Eric England said:
First, let's get this one straightened out. The English language, taken all the way back to its roots, and with all of its inter-implications recognized, is a about as vague as a bullet in the head.
Now do you put that forth as an opinion or are you prepared to prove it? I am of the opinion that you are misinterpreting what I meant by vague. When I say the English language is vague, I mean that it is rampant with opportunities to be misinterpreted. I find these forums (which are in English for the most part) consist of exchanges which often include misunderstandings. Ergo, I think you are wrong.
Now mathematical notation can also be occasionally misinterpreted; however, it is much less susceptible to misunderstanding than is English.
selfAdjoint said:
This claim amazes me. You have a doctorate and don't know http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebesgue_measure" ?
I apologize; I thought you were referring to measurable as used by the physics community, a very physical concept.
selfAdjoint said:
But the fact that you have set up a differential equation over the set of these information items, and propose to solve it, assumes that all this information is measurable.
You apparently miss the point that I enumerate the information (which must be communicated via a finite number of references) first and then embed that information in the real (x,tau,t) space. The mathematical concept of "measurable" certainly includes the standard definition of the Euclidean axis itself. If there are indeed problems with the concept, I will leave the difficulties to the professional mathematicians as my only interest in mathematics consists of using it as a communication device: i.e., that my definitions of entities, properties and procedures can be understood.
My work initially began entirely with finite sets of numbers (used as symbols to refer to specific concepts) in which case, probabilities are defined purely by the number of repetitions of specific patterns divided by the total number of patterns examined (I could go through that analysis if you think it would be worthwhile). As such, the Psi's also become finite sets and don't really confront the issue of mathematical "measure". It is only when I extend
D to cover the entire axis that the issue could even possibly arise; however, the results required to insure consistency still reduce to a finite set in any checkable circumstance so that the presumption that Psi is a measurable function (in the mathematical sense) is of no real consequence (as all it is ever used for, in the final analysis, is the construction of finite tables). Continuity does nothing more or less then provide us with an interpolation mechanism for our expectations not on the known tables.
Remember, we are not talking about truth here, we are talking about a decent method of obtaining our expectations consistent with what is known; a method, once established, which will yield expectations for future events. I am not saying that my method is the only way of generating expectations consistent with what we know, what I am saying is that it is a method which will do so and it is quite simple. Furthermore, if you attempt to explain to me a better method, I can use my method to establish an understanding of what you are trying to tell me. That is, I can certainly judge my understanding of you via support of the validity of my expectations as obtained from my understanding thus my method of interpreting your explanation will work just fine.
Rade said:
Well, yes indeed. So I take it then that you cannot use your equation to calculate the exact number of constraints that are present in the internally consistent mathematical argument of "chaos theory" --that is, you cannot show me here how your equation would yield the explanation to the real number--would that be correct ?
You misunderstand what my equation represents. It is a constraint upon any internally self consistent explanation of anything. As such, failure to satisfy the equation is evidence that an explanation is not internally self consistent. You give me your explanation of "the internally consistent mathematical argument of 'chaos theory'" in its absolute entirety (where no possible questions concerning any issues related to the argument could be asked), and I will show you how to determine if that explanation is internally self consistent. I will also point out to you that an effort to follow that procedure would be pretty worthless.
Rade said:
Also, are you aware that others offer mathematical models that claim to do exactly what your equation claims--that is, they would claim that your equation is nothing more than a subset of their equation--how do you falsify such claims--why should I accept your equation and not their equation ?--see these links:
http://www.cs.cornell.edu/home/halpern/papers/expl.pdf
http://yudkowsky.net/bayes/technical.html
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/arc...ything_a_TM_and_Does_It_Matter_Publish_12.doc
No, I am not aware of any such claims. I looked at your links and read the first two. The third is so poorly presented by my browser that it is very difficult to read so I didn't bother to read it.
Neither of the other two make any attempt to present any absolute constraint applicable to all explanations of anything. You should have noticed that fact when you read the Chajewska and Halpern paper as they make the comment, "Clearly the appropriateness of a notion of an explanation will depend in large part on the intended application." That is not the statement of someone intent on maintaining absolute generality. In fact, they state their concern as bearing on the issue of probabilistic inference. Yudkowsky, on the other hand is concerned with common mistaken concepts of probability and he very definitely brings up the very issues which are important to my analysis; however, he does not back up to the underlying problem but rather makes exactly the same assumption as everyone else: i.e., he assumes his understanding of the universe is correct and tries to specify detailed consistency under that presumption. And he provides no equations thus it is meaningless to even suggest could my equation could be a subset of his.
You have to comprehend that my analysis is based on the analytic truth (that would be truth by definition) that
"An explanation" is
a method of obtaining expectations from
given known information. That definition was arrived at by considering the answer to the question, "exactly how does one know that they understand something?" To quote Yudkowsky, "since the beginning, not one unusual thing has ever happened": i.e., if you understood everything, your statistical expectations would match the statistics of what happened exactly. It follows from that, that the alignment of your expectations with what happens is exactly the criteria by which one judges their understanding.
Any explanation of anything (even when you are explaining it to yourself) consists of a collection of concepts, things, events observations, experiences ... (whatever you want to call them) which you have at your disposal. The very definition of those things must be arrived at via your explanation. You must realize that some of those things are irreducible and others are explicable in terms of the fundamentals (they are what is referred to as "emergent" phenomena). My equation specifies a required relationship between the fundamental entities; required only by the fact that the explanation (the method of obtaining those statistical expectations) must be in perfect alignment with what actually happened. The "emergent" phenomena must also be in perfect alignment with that equation as it is no more than collections of fundamental phenomena; however, a detailed analysis of "emergent" phenomena is far beyond the mental capabilities of anyone. With regard to "emergent" phenomena, the only method available to us at the moment is "by guess and by golly". Someday, we may have computers powerful enough to perform the required detailed analysis but, until then, working on that stuff is not science, it's entertainment.
My problem with your question (and almost every question raised by everyone) is that they are all based upon "emergent" phenomena which, by its very existence, presumes your explanation of the underlying fundamental phenomena is correct. My concerns are with the fundamental phenomena but my conclusions apply just as well to the "emergent" phenomena.
I hope someone has understood what I have just said.
Have fun -- Dick