Main Question or Discussion Point
What are the experiments that disprove the idea that consciousness causes wavefunction collapse?
There are no such experiments (despite the fact that a paper coauthored by my brother (who is a psychologist by education) claims the opposite).What are the experiments that disprove the idea that consciousness causes wavefunction collapse?
Of course not. Its very much like solipsism - inherently unprovable. Even the reason for its introduction, which leads to all sorts of weird effects - is no longer is relevant. Its very backwater these days - like Lorentz Ether Theory is to relativity. You cant disprove it, but modern presentations of SR based on symmetry make it totally irrelevant.Is there any proof for the consciousness causes collapses idea?
Yes, but if you look later, you only know what is there later. You cannot know what was there before. You can only assume that it was there before, but you cannot prove that assumption by scientific method. You can "prove" it by using some philosophy, but philosophy is not science, right?Hm, but you can look later on the photoplate or (nowadays) the digitallly stored measurement data and check what the detector has registered. The investigated system only "cares" about what it's really interacting with, i.e., the detector and not with some "consciousness" (whatever that might be) looking at the result (maybe 100 years later)!
In Bohmian Mechanics, the wave function of the universe does not collapse. Yet Bohmian Mechanics says that predictions obtained with collapse are correct. Since objectively the wave function of the universe does not collapse, I thought wave function collapse in Bohmian Mechanics is subjective (ie. requires consciousness).No, why do you ask?
This is very much like saying that validity of Bayes formula for conditional probability requires consciousness. Would you say that Bayes formula requires consciousness?In Bohmian Mechanics, the wave function of the universe does not collapse. Yet Bohmian Mechanics says that predictions obtained with collapse are correct. Since objectively the wave function of the universe does not collapse, I thought wave function collapse in Bohmian Mechanics is subjective (ie. requires consciousness).
How that works? I would also like to know that general powerful technique of argumentation based on Bayes.With an argument involving Bayes and his (purely mathematical) theorem nowadays you can argue for anything you like, including a huge pile of bovine excrements. SCNR
I'm not sure. My instinct is to say it depends.This is very much like saying that validity of Bayes formula for conditional probability requires consciousness. Would you say that Bayes formula requires consciousness?
Surely no need to "create" since the name at least is already in use? E.g.Well, you can, e.g., create a whole new philosophy "of it all" called "quantum Bayesianism".
Sounds wise. How does the personal judgement of the agent affect a future interaction or measurement of the state. Is there still a state if there is no agent ?Surely no need to "create" since the name at least is already in use? E.g.
I know about this only because it is one of many interpretations discussed in Michael Raymer's July 2017 book from Oxford U. Press, Quantum Physics: What Everyone Needs to Know.
And certainly @atyy is correct when he says "If interpreted in a subjective Bayesian sense, then Bayes's theorem does require consciousness"; here's a syllogism from the last link above, a slide show put together by Schack:
A quantum state determines probabilities through the Born rule.
Probabilities are personal judgements of the agent who assigns them.
HENCE: A quantum state is a personal judgement of the agent who assigns it.
I would say that Bayesian probability is probability done right, but luckily for frequentists, the difference between a correct Bayesian analysis and in incorrect frequentist analysis disappears in the limit of many trials.Ok, it's a matter of opinion, but I consider this subjective interpretation of probabilities as gibberish. Nobody following this new idea (why it is attributed to poor Bayes is not clear to me either by the way) has ever been able to explain to me what this means for real-world measurements, which use of course the frequentist interpretation of probabilities, and the frequentist interpretation just works. So why do I need a new unsharp subjective redefinition about the statistical meaning of probability theory?