Study Favors Q-Mind - Support for quantum consciousness?

[testingus]

I've read a lot of posts talking about quantum consciousness, and it seems the general consensus is that it is crack, woo, psuedoscience etc. But then I found a news feed that pointed to this,

Travis John Adrian Craddock, Douglas Friesen, Jonathan Mane, Stuart Hameroff, and Jack A. Tuszynski. The feasibility of coherent energy transfer in microtubules. J. R. Soc. Interface, 2014; 11(100): 20140677; DOI:10.1098/rsif.2014.0677 1742-5662

It comes from Hameroff, the purveyor of the infamous Orch OR quantum theory of consciousness. However, it's published in a respectable journal. I'm not sure what to believe. If this is published work, why is quantum computing in microtubules considered woo?

I've asked this elsewhere, but have not received a straight response. Any insight would be appreciated.

Note: original newsfeed http://www.newswise.com/articles/new-study-favors-quantum-mind

 

[Doug Huffman]

I am intrigued by the quantization of entropy information at the root of the Holographic Principle and will attend to developments associating it with ego/consciousness.

 

[Choppy]

It's important to make the distinction between a study that investigates the coherent energy transfer in microtubules and the implication that orchestrated objective reduction is the basis for consciousness.

One is a small, incremental step. The other is a giant leap.

Knowing the difference is very important when you're standing on a cliff.

 

[testingus]

But this opens the door to it being a possibility, doesn't it? While it doesn't confirm quantum consciousness, it does provide a mechanism that could support quantum computation in the brain.

 

[madness]

Personally, I don't see where the link between quantum computation and consciousness is supposed to be. The quantum computation part is a reasonable scientific hypothesis which should be amenable to experiments and falsification, but I don't know whether quantum consciousness could be confirmed even in principle.

 

[Pythagorean]

But this opens the door to it being a possibility, doesn't it? While it doesn't confirm quantum consciousness, it does provide a mechanism that could support quantum computation in the brain.

Well... it doesn't overcome the chief criticisms of Quantum Mind: namely that the processes associated with neural events are on time scales and over spatial distances too long and far for unique QM effects to be significant (I mean, obviously you can argue that all the classical things happening are actually QM underneath, but that's not what Quantum Mind is saying - it's saying that phenomena unique to QM is playing a role).

Another objection is that there are plenty of classical based theories of consciousness that have been more fruitful:

http://www.biolbull.org/content/215/3/216.full

the fruit:

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23946194
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16195466

 

[testingus]

Well... it doesn't overcome the chief criticisms of Quantum Mind: namely that the processes associated with neural events are on time scales and over spatial distances too long and far for unique QM effects to be significant (I mean, obviously you can argue that all the classical things happening are actually QM underneath, but that's not what Quantum Mind is saying - it's saying that phenomena unique to QM is playing a role).

Another objection is that there are plenty of classical based theories of consciousness that have been more fruitful:

http://www.biolbull.org/content/215/3/216.full

the fruit:

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23946194
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16195466

I understand that this is the case. These effects would need to be propagated to timescales of milliseconds, and I'm not sure how this could be done. However, excited tryptophan can radiate by both fluorescence, and phosphorescence, with the later taking place on time scales of 1 ms or greater. There is no proof for this, but could this not provide a link between picosecond quantum calcs, and ms neuron firings?

I'm new to the work of Tononi, but it looks intriguing. As far as I know it's based on the idea of integrated information, and depends on how the complexity of the system is defined i.e. where the "cruelest cuts" may be made. However, I don't think that spatio temporal scales are well defined. He makes a hypothesis that this is at the scale of neurons on the timescale of milliseconds, but why not the microtubule cytoskeleton in neurons?

I would also like to see how PCI measures are affected by hallucinogens like psylocibin, a so-called consciousness enhancing drug. The following show decreased activity in brains under psylocibin in an fMRI study. This is not EEG, but if the trend holds it would suggest that the PCI value would be closer to unconscious.

http://www.pnas.org/content/109/6/2138.abstract

 

[testingus]

Personally, I don't see where the link between quantum computation and consciousness is supposed to be. The quantum computation part is a reasonable scientific hypothesis which should be amenable to experiments and falsification, but I don't know whether quantum consciousness could be confirmed even in principle.

This is true for all theories of consciousness, isn't it (Tononi's work not excluded)? I think the link between quantum computation, and consciousness comes in the transition. While computing the quantum state would be unconscious (i.e. superpositions, unmeasured system etc.), the realization of a specific state of the system (through measurement, decoherence or some sort of objective collapse) would then be considered a conscious event.

 

[Pythagorean]

I would also like to see how PCI measures are affected by hallucinogens like psylocibin, a so-called consciousness enhancing drug. The following show decreased activity in brains under psylocibin in an fMRI study. This is not EEG, but if the trend holds it would suggest that the PCI value would be closer to unconscious.

http://www.pnas.org/content/109/6/2138.abstract

I think it depends on context. The brain has break systems and accelerator systems. If you disable a break system, you could be enabling other systems. The paper you cite indicates as much (using the term "unconstrained cognition"). Other research has indicated enhancement of memory recall, which is useful for the reversal of cognitive biases:

http://bjp.rcpsych.org/content/200/3/238.short

But "conscious-enhancing" the way a spiritual/recreational user might define it is different than how a neuroscientist like Tononi would define it. In meditation practices, taoism, and many sects of buddhist, conscious minimalism (emptying your mind of thoughts) is a step to enlightenment - (an enhanced cognitive state). To some extent, the loudness of your own consciousness is a distraction from development of that same consciousness. A person suffering a paranoid schizophrenic anxiety attack must be experiencing a high degree of consciousness, but that's not really helpful to them. Being overly self-conscious can inhibit development of your social cognition. So when we transcribe laymen claims like this, we have to be careful to separate a "consciousness" in general as measured by information complexity vs. the quality and kind of consciousness the laymen are talking about.

 

[madness]

This is true for all theories of consciousness, isn't it (Tononi's work not excluded)? I think the link between quantum computation, and consciousness comes in the transition. While computing the quantum state would be unconscious (i.e. superpositions, unmeasured system etc.), the realization of a specific state of the system (through measurement, decoherence or some sort of objective collapse) would then be considered a conscious event.

To some extent, yes, but in some quite important ways, no. Tononi's theory has specific frameworks for predicting the degree of consciousness (phi) and the quality of consciousness (the "qualia complex"). I don't think theories of quantum computation do that at the moment. Of course, the fundamental question of "why?" still remains, just as it still remains in any scientific theory.

 

[testingus]

I think it depends on context. The brain has break systems and accelerator systems. If you disable a break system, you could be enabling other systems. ...

So when we transcribe laymen claims like this, we have to be careful to separate a "consciousness" in general as measured by information complexity vs. the quality and kind of consciousness the laymen are talking about.

Could you please describe the relevance of break systems and accelerator systems.

The fMRI psylocibin seems to quiet the brain, would this not result in a lower PCI?

 

[Pythagorean]

Could you please describe the relevance of break systems and accelerator systems.

The fMRI psylocibin seems to quiet the brain, would this not result in a lower PCI?

Less break may result in less activity measured, but is actually letting another system do more. Coffee, for instance, disables a break system.

Not necissarily. Twenty violins all playing the same note are louder but less complex than two violins playing harmonic melodies.

But my point was that even if it leads to a lower PCI, it's still erroneous to equate the recreationalist's "enhanced consciousness" with a higher consciousness score the way Tonini defines it.

 

[testingus]

... Twenty violins all playing the same note are louder but less complex than two violins playing harmonic melodies.

But my point was that even if it leads to a lower PCI, it's still erroneous to equate the recreationalist's "enhanced consciousness" with a higher consciousness score the way Tonini defines it.

I'm assuming that two violins in discord would be less complex, while twenty violins in harmony be greater. So, does this mean that PCI/Integrated information relies on things being coordinated?

I see your point regarding the recreationalist's "enhanced consciousness", however in the Sci Transl Med paper you link to they show that REM sleep has a PCI near equivalent to normal wakefulness. This suggests that we are conscious in our dreams (without necessarily being lucid). I don't see why psylocibin, which produces vivid hallucinations, would potentially lead to a lower PCI, if REM dreams result in PCI similar to being awake.

 

[Pythagorean]

I'm assuming that two violins in discord would be less complex, while twenty violins in harmony be greater. So, does this mean that PCI/Integrated information relies on things being coordinated?

I see your point regarding the recreationalist's "enhanced consciousness", however in the Sci Transl Med paper you link to they show that REM sleep has a PCI near equivalent to normal wakefulness. This suggests that we are conscious in our dreams (without necessarily being lucid). I don't see why psylocibin, which produces vivid hallucinations, would potentially lead to a lower PCI, if REM dreams result in PCI similar to being awake.

If you think in terms of the entropy in the state space of the violins, there's no reason discord would be more or less complex than harmony. In some aspects, it may be more complex (caused by beating between the notes).

As noted in the paper you cited, psylocibin dissociates two regions of the brain that are normally not so dissociated. As I was saying about break systems, you're essentially removing a break (presumably the PFC). It changes the quality of the conscious experience in a dramatic way, but that doesn't indicate how the quantity of consciousness (here measured by PCI) might change. That's what I've been trying to explain, qualitative aspects of consciousness vs. quantitative aspects. PCI measures quantity, our subjective experience is all that can measure quality.

 

[testingus]

...It changes the quality of the conscious experience in a dramatic way, but that doesn't indicate how the quantity of consciousness (here measured by PCI) might change. That's what I've been trying to explain, qualitative aspects of consciousness vs. quantitative aspects. PCI measures quantity, our subjective experience is all that can measure quality.

Then why is PCI considered a good measure of consciousness? What does quantity of consciousness even mean? For arguments sake, let's say that PCI is reduced in psylocibin use, but subjectively a user has a profound experience, then PCI is not a good measure of consciousness. Equating integrated information with consciousness can be considered a semantic spook, if it does not reflect the subjective experience.

Back to the OP, can this be interpreted in terms of quantum computation? If one considers unconscious experience the same as the quantum computation, and conscious experience as the measurable (i.e. experienced) end result, then I don't see why not.

 

[testingus]

If you think in terms of the entropy in the state space of the violins, there's no reason discord would be more or less complex than harmony. In some aspects, it may be more complex (caused by beating between the notes).

I think that this would result in a loss of information overall. I mean if the signal is lost in the noise, then how is the information integrated?

 

[Nugatory]

But this opens the door to it being a possibility, doesn't it? While it doesn't confirm quantum consciousness, it does provide a mechanism that could support quantum computation in the brain.

That newsfeed article is greatly overstating the case - "Provides a mechanism" is a much weaker statement than "favors", and a more accurate headline would be "New study nether conforms nor denies quantum consciousness" This is fairly typical of bad science journalism, unfortunately.

There's a related thread in the QM subforum: What are the problems with the Orch-Or Consciousness Theory?

 

[Pythagorean]

Then why is PCI considered a good measure of consciousness? What does quantity of consciousness even mean? For arguments sake, let's say that PCI is reduced in psylocibin use, but subjectively a user has a profound experience, then PCI is not a good measure of consciousness. Equating integrated information with consciousness can be considered a semantic spook, if it does not reflect the subjective experience.

There's two chief reasons why quantifying consciousness is important: 1) measuring consciousness in coma patients for medical purposes and 2) measuring consciousness of animals for ethical purposes in animal research. The point is to determine whether the subject of the test has a conscious experience at all, not the quality of it. The quality of consciousness is basically described (or rather, correlated with neural structures and dynamics) by the fields of cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology.

 

[testingus]

There's two chief reasons why quantifying consciousness is important: 1) measuring consciousness in coma patients for medical purposes and 2) measuring consciousness of animals for ethical purposes in animal research. The point is to determine whether the subject of the test has a conscious experience at all, not the quality of it. The quality of consciousness is basically described (or rather, correlated with neural structures and dynamics) by the fields of cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology.

I'm not saying that knowing if a subject is conscious or not, is not important. In fact I believe that it is deeply important. However, I think that merely attributing consciousness to some measure that does not account for the subjective feel of an experience is dangerous ground. If my integrated information was through the roof, but inwardly I felt nothing, then who cares. Vice versa if my integrated information is near the floor, but I vivdly experience my own dissection that would be a downright shame.

For a viewpoint on why integrated information is not a good measure of consciousness see:
http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799

It's long, and gets in deep to some computational math, but I think his point is valid.

 

[testingus]

That newsfeed article is greatly overstating the case - "Provides a mechanism" is a much weaker statement than "favors", and a more accurate headline would be "New study nether conforms nor denies quantum consciousness" This is fairly typical of bad science journalism, unfortunately.

There's a related thread in the QM subforum: What are the problems with the Orch-Or Consciousness Theory?

I agree, the journalism is sensational. I took a look in the other post and saw a statement that said the Orch OR model could not be falsified as is therefore invalid. However, I thought that there were 20 testable predictions made by Hameroff that could invalidate it.

 

[Pythagorean]

I'm not saying that knowing if a subject is conscious or not, is not important. In fact I believe that it is deeply important. However, I think that merely attributing consciousness to some measure that does not account for the subjective feel of an experience is dangerous ground. If my integrated information was through the roof, but inwardly I felt nothing, then who cares. Vice versa if my integrated information is near the floor, but I vivdly experience my own dissection that would be a downright shame.

For a viewpoint on why integrated information is not a good measure of consciousness see:
http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799

It's long, and gets in deep to some computational math, but I think his point is valid.

What is his point?

If I google "integrated information theory criticism" or "problems with integrated information theory" it's google's first result. How do I know you are not simply looking for something that confirms your preconcieved beliefs? It would be helpful if you outlined his point instead of just posting link and requiring readers to read the whole thing.

Anyway, I am not an IIT advocate, I can neither confirm nor deny, etc. But I do like that people are thinking about the problem.

 

[Nugatory]

However, I thought that there were 20 testable predictions made by Hameroff that could invalidate it.

Do you have a source for that?

 

[testingus]

Do you have a source for that?

http://www.alice.id.tue.nl/references/hameroff-1998.pdf

See page 23.

 

[testingus]

What is his point?

If I google "integrated information theory criticism" or "problems with integrated information theory" it's google's first result. How do I know you are not simply looking for something that confirms your preconcieved beliefs? It would be helpful if you outlined his point instead of just posting link and requiring readers to read the whole thing.

Anyway, I am not an IIT advocate, I can neither confirm nor deny, etc. But I do like that people are thinking about the problem.

My apologies. I don't think that I can do justice to his point (that would require reading the actual information), but to try and sum it up, systems that rationally would not be considered conscious, or even intelligent, can be shown to have an enormous amount of integrated information (ie. large quantity of consciousness).

I would also like to point out that I do not have any "preconcieved beliefs" in either IIT or quantum consciousness, and hope you are not insinuating that I do. I am posting out of curiosity and the hope for intelligent discussion. It is good that people are thinking, and talking about these issues. I find too often these types of discussions turn to people digging in their heels and refusing to hear what the other side has to say. I hope this won't be the case here.

 

[madness]

systems that rationally would not be considered conscious, or even intelligent, can be shown to have an enormous amount of integrated information

This is a slippery issue. Which systems would rationally be considered conscious? Searle's Chinese room? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room ... Or the China brain? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_brain

What I'm getting at, is that nobody agrees on what would "rationally be considered conscious". Functionalists think that the population of China would become a conscious system if they organised themselves in such a way as to mimic the actions of neurons in a brain. Similarly, proponents of information theory think that any system with high integrated information will be conscious.

 

[testingus]

This is a slippery issue. Which systems would rationally be considered conscious? Searle's Chinese room? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room ... Or the China brain? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_brain

What I'm getting at, is that nobody agrees on what would "rationally be considered conscious". Functionalists think that the population of China would become a conscious system if they organised themselves in such a way as to mimic the actions of neurons in a brain. Similarly, proponents of information theory think that any system with high integrated information will be conscious.

Yes, nobody agrees, so how can this be reconciled? Panpsychism? Everything is conscious at some level? Philosophers have debated this years on end.

What about only life can support consciousness (yes, this open the question of what does it mean to be living)? I may be wrong, but I think we can agree at least that animals have an inner subjective consciousness. No?

 

[Pythagorean]

The functionalists have some kind of clout though, since many aspect of consciousness are social constructs - masculinity, morality and religion, even perception of the self is modulated through a social lens. Some even go as far as to say consciousness IS a social construct:

http://journals.cambridge.org/actio...age=online&aid=30921&fileId=S0140525X99001806

And the integrated information approach is reasonable from a monist point of view: the basic fact is that matter can have consciousness; not all matter, but at the very least matter in the configuration of humans. If you accept that it must fit within the confines of cause and effect like every other phenomena we study in nature, then it must have to do with how the matter is arranged and the dynamics of the statespace of that matter. If that's the case, then why should it be unique to brains in living organisms? If we can set up the same interactions in another material, that material should have consciousness. Otherwise, we're accepting dualism - that there's some kind of special ethereal plane from which consciousness comes - and somehow it only can take up the vessels of living organisms, and that wouldn't be consistent with the trend of every other phenomena we studied (that it all comes down to physics).

As to the consciousness of animals, scientists use what they know about human consciousness and associated neural structures to define ethical guidelines for when animals might be capable of suffering. You have to, under anesthesia, remove the forebrains of amphibians before performing experiments to minimize their suffering. The general consensus is that invertebrates (like insects) lack the neural structures required for a conscious experience - it's still a debate whether lower vertebrates, like fish, "have feelings". It is not a completely informed consensus, lacking a robust theory of consciousness, but it's the best guess we have right now. Thus, why approaches like Tonini's are welcome - even if they may be flawed, finding those flaws and addressing them is the next step.

 

[testingus]

The functionalists have some kind of clout though, since many aspect of consciousness are social constructs - masculinity, morality and religion, even perception of the self is modulated through a social lens. Some even go as far as to say consciousness IS a social construct:

http://journals.cambridge.org/actio...age=online&aid=30921&fileId=S0140525X99001806

And the integrated information approach is reasonable from a monist point of view: the basic fact is that matter can have consciousness; not all matter, but at the very least matter in the configuration of humans. If you accept that it must fit within the confines of cause and effect like every other phenomena we study in nature, then it must have to do with how the matter is arranged and the dynamics of the statespace of that matter. If that's the case, then why should it be unique to brains in living organisms? If we can set up the same interactions in another material, that material should have consciousness. Otherwise, we're accepting dualism - that there's some kind of special ethereal plane from which consciousness comes - and somehow it only can take up the vessels of living organisms, and that wouldn't be consistent with the trend of every other phenomena we studied (that it all comes down to physics).

As to the consciousness of animals, scientists use what they know about human consciousness and associated neural structures to define ethical guidelines for when animals might be capable of suffering. You have to, under anesthesia, remove the forebrains of amphibians before performing experiments to minimize their suffering. The general consensus is that invertebrates (like insects) lack the neural structures required for a conscious experience - it's still a debate whether lower vertebrates, like fish, "have feelings". It is not a completely informed consensus, lacking a robust theory of consciousness, but it's the best guess we have right now. Thus, why approaches like Tonini's are welcome - even if they may be flawed, finding those flaws and addressing them is the next step.

Okay, let's changes gears here for a second. What if the integrated information of the microtubule cytoskeleton shows a high "quantity" of consciousness? What would that mean for quantum views of consciousness?

 

[madness]

Okay, let's changes gears here for a second. What if the integrated information of the microtubule cytoskeleton shows a high "quantity" of consciousness? What would that mean for quantum views of consciousness?

There are a couple of important things to consider here. Firstly, the microtubules would have to show a high level of integrated information globally across the brain, not individually (otherwise each would be a separate conscious entity). Secondly, there is what David Chalmers calls the "coherence between consciousness and cognition" - i.e., there is some kind of isomorphism between cognitive apparatus and conscious experience. For example, there is a strong isomorphism between the quality of colour experience and the neural firing properties in the visual cortex which is processing this colour information. For the microtubule theory of consciousness to work in conjunction with integrated information theory, there would have to be both a global integration of information across microtubules in the brain, and this information would have to somehow represent the cognitive processes associated with our subjective experience. I don't think either of those are true.

 

[Pythagorean]

Okay, let's changes gears here for a second. What if the integrated information of the microtubule cytoskeleton shows a high "quantity" of consciousness? What would that mean for quantum views of consciousness?

Well, first, I'm not sure how you would translate the measurement from a classical system to a quantum system to be able to make a valid comparison of a consciousness index. But ignoring that and assuming IIT is a true and correct theory (which I don't assert):

It would still be a question of "who" it belonged to. If it doesn't correlate with the timescales (or spatial scales as madness indicated above) of human experience (and their neural correlates) it's hard to make the case that the system's alleged consciousness could be attributed to the human conscious experience. If consciousness is something that emerges from physical interactions, then it may show up to varying degrees in different subsystems that make up one whole subsystem that has a quantity of consciousness. If IIT is a true theory, then highly coupled conscious systems would make a superconscious system (so long as the coupling doesn't disrupt the consciousness score of the contributing components). Thus, the collective consciousness of a culture or society is made up individual conscious beings. A conscious being may be made of individual conscious components.

 

[testingus]

Firstly, the microtubules would have to show a high level of integrated information globally across the brain, not individually (otherwise each would be a separate conscious entity).

From your previous post, IIT posits that a single neuron could be a conscious entity, but what I think you and Pythagorean are saying is that to create the human conscious experience these individual entities would themselves need to be integrated. If the brain is already rich in IIT at the neuron level then the later is a given. What is then required is for IIT in the microtubule cytoskeleton to be both rich, and relevant timescale wise to neuron function. Is this correct? But isn't function of the microtubule network already relevant at the timescale needed to allow neurons to work properly (i.e. ion channel function, neurotransmitter trafficking etc.)? This would only leave showing that this function of the cytoskeleton possesses a significant IIT.

Secondly, there is what David Chalmers calls the "coherence between consciousness and cognition" - i.e., there is some kind of isomorphism between cognitive apparatus and conscious experience. For example, there is a strong isomorphism between the quality of colour experience and the neural firing properties in the visual cortex which is processing this colour information.

Do you have a source for this?

For the microtubule theory of consciousness to work in conjunction with integrated information theory, there would have to be both a global integration of information across microtubules in the brain, and this information would have to somehow represent the cognitive processes associated with our subjective experience.

I'm not suggesting divorcing the neuron level involvement in cognitive function from microtubule function, but rather saying that the function of the microtubule cytoskeleton supplements the neuron function providing for a deeper level of integrated information (ie. higher IIT for the brain overall). Alluding to Pythagorean's statement, each neuron could function as a conscious entity, but join to some super entity which is the brain. This would not separate standard neuroscience from the microtubule level, but would extend it.

I don't think either of those are true.

In the words of Pythagorean, is this some sort of "preconceived belief" or do you have backing for this statement. I'm not saying that there is proof for the alternative, but simply dismissing it out of hand without evidence would be unscientific.

 

[testingus]

Well, first, I'm not sure how you would translate the measurement from a classical system to a quantum system to be able to make a valid comparison of a consciousness index.

I believe that quantum phenomena have little IIT (I believe Tegmark states this). However, as I've stated above the quantum computation portion would be unconscious. When a specific measurement of this system is made (by some mechanism: Orch OR, decoherence or something else) it moves to the classical level, which given a high IIT would be a conscious event.

But ignoring that and assuming IIT is a true and correct theory (which I don't assert):
It would still be a question of "who" it belonged to. If it doesn't correlate with the timescales (or spatial scales as madness indicated above) of human experience (and their neural correlates) it's hard to make the case that the system's alleged consciousness could be attributed to the human conscious experience. If consciousness is something that emerges from physical interactions, then it may show up to varying degrees in different subsystems that make up one whole subsystem that has a quantity of consciousness. If IIT is a true theory, then highly coupled conscious systems would make a superconscious system (so long as the coupling doesn't disrupt the consciousness score of the contributing components). Thus, the collective consciousness of a culture or society is made up individual conscious beings. A conscious being may be made of individual conscious components.

Please see my reply to madness, but I think I'm in agreeance with you here.

 

[madness]

From your previous post, IIT posits that a single neuron could be a conscious entity

I'm not sure where I said that. I wouldn't generally consider this to be true, except in the trivial sense that everything has some nonzero value of integrated information.

to create the human conscious experience these individual entities would themselves need to be integrated. If the brain is already rich in IIT at the neuron level then the later is a given.

I don't understand. Why could information rich individual components necessarily be integrated as a system?

Do you have a source for this?

http://cogprints.org/316/1/consciousness.html - specifically, "Take color sensations as an example. For every distinction between color experiences, there is a corresponding distinction in processing. The different phenomenal colors that we experience form a complex three-dimensional space, varying in hue, saturation, and intensity. The properties of this space can be recovered from information-processing considerations: examination of the visual systems shows that waveforms of light are discriminated and analyzed along three different axes, and it is this three-dimensional information that is relevant to later processing. The three-dimensional structure of phenomenal color space therefore corresponds directly to the three dimensional structure of visual awareness. This is precisely what we would expect. After all, every color distinction corresponds to some reportable information, and therefore to a distinction that is represented in the structure of processing."

In the words of Pythagorean, is this some sort of "preconceived belief" or do you have backing for this statement. I'm not saying that there is proof for the alternative, but simply dismissing it out of hand without evidence would be unscientific.

I just mean that there's no evidence that microtubules are performing the computations underlying the cognitive processes with which consciousness experience is associated with, and that there's no evidence that microtubules have a high level of global information integration across large networks of the brain.

 

[my2cts]

We do not understand quantum mechanics. We do not understand consciousness.
To some this means that the two are connected.
Personally I think no two subjects are further apart.

 

[.Scott]

There are a couple of important things to consider here. Firstly, the microtubules would have to show a high level of integrated information globally across the brain, not individually (otherwise each would be a separate conscious entity).

There have been attempts to locate the "seat" or "seats" of consciousness, but they are directed as much by what can be measured rather than what must be measured. Here is an example:
http://authors.library.caltech.edu/40352/

I am not a microtubule fan, but I think this "globally" remark needs some qualification.

The essential item I think we can agree on is that when we are conscious, the information we are conscious of can be quite elaborate. However, it is not everything we sense or know about in that moment. Also, note that even with extensive cerebral damage, people can still be conscious of information processed by unaffected parts of their brains.

My point is that there doesn't have to be a single "seat of consciousness". More likely, there are lots and lots of places in the brain where conscious thought can reside - each with its own specialty. Our self perception of their being only a single seat suggests only that only one of these seats is "in charge" at a time - and that is the one that can record its thoughts in memory and offer its intentions for possible motor implementation.

So we won't need to show a "high level of integrated information globally".

Secondly, there is what David Chalmers calls the "coherence between consciousness and cognition" - i.e., there is some kind of isomorphism between cognitive apparatus and conscious experience.

Agreed - to a limited extent. I would suggest two other signs.
First, that the "some kind of isomorphism" be between the "apparatus" and the creation of an intention. The reason for this is that a QM mechanism for data processing may be used for several purposes in the brain. But the one that we are talking about is the one that is in a position to report its own sense of qualia. What we should expect to find is many "seats", some specializing in articulating or reflecting recent thoughts. Since we would normally be using animal models, we might not find one that's set up to say "I think therefor I am", but once we identify the type of circuitry that where intentions are generated, we will at least be in the right category.

Second, the real coupe will be to demonstrate that the information processing of the "apparatus" is of the sort that can benefit from QM processing. If it is not, then why would Darwinian selection favor a relatively expensive QM mechanism when normal neural activity would work as well.