Virginia US Earthquake - Nuclear Plant

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Discussion Overview

The discussion centers around the recent earthquake in Virginia, specifically its impact on the North Anna Nuclear Generating Station. Participants explore the earthquake's magnitude, the plant's response, and concerns regarding safety protocols and spent fuel management. The conversation includes technical details about the plant's operations during the seismic event.

Discussion Character

  • Exploratory
  • Technical explanation
  • Debate/contested

Main Points Raised

  • Some participants note the earthquake's magnitude was initially reported as 5.9, later adjusted to 5.8, and then reverted to 5.9, indicating uncertainty in the measurements.
  • There are discussions about the North Anna plant's operating and design basis earthquakes, with some suggesting potential damage but not to safety-critical components.
  • Concerns are raised about the plant venting steam, with some arguing it is a normal procedure during power trips, while others express confusion and concern over the implications.
  • Participants discuss the status of the spent fuel pools, with conflicting claims about whether they require backup power, leading to further clarification attempts regarding safety systems.
  • One participant explains the function of steam dump valves during operational transitions, emphasizing that venting steam is a standard practice under certain conditions.
  • There are references to the restoration of off-site power and the operational status of emergency diesel generators following the earthquake.
  • Some participants challenge the accuracy of external reports regarding the plant's safety measures and the handling of spent fuel.

Areas of Agreement / Disagreement

Participants express multiple competing views regarding the safety protocols of the North Anna plant, particularly concerning the spent fuel pools and the venting of steam. The discussion remains unresolved with no consensus on several technical aspects.

Contextual Notes

Participants highlight limitations in the information available regarding the plant's emergency response and the specific requirements for spent fuel cooling systems. The discussion reflects uncertainty about the implications of the earthquake on plant safety and operational integrity.

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  • #62


QuantumPion said:
Hah that's awesome.

zz and QP

Before the onslaught of inane one-liner comments gets too obnoxious, isn't it reassuring that in spite of the state of the art THIRTY SIX YEARS AGO being a little weak on forecasting the earthquake, they still managed to build a plant that produced power without undo risk to the public? Perhaps we should take an unintended lesson from Arnie Gundersen and go back to using slide rules, because what they designed, seems to have worked rather well.

Thank you zz, for finding this evidence of successful design, construction, operation, and maintenance of a nuclear power plant.
 
  • #63


NUCENG said:
zz and QP

Before the onslaught of inane one-liner comments gets too obnoxious, isn't it reassuring that in spite of the state of the art THIRTY SIX YEARS AGO being a little weak on forecasting the earthquake, they still managed to build a plant that produced power without undo risk to the public? Perhaps we should take an unintended lesson from Arnie Gundersen and go back to using slide rules, because what they designed, seems to have worked rather well.

Thank you zz, for finding this evidence of successful design, construction, operation, and maintenance of a nuclear power plant.

Hey. Sorry for not providing a summary. I know it's an obnoxious habit, I was on the run.

You may have a very good point wrt slide rules.

An engineer friend of mine once told me that Roman buildings that have survived to this day did not survive because the Romans were engineering gods. Quite to the contrary, they survived because they are grossly overbuilt - Romans pretty much sucked at materials science, knew very little about static loads and nothing about dynamics so they just built'em as thick as they could afford, left ample room for the many unknown unknowns they were dealing with.

He also told me that safety standards evolve. The more you know, the finer you can cut it.
 
  • #65


News item from 1977 showing typical HUFPO bias:

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/06/north-anna-nuclear-earthquake_n_1078870.html

The original story is perhaps a little more balanced because they actually included the NRC response:

http://www2.timesdispatch.com/news/news/2011/nov/06/tdmain01-utility-and-federal-regulators-covered-up-ar-1438362/

Please, read the following 1977 DOJ memo carefully:

http://www2.timesdispatch.com/mgmedia/file/408/110511-nuke/

Note that the issue was reviewed and resolved before the Units 1 and 2 operating licesnses were issued and operation began in 1978 and 1980, respectfully. (Units 3 and 4 were canceled after TMI2.) Another excellent example of why coverup is stupid.
 
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  • #66


http://www.dailypress.com/business/dp-nws-dominion-north-anna-20111114,0,7317172.story"

So, despite the fact that the recent Virginia earthquake exceeded the geological estimates for the site, and despite the fact that the quake exceeded the design basis, and despite the fact that the quake damaged the plant, it has been 'determined' that the plant is safe to resume operation. Should we conclude that the recent quake was the 'new' largest possible for the region?
 
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  • #67


swl said:
http://www.dailypress.com/business/dp-nws-dominion-north-anna-20111114,0,7317172.story"

So, despite the fact that the recent Virginia earthquake exceeded the geological estimates for the site, and despite the fact that the quake exceeded the design basis, and despite the fact that the quake damaged the plant, it has been 'determined' that the plant is safe to resume operation. Should we conclude that the recent quake was the 'new' largest possible for the region?
North Anna Unit 1 started up this morning.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/reactor-status/2011/20111114ps.html#r2

The plant staff did inspections regarding the various critical systems and determined that structural integrity was maintained. I expect they will to a relatively slow power ascension, with a few hold points.

One should not expect that the earthquake is the maximum possible. USGS and the utility will have to monitor the area.
 
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  • #68


swl said:
..., and despite the fact that the quake damaged the plant,
I am aware there was incidental damage to support buildings. I am not aware of any damage to the reactor or its containment structure, nor to any waste storage. Do you have information to the contrary?
 
  • #69


mheslep said:
I am aware there was incidental damage to support buildings. I am not aware of any damage to the reactor or its containment structure, nor to any waste storage. Do you have information to the contrary?

There wasn't any damage, period. The only issue was some cracking of some dry cask horizontal storage module concrete non-structural components.

Also, I think there is some confusion as to the definition of what a design basis accident is. A design basis accident is not the the worst case scenario which the plant can withstand. A design basis accident is the MINIMUM accident the plant MUST be able to withstand without any loss of safety function. The distinction lies in the fact that there is tons of margin and conservatism in the design.

Oh, and it was the NRC that "determined" the plant could start back up again.
 
  • #70


Unit 1 was at 8% of full power, so they are taking it nice and easy.
 
  • #71


Among the points raised by the Group of Concerned Scientists and Engineers Calling for the Closure of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant after the 2007 earthquake at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, one question was whether "the force applied exceeded the elasticity limit of the materials of equipment" ( http://cnic.jp/english/topics/safety/earthquake/kkscientist21aug07.html ). Even if there is no apparent damage, if the elasticity limit has been exceeded, the metal might have become more brittle and would not resist a future earthquake as well as fresh new metal coming right down from the furnace. I guess similar questions could be asked, or rather, I hope, have already been asked and given a satisfying answer, concerning the Virginia earthquake.
 
  • #72


tsutsuji said:
Among the points raised by the Group of Concerned Scientists and Engineers Calling for the Closure of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant after the 2007 earthquake at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, one question was whether "the force applied exceeded the elasticity limit of the materials of equipment" ( http://cnic.jp/english/topics/safety/earthquake/kkscientist21aug07.html ). Even if there is no apparent damage, if the elasticity limit has been exceeded, the metal might have become more brittle and would not resist a future earthquake as well as fresh new metal coming right down from the furnace. I guess similar questions could be asked, or rather, I hope, have already been asked and given a satisfying answer, concerning the Virginia earthquake.

That sounds like 99% enriched weapons-grade-baloneyum to me.
 
  • #73


A few details about the margins against elasticity limits at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa are mentioned in Atsuyuki Suzuki, Chairman, Nuclear Safety Commission "Findings of and Lessons Learned from the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Quake" INRA meeting, Seoul, Korea April 28-29, 2009 http://www.nsc.go.jp/anzen/sonota/kouenroku/20090430.pdf (9 pages)
 
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