Study Favors Q-Mind - Support for quantum consciousness?

[testingus]

But if you go from a (somewhat) specific proposal like Orch-OR to just non-specific "There may be more quantum effects that play a crucial role" then there is nothing to discuss. Action potential and synchrony in the brain depend on chemistry which depends on quantum mechanics.

Maybe I am being a bit too loose with the term "quantum effects". What I mean when I write this is "non-trivial" quantum effects which take advantage of entanglement, superposition, coherence etc., as opposed to "trivial" quantum effects like van der Waals forces, and hydrogen bonds.

What I seem to be gathering from these posts is that:
a) There is no objection to the notion that biology depends on chemistry which depends on trivial quantum effects.
b) There is some support for non-trivial effects in brain function (superposition in ion channels (see Bernroider et al. 2012) or dissipative quantum field theory descriptions of neurodynamics (see Capolupo et al. 2013 courtesy of DiracPool )).
c) There is staunch disagreement with the Orch OR theory of consciousness.

The OP was interested in "Why is quantum computing in microtubules considered woo?". It is clear that it is considered woo due to point c). The disagreement with Orch OR stems from:
a) The reliance on Diosi-Penrose collapse, which is not a proven form of quantum mechanics, although it can be tested. Additionally, Rosa and Faber suggest that quantum computation in brain microtubules may make use of decoherence as opposed to objective collapse circumventing this issue.
b) The lack of connection with functional neuroanatomy and neurophysiology, and the difference in scales between neural oscillations and quantum phenomena, however the work of Craddock et al., Plankar et al., and Capolupo et al. suggest ways in which this may be reconciled.

So while the notion of quantum computing in microtubules being related to brain function is lacking in a complete description of how this would work, and is not experimentally verified at this point, I think I can say that it is not “woo” which implies a psuedo-scientific non-testable hypothesis.

 

[Pythagorean]

The reason it's considered woo is because neither mainstream neuroscientists nor mainstream quantum physicists find it's premises valid (and we've discussed some of the issues with in this thread).

 

[testingus]

The reason it's considered woo is because neither mainstream neuroscientists nor mainstream quantum physicists find it's premises valid (and we've discussed some of the issues with in this thread).

What classifies some one as the "mainstream"? Roger Penrose was a prominent physicist, and I dare say mainstream, until the Emperor's New Mind. Walter Freeman is a well known neuroscientist, but advocates for dissipative quantum brain dynamics.

Please note I am specifically discussing quantum computation in microtubules, not necessarily Orch OR. To say something is "woo" (i.e. pseudo-science) because it is not popular is not very scientific. I've listed the two cogent criticisms brought up against Orch OR in this thread. These are both valid concerns. The first is open to experimental verification. The second shows that Orch OR is not consistent with "mainstream" neuroscience, but does not necessarily rule out quantum computation in microtubules (as separate from the Orch OR mechanism and theory) being related to brain function, (see the papers cited). If there are other arguments listed in this thread that I have missed that are brought up against quantum computation in microtubules related to brain function (not Orch OR) please feel free to state them explicitly.

 

[atyy]

I wouldn't consider Orch-OR unscientific, just subjectively unlikely on current data. But let's be clear, the only motivation for Orch-OR or decoherence as an explanation for consciousness is the hard problem, right?

 

[Pythagorean]

What classifies some one as the "mainstream"? Roger Penrose was a prominent physicist, and I dare say mainstream, until the Emperor's New Mind. Walter Freeman is a well known neuroscientist, but advocates for dissipative quantum brain dynamics.

It's a good question; it's a matter of sociology than science. I don't know that esteem really matters so much as consensus and authority. Stuart Hameroff's vocal associations of quantum mind with spirituality and Brahman philosophy probably doesn't help the case for quantum mind.

Please note I am specifically discussing quantum computation in microtubules, not necessarily Orch OR. To say something is "woo" (i.e. pseudo-science) because it is not popular is not very scientific. I've listed the two cogent criticisms brought up against Orch OR in this thread. These are both valid concerns. The first is open to experimental verification. The second shows that Orch OR is not consistent with "mainstream" neuroscience, but does not necessarily rule out quantum computation in microtubules (as separate from the Orch OR mechanism and theory) being related to brain function, (see the papers cited). If there are other arguments listed in this thread that I have missed that are brought up against quantum computation in microtubules related to brain function (not Orch OR) please feel free to state them explicitly.

I agree. To say something is woo at all is not really scientific, it's more of an administrative function for science, guided by social factors (basically, in the name of brevity, we don't want to spend too much energy on every pet theory because we're not going to be alive long enough to learn everything). Of course we can't prove a negative, so there can always be an exceptions to the criticisms.

 

[madness]

Please note I am specifically discussing quantum computation in microtubules, not necessarily Orch OR.

I wouldn't be shocked if there were quantum computation in microtubules, or some other subcellular processes. I would be very surprised if this was directly to consciousness, however, since as far as we know microtubules are not performing any cognitive functions.

 

[testingus]

I wouldn't consider Orch-OR unscientific, just subjectively unlikely on current data. But let's be clear, the only motivation for Orch-OR or decoherence as an explanation for consciousness is the hard problem, right?

Any theory of consciousness will eventually encounter the 'hard problem', however it is not the only motivation. From what I've read the rationale for a quantum description is to address the following:

1) The nature of subjective experience and how conscious experience arises from the combined action of neuronal, synaptic and molecular processes. (This is the hard problem aspect).
2) How spatially distributed brain activities bind together to produce the unity of consicous perception, known as the Binding Problem. (DiracPool gave a couple of references addressing this at both the neural and quantum levels.)
3) What is the critical level of complexity required by a system to have consciousness. (This may be a spectrum, and I think this is what is attempted by Tononi's IIT, however the question of scale, and the enhancement of IIT by subneural components remains open).
4) How a system based on the deterministic laws of classical physics accounts for non-computable processes such as consciousness. (The non-algorithmic nature of consciousness is brought up by Penrose's Goedel argument. Some have argued for this type of behavior at the edge of chaos (see Stuart Kaufmann and the article below specifically for the role in quantum biology)).
5) How can a system based on deterministic laws account for concepts such as free will. (This starts into the realm of philosophy, "Is there such thing as free will?" etc. If it's pure determinism, then no. If QM theories are truly random than is it really free will? Some thing at the edge might account for this. Is it orchestrated?)
6) How can a neural level of consciousness account for the rudimentary 'consciousness' observed in single cell organisms.

Vattay, G., Kauffman, S., & Niiranen, S. (2014). Quantum biology on the edge of quantum chaos. PloS one, 9(3), e89017.

 

[testingus]

It's a good question; it's a matter of sociology than science. I don't know that esteem really matters so much as consensus and authority. Stuart Hameroff's vocal associations of quantum mind with spirituality and Brahman philosophy probably doesn't help the case for quantum mind.

I agree. Associations with 'new age', 'eastern' or 'spiritual' philosophies naturally puts skeptical scientists on edge. That's not to say that there isn't parallels, however, it doesn't win an argument by saying it jives with what the mystics have been saying all along. That being said, it does raise the question of 'pre-conceived belief' systems in science. Is materialism really better than the alternative when it comes to understanding the world around us. Does materialism cause us to leave important aspects "on the sidewalk"? I don't know, and am wary to enter this type of discussion. This is a question for philosophers.

I agree. To say something is woo at all is not really scientific, it's more of an administrative function for science, guided by social factors (basically, in the name of brevity, we don't want to spend too much energy on every pet theory because we're not going to be alive long enough to learn everything). Of course we can't prove a negative, so there can always be an exceptions to the criticisms.

All we can really do is follow where the evidence points, regardless of what it means socially or philosophically.

 

[testingus]

I wouldn't be shocked if there were quantum computation in microtubules, or some other subcellular processes. I would be very surprised if this was directly to consciousness, however, since as far as we know microtubules are not performing any cognitive functions.

Of course the natural follow up question is, what is meant by cognitive function? Single cell slime mold can use tendrils composed of bundles of microtubules to forming patterns which, seek food, and solve problems such as escaping a maze (Adamatzky 2012). This relates to point 6) brought up in the previous post of the reason for looking at subneural processes as the rudiments of consciousness/cognitive processing.

If each neuron possesses highly integrated subneural components, and these neurons are highly integrated to form the brain, all this means is that the brain, cognition and consciousness, are way more complex than previously surmised. Would a single cell be as conscious as a human? No. But rudimentary cognition in single cells may provide the basis.

Adamatzky A. (2012). Slime mould computes planar shapes. Int. J. Bio-Inspired Comput. 4, 149–154

 

[madness]

Of course the natural follow up question is, what is meant by cognitive function?

In this particular context, it means the functional/computational operations with which conscious experience is associated. Consciousness doesn't just exist as a thing in and of itself, it exists as the subjective feeling associated with some functional processes occurring within the brain. Since microtubules don't carry out the compuations underlying these cognitive processes, they are probably not involved in conscious experience.

Single cell slime mold can use tendrils composed of bundles of microtubules to forming patterns which, seek food, and solve problems such as escaping a maze (Adamatzky 2012). This relates to point 6) brought up in the previous post of the reason for looking at subneural processes as the rudiments of consciousness/cognitive processing.

I don't expect that single cell organisms have a rudimentary level of consciousness as you claim. Of course I cannot prove that they don't, however.

If each neuron possesses highly integrated subneural components, and these neurons are highly integrated to form the brain, all this means is that the brain, cognition and consciousness, are way more complex than previously surmised. Would a single cell be as conscious as a human? No. But rudimentary cognition in single cells may provide the basis.

I don't know of any evidence that these heirarchical processing are integrated in a way which is relevant for conscious experience (e.g., that they have a high level of integrated information). We would more typically view subcellular processes are performing the necessary support roles to allow neurons and circuits to function correctly.

 

[DiracPool]

Any theory of consciousness will eventually encounter the 'hard problem', however it is not the only motivation. From what I've read the rationale for a quantum description is to address the following:

IMO, the rationale for a quantum description leads largely from the “Law of the minimization of mystery” phenomenon I alluded to in an earlier post. Of course, at the end of the day, we’d all like to have both a classical description of what consciousness is as well as a quantum description, along with a satisfying “correspondence principle” to bridge the two. However, I don’t think we’re ready for a quantum model of consciousness just yet. Why? Because we don’t have a well agreed upon model of how cognition and phenomena such as “self” and “agency” are created in the human brain and whether or not any sort of homologue of these experiential phenomena exist in nonhuman species. Until we have better handle on that from a classical perspective, what insight can we hope to gain from a quantum description of the same enigma?

Of course the natural follow up question is, what is meant by cognitive function? Single cell slime mold can use tendrils composed of bundles of microtubules to forming patterns which, seek food, and solve problems such as escaping a maze (Adamatzky 2012). This relates to point 6) brought up in the previous post of the reason for looking at subneural processes as the rudiments of consciousness/cognitive processing.

If each neuron possesses highly integrated subneural components, and these neurons are highly integrated to form the brain, all this means is that the brain, cognition and consciousness, are way more complex than previously surmised. Would a single cell be as conscious as a human? No. But rudimentary cognition in single cells may provide the basis.

I personally think there is significant, qualitative difference between human consciousness and nonhuman consciousness and that trying to define consciousness as a sort of unified phenomenon common to all animal species with a nervous system that arises from some sort of ill-defined “quantum coherence” is really missing the point. The place to start is in 1) studying the evolutionary functional neuroanatomy of vertebrates in particular, 2) develop a classical model of the differences in brain function and it’s relation to cognitive function across genera, and only then 3) look to how quantum processes may yield additional insight into the discussion of what conscious experience is from a biophysical perspective.

3) What is the critical level of complexity required by a system to have consciousness. (This may be a spectrum, and I think this is what is attempted by Tononi's IIT, however the question of scale, and the enhancement of IIT by subneural components remains open).

I would be very surprised if there was a link between the level of complexity or "information integration" of a system and whether it is conscious or not, much less there being a defined threshold for such. IMO, that is a non-instructive path to understanding how conscious experience evolved in the human brain.

 

[Pythagorean]

IMO, the rationale for a quantum description leads largely from the “Law of the minimization of mystery” phenomenon I alluded to in an earlier post. Of course, at the end of the day, we’d all like to have both a classical description of what consciousness is as well as a quantum description, along with a satisfying “correspondence principle” to bridge the two. However, I don’t think we’re ready for a quantum model of consciousness just yet. Why? Because we don’t have a well agreed upon model of how cognition and phenomena such as “self” and “agency” are created in the human brain and whether or not any sort of homologue of these experiential phenomena exist in nonhuman species. Until we have better handle on that from a classical perspective, what insight can we hope to gain from a quantum description of the same enigma?
I personally think there is significant, qualitative difference between human consciousness and nonhuman consciousness and that trying to define consciousness as a sort of unified phenomenon common to all animal species with a nervous system that arises from some sort of ill-defined “quantum coherence” is really missing the point. The place to start is in 1) studying the evolutionary functional neuroanatomy of vertebrates in particular, 2) develop a classical model of the differences in brain function and it’s relation to cognitive function across genera, and only then 3) look to how quantum processes may yield additional insight into the discussion of what conscious experience is from a biophysical perspective.
I would be very surprised if there was a link between the level of complexity or "information integration" of a system and whether it is conscious or not, much less there being a defined threshold for such. IMO, that is a non-instructive path to understanding how conscious experience evolved in the human brain.

I mostly agree. Particularly that consciousness probably emerges differently in different organisms. Since we find neural correlates of particular aspects of consciousness across all humans, but only some of the homologous brain structures (with similar function) in other animals, we can only assume that other animals have a different kind of consciousness and that some don't seem to have any of the neural equipment associated with consciousness.

I do think there's a benefit to having a score and a threshold. Similar to a medical diagnosis, the score isn't a definitive test and is only a tool to help troubleshoot consciousness, but it can help researchers (or medical professionals) investigate if the scoring is shown to have validity in a roc curve.