask a rhetorical question in this manner (where the desired answer is merely a claim you are withholding) is considered by proponents of fair argument to be rude and unhelpful.

More specifically: Even when we deeply believe we are right (as you clearly do here), it is still our responsibility to explain ourselves when we disagree. I can cite many sources on this from my library of books about teaching, including the teaching of argumentation; for simplicity's sake, here is a brief explanation via the web: https://watchyourlanguage.wikispaces.com/Rhetorical+Questions

I will admit that I behaved badly as well: I made the mistake of phrasing my comment to you in the same adversarial tone. I regret this and apologize for it. I don't like rudeness in myself any more than in others, and have been doing my best to minimize this tendency as I get older. For the sake of minimizing friction, I am making a mental note to avoid responding to you in future.
 
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  • #53
atyy said:
I'm not sure. My instinct is to say it depends.

If interpreted in a frequentist sense, then Bayes's theorem does not require consciousness.

If interpreted in a subjective Bayesian sense, then Bayes's theorem does require consciousness.

I don't believe the objective Bayesian approach makes any sense.
You can say the same for Bohmian mechanics too.
 
  • #54
UsableThought said:
I differ and could explain why

Then please do so.

UsableThought said:
Even when we deeply believe we are right (as you clearly do here), it is still our responsibility to explain ourselves when we disagree.

I thought the point I was making was sufficiently obvious; you appear to agree since you say you could explain why you differ. But if you would like it to be made more explicit, I will do so below.

First, however, a brief comment: disagreement in itself is not uncivil. Neither is leaving some points implicit, when it seems clear that the reader is able to fill them in for himself/herself. I did not find your previous posts uncivil, and although I'm glad to accept your apology in the spirit in which it was offered, I don't think any apology was necessary. I am just interested to see what your explanation is of why you differ, as I requested above.

Now to make my objection more explicit, here I will repeat the statement I quoted before (which I understand is not yours, you were quoting it from the article you referenced):

UsableThought said:
it remains problematic that Bayesian statistics is sensitive to subjective input. The undeniable advantage of the classical statistical procedures is that they do not need any such input

This is simply false. One can express the falsehood in one of two ways, depending on how one wants to define "subjective input". If Bayesian priors are subjective input, then so are the corresponding assumptions in classical statistical procedures. If the latter are not subjective input, then neither are Bayesian priors. So the claimed distinction in the above quote is simply not valid. And since the quote is clearly given from a frequentist perspective, it clearly is evidence against the claim that frequentism makes its assumptions explicit, since it can't even admit that it has to make assumptions (corresponding to the priors in the Bayesian case) at all.

I think the root of the problem here is that there is no unique "right answer" when you're trying to estimate probabilities, at least not in any case of more than trivial interest. Any estimate of probabilities is going to have to put numbers to things based on incomplete knowledge. Whether you want to call those numbers priors or something else, the problem is there, and there's no way around it--after all, if you had complete enough knowledge to know for sure what those numbers were, you wouldn't be estimating probabilities, you would be computing precise quantitative predictions that you already knew would turn out to be correct.
 
  • #55
PeterDonis said:
Then please do so.
...
I think the root of the problem here is that there is no unique "right answer" when you're trying to estimate probabilities, at least not in any case of more than trivial interest. Any estimate of probabilities is going to have to put numbers to things based on incomplete knowledge...

It's a good summary of issue. Even a trivial probabilities once a complete set of outcomes are defined, it still solely depends on such definition ;o) To establish an "adequate" probability of 0/1 output of an arbitrary black-box of 0/1 generator with limited history is a good representation of the problem. Frankly, there is a reliable way to asses who does a better job - the more compact entropy encoding output the more adequate probabilities assessment is. The "problem" is that any winner can become a looser across all possible 0/1 generators...
 
  • #56
I recently went through the exercise of using Bayesian probability to figure out the most likely probability for "heads" given that H tosses yielded heads out of N trials. The derivation was enormously complicated, but the answer was very simple: p = \frac{H+1}{N+2}. In the limit as N \rightarrow \infty and H \rightarrow \infty, this approaches the relative frequency, \frac{H}{N}, but it actually is better-behaved. Before you ever toss the first coin, with N = H = 0, the Bayesian estimate gives p = \frac{1}{2}. If you get heads for the first toss, this estimate gives p = \frac{2}{3}, rather than the relative frequency estimate, p = 1.

I should probably explain what I mean by "the most likely probability". I start off assuming that each coin has a parameter--I'm going to call it B, for bias--that characterizes the coin tosses. The model is that:

P(H | B) = B

So the bias is just the probability of heads. But I'm treating it as a parameter of the model. As a parameter, it has a range of possible values, 0 \leq B \leq 1. If i have no idea what the value of B is, I can use the least informative prior, which is to assume that B is uniformly distributed in the range [0,1].

That's kind of an odd concept--we're talking about the probability of a probability. Kind of weird, but let's go on.

So we toss the coin N times and get H heads. Then Bayesian updating tells us the adjusted, posterior probability distribution for B, given that data. The rule is (letting E(H,N) be the fact that I got H heads when I flipped the coin N times):

P(B | E(H,N)) = \frac{P(E(H,N)| B) P(B)}{P(E(H,N)}

where P(E(H,N) | B) is the probability of E(H,N), given B, and P(B) is the prior probability density of B (which is just 1 for the least informative prior), and P(E(H,N)) is the prior probability of E(H,N), not knowing anything about B.

These can be computed readily enough:

P(B) = 1
P(E(H,N) | B) = B^H (1-B)^{N-H} \frac{N!}{H! (N-H)!}
P(E(H,N)) = \int dB P(B) P(E(H,N)|B) = \frac{N!}{H! (N-H)!} \int dB\ B^H (1-B)^{N-H}

That last integral is hard to do, but it's done here: https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/86542/prove-binomnk-1-n1-int-01xk1-xn-kdx-for-0-leq-k-le

\int dB\ B^H (1-B)^{N-H} = \frac{H! (N-H)!}{(N+1)!}

That gives: P(E(H,N)) = \frac{1}{N+1}

So our posterior probability distribution for B is:

P(B|E(H,N)) = \frac{(N+1)!}{H! (N-H)!} B^H (1-B)^{N-H}

Now, we compute \langle B \rangle_{E(H,N)}, which is the expected value of B, given E(H,N). The formula for expectation values is:

\langle B \rangle_{E(H,N)} = \int dB\ B\ P(B | E(H,N)) = \frac{(N+1)!}{H! (N-H)!} \int dB\ B^{H+1} (1-B)^{N-H}

We can write: \int dB\ B^{H+1} (1-B)^{N-H} = \int dB\ B^{H+1} (1-B)^{(N+1)-(H+1)} = \frac{(H+1)! (N-H)!}{(N+2)!}. So we can immediately write:

\langle B \rangle_{E(H,N)} = \frac{(N+1)!}{H! (N-H)!} \frac{(H+1)! (N+1-H)!}{(N+2)!} = \frac{H+1}{N+2}

Like I said, very simple result that is very complicated to derive.
 
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  • #57
stevendaryl said:
I recently went through the exercise of using Bayesian probability to figure out the most likely probability for "heads" given that H tosses yielded heads out of N trials. The derivation was enormously complicated, but the answer was very simple: p = \frac{H+1}{N+2}. In the limit as N \rightarrow \infty and H \rightarrow \infty, this approaches the relative frequency, \frac{H}{N}, but it actually is better-behaved. Before you ever toss the first coin, with N = H = 0, the Bayesian estimate gives p = \frac{1}{2}. If you get heads for the first toss, this estimate gives p = \frac{2}{3}, rather than the relative frequency estimate, p = 1.[]
P(B | E(H,N)) = \frac{P(E(H,N)| B) P(B)}{P(E(H,N)}

[]

So we can immediately write:

\langle B \rangle_{E(H,N)} = \frac{(N+1)!}{H! (N-H)!} \frac{(H+1)! (N+1-H)!}{(N+2)!} = \frac{H+1}{N+2}

Like I said, very simple result that is very complicated to derive.

Have you checked if your estimator is

1. The maximum likekihood estimator
2. Has expection 1/2 under a binomial (p=1/2) distribution.

These are usually considered desirable.

This has nothing to do with QT. Probability is not observable so we always have to process counts - i.e. frequencies. How we process the counts is a matter of taste.
 
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  • #58
Mentz114 said:
This has nothing to do with QT. Probability is not observable so we always have to process counts - i.e. frequencies. How we process the counts is a matter of taste.

My first reaction, apparently it us true; but what if the interpretation/"taste" of observable/counts effects the ongoing experiment itself then the interpretation seems relevant... It's definitely a murky path to take, still it seems a viable insight to think about...
 
  • #59
Demystifier said:
Yes, but scientists didn't check whether detector detected anything when nobody was looking at it.

Demystifier said:
Yes, but if you look later, you only know what is there later. You cannot know what was there before. You can only assume that it was there before, but you cannot prove that assumption by scientific method. You can "prove" it by using some philosophy, but philosophy is not science, right? :-p

I want to understand this better but I don't quite follow.

Case A: No detector at the slit and we see an interference pattern.
Case B: Detector with conscious observation at the slit and we do not see an interference pattern.

Now remove the conscious observation of the detector at the slit, but leave the detector on.
Case C: Detector without conscious observation at the slit. If we see an interference pattern then the consciousness is required to collapse. If we do not see an interference pattern then consciousness is not required to collapse the function. This logic does not follow?
 
  • #60
ModusPwnd said:
Detector without conscious observation at the slit. If we see an interference pattern then the consciousness is required to collapse.

Or the presence of the detector at the slits changes the wave function so that no interference is produced. Which is what the math of QM actually tells you if you work it out. So no, this method of testing whether consciousness is required for collapse will not work.
 
  • #61
Why doesn't it work? You just described one possible outcome and then say it doesn't work...

PeterDonis said:
Or the presence of the detector at the slits changes the wave function so that no interference is produced.

Right, I included that possibility in my post (right after where you quoted me). If the detector alone changes the wave function so that no interference pattern is produced then consciousness is not required.

I'm confused because it looks like you describe that consciousness is not required then simply state it doesn't work (that is, we don't know if consciousness is required) .
 
  • #62
ModusPwnd said:
I want to understand this better but I don't quite follow.

Case A: No detector at the slit and we see an interference pattern.
Case B: Detector with conscious observation at the slit and we do not see an interference pattern.

Now remove the conscious observation of the detector at the slit, but leave the detector on.
Case C: Detector without conscious observation at the slit. If we see an interference pattern then the consciousness is required to collapse. If we do not see an interference pattern then consciousness is not required to collapse the function. This logic does not follow?
In case C we do not see an interference pattern (and most if not all experiments have been case C not case B), but that does not lead to the conclusion that consciousness is not required to collapse the wave function. The problem is that we still have to look at the experimental results to see ("see" is your word not mine!) if there is an interference pattern, so we haven't disproved the hypothesis that the recording device was in a superposition of interference pattern and no interference pattern until it collapsed when us conscious observers looked at it.

That hypothesis is somewhat absurd, and it is no part of the modern formulation of quantum mechanics in which consciousness is irrelevant to collapse, but is not disproved by this experiment; there is no experiment that could even in principle disprove it.
 
  • #63
Nugatory said:
In case C we do not see an interference pattern (and most if not all experiments have been case C not case B), but that does not lead to the conclusion that consciousness is not required to collapse the wave function. The problem is that we still have to look at the experimental results to see ("see" is your word not mine!) if there is an interference pattern, so we haven't disproved the hypothesis that the recording device was in a superposition of interference pattern and no interference pattern until it collapsed when us conscious observers looked at it.

By "it" do you mean the screen or the recording device? In Case C we don't look at the recording device, we look at the screen. In Case A we look at the screen and see an interference pattern. Only in Case B do we look at the recording device.
 
  • #64
ModusPwnd said:
I included that possibility in my post

Sorry, I see now I was a little unclear in my response. You are assuming that QM allows for the possibility that an interference pattern can be observed with detectors at the slits. It doesn't. On any interpretation of QM, if there are detectors at the slits then no interference pattern will be observed. So you can't use this experiment to distinguish between a "consciousness is required for collapse" interpretation and a "consciousness is not required for collapse" interpretation; to do that, the two interpretations would have to make different predictions, and they don't.
 
  • #65
PeterDonis said:
On any interpretation of QM, if there are detectors at the slits then no interference pattern will be observed.

Yes, that is what I went into this assuming. To me this statement looks like an affirmation that consciousness is not required. After all, the detector is not conscious.

PeterDonis said:
So you can't use this experiment to distinguish between a "consciousness is required for collapse" interpretation and a "consciousness is not required for collapse" interpretation; to do that, the two interpretations would have to make different predictions, and they don't.

They don't? In my Case C I gave two different predictions. Prediction 1: If consciousness is required the detector alone will not collapse the wave function at the slit and we will see interference pattern at the screen. Prediction 2: If consciousness is not required then the detector alone will collapse the wave function at the slit and we will not see an interference pattern at the screen.
Nugatory said " the recording device was in a superposition of interference pattern and no interference pattern until it collapsed when us conscious observers looked at it." I don't follow yet, but I suspect this is where my thinking is incorrect.
 
  • #66
ModusPwnd said:
To me this statement looks like an affirmation that consciousness is not required.

No, it isn't, because there is no need to assume that the wave function collapses at the detector in order to derive the prediction that, with detectors present at the slits, no interference pattern will be observed. That's why I stressed that this is a prediction of QM for any interpretation; that includes no collapse interpretations like the MWI.
 
  • #67
ModusPwnd said:
I want to understand this better but I don't quite follow.

Case A: No detector at the slit and we see an interference pattern.
Case B: Detector with conscious observation at the slit and we do not see an interference pattern.

Now remove the conscious observation of the detector at the slit, but leave the detector on.
Case C: Detector without conscious observation at the slit. If we see an interference pattern then the consciousness is required to collapse. If we do not see an interference pattern then consciousness is not required to collapse the function. This logic does not follow?

Following Feynman: "Nature does not know what you are looking at, and she behaves the way she is going to behave whether you bother to take down the data or not."

Whether you read out the detectors or not, it doesn't matter. Have a look at chapter 3-2, "The Feynman Lectures on Physics, Volume III"
 
  • #68
PeterDonis said:
No, it isn't, because there is no need to assume that the wave function collapses at the detector in order to derive the prediction that, with detectors present at the slits, no interference pattern will be observed. That's why I stressed that this is a prediction of QM for any interpretation; that includes no collapse interpretations like the MWI.

Thanks for bearing with me. I'm sorry, but I still don't get it.

Im not versed in MWI, but I do understand it produces the same results as other interpretations. I can forget the idea of a collapsing wave function. Still, the detector does something - right? Otherwise Case A and Case B would produce the same result at the screen. The difference between Case A and Case B is the detector and conscious observer at the slit. We hold everything else constant in the experiment and thus determine that is the inclusion of the detector and conscious observer at the slit that prevents the interference pattern. Now we can take it a step further and perform the experiment without the conscious observer and see what we get.

Lord Jestocost said:
Following Feynman: "Nature does not know what you are looking at, and she behaves the way she is going to behave whether you bother to take down the data or not."

Whether you read out the detectors or not, it doesn't matter. Have a look at chapter 3-2, "The Feynman Lectures on Physics, Volume III"

Thanks for the reference, I will check that out. I have to say though, each of your sentences look like definite affirmations that consciousness is not required to destroy the interference pattern. (That is to say, consciousness is not required to count as an "observation".) If I don't read the detectors, consciousness isn't involved in the observation.
 
  • #69
ModusPwnd said:
the detector does something - right?

Yes.

ModusPwnd said:
The difference between Case A and Case B is the detector and conscious observer at the slit.

There is no need to invoke a conscious observer at the slit to derive the difference in predictions. That's my point. So your case B includes an extra specification--the conscious observer at the slit--that is irrelevant to deriving the prediction for that case.

ModusPwnd said:
consciousness is not required to count as an "observation".

That depends on how you define an "observation". That term is an ordinary language term and is not precise. You can define it so that a detector that is not looked at by any conscious observer counts as an "observation", or you can define it so that only a conscious observer looking at something counts as an "observation". But this difference in definition is not about physics; it's about the use of ordinary language words.
 
  • #70
I define "observation" as something that affects the wavefunction such that an interference pattern is not produced.

PeterDonis said:
There is no need to invoke a conscious observer at the slit to derive the difference in predictions. That's my point. So your case B includes an extra specification--the conscious observer at the slit--that is irrelevant to deriving the prediction for that case.

Again, that looks like a clear statement that consciousness is not required to be an observation or collapse the wavefunction or whatever you want to call destroying the interference pattern. lol Oh well, this is why I'm not smart enough to be a physicist.
 
  • #71
ModusPwnd said:
I define "observation" as something that affects the wavefunction such that an interference pattern is not produced.

Ok, but you need to understand that not everybody uses this definition. Again, "observation" is an ordinary language term. Your definition links this term to actual stuff in the physical model, which is good if you want to discuss physics. But not everybody wants to use the term "observation" for that purpose.

ModusPwnd said:
Again, that looks like a clear statement that consciousness is not required to be an observation or collapse the wavefunction or whatever you want to call destroying the interference pattern.

Now you're throwing together two different things. You defined "be an observation" as "something that affects the wavefunction such that an interference pattern is not produced". This refers, as I said above, the actual stuff in the physical model--stuff that affects the wavefunction.

However, "collapse the wavefunction" does not refer to anything in the physical model. It's an interpretation. You can describe the same physical model--the same math--without ever using the term "collapse" at all (e.g., using the MWI). So by your definition of "observation", "collapse the wavefunction" is not even the same kind of thing as an observation.

So you have taken what looks to you like a "clear statement" and made it into a muddle of two different things. The first amounts to saying that consciousness does not appear anywhere in the physical model--the math of QM doesn't invoke consciousness anywhere to explain what happens to the wavefunction. That's true (and is basically what I've been saying).

But the second thing is a statement about an interpretation--a version of the collapse interpretation in which "collapse" only happens when a conscious observer looks at something. This has nothing to do with the actual physical model, because "collapse" doesn't appear anywhere in that model, any more than consciousness does. I haven't said anything at all about whether that interpretation is "right" or not; I personally don't even think that's a meaningful question.
 
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  • #72
ModusPwnd said:
Thanks for bearing with me. I'm sorry, but I still don't get it.

Thanks for the reference, I will check that out. I have to say though, each of your sentences look like definite affirmations that consciousness is not required to destroy the interference pattern. (That is to say, consciousness is not required to count as an "observation".) If I don't read the detectors, consciousness isn't involved in the observation.

Maybe, you have misunderstood me. I am not talking about the role of consciousness in connection with quantum physics. I am merely talking about the quantum mechanical formalism as a calculational recipe to predict the probabilities of macroscopic outcomes when, e.g., performing “double-slit experiments with detectors present at the slits”.

EDIT: To my mind, the quantum enigma is, to quote A.J. Leggett: “Basically, the quantum measurement paradox is that most interpretations of QM at the microscopic level do not allow definite outcomes to be realized, whereas at the level of our human consciousness it seems a matter of direct experience that such outcomes occur….” (A. J. Leggett, “The Quantum Measurement Problem”, Science 307, 871 (2005))
 
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  • #73
Again, there is no consciousness needed for anything to collapse (despite the fact that I don't believe in the religion of collapse at all). The point is that if you want to have which-way information you need to somehow prepare the photons going through the slits such that they carry the information through which slit they came, and this destroys the interference pattern. One way is to use initially linearly polarized photons (say in ##x## direction) then you put quarter-wave plates in each of the slit one oriented ##45^{\circ}## and one ##-45^{\circ}## relative to the ##x## direction. Then the photons going through slit 1 are left- and the ones going through slit 2 are right-handed polarized. In adding the amplitudes for the photons going through either slit and taking the modulus squared you'll get no interference term because the two polarization degrees of freedom are exactly orthogonal to each other, and thus by measuring the polarization you can precisely know through which slit each photon came. There's no consciousness necessary to make the interference pattern vanishing but just the appropriate preparation procedure such that the photons cary the which-way information.

Quantum theory is sometimes a bit counter-intuitive, because our everyday experience is trained on our interaction with macroscopic bodies which behave (according to quantum statistics!) classical. You don't need esoterics but just quantum theory to understand the behavior of microscopic entities, and in physics you don't need to find a proper definition of consciousness, which in my opinion is impossible to get anyway.
 
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  • #74
Consciousness might play a role for else no one could verify the measurement. However, if the natural laws governing the experiment are dreamt up by the observer, there is no reason they should be constant, which they appear to be. Furthermore, if the natural laws are dreamt up by the observer, anything could be dreamt up by the observer. By avoiding this standpoint, we can admit that the laws of nature determine the measurement. However, again, the conscious observer can't be taken out of the equation. Still, then you have: "who is it?" :wink:
 
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  • #75
Lord Jestocost said:
“Basically, the quantum measurement paradox is that most interpretations of QM at the microscopic level do not allow definite outcomes to be realized, whereas at the level of our human consciousness it seems a matter of direct experience that such outcomes occur….” (A. J. Leggett, “The Quantum Measurement Problem”, Science 307, 871 (2005))

This is the sort of thing that gets me.

Now Leggert is a professor of physics so of course you have to give some weight to what he says.

But also as a professor of physics he knows, as well as most physicists do, that the modern theory of quantum observations resolves that ie why we in everyday experience only have definite outcomes ie the quantum world is hidden - and there is even a standard textbook on it:
https://www.amazon.com/dp/3540357734/?tag=pfamazon01-20

Now there are some issues left to be resolved, and if you want to discuss them start a new thread and me and others will be only to happy to tell them to you - as Leggert should have done rather than the, at best, half truth he did say - at worse an actual falsehood.

Thanks
Bill
 
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  • #76
bhobba said:
...Now there are some issues left to be resolved, and if you want to discuss them start a new thread and me and others will be only to happy to tell them to you - as Leggert should have done rather than the, at best, half truth he did say - at worse an actual falsehood.Bill

With all due respect, as I don't get the point there is no need to start a new thread.
 
  • #77
Lord Jestocost said:
With all due respect, as I don't get the point there is no need to start a new thread.

Scratching head. What don't you get about the fact he is wrong? Its not a matter of opinion - its standard textbook stuff - I even gave the textbook. We know very well why the brain perceives specific outcomes - its because the world around us is classical and much progress has been made in understanding why. There are some remaining issues, but this is not the correct thread to discuss it. Just as an example even more fundamental than our brains registering specific outcomes is why to we get any outcomes at all. That's a legit problem - technically its how an improper state becomes a proper one. It goes way beyond the consciousness thing although those into it will probably find a way to invoke it.

Thanks
Bill
 
  • #78
bhobba said:
What don't you get about the fact he is wrong?
Wrong about what?
 
  • #79
bhobba said:
...What don't you get about the fact he is wrong?...

What facts about what?
 
  • #80
Lord Jestocost said:
What facts about what?

I carefully explained it.

One more time - he said 'whereas at the level of our human consciousness it seems a matter of direct experience that such outcomes occur'

This is because the world around us is classical and, with a few caveats, we know why that is.

If you don't get it when it's that clear - :rolleyes::rolleyes::rolleyes::rolleyes::rolleyes::rolleyes::rolleyes:

Thanks
Bill
 
  • #81
StevieTNZ said:
Wrong about what?

The same as above. The reason our brain perceives single outcomes is because that's how the world around us actually is. QM at the atomic level is different - but we know why these days that is.

I know you think consciousness is involved in that, but such is very backwater these day for good reason. Yes its still a legit interpretation, but far from the only one.

Thanks
Bill
 
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  • #82
This thread has run its course and is now closed.
 
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