An unusual proposal for the concept of a human subject is proposed in the thread about Gregg Rosenberg’s book (chapter 12 and chapter 13). I want to discuss it independent of the context of Rosenberg. It is proposed that a (human) subject is: “a thing that experiences a bounded unit of phenomenal qualities”. This possibility excludes the “such-and-such personality, memories, interests, skills, worldviews, and so on” from the concept of the self. All these cognitive items, the “cognitive-self construct” is only like a memory stick that can be read and written and read by the subject that can in principle be plugged in and out of the phenomenal engine (=the subject) without destroying it. I think this proposal has great advantages: (1) Phenomenal qualities are more immediate to me as my personality, my wishes and believes are. This concept of the self subject seems to be drawn from live. The cognitive seems to be something secondary and fare of the core person. (2) My cognitive processing includes general assumptions like “Dakar is the capitol of Senegal” in the same way as it includes facts of my personality. Hence the unity of my self cannot be defined via cognitive contents as simple as it can be done by private phenomenal qualities. (3) Animals belong to the same category of subjects as humans do. Hence the continuity between animals and humans is very good reflected in this conception of the subject.I do not like this proposal anyway. But I’m not sure whether I have a good argument against it: I will try to give one. It is a central fact that human subjects are involved in actions. These actions integrate the cognitive processes of the acting subjects. An action in the full sense stands also in some correspondence to the personality I am: (E.g.: This is typical for me or it marks a decision that is a discontinuity to my wishes up to now.) This correspondence is no accidental feature of my subjectivity. I see that a subject understood as united phenomenal qualities also integrates some cognitive qualities. But I think that there are some cognitive features belonging to the essence of the subject. (I’m not sure whether they need a phenomenal component or not.) My question is: What is your conception of the human subject? Do you have some arguments concerning the view described above? The following texts are quoted from the thread about Gregg Rosenberg’s book “A Place for Consciousness” and illustrate further the problematic concept of a subject.