What Are the True Laws of Physics and Their Role in Understanding Nature?

[kgbgru]

The "Laws" of physics

In physics and math we often talk about the laws of nature. I have never liked to call these laws. My first diff EQ treacher felt the same. He liked to call them "really good aproximations". I perfer to think of them as equations that relate quanties in nature, or "relationships" we see in nature. I am curious to how others think of others think the math we use to describe our universe.

 

[Q_Goest]

Good question. There was an interesting article in Scientific American that can be read online http://www.scientificamerican.com/blog/post.cfm?id=deep-in-thought-what-is-a-law-of-ph-2010-06-04".

One description of a law I liked was here:

A law not only describes a pattern in nature, but distinguishes between patterns that arise by chance and those that are always there, independent of the particulars of a situation.

I wouldn't say the laws of nature are our mathematical models. We come up with models such as F=ma that are aproximations to the patterns seen in nature, but they are not the physical laws written out in mathematical form. These are only models of what is occurring.

I think the most difficult issue we deal with in defining what a law is, is separating what's controlling the physical occurances we see from the mathematical models we attribute to those causes. In other words, physical laws are the 'framework' that the patterns (or physical occurances) we see in nature must abide by. Our models are not the laws themselves, they are only our representations of the laws of nature.

 

[Pythagorean]

Here's a link that has been posted here numerously in response to similar questions:

http://www.dartmouth.edu/~matc/MathDrama/reading/Wigner.html

 

[brainstorm]

I find it confounding when people talk about physical "laws" as if they are causes of deterministic behavior instead of generalized observations. Just because patterns are observed to be law-like in regularity doesn't make them the functional cause of the occurrences they explain. I can't think of a good example now, but I have encountered it in the past that people confused laws extrapolated from patterned observations as the cause of the observed data.

 

[loseyourname]

Well, I don't think ordinary or scientific usage of the term "law" expresses an agent of causal origination so much as a description of constrained behavior. Certainly, in the social sense, laws don't cause human behavior, but they do constrain it or at least they attempt to. When we move down the hierarchy of complexity and predictability from human decision-making to something like the path of a struck baseball, these constraints become more and more without exception to the point that we can very accurately predict the path of a baseball from facts about the collision between it and the bat.

But even here, I don't think anyone would say the laws of aerodynamics and classical mechanics cause the path of the baseball. They just constrain it and allow us to predict it.

 

[brainstorm]

But even here, I don't think anyone would say the laws of aerodynamics and classical mechanics cause the path of the baseball. They just constrain it and allow us to predict it.

Good example. I don't know if I would even give the law causal power to "constrain." I think the law is purely a representational description of generalized observations. I don't think it exists physically in the realm of the data. Forces are a different story. Those I think actually exist as causal "forces" (lol) of physical phenomena, as would something like momentum carrying energy that it delivers through a collision to another object/particle. However, to say that the law of conservation of momentum constrains a baseball from causing a bowling ball to move faster than it after a collision is false, imo. The bowling ball would never be inclined to move faster than a baseball colliding with it in the first place, so how is it "constrained" or otherwise caused to attain whatever speed it does? To me the bowling ball just moves with whatever amount of momentum it has been imparted with by the baseball - i.e. direct determination. The laws, imo, are just representational descriptions that explain and predict regularities of observation.

 

[loseyourname]

I think you're right. Using the word "constrain" rather than "describe" or "predict" does imply a causal relationship I don't mean to imply.

 

[apeiron]

I think you're right. Using the word "constrain" rather than "describe" or "predict" does imply a causal relationship I don't mean to imply.

Why not go the next step and accept constraints as causal?

In "larger" models of causality - from Aristotle's four causes to systems science and holism today - there really is no problem in treating constraints as top-down causality.

Global constraints emerge via self-organisation (which is why it is tempting to treat them as secondary and non-fundamental - and so just "effects") but they are still causal in that they shape the potential for local actions. They actively restrict the local degrees of freedom - the very degrees of freedom that are supposed to be "causing" the system to be in the first place.

 

[Dickfore]

https://www.amazon.com/dp/0679601279/?tag=pfamazon01-20 called it that. Altough appeal to authority is a logical fallacy.

 

[brainstorm]

Why not go the next step and accept constraints as causal?

In "larger" models of causality - from Aristotle's four causes to systems science and holism today - there really is no problem in treating constraints as top-down causality.

Global constraints emerge via self-organisation (which is why it is tempting to treat them as secondary and non-fundamental - and so just "effects") but they are still causal in that they shape the potential for local actions. They actively restrict the local degrees of freedom - the very degrees of freedom that are supposed to be "causing" the system to be in the first place.

You don't see the problem with saying that the conservation of momentum "causes" a bowling ball to roll slower than a billiard ball that collides with it? The cause of the bowling ball's motion is the energy it receives from the billiard ball. Conservation of momentum is just an explanation for why the velocity results of momentum vary according to mass. There is no constraint because there is no inclination to behave in any other way than what is directly determined.

 

[apeiron]

You don't see the problem with saying that the conservation of momentum "causes" a bowling ball to roll slower than a billiard ball that collides with it? The cause of the bowling ball's motion is the energy it receives from the billiard ball. Conservation of momentum is just an explanation for why the velocity results of momentum vary according to mass. There is no constraint because there is no inclination to behave in any other way than what is directly determined.

I don't see any problem with smaller models of causality - reductionist ones that invoke just local efficient cause. You can model the world that way. But I am saying that the larger model is a truer account.

The reason for inertia is a famous problem for strictly reductionist accounts. That's why Mach suggested the universe itself must provide the reference frame, the ambient back-drop of constraint.

Calling inertia a property locally inherent in mass clearly is not an explanation that ultimately satisfies people, even though it makes for the simplest models.

 

[brainstorm]

I don't see any problem with smaller models of causality - reductionist ones that invoke just local efficient cause. You can model the world that way. But I am saying that the larger model is a truer account.

I'm not talking about how true or false a generalization or observed pattern is. I'm talking about empirical causation verses observed patterns. Observed patterns don't cause anything empirically, regardless of how well they explain or predict observations. I think you have to be able to distinguish between empirical causes at the material level and explanations and modeling at the level of discourse. Laws are discursive, not part of the material systems they describe/explain.

 

[apeiron]

I'm not talking about how true or false a generalization or observed pattern is. I'm talking about empirical causation verses observed patterns. Observed patterns don't cause anything empirically, regardless of how well they explain or predict observations. I think you have to be able to distinguish between empirical causes at the material level and explanations and modeling at the level of discourse. Laws are discursive, not part of the material systems they describe/explain.

The magnetic field of a bar magnet is an observed pattern - a global state of organisation. It is caused by atomic dipoles lining up as the hot metal cools. And the emerging field is also causing the dipoles to line up. The emerging field becomes a global constraint on local behaviour.

 

[planck]

Yes, but can approximations be good enough to successfully create a self-sustaining...machine, universe, take your pick.

I think that's the main reason, at least for me, why laws must remain immutable.

 

[Redsummers]

Let's first think about the language we use to express those 'laws' (or a way to predict such and such phenomenon). I think in mathematics the formulas and the platonic forms of those concepts are equal. Take for instance a circle. No matter how even you draw it, it will never be perfect. But the equation expresses a perfect circle; and if you could make it general enough, it could also express all circles. Hence it becomes the “circleness” from the platonic form.

So in this way, mathematics becomes the tool to describe this one little aspect of the platonic realm (the circle). Nevertheless, mathematics are not the platonic form, they just help us express it, and we could have used any other language as long as we express these concepts correctly. Remember that we created the language of mathematics, in order to discover other concepts, hidden, in this platonic realm of mathematics. The number ten, as '10', does not exist in this 'platonic realm' but just the concept of ten units. Look at spiders, they reproduce with each other and they have an intrinsic number kept in their nature: they must create other spiders with exactly eight legs.

Now, going back to how do we apply this to physics (which doesn't seem to be a big deal, since physics is mainly represented by mathematics) we should first come to reality and find a mathematical model to express this phenomenon. But then this general expression, the one we made, may or may not align with the platonic form of this phenomenon.

For example, take Newtonian mechanics. We describe it in math, and the concepts expressed with math are what we believe is it's most general form –it's platonic form. We may be wrong, because we can absolutely never be 100% sure that the general form that we outlined in mathematics (our guess as its platonic form) accurately describes the perfect form of this phenomenon. And that is basically the main difference in mathematics and physics.

Due to the fact that we have to ground everything in reality, we have to check all our math physics in reality –this leads to logical induction- which is not proof. We can see a planet orbit a circle, and we think that orbit is a circle, and we can guess that it orbits a circle, and predict and check. And a million times out of a million it will always be on that circle. But that doesn’t guarantee that the millionth and 1 time it will still be a circle. It seems to us crazy that it could not be, (and I mean, it will be) but the point is it’s not proven.

In math, we lose the reality step. We create the formula for a circle –then we have the concept of a circle. We don’t really care that circles exist or not in reality, and because of that we can use deductive logic. That uses proofs. Mathematics is the only subject that
can prove it’s postulates. All other subjects use induction ( and again, logical induction is much different from mathematical induction and isn’t the same thing at all, mathematical induction unlike logical induction is a rigorous proof).

This is why the incompleteness axiom is a huge blow to math, but doesn’t really matter for physics. Because all of a sudden, the only thing ever proved might be proved on bad foundations. But physics was never proved anyway, physics is just really really really
good guesses which for the majority of it will certainly not be disproved, but that doesn’t mean its proven rigorously. So the incompleteness thing just says that it can’t be proven rigorously –well that’s no problem because physics wasn’t anyway. So at the end of the day it doesn’t really matter.

However, I don't know –I'd say nobody does– if there is really a link between physical phenomena and the mathematics realm. I'd say there is none. Still, I like Maxwell's laws, I like the mathematics of it; and I will probably keep on calling them 'laws', even if that would make me an hypocrite, I mean in this case is just a word. Another example I would like to mention is that of String theory, there is no doubt that there are 11 dimensions in the theory (of course not, in the mathematics of it is well stated), but we cannot tell whether a correct proposition of a language –in this case mathematics– corresponds directly to a true-proposition as for in the reality –the platonic form of the physical phenomenon.

 

[Redsummers]

and I will probably keep on calling them 'laws', even if that would make me an hypocrite, I mean in this case is just a word.

I don't want to be a spammer here, but I was just thinking, and instead of law, we could just use Thomas Kühn's word for this: paradigm.
He gives a nice definition of this term, and yes its definition is basically what I was explaining in that last post. But nowadays –as well as one century ago–, that most of the scientists have understood the scientific method, they still call these paradigms 'laws'. I would like to believe that in the quantum revolution, the physicists such as Heisenberg, Dirac, Bohr, etc. already had a positivist idea of science (which later evolved to the actual scientific method).

 

[apeiron]

However, I don't know –I'd say nobody does– if there is really a link between physical phenomena and the mathematics realm. I'd say there is none. Still, I like Maxwell's laws, I like the mathematics of it; and I will probably keep on calling them 'laws', even if that would make me an hypocrite, I mean in this case is just a word. Another example I would like to mention is that of String theory, there is no doubt that there are 11 dimensions in the theory (of course not, in the mathematics of it is well stated), but we cannot tell whether a correct proposition of a language –in this case mathematics– corresponds directly to a true-proposition as for in the reality –the platonic form of the physical phenomenon.

If you don't like the term laws, there are alternatives like CS Peirce's use of "habits". From a self-organised constraints point of view, the universe evolved a set of self-consistent regularities.

But the "laws of physics" are given a commonsense interpretation based on the acceptance that science is only modelling reality - it is making a useful, rather than necessarily "truthful" map of the terrain.

So in this view, mathematics is our most precise language for making mapping-type statements - constructing formal models. We can then measure reality against our idealised concepts of it. Maths seems rather detached from physics because you can draw all kinds of maps of imaginary worlds. It is a landscape of free play that lacks constraints (edit: or rather internalises its constraints by way of axioms). But science is the activity of mapping constrained by a reality.

Wiki has a good page on what people generally understand by "physical law".
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_law

A physical law or scientific law is a scientific generalization based on empirical observations of physical behaviour (i.e. the law of nature [1]). Laws of nature are observable. Scientific laws are empirical, describing observable patterns. Empirical laws are typically conclusions based on repeated scientific experiments and simple observations, over many years, and which have become accepted universally within the scientific community.

Physical laws are:
* True, at least within their regime of validity. By definition, there have never been repeatable contradicting observations.
* Universal. They appear to apply everywhere in the universe. (Davies, 1992:82)
* Simple. They are typically expressed in terms of a single mathematical equation. (Davies)
* Absolute. Nothing in the universe appears to affect them. (Davies, 1992:82)
* Stable. Unchanged since first discovered (although they may have been shown to be approximations of more accurate laws—see "Laws as approximations" below),
* Omnipotent. Everything in the universe apparently must comply with them (according to observations). (Davies, 1992:83)
* Generally conservative of quantity. (Feynman, 1965:59)
* Often expressions of existing homogeneities (symmetries) of space and time. (Feynman)
* Typically theoretically reversible in time (if non-quantum), although time itself is irreversible. (Feynman)

Physical laws are distinguished from scientific theories by their simplicity...Simply stated, while a law notes that something happens, a theory explains why and how something happens.

(I'm not agreeing with all these statements, but they show there is a considered view - something definite and coherent to argue against).

 

[Redsummers]

If you don't like the term laws, there are alternatives like CS Peirce's use of "habits". From a self-organised constraints point of view, the universe evolved a set of self-consistent regularities.

But the "laws of physics" are given a commonsense interpretation based on the acceptance that science is only modelling reality - it is making a useful, rather than necessarily "truthful" map of the terrain.

So in this view, mathematics is our most precise language for making mapping-type statements - constructing formal models. We can then measure reality against our idealised concepts of it. Maths seems rather detached from physics because you can draw all kinds of maps of imaginary worlds. It is a landscape of free play that lacks constraints (edit: or rather internalises its constraints by way of axioms). But science is the activity of mapping constrained by a reality.

Wiki has a good page on what people generally understand by "physical law".
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_law

[...]

(I'm not agreeing with all these statements, but they show there is a considered view - something definite and coherent to argue against).

Ah, yes. I would pretty much agree with all this. I like this idea of mapping that you just stated here. But again, we should remember that these 'laws' or 'habits' or 'paradigms' (I like this last one too) hold not a unique and eternal truth, but a 'temporal' truth. As long as science advances, we modify our models.
But yeah, apart from this, the way we have to express these paradigms is by using mathematical models.

 

[apeiron]

But again, we should remember that these 'laws' or 'habits' or 'paradigms' (I like this last one too) hold not a unique and eternal truth, but a 'temporal' truth.

I agree and would say it goes deeper. The modelling or map-making is largely driven by the principle of utility - we make maps to do something. And the main reason we want to know the world is so as to control it. We are not actually that interested (as a species) in knowing "truth" (even if many say they are) as knowing how to make things happen that are in our interest.

Science is generally oriented towards producing technology rather than producing understanding. The two aims are not orthogonal or mutually exclusive. But the alignment is weak at times.

 

[Dr Lots-o'watts]

In physics and math we often talk about the laws of nature. I have never liked to call these laws. My first diff EQ treacher felt the same. He liked to call them "really good aproximations". I perfer to think of them as equations that relate quanties in nature, or "relationships" we see in nature. I am curious to how others think of others think the math we use to describe our universe.

I agree, they are approximations. But if you think about it, political laws are also approximations, because they are often subject to interpretation by jurors. So it all comes down to what we mean by "law". I see it as a sign of respect to Newton, since his writings have come a longer way than that of many lawmakers.

 

[Evo]

I agree, they are approximations. But if you think about it, political laws are also approximations, because they are often subject to interpretation by jurors. So it all comes down to what we mean by "law". I see it as a sign of respect to Newton, since his writings have come a longer way than that of many lawmakers.

Scientific laws are NOT approximations! They are not subject to interpretation.

For those that do not know the difference between a scientific law, theory, and hypothesis.

Scientific Law: This is a statement of fact meant to describe, in concise terms, an action or set of actions. It is generally accepted to be true and universal, and can sometimes be expressed in terms of a single mathematical equation. Scientific laws are similar to mathematical postulates. They don’t really need any complex external proofs; they are accepted at face value based upon the fact that they have always been observed to be true.

Specifically, scientific laws must be simple, true, universal, and absolute. They represent the cornerstone of scientific discovery, because if a law ever did not apply, then all science based upon that law would collapse.

Some scientific laws, or laws of nature, include the law of gravity, Newton's laws of motion, the laws of thermodynamics, Boyle's law of gases, the law of conservation of mass and energy, and Hook’s law of elasticity.

http://wilstar.com/theories.htm

 

[Dr Lots-o'watts]

Scientific laws are NOT approximations! They are not subject to interpretation.

Scientific Law: ... generally accepted to be true and universal...accepted at face value based upon the fact that they have always been observed to be true...then all science based upon that law would collapse...

Some scientific laws, or laws of nature, include the law of gravity, Newton's laws of motion, the laws of thermodynamics, Boyle's law of gases, the law of conservation of mass and energy, and Hook’s law of elasticity.

http://wilstar.com/theories.htm

Boyle's law is a statistical approximation over innumerable distinct particles. Hooke's law is an approximation http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hooke's_law. The laws of conservation of mass and energy were each shattered by Einstein, and yet none of science has "collapsed".

In contrast, mathematical expressions are not "generally accepted to be true". They are as true anything can be. Science laws are not subject to interpretation as are political laws, they are much more robust, yet there are still approximations, somewhere between math and social laws. Newton's laws are nice, but the reality is that no object can go from an acceleration of 0m/s2 to 1m/s2 instantaneously. Absolute rigor would require that the 2nd law be of higher order than 2, but this becomes much to cumbersome. In this sense, Newton's 2nd law as a 2nd order equation is an approximation of reality. Perhaps the most successful, yet not absolute.

 

[thehacker3]

Do aliens follow our rules of physics as well? Like do you think they have the same principles of F=ma and E=mc^2?

I would assume that their development process yielded different "laws" than ours.

Unless of course the famous scientists we know about were actually aliens ;)

 

[brainstorm]

Do aliens follow our rules of physics as well? Like do you think they have the same principles of F=ma and E=mc^2?

I would assume that their development process yielded different "laws" than ours.

Unless of course the famous scientists we know about were actually aliens ;)

I recently read that a vatican astronomer believes that if extraterrestrial life would be discovered, they would have souls and could therefore be offered salvation. This is a slightly different angle, but essentially the same question imo.

Personally, I think extraterrestrial beings might be able to do physics completely intuitively and practice faith without any dogma, ritual, or institutions whatsoever.

 

[Redsummers]

Do aliens follow our rules of physics as well? Like do you think they have the same principles of F=ma and E=mc^2?

I would assume that their development process yielded different "laws" than ours.

Again, having the same argument as before, and assuming that the laws of physics developed by us are held everywhere in our universe wherever this aliens may be, you would agree to use the same laws that we have to predict such and such phenomena. Then, in the most likely case that the aliens do not share the same mathematical language as we do, they will still predict such and such phenomena (as long as they are concerned about physics... of course) and hence they will be 'using' the platonic form of the law in their own mathematical language. Because if they are that advanced I'm sure they would be able to figure out these relationships between forces, masses etc. by simple observational methods. Maybe there would be differences on the factors due to their notion of units regarding the quantities involved in the relationship.

But hey, I don't know how aliens are, I'm now imagining just a bunch of humans five hundred years more advanced than us. They probably have some kind wolfram alpha incorporated to their brains. But I can't even think how would aliens look like if they were millions of years more advanced than us.

Well, think of it. Because if the platonic form of the physical laws (i.e. the concept of the phenomena itself) are the same in all the points of the space, then the laws they use should not differ that much. And, in the case that they are way more advanced, they probably use other methods or are not even interested in the laws that we have established so far (say... some kind of crazy string theory, so that they never use F=ma but instead a bunch of tensors/whatever etc.)

Anyway, Kaku may enlighten you: (not sure how to copy-paste youtube vids? is it with the embed thing or I should use a /youtube code?)

 

[thehacker3]

Ahh I love Michio Kaku's books and lectures!

So you think they can't go at the speed of light either? =\

 

[wuliheron]

This is just so much splitting of semantic hairs.

For something to be considered scientific, including the definitions of scientific terms, they must conform to scientific standards rather than mere popular opinion or semantic games. That is, they must be self-consistent and their meaning clearly demonstrable in reproducable experiments. Thus far the only theory of linguistic analysis with any sort of realistic claim to being scientific is that of Pragmatic Functional Contextualism which asserts that "Word only have demonstrable meaning according to their function in specific contexts." Therefore any claims to an absolute meaning of laws in all scientific contexts is a philosophical assertion rather than a scientifically established fact and contradicts the evidence accumulated to date.

 

[brainstorm]

Pragmatic Functional Contextualism which asserts that "Word only have demonstrable meaning according to their function in specific contexts." Therefore any claims to an absolute meaning of laws in all scientific contexts is a philosophical assertion rather than a scientifically established fact and contradicts the evidence accumulated to date.

As is "Pragmatic Functional Contexualism" then, no?

 

[wuliheron]

As is "Pragmatic Functional Contexualism" then, no?

Functional Contextualism at least has some empirical evidence to support it's assertions. In particular, it has proven capable of bridging the cognitive and behavioral sciences and has been clinically tested. If you know of any other approach that has more scientific evidence I'd like to hear it.

 

[nismaratwork]

I recently read that a vatican astronomer believes that if extraterrestrial life would be discovered, they would have souls and could therefore be offered salvation. This is a slightly different angle, but essentially the same question imo.

Personally, I think extraterrestrial beings might be able to do physics completely intuitively and practice faith without any dogma, ritual, or institutions whatsoever.

Why do you believe that they would be able to do this intuitively, and where does faith enter into the picture?

I would just throw out in general, that what we call laws of physics are very much in line with apeiron's "top down" model whether we like it or not. There is no definitive "why" to answer why a given particle weighs what it does, until you look at the larger system and make some assumptions. Call them laws, or call them constants, all that can be said is that for as long as we can observe these constants have been what they are, and if they were not, we would probably not be around to do the observing. Doesn't this all return to the anthropic principle, whatever we call the "laws"?

I would say that laws of nature = a universe... new laws = new universe. Then we get into debates about MWI, a god, or what apeiron has been getting at. Personally I tend towards the latter, although the former is certainly not ruled out.

 

[Redsummers]

So you think they can't go at the speed of light either? =\

Ha, we were first talking about how would aliens (of about five hundred-one thousand years more advanced than us) look at physical laws, but I have no idea what is their technology like. Depending on how advanced they are, they probably can go through space at c-like speed, but I don't like claiming this since I don't really know. For now, the ones who cannot go at the speed of light are us, so let's be concerned on our models so far ;)

This is just so much splitting of semantic hairs.

For something to be considered scientific, including the definitions of scientific terms, they must conform to scientific standards rather than mere popular opinion or semantic games. That is, they must be self-consistent and their meaning clearly demonstrable in reproducable experiments. Thus far the only theory of linguistic analysis with any sort of realistic claim to being scientific is that of Pragmatic Functional Contextualism which asserts that "Word only have demonstrable meaning according to their function in specific contexts." Therefore any claims to an absolute meaning of laws in all scientific contexts is a philosophical assertion rather than a scientifically established fact and contradicts the evidence accumulated to date.

I have personally never read any essay on pragmatic functional contextualism (so if you could put your two pennies in if my understanding is err I would appreciate). But so far, from what you say [Word only have demonstrable meaning according to their function in specific contexts.] it sounds pretty much of Wittgenstein's latter work. And this, applied to science would be the scientific method we have by T.Kuhn (so it's basically what apeiron, nismaratwork and I were saying), so I don't know with whom are you disagreeing (?) –or maybe it's me that I don't understand PFC.

Then what I don't get is why do you say that laws in scientific context are philosophical assertion, didn't you just said that they have to be demonstrable? (verifiable/falsifiable –depending on your likes between Kuhn and Popper)

If what you are saying is that 'being a philosophical assertion' means that the law has been modeled by the principle of utility, then it's okay. I would buy that. But if by 'absolute law' you mean the ultimate truth in physics, then nobody here mentioned anything like this. We're saying that physics is being 'built', as if you got a logarithmic spiral centred on the origin (the origin being the ultimate truth) and our knowledge was one point in the curve approaching to the origin (and hence, never reaching the origin). That is, according to our language of mathematics and what we can build with it –physics. I am not talking about extraterrestrial intelligence. (And they would probably not be interested in the physics we do.)

Anyway, if I got something wrong by what you meant, I would appreciate that you could clarify it ;)

 

[wuliheron]

I have personally never read any essay on pragmatic functional contextualism (so if you could put your two pennies in if my understanding is err I would appreciate). But so far, from what you say [Word only have demonstrable meaning according to their function in specific contexts.] it sounds pretty much of Wittgenstein's latter work. And this, applied to science would be the scientific method we have by T.Kuhn (so it's basically what apeiron, nismaratwork and I were saying), so I don't know with whom are you disagreeing (?) –or maybe it's me that I don't understand PFC.

It's contextualism, so yes it along those lines. Here is a good website with some of their work.

http://contextualpsychology.org/functional_contextualism_0

I mention splitting semantic hairs and absolutes in particular as a response to Evo's statement that,

"Specifically, scientific laws must be simple, true, universal, and absolute. They represent the cornerstone of scientific discovery, because if a law ever did not apply, then all science based upon that law would collapse. "

I think that is pretty clearly as much a philosophical statement supporting absolutes, universals, and the truth.

Then what I don't get is why do you say that laws in scientific context are philosophical assertion, didn't you just said that they have to be demonstrable? (verifiable/falsifiable –depending on your likes between Kuhn and Popper)

If what you are saying is that 'being a philosophical assertion' means that the law has been modeled by the principle of utility, then it's okay. I would buy that. But if by 'absolute law' you mean the ultimate truth in physics, then nobody here mentioned anything like this. We're saying that physics is being 'built', as if you got a logarithmic spiral centred on the origin (the origin being the ultimate truth) and our knowledge was one point in the curve approaching to the origin (and hence, never reaching the origin). That is, according to our language of mathematics and what we can build with it –physics. I am not talking about extraterrestrial intelligence. (And they would probably not be interested in the physics we do.)

Anyway, if I got something wrong by what you meant, I would appreciate that you could clarify it ;)

Perhaps if you re-read my post in light of this response you will understand.

However, I would stress here that your response obviously contradicts that of Evo and can be interpreted as, again, so much splitting of semantic hairs and philosophizing. Scientific facts don't have to have any known utility, they just have to be established using accepted methodology (whatever that might be!)

What I am asserting is that there exist scientific methodologies for determing the meaning of terms and, to the best of my knowledge, Pragmatic Functional Contextualism is the most established of these. If words only have demonstrable meaning according to their use in specific contexts, then there is no need to endlessly debate philosophical differences and semantics that have eluded philosophers for centuries when we can simply demonstrate their meaning.

 

[brainstorm]

If words only have demonstrable meaning according to their use in specific contexts, then there is no need to endlessly debate philosophical differences and semantics that have eluded philosophers for centuries when we can simply demonstrate their meaning.

People do this to propagate their contextual meanings of choice. The only way for people to stop propagating context would be for them to stop communicating completely. As long as people are formulating communication, their words will procure certain meanings (provided its intelligible communication). Nothing as "eluded" philosophers. When philosophers claim to be eluded by a problem, they do it to set the stage for a rigorous exploration of the topic. They may not have the answer, but they've elaborated the question well enough to set and write about it. Why would you assume that all valid knowledge comes in the form of positive statements? Sometimes there's more value in knowing how to approach an issue than in being able to answer questions conclusively. Often the most conclusive answer is the least valuable one.

 

[Redsummers]

It's contextualism, so yes it along those lines. Here is a good website with some of their work.

http://contextualpsychology.org/functional_contextualism_0

I mention splitting semantic hairs and absolutes in particular as a response to Evo's statement that,

"Specifically, scientific laws must be simple, true, universal, and absolute. They represent the cornerstone of scientific discovery, because if a law ever did not apply, then all science based upon that law would collapse. "

I think that is pretty clearly as much a philosophical statement supporting absolutes, universals, and the truth.

Perhaps if you re-read my post in light of this response you will understand.

However, I would stress here that your response obviously contradicts that of Evo and can be interpreted as, again, so much splitting of semantic hairs and philosophizing. Scientific facts don't have to have any known utility, they just have to be established using accepted methodology (whatever that might be!)

What I am asserting is that there exist scientific methodologies for determing the meaning of terms and, to the best of my knowledge, Pragmatic Functional Contextualism is the most established of these. If words only have demonstrable meaning according to their use in specific contexts, then there is no need to endlessly debate philosophical differences and semantics that have eluded philosophers for centuries when we can simply demonstrate their meaning.

Oh okay, I think I now see what you meant by philosophical assertions. And after having read functional contextualism I must say that it is a really sound philosophical model. Thanks for sharing.

And about this issue of utility, I didn't quite mean 'utility' in a sense of daily useful technology, but in a more 'need to know'-utility. Also, about laws being universal as Evo stated, I would partially agree with that. I mean in a sense, I see how laws are completely true (and if they are simple and beautiful, even better! but I'm not entering in mathematical beauty here), as F=ma for all masses and accelerations taken in a meticulously way (or by default in a platonic concept of the phenomena). But, you would have to agree that with the laws that we have nowadays we can't predict and describe every single phenomena yet (for instance, in the quantum realm we cannot use F=ma that easily; as well as we have to be careful which frame of reference are we using when taking into consideration high velocities). So if you take into account the definition of theories and hypothesis that Evo provided, you would see that I concur with what she is saying, because as we want to predict more things and made the law more complete, we have to augment our theories. And that's basically what I meant before by saying that we do hold not a unique and eternal truth, but a 'temporal' truth, since it's evolving step by step. (Here, again, you can see the analogy I did before with the logarithmic spiral. I think Evo would approve with that. Maybe not (?))

Well that's my two pennies' worth. Perhaps, as you said, I am splitting semantic hairs too much (I had to look up for this expression, never heard it before. Those are the inconveniences of not being a native english speaker), but that's where the discussion kind of lead us.@brainstorm: Yup, I see your point here. Kind of reminded me of the proposition #7 in the tractatus "whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent". I will first wait in case that wuliheron wants to add something.

 

[JaredJames]

Scientific laws are NOT approximations! They are not subject to interpretation.

For those that do not know the difference between a scientific law, theory, and hypothesis.

http://wilstar.com/theories.htm

I'd give up evo. This is philosophy, you won't win here by quoting these sort of truths . I personally can't stand it, but each to their own. Remember, this is the place people try to convince you that nothing really exists and you're a figure of your own imagination .

 

[brainstorm]

Originally Posted by Evo
Scientific laws are NOT approximations! They are not subject to interpretation.

For those that do not know the difference between a scientific law, theory, and hypothesis.

http://wilstar.com/theories.htm
I'd give up evo. This is philosophy, you won't win here by quoting these sort of truths . I personally can't stand it, but each to their own. Remember, this is the place people try to convince you that nothing really exists and you're a figure of your own imagination .

Maybe I can help. It depends on what you really mean by "approximation." In a sense, a photograph is less of an approximation of an object than a painting of it would be, yet in another sense the photograph can only approximate certain aspects of the tree like its size, texture, 3-dimensionality, etc. and so the photograph is an approximation too, not just the painting.

In the same sense you could say that while a law of physics describes a generalization that is always true when applied through testing, it is a partial rendering of the actual forces that causes it to be true in all cases. Conservation of matter-energy is always true, for example, but it does not fully describe all the situations in which matter and energy can be transformed in ways that transfers matter or energy without anything being lost or gained.

So I think you could say that a physical law is an approximation insofar as it is a reduction of the complexity of the reality it is derived from. This need not mean that it is inaccurate in terms of predicting measurements and outcomes precisely.

 

[thehacker3]

What about Newton's law F=ma.. Doesn't it break down at relativistic speeds??

 

[Redsummers]

I'd give up evo. This is philosophy, you won't win here by quoting these sort of truths . I personally can't stand it, but each to their own. Remember, this is the place people try to convince you that nothing really exists and you're a figure of your own imagination .

Yup, this is philosophy, but in this concrete thread we are dealing with philosophy of science, I personally think it is important for every single scientist to know what are the scientific methods used in our days. Nobody is talking here about our existence. No metaphysics here. I don't think a lot of people here would be posting if this was something to do with metaphysics.

And, if you read the latest posts, you would see how we are actually 'converging' to a final thought about the thread ;) Most of the times, in philosophy of science, people need to discuss a lot so that everyone can understand the real meaning of everyone's concepts and then develop these ideas logically. Just like the Vienna's circle did, ending up with the positivist movement.
But again, in metaphysics you would have other problems. So far I don't think we have entered in this realm

 

[wuliheron]

People do this to propagate their contextual meanings of choice. The only way for people to stop propagating context would be for them to stop communicating completely. As long as people are formulating communication, their words will procure certain meanings (provided its intelligible communication). Nothing as "eluded" philosophers. When philosophers claim to be eluded by a problem, they do it to set the stage for a rigorous exploration of the topic. They may not have the answer, but they've elaborated the question well enough to set and write about it. Why would you assume that all valid knowledge comes in the form of positive statements? Sometimes there's more value in knowing how to approach an issue than in being able to answer questions conclusively. Often the most conclusive answer is the least valuable one.

In this case the context of choice is self-evident and has nothing to do with whether or not all valid knowledge comes in the form of positive statements. This thread is about the meaning of scientific terminology and, therefore, it only makes sense to at least begin the discussion using a scientific analysis of scientific terminology. No doubt we could also choose an etymological or religious or any other approach to the subject, but I think going straight to the source and remaining as self-consistent as reasonable is usually the most productive way to begin.

 

[wuliheron]

Oh okay, I think I now see what you meant by philosophical assertions. And after having read functional contextualism I must say that it is a really sound philosophical model. Thanks for sharing.

And about this issue of utility, I didn't quite mean 'utility' in a sense of daily useful technology, but in a more 'need to know'-utility.

I don't understand what distinction you are trying to draw between "utility" and "need to know" or how it applies in the context of science. Science is a methodology while any perceived need to know or utility must be based on some sort of assumption.

Also, about laws being universal as Evo stated, I would partially agree with that. I mean in a sense, I see how laws are completely true (and if they are simple and beautiful, even better! but I'm not entering in mathematical beauty here), as F=ma for all masses and accelerations taken in a meticulously way (or by default in a platonic concept of the phenomena). But, you would have to agree that with the laws that we have nowadays we can't predict and describe every single phenomena yet (for instance, in the quantum realm we cannot use F=ma that easily; as well as we have to be careful which frame of reference are we using when taking into consideration high velocities). So if you take into account the definition of theories and hypothesis that Evo provided, you would see that I concur with what she is saying, because as we want to predict more things and made the law more complete, we have to augment our theories. And that's basically what I meant before by saying that we do hold not a unique and eternal truth, but a 'temporal' truth, since it's evolving step by step. (Here, again, you can see the analogy I did before with the logarithmic spiral. I think Evo would approve with that. Maybe not (?))

Well that's my two pennies' worth. Perhaps, as you said, I am splitting semantic hairs too much (I had to look up for this expression, never heard it before. Those are the inconveniences of not being a native english speaker), but that's where the discussion kind of lead us.

I certainly cannot speak for Evo, but I believe I understand the gist of what you are saying.

 

[brainstorm]

This thread is about the meaning of scientific terminology and, therefore, it only makes sense to at least begin the discussion using a scientific analysis of scientific terminology. No doubt we could also choose an etymological or religious or any other approach to the subject, but I think going straight to the source and remaining as self-consistent as reasonable is usually the most productive way to begin.

Nominalist logic is so compelling, isn't it? So what, according to you, is a "scientific analysis" of scientific terminology and what exactly is scientific about it?

 

[apeiron]

Science is a methodology while any perceived need to know or utility must be based on some sort of assumption.

The basics of epistemology are well explored - everyone ends up with some version of a modelling story. But I would say that the question of purpose is a big gap in most people's thinking. It is just sort of assumed that we know why we model, what the goal is, and so this aspect is not normally formalised.

Broadly, the goal of modelling can be divided into a search after truth vs a search after control. One is about knowing reality in some complete and objective fashion (but in a passive, contemplative, just lookin' at it way). While the other is a pragmatic, utiltarian, operational kind of knowing the world where it does not matter if our models are "true", just that they are functional - they allow us to act on the world and get results that matter to us for some reason.

The difference in goals is actually quite important. The utilitarian one can be argued to be the more natural (it is the way all other systems apart from human philosophers probably operate ).

Something else that is often missed is the importance of reductionism to this goal. A good model is the one that involves recording or otherwise handling the least amount of information.

Knowledge is usually viewed as "seeing every tiny detail". So more information is better. But effective modelling goes the other direction. It demands that you shed information (ie: you generalise to find universal rules, or physical laws). And even the other part of modelling, the predictions and measurements, are as reduced as possible. A good model is one that predicts everything you want from one (perhaps a few) very precise inputs.

Which is why we worship F = ma, for instance. A compact description powered by equally compact measurements. (And any alien culture would have to come up with the same formula, or at least a version of the formula that could be translated in the way that one human language mostly maps onto another in terms of its concepts).

But anyway, back to the quote above. It clearly drives a false wedge between scientific method and human purposes. Scientific method has always been grounded in philosophy (specifically epistemology). And purpose does not get discussed enough. It is a live issue. Particularly because there is this counter-intuitive aspect about modelling - that good models shed as much detail as possible and so tend to look "unreal" to those who wrongly expect science to be a passive kind of "all seeing perception".

For example in mind science, there is a constant lament about the hard problem and the failure of science to deliver "what is it like" type explanations. This just fails to get what modelling is actually ultimately about.

 

[wuliheron]

The basics of epistemology are well explored - everyone ends up with some version of a modelling story. But I would say that the question of purpose is a big gap in most people's thinking. It is just sort of assumed that we know why we model, what the goal is, and so this aspect is not normally formalised.

Broadly, the goal of modelling can be divided into a search after truth vs a search after control. One is about knowing reality in some complete and objective fashion (but in a passive, contemplative, just lookin' at it way). While the other is a pragmatic, utiltarian, operational kind of knowing the world where it does not matter if our models are "true", just that they are functional - they allow us to act on the world and get results that matter to us for some reason.

The difference in goals is actually quite important. The utilitarian one can be argued to be the more natural (it is the way all other systems apart from human philosophers probably operate ).

Something else that is often missed is the importance of reductionism to this goal. A good model is the one that involves recording or otherwise handling the least amount of information.

Knowledge is usually viewed as "seeing every tiny detail". So more information is better. But effective modelling goes the other direction. It demands that you shed information (ie: you generalise to find universal rules, or physical laws). And even the other part of modelling, the predictions and measurements, are as reduced as possible. A good model is one that predicts everything you want from one (perhaps a few) very precise inputs.

Which is why we worship F = ma, for instance. A compact description powered by equally compact measurements. (And any alien culture would have to come up with the same formula, or at least a version of the formula that could be translated in the way that one human language mostly maps onto another in terms of its concepts).

But anyway, back to the quote above. It clearly drives a false wedge between scientific method and human purposes. Scientific method has always been grounded in philosophy (specifically epistemology). And purpose does not get discussed enough. It is a live issue. Particularly because there is this counter-intuitive aspect about modelling - that good models shed as much detail as possible and so tend to look "unreal" to those who wrongly expect science to be a passive kind of "all seeing perception".

For example in mind science, there is a constant lament about the hard problem and the failure of science to deliver "what is it like" type explanations. This just fails to get what modelling is actually ultimately about.

It does not drive a false wedge, but is merely a statement of fact. Personally I'm not interested in creating a private language only I understand, so I tend to stick with the widely used definitions of words. In this case:

Science
noun
1. a branch of knowledge or study dealing with a body of facts or truths systematically arranged and showing the operation of general laws: the mathematical sciences.
2. systematic knowledge of the physical or material world gained through observation and experimentation.

These are the first two definitions listed because they are the most widely used and applicable. What both share is the emphasis on science as a methodology and what both do not address explicitly is anything about "modelling reality" or epistemology. If you wish to think of science in such terms that is all good and well, but is certainly not explicitly stated by the widely used definitions of the term. For example, others might argue from a consensual reality perspective that science is actually a creative act and instead of modelling reality we are creating reality. Such assertions are clearly philosophical and do not conform to the dictionary definition of the word.

 

[wuliheron]

Nominalist logic is so compelling, isn't it? So what, according to you, is a "scientific analysis" of scientific terminology and what exactly is scientific about it?

Relational Frame Theory is a good example and I have already provided a link. As I have also already indicated in the above post, I prefer to use the commonly used definitions of words whenever reasonable.

 

[apeiron]

If you wish to think of science in such terms that is all good and well, but is certainly not explicitly stated by the widely used definitions of the term.

If this is a demonstration of "functional" and "contextual" then it leaves plenty to be desired.

 

[wuliheron]

If this is a demonstration of "functional" and "contextual" then it leaves plenty to be desired.

I can, of course, post the definitions of those words too if you wish another opportunity to express general dissatisfaction with the English language.

 

[apeiron]

I can, of course, post the definitions of those words too if you wish another opportunity to express general dissatisfaction with the English language.

OK, it's just clicked that functional contextualism is part of a neo-Skinnerian therapy/proto-cult. I nearly died laughing! In this day and age we still have such an improverished view of human psychology?

No wonder that link you provided was just grandiose verbiage. I'll just stick to Peirce, Vygotsky and Mead if you don't mind.

 

[wuliheron]

OK, it's just clicked that functional contextualism is part of a neo-Skinnerian therapy/proto-cult. I nearly died laughing! In this day and age we still have such an improverished view of human psychology?

No wonder that link you provided was just grandiose verbiage. I'll just stick to Peirce, Vygotsky and Mead if you don't mind.

Instead of addressing my points you resort to vacuous insults? Please, do stick with whatever philosophers you prefer, Contextualism has a reputation to uphold.

 

[Phrak]

Dear argumentibles,

Are any of you aware that the designation "Law of Physics" is an historical artifact?

This turn of phrase has been passed down to us from an era when Newtonian physics was king, Newton was long dead, and the community of physics had nothing to do but refine the immutable F=ma while dusting and cleaning the pedestal upon which they had placed Newton's image.

(And if anyone wonders if my response is in anyway an insult or belittlement of the genius of Newton, it is not.)

 

[Pythagorean]

Dear argumentibles,

Are any of you aware that the designation "Law of Physics" is an historical artifact?

This turn of phrase has been passed down to us from an era when Newtonian physics was king, Newton was long dead, and the community of physics had nothing to do but refine the immutable F=ma while dusting and cleaning the pedestal upon which they had placed Newton's image.

(And if anyone wonders if my response is in anyway an insult or belittlement of the genius of Newton, it is not.)

Well, it may be an assault to those "dusting and cleaning". There were really not many fundamental contradictions (I actually know of none) with observation at the time because we couldn't see on the quantum or relativistic scale.

Also, I hope your'e not ignoring the intermediate studies of electromagnetism and thermodynamics that really lead, unavoidably, to relativity and quantum both.

Once you know Newton's three laws, everything isn't all the sudden solved either. We're still solving many classical problems today.