Study Favors Q-Mind - Support for quantum consciousness?

[atyy]

I understand that Diosi-Penrose collapse is not standard quantum mechanics, but I don't think it violates quantum mechanics. The collapse mechanism is an addition to try and resolve so-called wavefunction collapse by giving it a objective mechanism. In standard QM no such mechanism is given leading to multiple interpretations of how this takes place (Copenhagen, von Neumann-Wigner, etc.), if it takes place at all (Multiple Worlds, Multiple Minds etc.).

Diosi-Penrose violates quantum mechanics because it is not a pure interpretation, the only known fully workable one of which is a flavour of Copenhagen. Some flavour of Many-Worlds would be a pure interpretation, but there is consensus even among proponents that technical details remain to be worked out. Simply put, Diosi-Penrose and standard quantum mechanics give different predictions, which are in principle experimentally testable.

 

[testingus]

Diosi-Penrose violates quantum mechanics because it is not a pure interpretation, the only known fully workable one of which is a flavour of Copenhagen. Some flavour of Many-Worlds would be a pure interpretation, but there is consensus even among proponents that technical details remain to be worked out. Simply put, Diosi-Penrose and standard quantum mechanics give different predictions, which are in principle experimentally testable.

Thank-you for the clarification.

 

[testingus]

I never said that Hameroff et al. suggested "divorcing the quantum treatment from standard neuroscience." Why divorce yourself from something you don't really even address. It took me 7 years to master the connectional neuroanatomy of the brain, why take the time to do that when you can just wave your quantum de-coherence wand and solve the problem in one fell swoop?

My mistake. Could you then please explain what you meant by "...the vast majority if not all quantum treatments of the consciousness issue invariably eschew a discussion of the functional anatomy of the human brain". Thank-you.

 

[DiracPool]

My mistake. Could you then please explain what you meant by "...the vast majority if not all quantum treatments of the consciousness issue invariably eschew a discussion of the functional anatomy of the human brain". Thank-you.

Well, I'm not going to do an exhaustive survey of the literature, but if you look into it yourself, I'm sure you will find a conspicuous paucity in quantum treatments of consciousness of the functional neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of brain function. This has been my experience in debating the quantum consciousness advocates, they try to reduce a very complex networked hierarchy of spatio-temporal brain relations to a naive "flat" reductionist model. What's left on the sidewalk in these treatements is what distinguishes human consciousness from from that of an ape, a rat, a toad, or a cockroach. There's no provision for that in the "Q-mind" or other quantum treatments of consciousness as far as I'm aware.

If you want to know how the brain creates consciousness, I suggest you start here:

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12874778

 

[testingus]

...they try to reduce a very complex networked hierarchy of spatio-temporal brain relations to a naive "flat" reductionist model.

Can't the same criticism be made against standard neuroscientists for reducing the very complex networked hierarchy of spatio-temporal molecular interactions in a single neuron to a simple "on/off" switch?

If you want to know how the brain creates consciousness, I suggest you start here:

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12874778

Thanks for the article. I'm reading it now. From this I believe that you are suggesting that the brain creates consciousness through synchronized oscillations? One question, how are the synchronized oscillations across the brain generated? The following two articles suggest that molecular level, and maybe even quantum effects, are what give rise to this synchrony.

Plankar, M., Brežan, S., & Jerman, I. (2013). The principle of coherence in multi-level brain information processing. Progress in biophysics and molecular biology, 111(1), 8-29.

Craddock, T. J., Priel, A., & Tuszynski, J. A. (2014). Keeping time: Could quantum beating in microtubules be the basis for the neural synchrony related to consciousness?. Journal of integrative neuroscience, 13(02), 293-311.

Also note that the second article by Craddock et al. makes explicit use of the mechanism mentioned in the OP.

 

[DiracPool]

Can't the same criticism be made against standard neuroscientists for reducing the very complex networked hierarchy of spatio-temporal molecular interactions in a single neuron to a simple "on/off" switch?

Who are you talking about in particular? There is no such thing as a "standard neuroscientist" in the same way there is no such thing as a "standard physicist." Each member of the community focuses on a different aspect or scale of the science and many have differing views and models. There certainly are those who focus on single neuron function, but there are many more, especially these days with the advances in non-invasive imaging, that focus more on systems neuroscience. I don't know very many in the field that are "...reducing the very complex networked hierarchy of spatio-temporal molecular interactions in a single neuron to a simple "on/off" switch" That is somewhat of an outdated concept.

From this I believe that you are suggesting that the brain creates consciousness through synchronized oscillations? One question, how are the synchronized oscillations across the brain generated?

If you read the article I posted that you said you were reading, it should be patently evident. Basically you have a situation in the cortex where various regions destabilize their oscillations through aperiodic feedback in order to maintain a high dimensional "background attractor" that puts the brain in a "ready" state to receive sensory input. Once that input arrives, the entire hemisphere of the cortex converges on a learned attractor that represents the stimulus memory, formed through the selective strenghening of "Hebbian" synapses. This is a cyclic process that works similarly to a Carnot cycle and that effectively yields a system whereby "frames" of percepts roll out of the cortex like frames in a movie reel. There is also evidence that binding in the cortex is achieved through 40 hz thalamocortical oscillations. However, there is likely no sensory specific information that is manipulated through this latter means.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4169877/pdf/nihms457171.pdf
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16513196

The following two articles suggest that molecular level, and maybe even quantum effects, are what give rise to this synchrony.

As I've mentioned here before, you are always going to be able to dig up countering or alternative views on most any subject, especially when it comes to the brain and mind connection. All you can do is do the research and come to your own conclusions.

 

[testingus]

Who are you talking about in particular?

I wasn't referring to anyone in specific. I was referring to Hopfield type neural networks consisting of binary ("on/off") neurons. As far as I know this is how most classical neural networks are considered. I'm happy to be enlightened.

If you read the article I posted that you said you were reading, it should be patently evident...

Yes, my last post was written before I completely read the article. I have been muddling through it as it is not my area of expertise, but I am here to learn. Thank-you for the synopsis.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4169877/pdf/nihms457171.pdf
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16513196

Thanks for these articles. The first article discusses cortical neurodynamics expressed at the classical level by neural networks (are these binary?) and at the quantum level by dissipative quantum field theory. I have to say that I'm now a little confused. Previously you have stated:

You are looking at the issue from the wrong scale. You are never going to find consciousness at the level of the neuron or microtubule.

There's no provision for that in the "Q-mind" or other quantum treatments of consciousness as far as I'm aware.

Are these statements specific to consciousness, and not other cognitive processes like memory? If so, why? Or is it specifically quantum effects in microtubules that is the issue?

All you can do is do the research and come to your own conclusions.

This is most certainly true. That is why I am here, I'm trying to get perspective on these matters. You seem to be well versed in this field, and I would love to hear your thoughts on the previously posted articles by Plankar et al. and Craddock et al. The paper Capolupo et al. seems of a similar nature, but I may not be grasping the finer points. Thank-you.

 

[Pythagorean]

I wasn't referring to anyone in specific. I was referring to Hopfield type neural networks consisting of binary ("on/off") neurons. As far as I know this is how most classical neural networks are considered. I'm happy to be enlightened.

Please, allow me! Binary neurons are only used when you have a lot of neurons in the hopes of reducing computational cost in the interest of time. However, the most "realistic" neurons that are based on the actual conductance and channel phsyiology of the nerve cell, are not binary, they are continuous functions - smooth differential equations dictate the shape of the electrical waveform based on influx and eflux of sodium, calcium, potassium, etc. The canonical mode is the Hodgkin-Huxle model:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hodgkin–Huxley_model

You can see the electrical activity follows naturally from well-known physical laws (electrochemical potential and Kirchoff's current law, chiefly).

 

[testingus]

... the most "realistic" neurons that are based on the actual conductance and channel phsyiology of the nerve cell, are not binary, they are continuous functions - smooth differential equations dictate the shape of the electrical waveform based on influx and eflux of sodium, calcium, potassium, etc.

Thank-you Pythagorean. So more complex networks drop this level of detail because it becomes too computationally complex? In the words of DiracPool, I wonder "What's left on the sidewalk in these treatments"? I guess we can't fault the quantum fellows then for not incorporating the complexity of the functional neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of brain. There has been some recent theoretical work suggesting that quantum effects in ion channels can affect action potential timing [Bernroider et al. 2012], which I suspect would be important to overall brain function. There may be more quantum effects that play a crucial role, maybe even related to microtubules. Do you care to comment?

Bernroider, G., & Summhammer, J. (2012). Can Quantum Entanglement Between Ion Transition States Effect Action Potential Initiation?. Cognitive Computation, 4(1), 29-37.

 

[atyy]

Thank-you Pythagorean. So more complex networks drop this level of detail because it becomes too computationally complex? In the words of DiracPool, I wonder "What's left on the sidewalk in these treatments"? I guess we can't fault the quantum fellows then for not incorporating the complexity of the functional neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of brain. There has been some recent theoretical work suggesting that quantum effects in ion channels can affect action potential timing [Bernroider et al. 2012], which I suspect would be important to overall brain function. There may be more quantum effects that play a crucial role, maybe even related to microtubules. Do you care to comment?

Bernroider, G., & Summhammer, J. (2012). Can Quantum Entanglement Between Ion Transition States Effect Action Potential Initiation?. Cognitive Computation, 4(1), 29-37.

But if you go from a (somewhat) specific proposal like Orch-OR to just non-specific "There may be more quantum effects that play a crucial role" then there is nothing to discuss. Action potential and synchrony in the brain depend on chemistry which depends on quantum mechanics.

 

[testingus]

But if you go from a (somewhat) specific proposal like Orch-OR to just non-specific "There may be more quantum effects that play a crucial role" then there is nothing to discuss. Action potential and synchrony in the brain depend on chemistry which depends on quantum mechanics.

Maybe I am being a bit too loose with the term "quantum effects". What I mean when I write this is "non-trivial" quantum effects which take advantage of entanglement, superposition, coherence etc., as opposed to "trivial" quantum effects like van der Waals forces, and hydrogen bonds.

What I seem to be gathering from these posts is that:
a) There is no objection to the notion that biology depends on chemistry which depends on trivial quantum effects.
b) There is some support for non-trivial effects in brain function (superposition in ion channels (see Bernroider et al. 2012) or dissipative quantum field theory descriptions of neurodynamics (see Capolupo et al. 2013 courtesy of DiracPool )).
c) There is staunch disagreement with the Orch OR theory of consciousness.

The OP was interested in "Why is quantum computing in microtubules considered woo?". It is clear that it is considered woo due to point c). The disagreement with Orch OR stems from:
a) The reliance on Diosi-Penrose collapse, which is not a proven form of quantum mechanics, although it can be tested. Additionally, Rosa and Faber suggest that quantum computation in brain microtubules may make use of decoherence as opposed to objective collapse circumventing this issue.
b) The lack of connection with functional neuroanatomy and neurophysiology, and the difference in scales between neural oscillations and quantum phenomena, however the work of Craddock et al., Plankar et al., and Capolupo et al. suggest ways in which this may be reconciled.

So while the notion of quantum computing in microtubules being related to brain function is lacking in a complete description of how this would work, and is not experimentally verified at this point, I think I can say that it is not “woo” which implies a psuedo-scientific non-testable hypothesis.

 

[Pythagorean]

The reason it's considered woo is because neither mainstream neuroscientists nor mainstream quantum physicists find it's premises valid (and we've discussed some of the issues with in this thread).

 

[testingus]

The reason it's considered woo is because neither mainstream neuroscientists nor mainstream quantum physicists find it's premises valid (and we've discussed some of the issues with in this thread).

What classifies some one as the "mainstream"? Roger Penrose was a prominent physicist, and I dare say mainstream, until the Emperor's New Mind. Walter Freeman is a well known neuroscientist, but advocates for dissipative quantum brain dynamics.

Please note I am specifically discussing quantum computation in microtubules, not necessarily Orch OR. To say something is "woo" (i.e. pseudo-science) because it is not popular is not very scientific. I've listed the two cogent criticisms brought up against Orch OR in this thread. These are both valid concerns. The first is open to experimental verification. The second shows that Orch OR is not consistent with "mainstream" neuroscience, but does not necessarily rule out quantum computation in microtubules (as separate from the Orch OR mechanism and theory) being related to brain function, (see the papers cited). If there are other arguments listed in this thread that I have missed that are brought up against quantum computation in microtubules related to brain function (not Orch OR) please feel free to state them explicitly.

 

[atyy]

I wouldn't consider Orch-OR unscientific, just subjectively unlikely on current data. But let's be clear, the only motivation for Orch-OR or decoherence as an explanation for consciousness is the hard problem, right?

 

[Pythagorean]

What classifies some one as the "mainstream"? Roger Penrose was a prominent physicist, and I dare say mainstream, until the Emperor's New Mind. Walter Freeman is a well known neuroscientist, but advocates for dissipative quantum brain dynamics.

It's a good question; it's a matter of sociology than science. I don't know that esteem really matters so much as consensus and authority. Stuart Hameroff's vocal associations of quantum mind with spirituality and Brahman philosophy probably doesn't help the case for quantum mind.

Please note I am specifically discussing quantum computation in microtubules, not necessarily Orch OR. To say something is "woo" (i.e. pseudo-science) because it is not popular is not very scientific. I've listed the two cogent criticisms brought up against Orch OR in this thread. These are both valid concerns. The first is open to experimental verification. The second shows that Orch OR is not consistent with "mainstream" neuroscience, but does not necessarily rule out quantum computation in microtubules (as separate from the Orch OR mechanism and theory) being related to brain function, (see the papers cited). If there are other arguments listed in this thread that I have missed that are brought up against quantum computation in microtubules related to brain function (not Orch OR) please feel free to state them explicitly.

I agree. To say something is woo at all is not really scientific, it's more of an administrative function for science, guided by social factors (basically, in the name of brevity, we don't want to spend too much energy on every pet theory because we're not going to be alive long enough to learn everything). Of course we can't prove a negative, so there can always be an exceptions to the criticisms.

 

[madness]

Please note I am specifically discussing quantum computation in microtubules, not necessarily Orch OR.

I wouldn't be shocked if there were quantum computation in microtubules, or some other subcellular processes. I would be very surprised if this was directly to consciousness, however, since as far as we know microtubules are not performing any cognitive functions.

 

[testingus]

I wouldn't consider Orch-OR unscientific, just subjectively unlikely on current data. But let's be clear, the only motivation for Orch-OR or decoherence as an explanation for consciousness is the hard problem, right?

Any theory of consciousness will eventually encounter the 'hard problem', however it is not the only motivation. From what I've read the rationale for a quantum description is to address the following:

1) The nature of subjective experience and how conscious experience arises from the combined action of neuronal, synaptic and molecular processes. (This is the hard problem aspect).
2) How spatially distributed brain activities bind together to produce the unity of consicous perception, known as the Binding Problem. (DiracPool gave a couple of references addressing this at both the neural and quantum levels.)
3) What is the critical level of complexity required by a system to have consciousness. (This may be a spectrum, and I think this is what is attempted by Tononi's IIT, however the question of scale, and the enhancement of IIT by subneural components remains open).
4) How a system based on the deterministic laws of classical physics accounts for non-computable processes such as consciousness. (The non-algorithmic nature of consciousness is brought up by Penrose's Goedel argument. Some have argued for this type of behavior at the edge of chaos (see Stuart Kaufmann and the article below specifically for the role in quantum biology)).
5) How can a system based on deterministic laws account for concepts such as free will. (This starts into the realm of philosophy, "Is there such thing as free will?" etc. If it's pure determinism, then no. If QM theories are truly random than is it really free will? Some thing at the edge might account for this. Is it orchestrated?)
6) How can a neural level of consciousness account for the rudimentary 'consciousness' observed in single cell organisms.

Vattay, G., Kauffman, S., & Niiranen, S. (2014). Quantum biology on the edge of quantum chaos. PloS one, 9(3), e89017.

 

[testingus]

It's a good question; it's a matter of sociology than science. I don't know that esteem really matters so much as consensus and authority. Stuart Hameroff's vocal associations of quantum mind with spirituality and Brahman philosophy probably doesn't help the case for quantum mind.

I agree. Associations with 'new age', 'eastern' or 'spiritual' philosophies naturally puts skeptical scientists on edge. That's not to say that there isn't parallels, however, it doesn't win an argument by saying it jives with what the mystics have been saying all along. That being said, it does raise the question of 'pre-conceived belief' systems in science. Is materialism really better than the alternative when it comes to understanding the world around us. Does materialism cause us to leave important aspects "on the sidewalk"? I don't know, and am wary to enter this type of discussion. This is a question for philosophers.

I agree. To say something is woo at all is not really scientific, it's more of an administrative function for science, guided by social factors (basically, in the name of brevity, we don't want to spend too much energy on every pet theory because we're not going to be alive long enough to learn everything). Of course we can't prove a negative, so there can always be an exceptions to the criticisms.

All we can really do is follow where the evidence points, regardless of what it means socially or philosophically.

 

[testingus]

I wouldn't be shocked if there were quantum computation in microtubules, or some other subcellular processes. I would be very surprised if this was directly to consciousness, however, since as far as we know microtubules are not performing any cognitive functions.

Of course the natural follow up question is, what is meant by cognitive function? Single cell slime mold can use tendrils composed of bundles of microtubules to forming patterns which, seek food, and solve problems such as escaping a maze (Adamatzky 2012). This relates to point 6) brought up in the previous post of the reason for looking at subneural processes as the rudiments of consciousness/cognitive processing.

If each neuron possesses highly integrated subneural components, and these neurons are highly integrated to form the brain, all this means is that the brain, cognition and consciousness, are way more complex than previously surmised. Would a single cell be as conscious as a human? No. But rudimentary cognition in single cells may provide the basis.

Adamatzky A. (2012). Slime mould computes planar shapes. Int. J. Bio-Inspired Comput. 4, 149–154

 

[madness]

Of course the natural follow up question is, what is meant by cognitive function?

In this particular context, it means the functional/computational operations with which conscious experience is associated. Consciousness doesn't just exist as a thing in and of itself, it exists as the subjective feeling associated with some functional processes occurring within the brain. Since microtubules don't carry out the compuations underlying these cognitive processes, they are probably not involved in conscious experience.

Single cell slime mold can use tendrils composed of bundles of microtubules to forming patterns which, seek food, and solve problems such as escaping a maze (Adamatzky 2012). This relates to point 6) brought up in the previous post of the reason for looking at subneural processes as the rudiments of consciousness/cognitive processing.

I don't expect that single cell organisms have a rudimentary level of consciousness as you claim. Of course I cannot prove that they don't, however.

If each neuron possesses highly integrated subneural components, and these neurons are highly integrated to form the brain, all this means is that the brain, cognition and consciousness, are way more complex than previously surmised. Would a single cell be as conscious as a human? No. But rudimentary cognition in single cells may provide the basis.

I don't know of any evidence that these heirarchical processing are integrated in a way which is relevant for conscious experience (e.g., that they have a high level of integrated information). We would more typically view subcellular processes are performing the necessary support roles to allow neurons and circuits to function correctly.

 

[DiracPool]

Any theory of consciousness will eventually encounter the 'hard problem', however it is not the only motivation. From what I've read the rationale for a quantum description is to address the following:

IMO, the rationale for a quantum description leads largely from the “Law of the minimization of mystery” phenomenon I alluded to in an earlier post. Of course, at the end of the day, we’d all like to have both a classical description of what consciousness is as well as a quantum description, along with a satisfying “correspondence principle” to bridge the two. However, I don’t think we’re ready for a quantum model of consciousness just yet. Why? Because we don’t have a well agreed upon model of how cognition and phenomena such as “self” and “agency” are created in the human brain and whether or not any sort of homologue of these experiential phenomena exist in nonhuman species. Until we have better handle on that from a classical perspective, what insight can we hope to gain from a quantum description of the same enigma?

Of course the natural follow up question is, what is meant by cognitive function? Single cell slime mold can use tendrils composed of bundles of microtubules to forming patterns which, seek food, and solve problems such as escaping a maze (Adamatzky 2012). This relates to point 6) brought up in the previous post of the reason for looking at subneural processes as the rudiments of consciousness/cognitive processing.

If each neuron possesses highly integrated subneural components, and these neurons are highly integrated to form the brain, all this means is that the brain, cognition and consciousness, are way more complex than previously surmised. Would a single cell be as conscious as a human? No. But rudimentary cognition in single cells may provide the basis.

I personally think there is significant, qualitative difference between human consciousness and nonhuman consciousness and that trying to define consciousness as a sort of unified phenomenon common to all animal species with a nervous system that arises from some sort of ill-defined “quantum coherence” is really missing the point. The place to start is in 1) studying the evolutionary functional neuroanatomy of vertebrates in particular, 2) develop a classical model of the differences in brain function and it’s relation to cognitive function across genera, and only then 3) look to how quantum processes may yield additional insight into the discussion of what conscious experience is from a biophysical perspective.

3) What is the critical level of complexity required by a system to have consciousness. (This may be a spectrum, and I think this is what is attempted by Tononi's IIT, however the question of scale, and the enhancement of IIT by subneural components remains open).

I would be very surprised if there was a link between the level of complexity or "information integration" of a system and whether it is conscious or not, much less there being a defined threshold for such. IMO, that is a non-instructive path to understanding how conscious experience evolved in the human brain.

 

[Pythagorean]

IMO, the rationale for a quantum description leads largely from the “Law of the minimization of mystery” phenomenon I alluded to in an earlier post. Of course, at the end of the day, we’d all like to have both a classical description of what consciousness is as well as a quantum description, along with a satisfying “correspondence principle” to bridge the two. However, I don’t think we’re ready for a quantum model of consciousness just yet. Why? Because we don’t have a well agreed upon model of how cognition and phenomena such as “self” and “agency” are created in the human brain and whether or not any sort of homologue of these experiential phenomena exist in nonhuman species. Until we have better handle on that from a classical perspective, what insight can we hope to gain from a quantum description of the same enigma?
I personally think there is significant, qualitative difference between human consciousness and nonhuman consciousness and that trying to define consciousness as a sort of unified phenomenon common to all animal species with a nervous system that arises from some sort of ill-defined “quantum coherence” is really missing the point. The place to start is in 1) studying the evolutionary functional neuroanatomy of vertebrates in particular, 2) develop a classical model of the differences in brain function and it’s relation to cognitive function across genera, and only then 3) look to how quantum processes may yield additional insight into the discussion of what conscious experience is from a biophysical perspective.
I would be very surprised if there was a link between the level of complexity or "information integration" of a system and whether it is conscious or not, much less there being a defined threshold for such. IMO, that is a non-instructive path to understanding how conscious experience evolved in the human brain.

I mostly agree. Particularly that consciousness probably emerges differently in different organisms. Since we find neural correlates of particular aspects of consciousness across all humans, but only some of the homologous brain structures (with similar function) in other animals, we can only assume that other animals have a different kind of consciousness and that some don't seem to have any of the neural equipment associated with consciousness.

I do think there's a benefit to having a score and a threshold. Similar to a medical diagnosis, the score isn't a definitive test and is only a tool to help troubleshoot consciousness, but it can help researchers (or medical professionals) investigate if the scoring is shown to have validity in a roc curve.