PeterDonis said:
Basically, at this point I think you are just throwing undefined terms around based on your intuition, not making arguments based on commonly accepted premises.
I am mindful of the fact that my use of terminology is probably imprecise, so I try to clarify my understanding as best I can using the language as I understand it. In doing so, I hope to portray my point in a manner that can be understood and hopefully refine my statements along the way. Discussions like this are a helpful part of that process as members such as yourself usually help to clarify where a term is being used incorrectly or a meaning is misunderstood - unfortunately, the benefit gleamed from discussions such as this tend to be very one-sided, in that I gain all the benefit of improving my understanding; even if it often appears to be at a glacial pace.
PeterDonis said:
This is not an argument for anything, it's just a definition of what you mean by "properties".
Now you are assuming without proof or argument that "having properties" must mean "in some state". Suppose whatever "properties" are required to interact with the measurement device don't include a "state"? You have not excluded this possibility at all.
I am also mindful of the possibility that the way in which the term "state" is used, in the context of quantum mechanics, is not necessarily the same as how it was used by Laplace when he said
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy said:
We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state and as the cause of the state that is to follow.
This can possibly lead to us talking past each other, so I am keen to avoid that. That is why I am trying to find the correct term.
In
@Demystifier's paper he talks about the property of "particle positions" and says,
It is important that particles have some positions (for otherwise it is not clear how can a perceptible exist)
Here, he is talking about a very specific property associated with particles and talks about the point I am trying to make, the idea that it is unclear how an observable, experimental outcome i.e. perceptible is possible if particles do not have specific properties, such as position.
The point I am trying to make is effectively the same, but I am suggesting we don't need to talk about specific properties, such as position, instead we can talk about properties simpliciter*; we can talk in the broadest possible terms about properties.
Instead of saying it is unclear how a perceptible can occur if particles don't have position, we can speak in even more general terms and question how measurements can happen if particles have absolutely no properties whatsoever?
If the use of the term "state" is an issue, we can replace it with the word "properties" and still get a clear statement about determinism, from Laplace's original statement:
We ought to regard the present [properties] of the universe as the effect of its antecedent [properties] and as the cause of the [properties] that [are] to follow.
*I'm not sure if I have used the term "simpliciter" correctly in this context.
PeterDonis said:
Similar remarks apply to your claims about a "causal chain"; suppose whatever "properties" are required to interact with the measurement device don't include a "deterministic causal chain", but allow either no "causal chain" at all, or one that is not deterministic? You have not excluded these possibilities either.
This is essentially the point in question.
To me, it seems axiomatic that things in the Universe have properties - or at least one property - and that only things with properties can interact with other things that have properties. If something has no properties whatsoever, I cannot see how it can interact with anything else.
If we grant that the exposure event, on the SG plate, is caused by something with properties then we can establish that the properties of the Universe at the moment of the exposure event, is the effect of the antecedent properties of the Universe - I would be inclined to use the term "state" here instead of properties, but I don't think it is strictly necessary. That much allows us to establish a causally deterministic chain starting at the exposure event. It doesn't yet stretch back to the device used to prepare the "particle", but we can apply similar reasoning to get us there.
If the properties of the particle are the effect of its antecedent properties, then a causally deterministic chain is a given.
If the the properties of the particle are
not the effect of its antecedent properties, then it means that the particle can have properties and then have absolutely no properties and then acquire properties again,
ad infinitum. Or it can start without any properties and have the reverse happen, having absolutely none, then acquiring some, then losing them again,
ad infinitum. This in itself would require an explanation.
The other alternative, one which appears to have been favoured by some instrumentalists, is the idea that the act of measurement is what bestows the particle with its properties, implying that it had absolutely no properties prior to measurement.
That just brings us back to our question of how something with absolutely no properties whatsoever, can interact with something that does have properties? A more fundamental question would be, how can something without any properties whatsoever be said to be in, or part of, the Universe in the first place?
As soon as we grant that things in the Universe have properties and that the exposure event was caused by something with some property - any property whatsoever - it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion of casual determinism, that the present properties/state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent properties/state.
PeterDonis said:
Your two ways are fine except that the first kind of interpretation does not have to be deterministic. We already have at least one example of an indeterministic interpretation of this type: the stochastic version of the Bohmian interpretation that
@Demystifier referred to.
I must check that out, thanks Peter.
PeterDonis said:
No, it doesn't ignore it; it uses it to make predictions and stops there. Many physicists feel that since the predictions are all we can test against experiment, going beyond that is not physics, but something else, like "philosophy", which they are happy to leave to philosophers.
I didn't mean it in the pejorative sense, I simply meant it as you outline above. They ignore it insofar as they don't engage in what they feel amounts to nothing more than philosophy. It's a perfectly reasonable position if one is not interested in the fundamental questions.
PeterDonis said:
It's a particular term in the Hamiltonian in the Bohmian interpretation, when that interpretation is done using a particular mathematical framework that is equivalent to the usual one in QM, but which rearranges the terms in a way that Bohmians prefer. It can be thought of as part of the potential energy.
Thank you. Clarifications like this really help to break down the conceptual barrier I sometimes face when reading papers and articles on the subject.
PeterDonis said:
It's simpler than that. The quantum potential is nonlocal for the same reason that the Coulomb potential between charged particles is nonlocal. The Coulomb potential depends on the positions of two particles (since it involves the distance between the particles, which is the difference in their positions). The quantum potential depends on the positions of all the particles in whatever quantum system you are describing; ultimately, on all the particles in the universe. Depending on more than one position is what makes the potential nonlocal.
So, non-locality is not really that "spooky" at all but rather quite pedestrian and dare I say, intuitive?