What is the Role of Ontology in Epistemic Differences and Entity Connections?

[Mentat]

Why does the epistemic differences established by mind-body distinctions necessitate an ontological divide? What is the defining difference between ontologies? How could two entities, from separate ontologies, ever be connected?

Any related comments or answers are, as always, greatly appreciated .

 

[Fliption]

Why does the epistemic differences established by mind-body distinctions necessitate an ontological divide? What is the defining difference between ontologies? How could two entities, from separate ontologies, ever be connected?

Any related comments or answers are, as always, greatly appreciated .

I believe that there is but one reality where everything co-exists in a consistent paradigm. In my opinion, the distinctions and labels we use are all man made based on our epistomology. Of course, there has to be something about the ontology that leads to the epistemic differences, but I think the ontologies are consistent whereas, our limitations many times result in the epistemic differences not being consistent. This is why I am so torn on what to believe when it comes to ontology. Sometimes I feel like I'm skydiving without a parachute.

 

[Mentat]

I believe that there is but one reality where everything co-exists in a consistent paradigm. In my opinion, the distinctions and labels we use are all man made based on our epistomology. Of course, there has to be something about the ontology that leads to the epistemic differences, but I think the ontologies are consistent whereas, our limitations many times result in the epistemic differences not being consistent. This is why I am so torn on what to believe when it comes to ontology. Sometimes I feel like I'm skydiving without a parachute.

So, you think there are more than one ontology, but you think they are consistent with one another?

I guess that takes one back to the question of what would connect two ontologically distinct entities...I know this is all very familiar to you. We've had these discussions before (though it seemed inexorably tied to the homunculus problem that I could never explain worth crap )...good times .

 

[Fliption]

So, you think there are more than one ontology, but you think they are consistent with one another?

I guess that takes one back to the question of what would connect two ontologically distinct entities...I know this is all very familiar to you. We've had these discussions before (though it seemed inexorably tied to the homunculus problem that I could never explain worth crap )...good times .

I'm not real sure what you mean when you say two distinct ontological entities. I'm not sure I believe that is the case. It depends on what you mean. For example, if we're talking about mind and body then I believe that ultimately it's all the same "stuff". Our disagreements likely center around the nature of that "stuff".

 

[Canute]

If mind and body both reduce to an underlying form of consciousness then does this solve the problem? It would mean that mind/matter are, in Fliptions terms, the result of an epistemilogical difference, but that they share the same ontology. This avoids dualism and there is then no need for an 'ontological divide'.

 

[Mentat]

If mind and body both reduce to an underlying form of consciousness then does this solve the problem? It would mean that mind/matter are, in Fliptions terms, the result of an epistemilogical difference, but that they share the same ontology. This avoids dualism and there is then no need for an 'ontological divide'.

Well, that's not necessarily so. Ontological dichotomies needn't be limited to mind-body duality.

Anyway, if one is to think of "mind" and "body" as being "made of the same stuff", then one has to assume that there is more to "mind" than what can be explained in terms of "body". One must then, in turn, assume that they are both made of some underlying form of consciousness (as Canute suggests) in order to get rid of the problems of ontology. Isn't that anti-Ockham's Razor?

 

[Mentat]

I'm not real sure what you mean when you say two distinct ontological entities. I'm not sure I believe that is the case. It depends on what you mean. For example, if we're talking about mind and body then I believe that ultimately it's all the same "stuff". Our disagreements likely center around the nature of that "stuff".

But, if they're made of the same "stuff", then they're not ontologically distinct.

What I'm really wondering about is whether the development of "ontological divides", in early philosophical thought, was due to having made a bad assumption earlier on. There are those who (for one example) would insist that the difference between "universals" and "particulars" is ontological. This clearly comes from the bad assumption that universals even exist. If, instead of seeing instances of something interesting as "particulars" of something "universal", we just see them as instances of something interesting that can be categorized along with other such instances that bear a certain resemblance, we could eliminate this particular dichotomy.

After reading Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, along with some of Rorty's writings, I'm wondering if the "mind-body problem" might not be solved in a similar way (or rather, avoided completely in a similar way).

 

[Epcious]

Metaphysics proposes universals of which in epistemology provide a natural briding ground for any separation. It may be possible that in epistemology among ontological division that there is no connection between very broad areas down to very specific areas. Yet, the connection is found more fundamental operational or prehaps if not historically both of which can lead back metaphysics but often not it only requires a look back to the material causes of division. Althought one must note that all division indicative in a material or mental atmosphere must have causes in a metaphysical manner for this is the original basis for reality and all pertainable to it.

 

[Fliption]

After reading Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, along with some of Rorty's writings, I'm wondering if the "mind-body problem" might not be solved in a similar way (or rather, avoided completely in a similar way).

Perhaps it would be better if you laid out how that works. As you may recall, we've had a few of those "Wittgenstein" folks participate in some discussions claiming grand things about how language causes all philosophy problems but then they never have the patience or competence to explain their position.

 

[Canute]

Anyway, if one is to think of "mind" and "body" as being "made of the same stuff", then one has to assume that there is more to "mind" than what can be explained in terms of "body". One must then, in turn, assume that they are both made of some underlying form of consciousness (as Canute suggests) in order to get rid of the problems of ontology. Isn't that anti-Ockham's Razor?

I'd rather say the opposite. Making mind and body the same substance reduces the number of hypothetical fundamental substances to one. There are other problems of course, but I don't think Ockham is one of them.

I believe that Charles Peirce argued that to explain anything fully required a fundamental trinity of terms from which to construct the explanation. (He wrote a book on trinities but I've never got around to tracking it down). If he was right then this would explain why we cannot explain mind and body properly. Not enough terms. Adding a third would allow us to reduce mind and body to one, and would, in principle at least, allow a solution to the mind/body interaction problem. I'd have a job arguing that mind and body do reduce to a third term (or substance or entity), but it is at least the right kind of solution, it does at least allow us to swap dualism for monism, which is not a complete solution, but it's a start.

I don't think it implies that there is more to mind than body, except inasmuch as in the final analysis, at a fundamental level, the experiencer is distinct from mind. I suppose it suggests that there is more to being conscious than being aware of the contents of our minds.

Fliption - I'm interested that you believe mind and body reduce to the same stuff. What's your view on what sort of stuff they reduce to?

 

[Fliption]

Fliption - I'm interested that you believe mind and body reduce to the same stuff. What's your view on what sort of stuff they reduce to?

I can tell you that my thinking on this is not based on a solid argument that I can defend at the moment. Of course, my opinion is influenced by many of the topics that go on here but largely my opinion is intuitive and may be entirely different tomorrow . I think that the essence of this stuff is beyond words to describe much like the experience of red is. I suspect it is very much tied to experience and consciousness as it makes more and more sense to me that these things are fundamental to reality. But I think our experience is but an aspect of it. Which is why the dual aspect ideas are appealing to me. The idea of a single substance balanced between two extemes is appealing (the Yin and the Yang!). Les Sleeth has called it "potentiality". While this word may be accurate, it is unappealing because it tells us nothing about its essence. But I think this gets back to our inability to place words on it without losing something.

So if it is possible for a single entity to exists in a balanced dance of convergence and divergence creating a dual aspect, then this would be the ontological explanation for differences in epistomology. But would Mentat call such an entity a single ontology? I would.

This is the best I can do. I have expressed this opinion in this thread because there is no way I can defend the view that there truly are two separate ontologies like mind and matter. To Mentat's point, I see no way to reconcile a fundamental separation like that. I stated that Mentat and I likely disagreed on the nature of this "stuff" because I assume he would claim there is but one aspect and its most fundamental parts are simply characters in a theory of physics i.e. quantum physics etc etc.

 

[Canute]

Thanks. I think you're right.

 

[Mentat]

Perhaps it would be better if you laid out how that works. As you may recall, we've had a few of those "Wittgenstein" folks participate in some discussions claiming grand things about how language causes all philosophy problems but then they never have the patience or competence to explain their position.

That's because Kantian, Aristotelian, Cartesian, and Lockean biases are so deeply ingrained in the reasoning of most people. I'll give it a try:

Through a Wittgensteinian approach we can first see language as not a singular process or ability, but as many. He calls each individual process/ability a "language-game", and the "family resemblances" between such "games" are many, but there is no singular quality that exists in all of them.

Now, games all have their own pieces and their own rules. Taking the "language-game" concept into history, Rorty thinks we will start to see (for an example) "ontological dichotomies" of mind and body or of universals and particulars as merely social conventions of language. IOW, whereas the mind-body distinction was originally designed (and later refined) specifically to establish a framework of things that could not be doubted -- from which we could extrapolate other "truths" and against which we could rigorously test conjectures, theories, even whole paradigms -- Wittgenstein does away with "absolute grounding" for truth (Rorty refers to "absolute grounding" as "polishing our Mirror of Nature, so that our inner representations are as accurate as possible"), and adopts a more relativistic viewpoint. Then, all that is left is to solve the puzzles that our language-games can create.

As an example, let's look at the concept of "a-consciousness" and "p-consciousness". These stand for "action-consciousness" and "phenomenal-consciousness" in the philosophical language-game. No other language game uses a distinction even remotely like this, because no other game needs it. Thus, it is only a puzzle brought on by an aspect of this particular game. Now, let's dissect the "pieces" and their roles.

"Phenomenal" is a term that has reference to events occurring in the mind, or otherwise being of a mental nature. Specifically, phenomenal-consciousness is that consciousness that is more than just neural processing of information or the uttering of responses. It is, to put it yet another way, the perception of "redness" beyond the simple electro-chemical processing of photonic information.

Now, why do we even have this concept (this "piece" in our "game")? Well, our philosophical language-game has allowed for such a distinction for some time (ever since Descartes). But why did Descartes come up with it? Well, if one looks at the time in which he was living, one can easily see how it would become necessary for him to try to establish which things could and could not be doubted. And, since you have first-hand priveleged access to what you are perceiving, that must be undoubtable. IOW, it's the one thing about which you could be allowed (by society? by other philosophers?) to be incorrigible, and nobody would mind; nobody could contest it, since it was your experience.

But, now, if "redness" was just a reflection of how something seemed to you, and had nothing to do with anything real...and if neuroscience could establish a well-grounded understanding of how we process every different kind of phenomenon, then you might not be allowed to be so incorrigible. After all, you could tell us how it seemed to you, but the neurologist could tell us how it actually was. And this is not so strange as it may seem, since people have always talked about how things seemed to them (for example, there are those who percieve an order and intelligence in the Universe...perfect clock-work) until science came in and showed them that their views needed correction (quantum mechanics, for example, does away with the clock-work Universe concept fairly well).

All I'm basically saying (for those of you who skipped ahead to the end ) is that our ability to be incorrigible about how something seems to us was blown way out of proportion (eventually becoming considered an ontological dichotomy (of all things!)), and has become the basis for a large slew of words (p- and a- consciousness among them) that would have had no meaning whatsoever without that misconception.

The usual objection is that our conscious experience ("experience" here being used in a way quite different than in any other language-game) cannot be doubted. How something seems to us cannot be overruled by someone else, and pain, "redness", love, etc, have no more existence other than how they seem to us. But, pace Rorty, I ask if that is really so. Is it really even comprehensible to speak of a "pain" without speaking of a being that is in pain? Much like beauty or valor, which cannot be spoken of intelligently (at all, really) without referencing the context (how can you speak of beauty without speaking something that "is beautiful"). What has happened, which has infected our philosophical language-game, is that words we use to describe these states have indeed been used to refer to particulars, our of context.

That is why it is nothing more than a language puzzle: it has no substance outside of one specific language game, and only has substance therein because of a misconstruition of a state for a particular.

There's obviously more to this (much more), but I'll stop here for now.

 

[AKG]

Why does the epistemic differences established by mind-body distinctions necessitate an ontological divide?

Which "epistemic differences" do you speak of?

What is the defining difference between ontologies?

Aside from being aware of the fact that brain states are strictly not mental states, I don't think we can say more. I don't think it would make sense to say much more. We can say, perhaps, that brain states cause mental states, but how do we talk about the differences? The thing is, the words we use in general, we use to describe the things of our perception, i.e. we know attributes which apply to the contents of our perceptions (among other things). We can say one apple which we perceive is bigger than another, since bigness/size is an attribute we know how to attach to a perceived apple. But we don't talk about perceptions as things in themselves. What is it about the attributes of perceptions themselves which differ from the attributes of the physical world (and the body) in itself? Can we fill in the blank: "perceptions are _______ and physical entities are not?" At this point, I think we would simply have to define a new term. We know that there certainly is a difference between perceptions and physical entities that are represented in those perceptions, if we want to label that difference, we'd have to make one up. Similarly, we know what it means to be physical, to be real, to exist, etc. but we cannot explain what these things mean in other terms. To repeat, we do know what they mean, but not in terms of other words. So we do know that the attributes of perceptions and mental things in general are different from physical things, if you want to label that set of attributes, I think you'll have to make it up.

How could two entities, from separate ontologies, ever be connected?

Is there any reason to think that they shouldn't be connected? We have that : "Two different types of things are connected." To me, this is so vague that I don't even know how any can find it problematic. It has to remain vague, since we aren't in the habit of observing the mental "world" from a separate standpoint, and characterizing it, comparing it to other "worlds", and noticing the patterns and relationships in the world itself from the outside. Our perception is directly immersed in the perceptual world. As a crude analogy, you can think of us as reading a word document, instead of looking at a folder containing the icon for that, and other, word documents. We don't know what perceptions look like from the outside, if that makes any sense. So, the incredibly vague sentence, "two different types of things are connected" is so vague that it cannot possibly imply a contradiction in that these two different things cannot be connected. We can't really put a word on how these things are different, so how can we say they cannot be connected?

Consider connecting the gross national product to a baseball. Clearly, that doesn't make sense. Those things are different in a sense that they cannot be connected metaphysically. Even here, it's hard to put words to explain the differences between the two, but we have a pretty good idea as to how these things differ and so can't be connected. But mental things and physical things just differ. We can't put words as to how they differ, so we can't say that they can't be connected. We only know that they differ, not how. And just to avoid confusion, the GNP is not a mental thing. Of course, it's something we think about, and we often refer to it as a concept, but the GNP is, and again, we know that there's a difference but can't describe what it is, quite different in its nature from things like perceptions, beliefs, etc.

 

[Fliption]

That's because Kantian, Aristotelian, Cartesian, and Lockean biases are so deeply ingrained in the reasoning of most people. I'll give it a try:

Actually, that isn't why. In these particular cases, the people were arrogant know-it-alls who had no ability to attempt to lay out the idea the way you have just done. The fact that none of those people are currently members here any longer says alot.

That is why it is nothing more than a language puzzle: it has no substance outside of one specific language game, and only has substance therein because of a misconstruition of a state for a particular.

I'm sorry. I don't get it. I can't argue against it or for it because I don't understand any of it enough to even begin to analyze it. At the moment I do not believe this is because I have been brainwashed by cartesian thinking. I just don't understand the sentences. They don't say anything to me. I have no idea what is meant by terms like "particulars" and "universals" etc.

But I will bet all my money in the bank that any theory that blames all philosophical problems on language is dead wrong and a cop-out But I can't prove it because I don't understand it enough to evaluate it.

 

[Mentat]

Which "epistemic differences" do you speak of?

Epistemology has to do with knowledge and the aquisition thereof. The epistemic difference I refer to just have to do with the differences in ways of aquiring information.

Aside from being aware of the fact that brain states are strictly not mental states, I don't think we can say more. I don't think it would make sense to say much more.

But does it make sense to speak of "mental states" in the first place. What is a mental state?

So, the incredibly vague sentence, "two different types of things are connected" is so vague that it cannot possibly imply a contradiction in that these two different things cannot be connected. We can't really put a word on how these things are different, so how can we say they cannot be connected?

To refer to things of different ontologies is to ascribe a difference in terms of "types/realms of reality". To refer to a connection 'twixt the two is to refer to what it always refers to: connecting things. What complicates this issue is that ontologically distinct entities couldn't be connected by anything within their own ontologies (they're already in their own ontologies, so what good is an attempted bridge that is of the exact same ontological nature?), and it couldn't by anything of a third ontology because then you have the same problem of what connects it to entities of separate ontologies.

Consider connecting the gross national product to a baseball. Clearly, that doesn't make sense. Those things are different in a sense that they cannot be connected metaphysically. Even here, it's hard to put words to explain the differences between the two, but we have a pretty good idea as to how these things differ and so can't be connected.

But they have nothing to do with one another. OTOH, for those who claim that "mind" is of one ontology and "body" is of another, there is a clear co-existence and correlation between the two, inspite of the problems of ontology.

 

[Mentat]

Actually, that isn't why. In these particular cases, the people were arrogant know-it-alls who had no ability to attempt to lay out the idea the way you have just done. The fact that none of those people are currently members here any longer says alot.

I recall RageSk8 using a somewhat Rortian view, and (AFAIK) he wasn't banned or even considered problematic.

OTOH, that these others were "arrogant know-it-alls" is not surprising, given the Wittgensteinian nature of their ideas. Wittgenstein's own intellectual arrogance and inability to relate his ideas intelligibly to others cannot help but show up in his followers' attempts at doing the same.

Finally, how do you know that it isn't those biases which keep you from comprehending the Wittgensteinian view? Let me put my (rude?) assumption to the test: What distinguishes you from the rest of the animal kingdom?

I'm sorry. I don't get it. I can't argue against it or for it because I don't understand any of it enough to even begin to analyze it.

Then it is I who am sorry. I'm not very good with explanations, as you well know. I still don't have a more comprehensive way to explain the homunculi problem, much less the possible resolution (or, perhaps, rational side-stepping) of all the philosophical "problems" throughout history.

Could you maybe point out something in particular that doesn't makes sense to you?

At the moment I do not believe this is because I have been brainwashed by cartesian thinking. I just don't understand the sentences. They don't say anything to me. I have no idea what is meant by terms like "particulars" and "universals" etc.

That's a bit of philosophical jargon, nothing more. Indeed, aside from philosophy, they don't really have much/any meaning at all. In fact...maybe the fact that statements that require those terms don't make sense to you is indicative of their having no real substance. I don't know.

But I will bet all my money in the bank that any theory that blames all philosophical problems on language is dead wrong and a cop-out But I can't prove it because I don't understand it enough to evaluate it.

Well, to start with, is there any philosophical problem that could be stated without using language?

 

[AKG]

Epistemology has to do with knowledge and the aquisition thereof. The epistemic difference I refer to just have to do with the differences in ways of aquiring information.

I'm not following. What differences in ways of aquiring information arise from a mind-body distinction?

But does it make sense to speak of "mental states" in the first place. What is a mental state?

I was using it vaguely. Perceptions are related to mental states, brain activity is related to physical states. Clearly, the two are different; science suggests that brain activity causes perceptions.

To refer to things of different ontologies is to ascribe a difference in terms of "types/realms of reality". To refer to a connection 'twixt the two is to refer to what it always refers to: connecting things. What complicates this issue is that ontologically distinct entities couldn't be connected by anything within their own ontologies (they're already in their own ontologies, so what good is an attempted bridge that is of the exact same ontological nature?), and it couldn't by anything of a third ontology because then you have the same problem of what connects it to entities of separate ontologies.

What exactly does it mean to be of a different ontology? We can understand this in a vague sense, but not in a very concrete sense. Two objects in totally isolated rooms cannot be connected by rope. This is a very concrete example, and we can see why they cannot be connected by rope. On the other hand, why does being of a different ontology mean that two things cannot be connected? You say that the "thing" connecting them would have to be of some ontology, and that this would give us problems. Why would there have to be a "thing" connecting them. Why does the connection between the two ontologies have to have an ontological status itself? At any rate, if such a vague question did need answer, the following possibilities could be considered:

1) Mental states and physical states are of the same ontology, fundamentally. They are things which "appear" to be different, but are fundamentally same in nature, thus there's no problem connecting them. This option actually illustrates why answering this question is unnecessary. What is the difference between being different ontologically, and appearing different? How could we possibly tell? It's so incredibly vague, and so beyond our ability to understand that the question is pointless, if not meaningles.

2) Some "thing" that is a continuum-like mixture between the two ontologies connects the two. Detergent is a molecule that has a hydrophobic end and a hydrophilic end. One end dissolves in water while the other dissolves in oil (stains on you clothes, etc.).

But they have nothing to do with one another. OTOH, for those who claim that "mind" is of one ontology and "body" is of another, there is a clear co-existence and correlation between the two, inspite of the problems of ontology.

That there is a correlation between mind and body is after the fact; after the fact of their connection. We can say that, perhaps, mind and body have fundamentally nothing to do with each other, but given some metaphysical connection, they do. Similarly, baseballs and the GNP have nothing to do with each other, and if we could connect the two, then there would be some correlation, but connecting the two is meaningless.

It seems to me that we can ask:

Does body produce mind?
Did they come about independently?
Are they of the same "substance" (ontology)?
Why is there a connection between the two?
How are the two connected?
Can things of different ontologies be connected without a thing connecting them?

Only speculative answers are possible. Any sufficiently vague response to any of these questions will be plausible. None of them will be verifiable.

I can offer one theory, answering the above questions in order:

Yes.
Obviously not, by above.
Yes.
The brain created the mind, that's why there's a connection.
Since they are the same substance, there is some natural connection.
No.

The above is perfectly consistent, and neither provable nor disprovable. Yet another theory:

No, the existence of a brain allows for a mind to connect to a body (which is why only things with brains appear to have minds).
Yes.
No.
Because of some special property of the brain which allows it to be connected to a mind.
By some strange, mixed-ontology duct tape.
Yes. Sometimes, things of different ontologies just are connected. There is no rule which states, "All things of different ontologies cannot be connected, and/or all things of different ontologies that are connected must be connected by some 'thing'." It just so happens that this metaphysical duct tape connects our brain and mind.

I can't even start to understand why there's a difficulty in presuming things of different ontologies have some connection. As I said, the above is so vague that I can't see where there's sufficient detail to even suggest a problem. There's nothing in the word "ontology" which suggests that different ontologies will have problems connecting (that's what I mean when I say that there is insufficient detail to even suggest a problem). Perhaps there is some intuitive, gut-feeling that irks you about different substances connecting, but I can't even sympathize with that, i.e. I can't understand how "Different ontologies can connect" could be counter-intuitive. We're dealing with things that are sufficiently abstract that intuition would have little to say on the matter.

Anyhow, the second theory above is also consistent, and again, undecideable. In some, the whole problem is uninteresting. We can't really give "proper" answers, nor should that concern us. Whether the connection between brain and mind "just is", or results from metaphysical duct tape, who cares. Can you prove either option right or wrong? No. None of the questions really give us any problems (for those who assert duality between body and mind). Whether we can answer them or not doesn't affect the dualist's position.

When a scientist observes that an apple falls from a tree towards the ground, whether or not he can explain why the apple falls towards the ground does not affect the truth of his observation that the apple does indeed fall to the ground. Whether we can explain how or why mental states and perceptions are related, it's clear that they are, and it's clear that they're different. The apple you see on your desk is not the electrons in your brain, nor your brain itself, nor the actions of your brain, nor the state of activity of the brain. It is caused by those things, it is nonsense to say that it is those things. Perhaps this is all we can say, but we need not say more unless we enjoy answering unanswerable, irrelevant questions.

 

[Mentat]

I'm not following. What differences in ways of aquiring information arise from a mind-body distinction?

Well, pace Kant, isn't there a distinction between those things which we percieve from objective stimulus and those things which are immediately present before our minds (such as our own existence, our imaginings, etc)?

I was using it vaguely. Perceptions are related to mental states, brain activity is related to physical states.

"Perceptions" makes reference to something. Is there such a thing as a singular "perception", or is not the typical and better use of the word in terms of the process of "percieving"?

Clearly, the two are different; science suggests that brain activity causes perceptions.

No it doesn't. Science doesn't deal with "perceptions", it deals with the process of percieving.

What exactly does it mean to be of a different ontology? We can understand this in a vague sense, but not in a very concrete sense. Two objects in totally isolated rooms cannot be connected by rope. This is a very concrete example, and we can see why they cannot be connected by rope.

But they could be if one drilled holes in the wall(s) that separated the two rooms.

One cannot drill holes in realities to facillitate the passage of, or connection to, something that is ontologically distinct.

On the other hand, why does being of a different ontology mean that two things cannot be connected? You say that the "thing" connecting them would have to be of some ontology, and that this would give us problems.

Are you familiar with the actual definition of "ontology". By this definition, anything that is "real", in any sense, must "be of some ontology" (as you put it).

Why would there have to be a "thing" connecting them. Why does the connection between the two ontologies have to have an ontological status itself?

It is definitive. Anything that can be referred to can be assigned ontological status.

1) Mental states and physical states are of the same ontology, fundamentally. They are things which "appear" to be different, but are fundamentally same in nature, thus there's no problem connecting them.

I'm not the one who assigned them different ontologies. I don't even assign "mental states" the right to be referred to outside of scare-quotes, when I write. They don't (yet?) mean anything to me, and so I can hardly care about whether or not "mental states" (if they exist at all) are ontologically (or otherwise) distinct from physical states. As it is, many other philosophers have indeed postulated such an ontological dichotomy, and I am interested in the problems that this presents.

This option actually illustrates why answering this question is unnecessary. What is the difference between being different ontologically, and appearing different?

It's a matter of definition, nothing more (though I don't know what it would mean for something to be "more" than a matter of definition).

How could we possibly tell?

Why should we be able to "tell" in order to discuss it? Philosophers have been doing it for centuries, without being able to explain comprehensively how we can "tell" that different ontologies even exist.

2) Some "thing" that is a continuum-like mixture between the two ontologies connects the two.

"Continuum-like mixture between the two ontologies" would be a separate ontology. The very fact that it is not of one or the other ontology makes it of a third. And the fact that you refer to a "mixture" just begs the question of how you can get things of different ontologies to react/mix/interact/even notice each other.

That there is a correlation between mind and body is after the fact; after the fact of their connection.

What do you mean?

We can say that, perhaps, mind and body have fundamentally nothing to do with each other, but given some metaphysical connection, they do.

If they both exist, and both do what we think they do...sure, they must have something to do with one another.

Similarly, baseballs and the GNP have nothing to do with each other, and if we could connect the two, then there would be some correlation, but connecting the two is meaningless.

Yes, but philosophers haven't been puzzling over baseballs, the GNP, and the correlation between the two for the past 400 years.

It seems to me that we can ask:

Does body produce mind?
Did they come about independently?
Are they of the same "substance" (ontology)?
Why is there a connection between the two?
How are the two connected?
Can things of different ontologies be connected without a thing connecting them?

Only speculative answers are possible. Any sufficiently vague response to any of these questions will be plausible. None of them will be verifiable.

I can offer one theory, answering the above questions in order:

Yes.
Obviously not, by above.
Yes.
The brain created the mind, that's why there's a connection.
Since they are the same substance, there is some natural connection.
No.

The above is perfectly consistent, and neither provable nor disprovable.

I beg to differ.

You forgot the part where you assume that there is such a thing as "mind" (or, for that matter, such a thing as "body").

Then you give no reasoning to support the idea that they are of the same ontology, thus side-stepping the age-old philosophical problem.

Then you assume that the brain created the mind (though that's technically your first stated assumption), but explain not how this is so or even what it would mean.

When a scientist observes that an apple falls from a tree towards the ground, whether or not he can explain why the apple falls towards the ground does not affect the truth of his observation that the apple does indeed fall to the ground. Whether we can explain how or why mental states and perceptions are related, it's clear that they are, and it's clear that they're different.

Not it's not. It's not clear to me that they are different.

The apple you see on your desk is not the electrons in your brain, nor your brain itself, nor the actions of your brain, nor the state of activity of the brain. It is caused by those things, it is nonsense to say that it is those things.

It is nonsense to say that the apple is "caused" by anything having to do with my brain or the electro-chemical processes therein. That apple exists regardless of my brain.

Perhaps this is all we can say, but we need not say more unless we enjoy answering unanswerable, irrelevant questions.

You mean, unless we're Philosophers?

 

[AKG]

"Perceptions" makes reference to something. Is there such a thing as a singular "perception", or is not the typical and better use of the word in terms of the process of "percieving"?

Are you suggesting that there is no such thing as a perception? The image you see of your computer right now, for example, is (part of) a perception. A dream is what one experiences when dreaming, a perception is what one experiences when perceiving.

But they could be if one drilled holes in the wall(s) that separated the two rooms.

One cannot drill holes in realities to facillitate the passage of, or connection to, something that is ontologically distinct.

Why not? Why can't we drill "holes" and connect the two ontologies with metaphysical duct tape? Sounds absurd, for sure, but this seems to be the type of response such a question invokes.

It is definitive. Anything that can be referred to can be assigned ontological status.

I can refer to my perception, so do you agree that it has an ontological status? That there is a connection between two things does not entail that there is a "thing" connecting the two. Simply that the two have a relation. Now, if you want, you can say that the relation itself has an ontological status. If we wanted, sure, we could assign ontological statuses to things like relations, actions, properties, etc., i.e. "things" that require some level of abstraction to be thought of as "things."

If you require that some "thing" connect the two ontologies, then metaphysical duct tape will be my answer. If we realize that what's going is simply that the mind and body are related, not that some "thing" is attaching them, then the question becomes meaningless.

It's a matter of definition, nothing more (though I don't know what it would mean for something to be "more" than a matter of definition).

Well, if it is a matter of definition, let's define them to be of the same ontology to quell your worries that they are of different ontologies, and thus no duct tape could ever hold them together.

Why should we be able to "tell" in order to discuss it? Philosophers have been doing it for centuries, without being able to explain comprehensively how we can "tell" that different ontologies even exist.

This wasn't meant to be an emprical problem, but one of definitions. The question wasn't, what evidence could we bring forth to show that they were of different ontologies, but, what the heck does it even mean to be of different ontologies? If, as you put, it is nothing more than a matter of definition, and as you seem to imply, it is somewhat arbitrary, why should we bother worrying about the problem of ontologically different things being connected when that problem could just be no different then the problem of how things in two different rooms could be connected.

You have to show that distinguishing between body and mind, and their ontological statuses, actually does define a problem, i.e. that to be of different ontological statuses really does mean that there is a problem if one suggests that the two are connected. And since it is pretty vague to say that x is of ontological status X, and y of ontological status Y, show that the actual distinction that dualists makes produces any sort of problem.

"Continuum-like mixture between the two ontologies" would be a separate ontology. The very fact that it is not of one or the other ontology makes it of a third. And the fact that you refer to a "mixture" just begs the question of how you can get things of different ontologies to react/mix/interact/even notice each other.

I really don't think it does. Somehow, people create detergent molecules that get a hydrophobic molecule to "notice" a hydrophilic one. Although this "continuum-like mixture" would be a third ontology, it would still be a mixture of the previous two, and would still facilitate the connection. The question of how a mixed-ontology thing could exist remains to be answered, but the sentence preceeding this one was already quite absurd, this is just getting worse. The truth is, I don't know how a mixed ontology thing came about, but I never claimed to make it. It just is. I don't think such a thing defies some absolute law, so what's the problem? Maybe it's a third ontology that has special properties that make it soluble in the other ontologies. Do you have any way of denying that such a thing is possible? Any whacky, sci-fi answer will do, so long as it is consistent. I can probably come up with numerous, always consistent but increasingly absurd and fantastic explanations, all of which will be irrefutable (and undemonstrable as well).

What do you mean?

If they both exist, and both do what we think they do...sure, they must have something to do with one another.

Yes, but philosophers haven't been puzzling over baseballs, the GNP, and the correlation between the two for the past 400 years.

What I meant was that the mind and body only have something to do with each other because there is a connection between the two (which could mean simply that they are related for some reason, or that some "thing" connects them), whereas there is no relation between GNPs and baseballs. But if some relation were conceived, or some metaphysical connecting thing came between them, then there would be a connection.

I beg to differ.

You forgot the part where you assume that there is such a thing as "mind" (or, for that matter, such a thing as "body").

Then you give no reasoning to support the idea that they are of the same ontology, thus side-stepping the age-old philosophical problem.

Then you assume that the brain created the mind (though that's technically your first stated assumption), but explain not how this is so or even what it would mean.

How could I explain how it is so? The question keep getting more and more absurd. Just because I can't explain how something is so does not deny that it is a fact (if it is), especially if I don't claim responsibility. It wasn't my decision to make the brain create the mind, that's just what it does. If I kick you in the back of the head, and your head gets injured, but when you turn around you see no one, the fact that your head is injured is not denied by the fact that you don't know how it came to be that way. My point was not to give any reasoning or explanation, just to show that I can provide a consistent theory that can neither be demonstrated nor refuted, and moreover, that I could present two such theories that were incompatible with each other (but internally consistent).

It is nonsense to say that the apple is "caused" by anything having to do with my brain or the electro-chemical processes therein. That apple exists regardless of my brain.

Sorry, the image of the apple is what I was referring to. I can certainly refer to the image of the apple. It is more than just a play on words, the image of the apple is really there, in fact I am more sure of the existence of the image of the apple than I am of the existence of the apple-in-itself. The image of the apple is neither the electrons, nor the brain, nor the brain in action, nor actions of the brain, nor any of this things related to the physical aspect of the process of perceiving. These actions of the brain cause the image of the apple to exist, but the image is not the brain. It is clearly something, and moreover it is something quite different. On the other hand, referring to the connection between mind and body as a thing, although possible, seems to be more of a play on words. You and I are different. In other words, the properties attributed to you are different from those attributed to me. So there is a difference between you and I. Shall we attribute some ontological status to the difference? We could, and this would be a rather abstract thing, but it seems, especially in the context we're dealing with, to not treat it as such. Similarly, it makes more sense to think of the connection between body and mind as a relation between the two, not something we should be referring to as a thing in the "normal" sense. The connection is as much a thing as a "difference" is. Clearly, a difference is not a physical thing. It does not have mass or energy, it is not located in space or time. So how can a difference with one ontological status exist between two physical beings of the same ontological status, but different from that of the difference? Is the difference between the ontological status of the difference and our ontological status itself a thing which holds some ontological status? This will naturally just lead to absurdities.

On the other hand, if you insist that the connection between the mind and body is a thing, again, that thing is metaphysical duct tape. How does it work, how does it attach two ontologies? That's just its special property. It doesn't defy the Law of Ontology, I doubt there even is one, so I don't see how you can see this as problematic. If it does give you problems, let's just say Goddidit and move on, okay? God didn't rest on day 7, he made mind-body-connecting duct tape.

You mean, unless we're Philosophers?

Quite true.

 

[Fliption]

I recall RageSk8 using a somewhat Rortian view, and (AFAIK) he wasn't banned or even considered problematic.

Oops. I wasn't referring to RageSk8. My apologies. I was referring to a few people who entered into the "consciousness" threads last year.

OTOH, that these others were "arrogant know-it-alls" is not surprising, given the Wittgensteinian nature of their ideas. Wittgenstein's own intellectual arrogance and inability to relate his ideas intelligibly to others cannot help but show up in his followers' attempts at doing the same.

Lol. Yes, I think one of them even said the same thing about himself! Arrogance is a pet peeve of mine. I detest it immensely. It is quite frustrating because I really am interested in understanding a view that can make the claims these people were claiming.

Finally, how do you know that it isn't those biases which keep you from comprehending the Wittgensteinian view? Let me put my (rude?) assumption to the test: What distinguishes you from the rest of the animal kingdom?

I'm sorry, I think you misunderstood. I didn't mean that I could not comprehend the idea of what you were saying. I'm claiming that the language itself doesn't make sense to me. I don't understand what the philosophical concepts being used to make the point actually mean. Can a person who has never learned language comprehend ecomonics? You cannot know until you teach them the language!

Could you maybe point out something in particular that doesn't makes sense to you?

Not really. The whole idea seems a bit confusing and presumptive.

That's a bit of philosophical jargon, nothing more. Indeed, aside from philosophy, they don't really have much/any meaning at all. In fact...maybe the fact that statements that require those terms don't make sense to you is indicative of their having no real substance. I don't know.

That's just what I mean. I can't understand the philosophy if I don't understand the jargon.

Well, to start with, is there any philosophical problem that could be stated without using language?

"Stated"? Since to "state" anything means to express something in language then the answer to your question is "no", by definition. But can a philosophical problem be "conceived" without language? I say yes.

 

[Mentat]

Are you suggesting that there is no such thing as a perception?

A perception? Yes. The process of perceiving? By no means.

IOW, I am indeed suggesting that there is no such thing as a (singular, quantitative) "perception". However, it is clear and undeniable that the process of "perceiving" is carried on by some beings (myself included).

The image you see of your computer right now, for example, is (part of) a perception.

What "image of my computer"? I am not looking at an image, I am looking directly at my monitor.

A dream is what one experiences when dreaming, a perception is what one experiences when perceiving.

Oooooh...I see. Not really... Are you saying that a dream, no matter how long, is considered a quantum (a singular entity)? I didn't know this. I thought the point was to "be dreaming", not to {insert activity here} dreams.

I just don't see why we are looking at processes in terms of particles. Why should we change the good concept of "perceiving" into the very bad (IMHO) concept of "a perception". If it were an accurate description (and there really were "perceptons" (not a typo, I purposely named our new particle a "percepton")), then someone would have to explain to me what it is that I do with such things, and how that relates in any way to "perceiving".

Why not? Why can't we drill "holes" and connect the two ontologies with metaphysical duct tape?

Because, my friend, the duct tape would have to be made of something (anything made of something is of a certain ontology, btw...this is a priori and should not be questioned, as it would reduce the argument to a debate on whether Mr. Webster is right about etymology), as would whatever we used to dig our "ontological holes".

Really, AKG, how long can you expect to hold onto this concept?

I can refer to my perception, so do you agree that it has an ontological status?

I knew you were going to say that. Of course perceiving has ontological status. Not a different status from, say, breaking down glucose to release energy, but status nonetheless.

That there is a connection between two things does not entail that there is a "thing" connecting the two. Simply that the two have a relation.

Wrong. Two things can be related, but still never interact with one another. OTOH, they cannot interact without being connected. It is a different concept altogether.

If you require that some "thing" connect the two ontologies, then metaphysical duct tape will be my answer. If we realize that what's going is simply that the mind and body are related, not that some "thing" is attaching them, then the question becomes meaningless.

I don't "require" anything. It is an inescapable result of reasoning on different ontologies. Metaphysical "duct tape" requires its own ontology, for the simple reason that it can be referred to, but doesn't belong to either of the ontologies that it connects.

No, we can't just refer to them as "being related". If mind and body are of separate ontologies, they can be as "related" as you like, and still not be any closer to interacting. Being "related" implies similarities, maybe even concomitance, but they are no closer to interacting because they are still ontologically distinct.

Well, if it is a matter of definition, let's define them to be of the same ontology to quell your worries...

They're not my worries. That's the point. You could define them to be of the same ontology, but then the concept would no longer be admissable in this thread. The point of this thread is to discuss things that are ontologically distinct.

The question wasn't, what evidence could we bring forth to show that they were of different ontologies, but, what the heck does it even mean to be of different ontologies?

It means that they are not of the same reality.

If, as you put, it is nothing more than a matter of definition...

What else would it be?

and as you seem to imply, it is somewhat arbitrary...

All definitions are, aren't they? Think of the distinction between "alive" and "non-living". I have discussed this distinction at length in the past, and it has been shown to be nothing more than an arbitrarily assigned title (or lack thereof), with a series of vague definitions. But that doesn't mean that I'm not alive.

why should we bother worrying about the problem of ontologically different things being connected when that problem could just be no different then the problem of how things in two different rooms could be connected.

But it is different, as I have shown.

You have to show that distinguishing between body and mind, and their ontological statuses, actually does define a problem, i.e. that to be of different ontological statuses really does mean that there is a problem if one suggests that the two are connected.

I have shown this.

And since it is pretty vague to say that x is of ontological status X, and y of ontological status Y, show that the actual distinction that dualists makes produces any sort of problem.

I have also shown this.

I really don't think it does. Somehow, people create detergent molecules that get a hydrophobic molecule to "notice" a hydrophilic one.

That's because they are not ontologically distinct, and no philosopher (or anyone else, for that matter) in his right mind would argue that point.

Although this "continuum-like mixture" would be a third ontology, it would still be a mixture of the previous two, and would still facilitate the connection.

No, it wouldn't, it would only make things worse. A "mixture" is the product of a pre-occuring reaction between to substances/elements/etc. To postulate that such a "mixture" already exists, is to postulate that the two ontologies have already interacted on a previous occasion (and done so without the posited "mixture" at hand, since they created that "mixture" in the reaction).

I can probably come up with numerous, always consistent but increasingly absurd and fantastic explanations, all of which will be irrefutable (and undemonstrable as well).

You have yet to present an "irrefutable" anything. You have, however, produced some "absurd and fantastic explanations", and I don't mind. The very fact that they need to be "absurd and fantastic" to even qualify as possible explanations is further indication that philosophers have made some awful mistakes in the past. That's good enough for me (for now).

What I meant was that the mind and body only have something to do with each other because there is a connection between the two (which could mean simply that they are related for some reason, or that some "thing" connects them), whereas there is no relation between GNPs and baseballs.

There are indeed "relations". I don't think it would be all that difficult to conceive of baseballs having something to do with baseball players, who in turn have something to do with their families, who in turn may have everything to do with the gross national product.

It doesn't matter, because no one has claimed ontological dichotomy between GNP and baseball. Philosophers have, however, claimed such for mind and body.

How could I explain how it is so? The question keep getting more and more absurd. Just because I can't explain how something is so does not deny that it is a fact (if it is), especially if I don't claim responsibility.

You "claimed responsibility" when you made the statement. English is not my first language, but I'm fairly sure the expression "own it" would come into play here (and I'm not just being sarcastic, English really isn't my first language, and I'm really not sure about the expression).

It wasn't my decision to make the brain create the mind, that's just what it does.

Oh, it does, does it?

If I kick you in the back of the head, and your head gets injured, but when you turn around you see no one, the fact that your head is injured is not denied by the fact that you don't know how it came to be that way.

I know that, AKG. What is important is that you are making a statement that is not backed by anything I've ever seen to be true (in fact, a series of such statements). Thus, the burden of explanation and proof rests on you.

Sorry, the image of the apple is what I was referring to. I can certainly refer to the image of the apple.

What "image"??

It is more than just a play on words, the image of the apple is really there, in fact I am more sure of the existence of the image of the apple than I am of the existence of the apple-in-itself. The image of the apple is neither the electrons, nor the brain, nor the brain in action, nor actions of the brain, nor any of this things related to the physical aspect of the process of perceiving. These actions of the brain cause the image of the apple to exist, but the image is not the brain. It is clearly something, and moreover it is something quite different.

This is all very interesting. Please substantiate at least one of the many statements you've made here.

How am I to believe that there is such a thing as an "image of an apple"? I percieve no such thing.

As to the rest of it, well, it all requires that there's an "image of an apple", I don't think there is. Indeed, I don't see how it ever entered into the discussion. We talked of apples, and scientists, and ontologies...but I see no reference to images.

You and I are different. In other words, the properties attributed to you are different from those attributed to me. So there is a difference between you and I.

That's the first thing you've said that I can manage to agree with. You are absolutely right here. Kudos.

Shall we attribute some ontological status to the difference?

Why?

We could, and this would be a rather abstract thing, but it seems, especially in the context we're dealing with, to not treat it as such. Similarly, it makes more sense to think of the connection between body and mind as a relation between the two, not something we should be referring to as a thing in the "normal" sense.

That "makes more sense" to you?

So how can a difference with one ontological status exist between two physical beings of the same ontological status, but different from that of the difference? Is the difference between the ontological status of the difference and our ontological status itself a thing which holds some ontological status? This will naturally just lead to absurdities.

That's because it's BS that has nothing to do with anything I've said. No offense, but are you even paying attention to what I'm saying to you? A difference is a comparison made by an observer (as is any other "relation"). No one can observe two ontologically distinct things at the same time, since he/she/it (the observer) would have to exist in both ontologies.

There, now that we've gotten rid of the whole "relation" thing, can we return to my questions?

 

[Mentat]

Lol. Yes, I think one of them even said the same thing about himself! Arrogance is a pet peeve of mine. I detest it immensely. It is quite frustrating because I really am interested in understanding a view that can make the claims these people were claiming.

I'm glad to hear it. I too despise arrogance (though I've been accused of it myself, more than once). It gets in the way of good debate.

I'm sorry, I think you misunderstood. I didn't mean that I could not comprehend the idea of what you were saying. I'm claiming that the language itself doesn't make sense to me. I don't understand what the philosophical concepts being used to make the point actually mean. Can a person who has never learned language comprehend ecomonics? You cannot know until you teach them the language!

I see. Well, answer my question about animals and humans, and I'll see if I can determine how best to explain my position.

Not really. The whole idea seems a bit confusing and presumptive.

Presumptive, no doubt. That was Wittgenstein's way. It was probably necessary, though, since (as I've mentioned) Kantian thought is quite deeply entrenched in the minds of most.

That's just what I mean. I can't understand the philosophy if I don't understand the jargon.

Well, you have to remember that this is an eliminativist philosophy. Wittgenstein, Rorty, etc, are trying to get rid of most of those concepts. They are useless bits of jargon. However, you do indeed understand some of the "bad" terms that we're trying to remove, and you accept them (if I am to judge by previous conversations, that is).

"Stated"? Since to "state" anything means to express something in language then the answer to your question is "no", by definition. But can a philosophical problem be "conceived" without language? I say yes.

And what would it mean for one to "conceive" of a problem, without discussing it? In what way would that person be altered by such a "conception"?

 

[Fliption]

I see. Well, answer my question about animals and humans, and I'll see if I can determine how best to explain my position.

Alright. You asked, "What distinguishes you from the rest of the animal kingdom?"

Assuming that you mean "you" as "you" in general as a human being and you aren't including other humans in the "animal kingdom" category, I suppose the biggest difference between me and the rest of the animal kingdom is the level of my reasoning ability as well as my ability to use my hands. Oh, and uhh I'm considered sexier in the eyes of human females

Well, you have to remember that this is an eliminativist philosophy. Wittgenstein, Rorty, etc, are trying to get rid of most of those concepts. They are useless bits of jargon. However, you do indeed understand some of the "bad" terms that we're trying to remove, and you accept them (if I am to judge by previous conversations, that is).

I accept some concepts that make sense to me. It has not been sufficiently shown that they are "bad" in any way.

And what would it mean for one to "conceive" of a problem, without discussing it? In what way would that person be altered by such a "conception"?

Hmmm, the same thing it would mean to conceive of one and discuss it? What's the difference? I do not rely on books, forums, or conversations with people to establish what I think a philosophical issue is.

Maybe I was a strange child but I can recall actually thinking about my own nature when I was young. How could I be what I am? How can a world that works the way science tells us it works(all they taught was classical physics in school when I was young) explain "me"? My ability to experience things perplexed me even as a child. I had no philosophical concepts to debate anyone with. All I knew is that I observed a feature of my existence that is not adequately explained. And I still observe it. I just don't see how any amount of conceptual trickery or semantic magic from a philosopher can change that fact.

(BTW, this is kinda scary but even as a child I concluded that experience had to be fundamental to nature. Of course I didn't know any of these words and could not have communicated these thoughts to anyone but it was my thought at the time.)

 

[AKG]

What "image of my computer"? I am not looking at an image, I am looking directly at my monitor.

I'm sure you're well aware of the image of your computer. When you see your computer, the light from the computer hits your eyes, creates activity in the brain, and then there is an image of the computer (the very one you are "experiencing" right now).

I just don't see why we are looking at processes in terms of particles. Why should we change the good concept of "perceiving" into the very bad (IMHO) concept of "a perception".

What is the difference between the computer-in-itself and what you see? You don't see the computer in itself, you see an image, a representation of it, i.e. the computer-in-itself is not what you apprehend, it is an image of the computer, which exists because of some causal process that starts at the computer-in-itself, that you apprehend.

If it were an accurate description (and there really were "perceptons" (not a typo, I purposely named our new particle a "percepton")), then someone would have to explain to me what it is that I do with such things, and how that relates in any way to "perceiving".

What is a hallucination, and how is it different from a real perception? Clearly, you can't equate the perception, or that which you see, with that which is out there in "reality," because when hallucinating, something does appear to you, but it isn't out there. What you see and what is there are distinct. If you hallucinate a pink elephant, then the image of the pink elephant is a thing in some sense, but not a physical sense.

Because, my friend, the duct tape would have to be made of something (anything made of something is of a certain ontology, btw...this is a priori and should not be questioned, as it would reduce the argument to a debate on whether Mr. Webster is right about etymology), as would whatever we used to dig our "ontological holes".

So? What's the problem? Why can't the duct tape be made of something?

I knew you were going to say that. Of course perceiving has ontological status. Not a different status from, say, breaking down glucose to release energy, but status nonetheless.

I can refer to the image of the computer. Look at your computer. "Before" you is the image of a computer, correct? I.e. if you see a computer, you "have" an image of a computer. I don't think I can say it in any simpler terms. Anyhow, that image of the computer can be referred to, and has an ontology. You seem to equivocate the image of the computer (a thing) with the process involved in seeing the image, and since you think that the process of seeing an image is not of a different ontology, then neither is the image (or you deny the image altogether, I don't know, but I don't see how you could honestly deny that there is an image).

Wrong. Two things can be related, but still never interact with one another. OTOH, they cannot interact without being connected. It is a different concept altogether.

The EPR paradox would suggest, I believe, that two things can interact with each other, "sharing" physical data while being very very disconnected, i.e. being very physically far apart. At any rate, fine, the mind and body interact with each other. There is postively no reason why a "thing" must be connecting them. Somehow, changes in the physical world initiate a change in the mental world (brain states causing mental states) in an "EPR-paradoxical" way. Or maybe, like it was suggested, they are fundamentally of the same ontology, so they are connected by the common foundation that they stand on.

I don't "require" anything. It is an inescapable result of reasoning on different ontologies. Metaphysical "duct tape" requires its own ontology, for the simple reason that it can be referred to, but doesn't belong to either of the ontologies that it connects.

Why can't it be of mixed ontology? Sure, that's a third ontology, but is also both of the previous ones. Weird, yes. But, like I said, your questions elicit such responses.

They're not my worries. That's the point. You could define them to be of the same ontology, but then the concept would no longer be admissable in this thread. The point of this thread is to discuss things that are ontologically distinct.

I think you missed my point. If we can't really say why being ontologically different is all that different from appearing ontologically different, and if you're willing to accept that things that appear ontologically different can interact, then what is the problem with accepting that things that are ontologically different can interact? What makes one ontology distinct from another, other than its "appearance?" If we see two things, and I say that they are of the same ontology and appear different, and you say that they are of different ontologies, is one of us right and the other wrong?

For example, there is a fixed definition for "dog." If we see a cat and a dog, and I say they are both dogs, but just look different, and you say, no, one is a dog and the other is a cat. Both of are different families (or orders, or phylum, whatever). One of us is wrong, because there is a clear definition. Theoretically, we could offer a clean, precise definition for things like phylum, genus, family, order, etc. such that we can always tell if two animals are of the same family or not. Can we do such thing with "realities?" What defines a reality, and what must be common to all things in a reality? What makes something a member of reality A, and another thing a member of reality B but looks like a member of reality A? Do we have a clear cut way to draw borders between realities? I think it's somewhat absurd to claim that we do.

It means that they are not of the same reality.

That's tautological more or less. I don't need a dictionary definition, I want to know what salient implications result from the assertion that two things are of different ontologies, and then can you show that these implications are false, therefore proving that they aren't of different ontologies?

All definitions are, aren't they?

Definitions are normally conventional, i.e. most people have to agree. In this case, it seems more arbitrary, since we don't have very clear ideas of what makes one ontology distinct from another, it's much more open to arbitrary distinctions. I can't go around arbitrarily calling cats dogs and claim that cats are of the same class as dogs when a conventionally accepted taxonomical system exists that distinguishes them. On the other hand, I don't think we have conventional rules and laws that govern how we speak about ontologies. That is why I think all the assertions like "No two ontologies can interact," are rather empty.

No, it wouldn't, it would only make things worse. A "mixture" is the product of a pre-occuring reaction between to substances/elements/etc. To postulate that such a "mixture" already exists, is to postulate that the two ontologies have already interacted on a previous occasion (and done so without the posited "mixture" at hand, since they created that "mixture" in the reaction).

That's not the case. I don't mean mixture as in, a batch of physical reality was mixed with a batch of mental reality, and the existence of this mixture came "after" the existence of the other two realities. There is one thing called mental reality, one thing called physical, and one thing made up of both realities.

You have yet to present an "irrefutable" anything.

The theories I presented a couple posts ago are irrefutable, I think.

You have, however, produced some "absurd and fantastic explanations", and I don't mind. The very fact that they need to be "absurd and fantastic" to even qualify as possible explanations is further indication that philosophers have made some awful mistakes in the past. That's good enough for me (for now).

No, it's simply indication that someone is asking rather absurd questions. To assume that, if we say that there is some distinction between mind and body, that suddenly we need a thing connecting these things, and that this thing cannot be of both ontologies nor can it be of a third, because two different ontologies cannot interact without a thing connecting them, is not based on anything true (just something you seem to assume) and leads to rather absurd questions.

You "claimed responsibility" when you made the statement. English is not my first language, but I'm fairly sure the expression "own it" would come into play here (and I'm not just being sarcastic, English really isn't my first language, and I'm really not sure about the expression).

I mean that I did not mix the two ontologies. I don't have to explain how they were mixed.

Oh, it does, does it?

Maybe, maybe not. Asking me to prove this is absurd, and asking me to account for how the brain does so is also absurd. However, you can't refute that the brain does create the mind.

I know that, AKG. What is important is that you are making a statement that is not backed by anything I've ever seen to be true (in fact, a series of such statements). Thus, the burden of explanation and proof rests on you.

Not at all. If you are kicked in the back of your head, and your head is injured, you don't need to provide an explanation as to how your head got injured and then prove that explanation if all you're doing is asserting that your head got injured. I'm only asserting that mind and body are different. I don't care about how this is so, so if I give you an explanation that duct tape allows for it, I don't care to prove it because it's not my assertion. Anyone who does attempt an explanation can only, as far as I'm concerned, give an explanation that sounds better than the duct tape one, but is not. It cannot be deduced from general laws of ontology, since I doubt there are any. It can't be inferred from observation and evidence, I don't see how we could bring meta-physical evidence to the table. However, the distinction between body and mind is clear. When you hallucinate a purple elephant, what is the ontological status of the purple elephant? Not physical, that's for sure.

What "image"??

I suppose this is the key issue, and I can't really understand why it creates such a difficulty. If you don't know what image, I don't know how to explain it. Do you know what an image is?

This is all very interesting. Please substantiate at least one of the many statements you've made here.

How am I to believe that there is such a thing as an "image of an apple"? I percieve no such thing.

As to the rest of it, well, it all requires that there's an "image of an apple", I don't think there is. Indeed, I don't see how it ever entered into the discussion. We talked of apples, and scientists, and ontologies...but I see no reference to images.

Well, hopefully the hallucination example will cover this.

Now I understand your point on interaction being a somewhat stronger thing than just a relation. I still don't see any reason why two ontologies would have to be connected by a "thing" to interact.

I'd like to refer to the EPR paradox one more time. Two very distant particles exchange information instantaneously. This contradicts an "intuition" that information cannot be exchanged instantaneously (specifically, that it cannot travel faster than the speed of light). But, this does not contradict an absolute law of the universe, otherwise it would never happen (and theoretically, it does). It is only paradoxical insofar as it contradicts an intuition, but if we relinquish that intuition, we realize that it is just really really weird, doesn't make a whole lot of sense, but hey, it's the facts, so there's really no need to press the argument. You assert, as though it is some Absolute Law of Ontology, that no two ontologically distinct things can interact without a "thing" connecting them. I see absolutely no reason whatsoever for this to be the case, and it should not form the basis of an argument. In your case, it is the very crux of your argument. But if I assert that mind and body are ontologically distinct, but interact without a connecting thing, it is possible that this assertion is fact because it does not deny any Absolute Law, just your intuition (I would think it is intuition, I really don't know where you're getting the idea of a "thing" being necessary, though). Now, if you let go of that intuition, and accept that different ontologies interact, then, like the EPR paradox, it tells us something very counter-intuitive, and to some, it may seem weird and may not make sense, but that doesn't stop it from being fact.

Also, I think saying that different ontologies are different realities is misleading. I don't think that there can be many realities. That which exists has an ontological status. All that exists (i.e. all that has ontological states) is real, i.e. there is only one reality, and it is all that exists. There can be things of different ontologies within this one reality, some interacting, some not. Again, it is not very clear what it means to be of different ontologies (to state that they are of different realities is wrong), but for the context of this discussion, we need only deal with the assertion that there are things called perceptions, and they are not physical.

The purple elephant is a thing (I can refer to it), it is certainly not physical, but I still see it. It is the content of my hallucination. Similarly, the content of my perception is non-physical, and the contents of hallucinations look the same as the contents of the perception, the only difference being that perceptions representations of things that actually have physical ontological status, hallucinations are not. How can we tell whether the images we see represent things with physical ontological status or not is a different question, and perhaps an unanswerable one (how do we know we're not always hallucinating?), but an irrelevant one to this discussion.

Seeing is a process that involves a subject (the seer) and an object (the seen, i.e. the image, or sometimes, the thing that the image represents, depends on context). However, you can't say that since seeing is just a process that we can ignore the reality and existence of a non-physical thing, the object of seeing, the image.

 

[Mentat]

Assuming that you mean "you" as "you" in general as a human being and you aren't including other humans in the "animal kingdom" category...

I do include us in the "animal kingdom"...that's why I said "from the rest" of it.

I suppose the biggest difference between me and the rest of the animal kingdom is the level of my reasoning ability as well as my ability to use my hands. Oh, and uhh I'm considered sexier in the eyes of human females

Ok. So there's nothing else? Specifically with regard to that "reasoning ability" bit.

Hmmm, the same thing it would mean to conceive of one and discuss it? What's the difference?

There's a very big one. It is one thing to ponder an issue, and quite another to do so within the confines of a particular vernacular.

I do not rely on books, forums, or conversations with people to establish what I think a philosophical issue is.

And yet your ability to think about them is, in part, due to those "books, forums, and conversations".

When you were a child, do you think you could have thought about what makes you unique, if you'd never met another person (a person who could give his/herself a name that is different from your name, describe themselves as being in a position other than the one you were in, etc)? Could you have wondered if there was something "more" to you than what classical science could describe if you'd not been taught the concept/word, "more", as well as the crude concepts/words of science.

 

[Mentat]

I'm sure you're well aware of the image of your computer.

No, that's the problem. I'm not. I am aware of my computer, and its constituent parts (obviously, since, if I were not aware of it, I would not be able to use it). But I know of no "image" of my computer. I have not taken a photograph of it, or video, or sculpted a copy of it, or painted an image of it...I just have the computer. What use would I have for such "images"?

When you see your computer, the light from the computer hits your eyes, creates activity in the brain, and then there is an image of the computer...

I didn't know that. I know that light from the monitor hits my eyes, and I know that that produces electrochemical reactions in my visual cortex. But I (once again) know of no image, nor do I understand what purpose it would serve, or even where it would be.

What is the difference between the computer-in-itself and what you see?

What are you talking about? I can see the computer ("in-itself" or otherwise). It's right in front of me.

You don't see the computer in itself, you see an image, a representation of it, i.e. the computer-in-itself is not what you apprehend, it is an image of the computer, which exists because of some causal process that starts at the computer-in-itself, that you apprehend.

Is that right? Three questions:

1) How does the computer make an image of itself?
2) Where is it?
3) How do I manage to see it, while I'm looking at the computer?

What is a hallucination, and how is it different from a real perception? Clearly, you can't equate the perception, or that which you see, with that which is out there in "reality," because when hallucinating, something does appear to you, but it isn't out there.

Nothing "appears" anywhere. A hallucination is a "mal"function of the neocortex, wherein processes (relating to arrays of synchronously-firing pyramidal neurons) that would normally accompany an external stimulus (light entering the eye) occur of their own accord.

What you see and what is there are distinct. If you hallucinate a pink elephant, then the image of the pink elephant is a thing in some sense, but not a physical sense.

If I "hallucinate a pink elephant" then the same processes that would have accompanied the stimulus "pink" and the stimulus "elephant" are occurring sans stimuli. So what? I don't "create" a pink elephant to fit the place of the missing stimuli...I'm not some magical wizard.

So? What's the problem? Why can't the duct tape be made of something?

Because it would then be of its own (third) ontology, and would only further complicate matters (instead of trying to get two ontologies to interact, we are now trying to get three of them to interact in a "chain").

I can refer to the image of the computer. Look at your computer. "Before" you is the image of a computer, correct?

Incorrect (for the tenth time). I have no use for an "image" of my computer. I am looking at, and making use of, my computer at this moment. What possible use could I make of an "image" of my computer?

I.e. if you see a computer, you "have" an image of a computer.

Are you saying that, in order for me to see my computer, I need first to procure an image of it. That doesn't make any sense. All I need is my computer, a good pair of eyes, and a good cortex.

The EPR paradox would suggest, I believe, that two things can interact with each other, "sharing" physical data while being very very disconnected, i.e. being very physically far apart.

The EPR paradox merely shows us that one thing can appear to be two distinct things (by "appear", I mean manifest itself physically as two distinct quanta, though being manifestations of the same wave-function).

At any rate, fine, the mind and body interact with each other. There is postively no reason why a "thing" must be connecting them.

Sure there is. As I've said, to postulate that two things are distinct, yet interacting constantly, is to postulate that the two are connected by something.

Why can't it be of mixed ontology? Sure, that's a third ontology, but is also both of the previous ones. Weird, yes. But, like I said, your questions elicit such responses.

I'm going to repeat myself yet again. Try to pat attention this time, as I'm getting tired of repeating the same point without counter-point: It can't be of a mixed ontology for the following two reasons:

1) A third ontology would only make matters worse, because you would then have to know how O1 (ontology 1) interacts with O2, and how O2 interacts with O3. It just begs the question. It resolved nothing.

2) To call an ontology "mixed" is to refer to it's being "part O1 and part O2". That requires that O1 and O2 (or parts thereof; entities therein) have already interacted, which also serves to beg the question.

I think you missed my point. If we can't really say why being ontologically different is all that different from appearing ontologically different, and if you're willing to accept that things that appear ontologically different can interact, then what is the problem with accepting that things that are ontologically different can interact?

The simple fact that their difference is definitively ontological.

What makes one ontology distinct from another, other than its "appearance?"

Things of a different ontology are of different "realities", or separate Universes. How they appear to us is irrelevant. However, if they are actually ontologically distinct, then we cannot observe more than one of them at a time. (As I've already proved).

If we see two things, and I say that they are of the same ontology and appear different, and you say that they are of different ontologies, is one of us right and the other wrong?

I would be wrong, because I couldn't perceive both at the same time, if they were actually of different ontologies.

For example, there is a fixed definition for "dog." If we see a cat and a dog, and I say they are both dogs, but just look different, and you say, no, one is a dog and the other is a cat. Both of are different families (or orders, or phylum, whatever). One of us is wrong, because there is a clear definition. Theoretically, we could offer a clean, precise definition for things like phylum, genus, family, order, etc. such that we can always tell if two animals are of the same family or not. Can we do such thing with "realities?" What defines a reality, and what must be common to all things in a reality? What makes something a member of reality A, and another thing a member of reality B but looks like a member of reality A? Do we have a clear cut way to draw borders between realities? I think it's somewhat absurd to claim that we do.

I never claimed that we do. I also never claimed that we need to. That's your claim, and now the burden of proof (once again) lies on you to prove why this must be the case. Why do we need a clear-cut definition? We don't have one for "alive" vs. "non-living", and yet we use these concepts on a daily basis.

That's tautological more or less. I don't need a dictionary definition, I want to know what salient implications result from the assertion that two things are of different ontologies, and then can you show that these implications are false, therefore proving that they aren't of different ontologies?

And what salient properties belong only to "living" creatures, such that, without those properties, I could declare something non-living (I don't actually expect an answer, as that would be another topic...I have, however, discussed this on numerous threads before, and it is a perfectly good example of a fuzzy/arbitrary distinction that is still useful).

Definitions are normally conventional, i.e. most people have to agree. In this case, it seems more arbitrary, since we don't have very clear ideas of what makes one ontology distinct from another, it's much more open to arbitrary distinctions. I can't go around arbitrarily calling cats dogs and claim that cats are of the same class as dogs when a conventionally accepted taxonomical system exists that distinguishes them. On the other hand, I don't think we have conventional rules and laws that govern how we speak about ontologies.

It. Doesn't. Matter! People have been doing it for centuries, and I'm challenging it. It doesn't matter if they didn't rigorously define their terms, no term can ever be "perfectly defined" anyway. If a cat and a dog could be bred (in vitro, by complex genetic engineering, this could indeed occur (AFAIK)), then we would not be able to call it a "cat", and we would not be able to call it a "dog", we would have to (arbitrarily) assign it the title "cog" or "dat" or whatever, and then, when this new name was accepted by convention, it would be defined.

Convention is all that any definition ever stands on. If philosophical convention has allowed for the discussion of ontologically distinct entities that interact with one another, then I want to know how they explain this interaction.

That's not the case. I don't mean mixture as in, a batch of physical reality was mixed with a batch of mental reality, and the existence of this mixture came "after" the existence of the other two realities. There is one thing called mental reality, one thing called physical, and one thing made up of both realities.

Which would require that two ontologically distinct entities have already interacted, to form this new ontology. That's what a "mixture" is.

No, it's simply indication that someone is asking rather absurd questions. To assume that, if we say that there is some distinction between mind and body, that suddenly we need a thing connecting these things, and that this thing cannot be of both ontologies nor can it be of a third, because two different ontologies cannot interact without a thing connecting them, is not based on anything true (just something you seem to assume) and leads to rather absurd questions.

"Based on anything true"? What does "truth" have to do with anything here? It doesn't matter if the distinction "actually exists" (whatever that means), it only matters that it's been discussed for so long, and that I am discussing it further. I'm carrying on a game that has been played for the past few centuries. Who cares if the game is "based on anything true"? It's the game.

I mean that I did not mix the two ontologies. I don't have to explain how they were mixed.

Yes you did, and yes you do. To postulate the existence of a mixed ontology is to bear the burden of proof and explanation.

Maybe, maybe not. Asking me to prove this is absurd, and asking me to account for how the brain does so is also absurd. However, you can't refute that the brain does create the mind.

Once again, the burden of proof is on you. I didn't postulate that the brain created the "mind" or, for that matter, that it "created" anything. I don't think the brain's function is "creation" or the manufacturing of "images". But I also don't say that that is certainly not the case. Therefore, the only person with anything to prove (any postulate to defend) is you.

Not at all. If you are kicked in the back of your head, and your head is injured, you don't need to provide an explanation as to how your head got injured and then prove that explanation if all you're doing is asserting that your head got injured. I'm only asserting that mind and body are different.

Getting kicked in the back of the head is an actual occurance. However, if I was actually not kicked in the back of the head (perhaps something else occured, but I thought I was kicked), then I would indeed have a problem proving that it was a kick, and not some other thing. After all, a "kick" implies the action having been done purposefully by another human. That would be a "bad" thing for another human to do to me, and I am thus accusing that other human of a "sin". So, the burden of proof, with regard to whether I was kicked, and who did it, does indeed rest on me.

You are asserting that "mind" and body are different, and the burden of proof rests on you, since I (as yet) have no reason to even postulate that "mind" exists.

I don't care about how this is so, so if I give you an explanation that duct tape allows for it, I don't care to prove it because it's not my assertion.

Yes it is. If you really didn't care, you wouldn't offer possible explanations.

However, the distinction between body and mind is clear.

As mud.

When you hallucinate a purple elephant, what is the ontological status of the purple elephant?

What "purple elephant"? When I hallucinate and believe that I am perceiving an elephant that is purple, there needn't actually be such an elephant (in fact, calling it an hallucination is indicative of the fact that there is not such an elephant).

I suppose this is the key issue, and I can't really understand why it creates such a difficulty. If you don't know what image, I don't know how to explain it. Do you know what an image is?

Yes. An image is something that looks like something else, but is not that other thing. A photograph of Niagra Falls is an "image" of a great, dynamic phenomenon. The photograph is but an "image", however, since I could not ascribe the terms "great" and "dynamic" (or "wet" and "dangerous") to the photograph.

Now I understand your point on interaction being a somewhat stronger thing than just a relation.

Not "stronger", different altogether, since a "relation" doesn't imply interaction of any kind, whereas a "connection" does.

I still don't see any reason why two ontologies would have to be connected by a "thing" to interact.

How else would you have them interact? I'm speaking in causal terms here. If there is a cause in one ontology and an effect in another ontology, then, by definition, there must have been an intermediate process (that was of neither ontology) which connects "cause" to "effect". If, OTOH, there is no causality or interaction, merely concomitance, then there is no problem; the two ontologies would be "related", but not "connected".

I'd like to refer to the EPR paradox one more time. Two very distant particles exchange information instantaneously. This contradicts an "intuition" that information cannot be exchanged instantaneously (specifically, that it cannot travel faster than the speed of light). But, this does not contradict an absolute law of the universe, otherwise it would never happen (and theoretically, it does).

This is just wrong. The EPR experiment helped prove that the Universe is "local", relative to a particle's wave-function (which could be considered as "spread" throughout). The intepretations of the experiment that I've read have led me to the conclusion that these "particles" are manifestations of but one wave-function...they are, in essence, one particle.

You assert, as though it is some Absolute Law of Ontology, that no two ontologically distinct things can interact without a "thing" connecting them. I see absolutely no reason whatsoever for this to be the case, and it should not form the basis of an argument.

If you see "absolutely no reason" then you have not been paying attention to me, and I may as well have been talking to a wall. Two ontologically distinct things cannot interact without some intermediate process that "connects" them, for the simple reason that nothing ever interacts with anything else, unless they are connected by something. If a neutron and a proton are attracted to one another ("attraction" being a form of -- supposedly causal -- interaction), then it is because there is an intermediate process of gluon-passing (for lack of a better term) 'twixt the two.

Two things of distinct ontologies cannot interact, and that is indeed the crux of my argument, but it is sound. For them to interact would require (as do all other interactions) some kind of intermediary process that was of neither ontology and would only complicate the matter worse.

Also, I think saying that different ontologies are different realities is misleading. I don't think that there can be many realities. That which exists has an ontological status. All that exists (i.e. all that has ontological states) is real, i.e. there is only one reality, and it is all that exists.

You can't redefine "ontology" at will. Ontology is the study of "being" and "existence". Things of different "ontologies" are of different natures of "existence". "Nature of actual existence" = reality.

The purple elephant is a thing (I can refer to it), it is certainly not physical, but I still see it.

No you don't "see it" you just think you do. Why should the fact that you believe something to be there require that such a thing (or an image of such a thing, or whatever) should actually be there? Can't you just be wrong?

Seeing is a process that involves a subject (the seer) and an object (the seen, i.e. the image, or sometimes, the thing that the image represents, depends on context). However, you can't say that since seeing is just a process that we can ignore the reality and existence of a non-physical thing, the object of seeing, the image.

This paragraph is so full of assumptions that I hardly know where to begin.

1) Seeing does indeed involve a "seer" and an "object seen", but you are once again invoking this concept of an "image" being seen, rather than the actual object.

2) Yes I can say that there are no non-physical things, but I don't. I just don't assume that there are either.

3) The fact that seeing is a process has nothing to do with the existence of non-physical things.

4) You hadn't mentioned before that the "image", to which you constantly refer, is non-physical. That just re-opens the ontological can of worms, since "physical" and "non-physical" are generally held to be of different ontology.

And, even if we drop the "ontology" problem (which would side-track the thread), the "physical"/"non-physical" problem takes the same form: How could anything that was non-physical interact with anything physical, without their intermediary being neither physical nor non-physical (which is semantic ridiculousness, since a thing is either physical or it is not).

 

[AKG]

1) How does the computer make an image of itself?

It doesn't make the image. Light reflects from the computer, your brain processes information, and somewhere in this process an image is created for the mind to apprehend.

2) Where is it?

Certainly not in any physical place. It is not in the brain, or any other physical place. Hence, it's in a different "reality."

3) How do I manage to see it, while I'm looking at the computer?

It is precisely what you see. The image is what you see, it is caused by the computer. "Looking at the computer" means "I see an image of a computer (and the image is produced by something "real").

Nothing "appears" anywhere. A hallucination is a "mal"function of the neocortex, wherein processes (relating to arrays of synchronously-firing pyramidal neurons) that would normally accompany an external stimulus (light entering the eye) occur of their own accord.

Irrelevant. When you hallucinate, you see an image. There is an image of a pink elephant. You think that the image is being caused by physical stimulus, but it's not. That doesn't change the fact that there does appear to be an elephant. That's precisely what it means to hallucinate : that there appears to be something that isn't physically there.

Because it would then be of its own (third) ontology, and would only further complicate matters (instead of trying to get two ontologies to interact, we are now trying to get three of them to interact in a "chain").

This does not answer the claim. It would be both a third ontology and a mixture of the previous two.

Incorrect (for the tenth time). I have no use for an "image" of my computer. I am looking at, and making use of, my computer at this moment. What possible use could I make of an "image" of my computer?

And for the tenth time, there is undeniably an image. I have to assume you don't know what an image is at this point.

Are you saying that, in order for me to see my computer, I need first to procure an image of it. That doesn't make any sense. All I need is my computer, a good pair of eyes, and a good cortex.

No, seeing a computer = procuring an image of it.

Sure there is. As I've said, to postulate that two things are distinct, yet interacting constantly, is to postulate that the two are connected by something.

No, it's not. That's a totally baseless assumption, perhaps something you feel intuitively, not something based in any sort of reason.

I'm going to repeat myself yet again. Try to pat attention this time, as I'm getting tired of repeating the same point without counter-point: It can't be of a mixed ontology for the following two reasons:

1) A third ontology would only make matters worse, because you would then have to know how O1 (ontology 1) interacts with O2, and how O2 interacts with O3. It just begs the question. It resolved nothing.

Because O2 is both O1 and O3. If you can't accept that, just say so. It's not problematic, but if you feel it is, then I can't force you to release your intuitions (or whatever hang-ups hold you back from understanding the point).

2) To call an ontology "mixed" is to refer to it's being "part O1 and part O2". That requires that O1 and O2 (or parts thereof; entities therein) have already interacted, which also serves to beg the question.

False. That's like saying that something purple can only have existed if it was made by mixing two things that previously existed that were blue and red. Purple can be made by mixing blue and red, but there's no reason something can't come into existence being purple to start with. The same goes for our duct tape. It just is both, it wasn't made after mixing two things that were of different ontologies. To say that it is mixed is not to say that it came to be that way after a mixing process, it is simply saying that it is both ontologies.

Things of a different ontology are of different "realities", or separate Universes.

That doesn't answer the question. What's the difference between something that is of a different universe from another, and one that seems so different that we think it is of a different universe? Are there clear cut distinctions between universes? If, to be of different ontologies is, by definition, to be unable to interact, then clearly no dualist holds the position that the mind and body are of different ontologies. Then they are the same ontology and just seem different. If two things can be ontologically different and interact, by definition, then let the two be of different ontologies.

I would be wrong, because I couldn't perceive both at the same time, if they were actually of different ontologies.

I never said you perceived both at the same time, so go back and answer the question.

I never claimed that we do. I also never claimed that we need to. That's your claim, and now the burden of proof (once again) lies on you to prove why this must be the case. Why do we need a clear-cut definition? We don't have one for "alive" vs. "non-living", and yet we use these concepts on a daily basis.

We need conventionally accepted definitions to be able to communicate. We don't need to agree 100% or have extremely precise definitions, but we need to have some sort of agreement, i.e. definitions can't be entirely arbitrary. All you seem to be able to tell me about ontologies is that they are of different universes/realities (which is either absurd or tautologous), and that they can't interact, and you use this to support your argument that they can't interact. You don't give us a more fundamental idea of what an ontology is from which you derive the conclusion that two ontologies can't interact, you seem to make it the defining characteristic. This is purely arbitrary, unconventional, and there's no point debating with you. I could define "false" to be, "anything you assert" and I'd have no trouble proving you false, since it would follow from definition, but that would be absurd, precisely as absurd as your position.

And what salient properties belong only to "living" creatures, such that, without those properties, I could declare something non-living (I don't actually expect an answer, as that would be another topic...I have, however, discussed this on numerous threads before, and it is a perfectly good example of a fuzzy/arbitrary distinction that is still useful).

It is a matter of degree. The definition is fuzzy, yes, but not too fuzzy. For one, we see living things and non-living things all the time in our life, so even if we have a fuzzy definition, we have plenty of examples. Can you give me examples of ontologies. What do ontologies look like, or taste like? I can tell you some things that only living things can do, i.e. only living things can breathe, etc. That's not comprehensive at all, but it gives some hints. As far as you've given me, ontologies are simply things that are of different universes that can't interact. If that's all I have to work with, then, obviously, I can't argue. In fact, since "ontology" is so fuzzy, I hestitate to call perceptions and other mental "things" ontologically different, I simply say that they're not physical.

Convention is all that any definition ever stands on. If philosophical convention has allowed for the discussion of ontologically distinct entities that interact with one another, then I want to know how they explain this interaction.

By conventional definition, ontologies are things that can interact. Does that suffice for you? Surely not, so hopefully you can see the problems I have with your position. You're asking, "how could they possibly interact," I'm saying, "why the heck would it be that they can't." Suppose that there's some alien race living light years away, of whom we know nothing but that they exist. To me, it seems that you're looking for someont to assert that their alien politics is mostly democratic, and asking for a rational debate as to whether it is the case that they are mostly democratic or not.

Which would require that two ontologically distinct entities have already interacted, to form this new ontology. That's what a "mixture" is.

Plainly false, as demonstrated.

"Based on anything true"? What does "truth" have to do with anything here?

This characterizes your position perfectly.

Once again, the burden of proof is on you. I didn't postulate that the brain created the "mind" or, for that matter, that it "created" anything. I don't think the brain's function is "creation" or the manufacturing of "images". But I also don't say that that is certainly not the case. Therefore, the only person with anything to prove (any postulate to defend) is you.

That's wrong, and I can only assume you're not reading what I wrote. I don't bear any burden. I am only asserting that such a thing is possible, i.e. that it is not irrefutable. Perhaps I should say that it is conceivable. I don't think we are in much of a position to dictate what is metaphysically possible, just as we are in no position to dictate what the physical laws of the universe ought to be. So we are stuck with dealing with conceivability. My only claim is that "the brain created the mind" is conceivable, and to deny that you would have to show that this is refutable. You could do that if it were impossible for the brain to create the mind, which would follow if it were impossible for two ontologies to interact, but that's not the case.

I don't claim that it must be the case, or even that it is probably the case, that the brain creates the mind. That you think I argue this suggests only that you haven't been reading at all. Recall my post where I posted two contradictory "theories". Did I ever state that both were true, or even that one was? No, only that it was consistent, and that it wasn't refutable, i.e. that you couldn't prove that it was wrong. I probably also mentioned that I couldn't prove it right, nor did I care to. The only thing that I did care to prove is that mind and body are distinct in some sense, and I did that. It requires that you acknowledge the image, and I don't see how you manage not to.

Getting kicked in the back of the head is an actual occurance. However, if I was actually not kicked in the back of the head (perhaps something else occured, but I thought I was kicked), then I would indeed have a problem proving that it was a kick, and not some other thing. After all, a "kick" implies the action having been done purposefully by another human. That would be a "bad" thing for another human to do to me, and I am thus accusing that other human of a "sin". So, the burden of proof, with regard to whether I was kicked, and who did it, does indeed rest on me.

Why would you even bother writing this? Whether you were kicked or not is irrelevant, that was the point of my example.

You are asserting that "mind" and body are different, and the burden of proof rests on you, since I (as yet) have no reason to even postulate that "mind" exists.

Yes, and I have proved it. Again, it rests on you accepting that the image you see exists, but for some unfathomable reason, you don't, so what can I say.

Yes it is. If you really didn't care, you wouldn't offer possible explanations.

I only care to show that other possible explanations exist, but I don't care to prove them because I don't, myself, claim to have an explanation. I didn't create the universe, and I don't claim to know how mind and body interact, I just know that they do.

What "purple elephant"? When I hallucinate and believe that I am perceiving an elephant that is purple, there needn't actually be such an elephant (in fact, calling it an hallucination is indicative of the fact that there is not such an elephant).

It indicates that there is no physical elephant, or, as some people would say, there is no "real" elephant. But you see an elephant, right? Or rather, the image of an elephant appears to you, does it not? When someone is hallucinating, they say he's "seeing things". They mean that he is seeing things that aren't physically there, i.e. the images he sees contain things that don't represent anything in the physical world. To believe that you see a purple elephant that isn't really "there" is precisely to see an image of a purple elephant when that image is not caused by an physically real purple elephant.

Yes. An image is something that looks like something else, but is not that other thing. A photograph of Niagra Falls is an "image" of a great, dynamic phenomenon. The photograph is but an "image", however, since I could not ascribe the terms "great" and "dynamic" (or "wet" and "dangerous") to the photograph.

Whether you see an waterfall or a photograph, you experience an image of that thing. An image of a photograph. It seems almost that you equate "image" with "photograph," as though, when I say that you see an image of an apple, that I am asserting that you are looking at a photograph of an apple.

Whether you dream or "really see" or hallucinate, what happens is that electrons do some stuff in your brain. That's as detailed as we need to get. But when electrons go around your brain, you don't see electrons, or you brain, or anything. You see an elephant. There is an image of the elephant, and this is more than just the brain, or the electrons, or the movement of the electrons, etc. So it is none of those physical thing, but you can't deny that there does appear to be an elephant. So that elephant is a "thing" in a non-physical sense. That has nothing to do with whether or not there is an elephant in the physical world/sense. In the loosest sense of the word "see", whether you are imagining, perceiving, dreaming, or hallucinating, you see something, that thing is an image.

If there is a cause in one ontology and an effect in another ontology, then, by definition, there must have been an intermediate process (that was of neither ontology) which connects "cause" to "effect".

False.

Two ontologically distinct things cannot interact without some intermediate process that "connects" them, for the simple reason that nothing ever interacts with anything else, unless they are connected by something.

And what does it mean to be connected? If two things, A and B, interact via a thing connecting them, C, then A must interact with C. But this can only be if D is connecting A and C. An infinite regress shows your position absurd. You would have to accept that one some level, there just is interaction, without a connecting thing.

Two things of distinct ontologies cannot interact, and that is indeed the crux of my argument, but it is sound.

No, it's not, it's based on nothing, and hence absurd. You do nothing but assert it, but do nothing to substantiate it, simply because it is unsubstantiable.

You can't redefine "ontology" at will. Ontology is the study of "being" and "existence". Things of different "ontologies" are of different natures of "existence". "Nature of actual existence" = reality.

That's wrong. Things of different ontology are of different nature, and in that respect, I will say that mind and body are of different ontology. But to say that they are of different "realities" is absurd. All I can say is that they are different, and hence of different nature. But whether their difference in nature implies that they can't interact, or whether it implies that one must have caused the other, or any other such implication relating the two I cannot assert.

1) Seeing does indeed involve a "seer" and an "object seen", but you are once again invoking this concept of an "image" being seen, rather than the actual object.

What does hallucination involve? The hallucinator, and the thing that is hallucinated, right?

How could anything that was non-physical interact with anything physical, without their intermediary being neither physical nor non-physical (which is semantic ridiculousness, since a thing is either physical or it is not).

I don't know how it could interact without such a thing, I don't know why it would it would need such a thing in the first place. One thing is physical, the other is non-physical. They interact, I don't know how, nor do I care, and that's that.

Really, these posts are getting excessively long, and as far as I'm concerned, the only issue that matters is that you don't know what an image is. Once you do, and realize it is there, the rest ought to follow. So I'll try to explain it.

Suppose I look to my right and see my co-worker. Suppose she leaves, then I hallucinate and she appears to be there again. Now, essentially, both cases appear to be the same, but in the first case, her atoms and molecules are physically there, and in second, they're not. So when I see something, I don't mean to say that I experience her atoms/molecules since I have the same experience whether her atoms/molecules are physically there or not. Whether her molecules are there or not, it looks the same, and that is precisely the same as saying that I have the same experience (the cause is simply different). Similarly, the light reflecting off her atoms or molecules are not what I experience, since I have the same experience regardless of whether the atoms/molecules are there or not. Now, it may be that whatever goes on in the visual cortex is the same. In case one, whatever happens in the cortex happens because it was caused by light from my coworker hitting my retina, and in the second, there was no external stimulus. But whatever happens in the cortex is perhaps still the same. So here we may have something which we can equivocate with experience. The experience I have of "seeing" my coworker may be equivalent to the process going on in the visual cortex. But that's absurd. The cortex is a bunch of flesh. There are simply moving electrons and flesh in my cortex, so that's certainly not my coworker. I could mail you a piece of my cortex, I could not mail you the image of the coworker that I experience or apprehend or see. I could not mail you my experience. I could poke my brain, but I could not poke my experience. My brain and cortex are physical, my experience is something else. And clearly, it's not in my brain, or floating above it, it is not in a physical place, so it's not physical.

 

[Fliption]

I do include us in the "animal kingdom"...that's why I said "from the rest" of it.

Yes but I wasn't sure you meant me specifically or me representing all humans.

Ok. So there's nothing else? Specifically with regard to that "reasoning ability" bit.

Well, I'm not putting a lot of rigor into this question Mentat. I can't honestly say that this is an exhaustive list but they are the major ones that come to mind.

There's a very big one. It is one thing to ponder an issue, and quite another to do so within the confines of a particular vernacular.

Sure they are different things in themselves but what I meant was that those differences don't have anything to do with philosophical issues that I see.

And yet your ability to think about them is, in part, due to those "books, forums, and conversations".

I don't think I agree with that. My ability to "talk" about them is due to those books, forums and conversations. I didn't learn how to think from a book.

When you were a child, do you think you could have thought about what makes you unique, if you'd never met another person (a person who could give his/herself a name that is different from your name, describe themselves as being in a position other than the one you were in, etc)?

Yes, without a doubt. I do not have to learn a persons name or even talk to them to make observations about their appearance, their behavior relative to their surroundings etc etc.

Could you have wondered if there was something "more" to you than what classical science could describe if you'd not been taught the concept/word, "more", as well as the crude concepts/words of science.

Of course I could. Where do you think the concept of "more" came from? The first man on Earth found a dictionary just laying around with the word in it?

The beef I have with what I've heard of this "language" view of the world is that it places way too much emphasis on language. This theory would have me believe that without learning how to utter words I would be nothing but a mindless zombie. Langauge is nothing but a verbal label that we place on the distinctions that we experience. Experience comes first, language second. The only thing that I can admit to you is that I have a conception of what current science tells me and I'm claiming that this conception isn't consistent with what I experience. Could my conception be wrong? Sure it could! But all this means is that physicalist actually agree with me and I just don't know it! And this is so extreme that it makes a mockery of language to the point that it's basically useless. Not just in philosophy, everything, including physics.

So far, this view seems to me to be just another attempt to get rid of what our paradigm cannot explain. It seems so against the evidence of my own personal experience that I can't honestly take it seriously.

 

[Mentat]

It doesn't make the image. Light reflects from the computer, your brain processes information, and somewhere in this process an image is created for the mind to apprehend.

Why? My brain is perfectly capable of "apprehending" (I like "perceiving" better, myself) the data coming from the computer. Why create an image? In turn, if we follow your reasoning, there are two big questions:

1) What "sees" the image? and...

2) Does it "see" it be producing yet another image, which its "mind" sees, and so on ad infinitum?

Why create such problems to defend a (to my mind) useless concept. I don't need an "image" in order to use my computer. I never have needed one, and don't see why I ever would.

Certainly not in any physical place. It is not in the brain, or any other physical place. Hence, it's in a different "reality."

Hence we go back to the difficulties with ontological divides that I described rhetorically in my very first post. Do you want there to be such philosophical "problems"? I ask because every new assumption you are adding is creating new ones.

Oddly enough, they are the same assumptions that philosopher were making throughout the ages (from Descartes to Kant, and on to good ol' Chalmers ), and they don't need to be made (see my other thread, "Wrong Turns").

It is precisely what you see. The image is what you see, it is caused by the computer. "Looking at the computer" means "I see an image of a computer (and the image is produced by something "real").

No it doesn't. I direct my eyes toward the monitor screen. I process incoming photons. I, in turn, apply pressure to the keys on my keyboard, and it (the computer) processes that information. Neither of us (I or my PC) need "images" of one another, in order to process the incoming information. Why would we? I'm perfectly content to deal directly with the computer.

Irrelevant. When you hallucinate, you see an image.

I beg your pardon, but, no I don't. I don't (yet) have any use for these "images" of which you speak. You haven't explained why they should ever even enter into the equation. When I process incoming photons there are concomitant processes that occur in the visual cortex. THAT'S IT. I don't need to sculpt an "image" out of non-physical puddy in order to do this (and that's basically what you are implying that I do). When I hallucinate, those aforementioned processes (in the visual cortex) occur sans stimuli. So WHAT??

That's precisely what it means to hallucinate : that there appears to be something that isn't physically there.

No. To hallucinate is to believe something is there that is not.

This does not answer the claim. It would be both a third ontology and a mixture of the previous two.

You are missing the point, and it's getting agravating.

In order for two ontologies to "mix" (or "dissolve" one another, or any other process of interaction), they must be able, already, to interact. This is a tautological statement, since all I'm saying is that, in order for them to interact (one form of interaction is "mixing"), they must be able to interact. You have thus only further begged the question, nothing more.

If you create a third ontology by virtue of a pre-existing interaction between ontologies, you beg the question of how ontologies can interact, nothing more.

And for the tenth time, there is undeniably an image. I have to assume you don't know what an image is at this point.

I once knew someone who I considered (and still consider) the most beautiful entity that has ever graced the Earth with her presence. I have a picture of her. That picture is an "image". I cannot talk with the "image" (or, at least, it cannot talk back). I cannot kiss the image (or, at least, it cannot kiss back). I cannot love the image.

An image is something that captures some of the external, visible parts of the thing it images. But I did not love an "image" of a person. I loved the person.

In the same way, I perceive the keyboard, monitor, computer, etc, not "images" thereof. I cannot respond to your (somewhat infuriating) comments, with a picture, or a sculpture (no matter how convincing) of a computer. I need an actual computer.

Do you get it now?

No, seeing a computer = procuring an image of it.

WHY?! You don't even realize what you're saying, do you? Seeing a computer = seeing a computer. Seeing an image = seeing an image.

Answer my question, for once; at least attempt it: Of what use would an "image" of a computer be when my objective is to respond to your statements? I can't type on an image of a keyboard. I can't send my reply on an image of the Internet.

Because O2 is both O1 and O3. If you can't accept that, just say so. It's not problematic, but if you feel it is, then I can't force you to release your intuitions (or whatever hang-ups hold you back from understanding the point).

For O2 to be a mixture or combination of O1 and O3 is to presuppose an interaction between O1 and O3, which culminated in the production of O2. This. Only. Further. Begs. The. Question.

False. That's like saying that something purple can only have existed if it was made by mixing two things that previously existed that were blue and red. Purple can be made by mixing blue and red, but there's no reason something can't come into existence being purple to start with. The same goes for our duct tape. It just is both, it wasn't made after mixing two things that were of different ontologies. To say that it is mixed is not to say that it came to be that way after a mixing process, it is simply saying that it is both ontologies.

Ah, now this is somewhat new. Unfortunately, you are still invoking a third ontology (quite why, I'm not sure, since you insist that a "connective ontology" or "bridge" is unnecessary), and that just further begs the question.

Also, purple is not part red and part blue unless it was produced by a mixing (interacting) of red and blue. Purple is just purple. A third color.

That doesn't answer the question. What's the difference between something that is of a different universe from another, and one that seems so different that we think it is of a different universe? Are there clear cut distinctions between universes? If, to be of different ontologies is, by definition, to be unable to interact, then clearly no dualist holds the position that the mind and body are of different ontologies. Then they are the same ontology and just seem different. If two things can be ontologically different and interact, by definition, then let the two be of different ontologies.

You are missing the point, once again. I. Do. Not. Have. To. Explain. What. Different. Ontologies. Are!

The distinction, vague though it may be, is already established. Philosophers have been debating its essence, and the essence of the interaction between two ontologies for centuries (is there an echo in here?), and I am merely responding to their ponderings. Nothing more.

I never said you perceived both at the same time, so go back and answer the question.

I can't see them both at any time. If I can perceive (perception being a form of interaction, by definition) one of them, then I must be of the same ontology as that one (since, as I've shown, ontologically distinct entities couldn't interact), and thus am of a different ontology than the second thing. I could thus only ever perceive one of the entities in question.

We need conventionally accepted definitions to be able to communicate.

BS. We communicate constantly without them. There isn't even a conventionally accepted definition of "god" or "deity", yet religion is the most common social practice in history.

We don't need to agree 100% or have extremely precise definitions, but we need to have some sort of agreement, i.e. definitions can't be entirely arbitrary.

Fine, and philosophers do indeed have a general consensus about what it means for something to be of a different ontology. That you think it should be more rigorous is completely irrelevant.

All you seem to be able to tell me about ontologies is that they are of different universes/realities (which is either absurd or tautologous), and that they can't interact, and you use this to support your argument that they can't interact.

I don't put their inability to interact in the definition. However, you are correct that it is quite bound to the definition of "different realities", that they be unable to. So, what? That's my point from the beginning.

If a definition is problematic, that doesn't make it any less of a definition, nor does it have any effect on whether or not it is the (currently) accepted definition.

It is a matter of degree. The definition is fuzzy, yes, but not too fuzzy. For one, we see living things and non-living things all the time in our life, so even if we have a fuzzy definition, we have plenty of examples.

That's just the kind of "I know it when I see it" reasoning that has created the "ontology" debates, in my opinion. It's all arbitrary. But that doesn't change the fact that it is a conventionally-accepted distinction (living/non-living; physical/non-physical; etc).

Can you give me examples of ontologies.

Physical vs. non-physical. Mind-stuff vs. third-person-stuff. Universals vs. particulars.

Again, I'm merely parroting the philosophers who invented the distinction (and among whom the definition I've given you is commonly accepted). It should not rest on me to defend the very notion I wanted to attack.

What do ontologies look like, or taste like?

Why should they "look" or "taste" like anything? Air doesn't look or taste like anything.

You're asking, "how could they possibly interact," I'm saying, "why the heck would it be that they can't." Suppose that there's some alien race living light years away, of whom we know nothing but that they exist. To me, it seems that you're looking for someont to assert that their alien politics is mostly democratic, and asking for a rational debate as to whether it is the case that they are mostly democratic or not.

I'm not looking for someone to assert that ontologies interact, philosophers have been asserting that for centuries. I'm creating rational debate with regard to something that has been accepted (outright or implicitly) for hundreds of years.

Besides, no one has yet proven to me even the existence of "mind" or any other such ontologically-distinct entity. You see? This is not my battle. The concept of ontology and the dichotomies thereof is not mine, but that of philosophers.

That's wrong, and I can only assume you're not reading what I wrote. I don't bear any burden. I am only asserting that such a thing is possible, i.e. that it is not irrefutable. Perhaps I should say that it is conceivable. I don't think we are in much of a position to dictate what is metaphysically possible, just as we are in no position to dictate what the physical laws of the universe ought to be. So we are stuck with dealing with conceivability. My only claim is that "the brain created the mind" is conceivable, and to deny that you would have to show that this is refutable. You could do that if it were impossible for the brain to create the mind, which would follow if it were impossible for two ontologies to interact, but that's not the case.

I don't claim that it must be the case, or even that it is probably the case, that the brain creates the mind. That you think I argue this suggests only that you haven't been reading at all. Recall my post where I posted two contradictory "theories". Did I ever state that both were true, or even that one was? No, only that it was consistent, and that it wasn't refutable, i.e. that you couldn't prove that it was wrong. I probably also mentioned that I couldn't prove it right, nor did I care to. The only thing that I did care to prove is that mind and body are distinct in some sense, and I did that. It requires that you acknowledge the image, and I don't see how you manage not to.Why would you even bother writing this? Whether you were kicked or not is irrelevant, that was the point of my example.Yes, and I have proved it. Again, it rests on you accepting that the image you see exists, but for some unfathomable reason, you don't, so what can I say. I only care to show that other possible explanations exist, but I don't care to prove them because I don't, myself, claim to have an explanation. I didn't create the universe, and I don't claim to know how mind and body interact, I just know that they do.

To claim that "they do" is to make a postulate, one that you will then be required to defend. Look, if you don't want to defend a position, don't take one. And you don't have to think that you're right in order for the position to be considered "yours". As long as you suggest that it is even possible for something to be the case, you bear the burden of proof for that assumption. As soon as you postulate that one of your possible scenarios is irrefutable, you open yourself up to attack, and it is up to you to either defend the possibility of the scenario against the attack, or to give up the scenario as refutable and refuted[/color].

It indicates that there is no physical elephant, or, as some people would say, there is no "real" elephant. But you see an elephant, right?

No. An elephant is a member of the family Elephantidae. They typically have long trunks and big incisors that are called "tusks". There are other characteristics, but what is important is that there is no such being before me for me to behold. Therefore, I behold no elephant.

Or rather, the image of an elephant appears to you, does it not?

It does not. I also do no possess, anywhere on my person, the image (photographic or otherwise) of anything meeting the aforementioned qualifications for "elephant".

When someone is hallucinating, they say he's "seeing things".

A metaphor, and a bad one at that, but not strange (since the same processes that would have occurred if they had seen "things" are occurring, there simply are no "things" for them to observe (physical or otherwise)).

Whether you see an waterfall or a photograph, you experience an image of that thing. An image of a photograph. It seems almost that you equate "image" with "photograph," as though, when I say that you see an image of an apple, that I am asserting that you are looking at a photograph of an apple.

A photograph is a kind of image. What use, then, would I have for an image of an image? This could, conceivably, go on ad infinitum, couldn't it (images of images of images of images)?

Whether you dream or "really see" or hallucinate, what happens is that electrons do some stuff in your brain. That's as detailed as we need to get.

I like that .

But when electrons go around your brain, you don't see electrons, or you brain, or anything. You see an elephant.

Whoa, whoa, whoa. When photons (sorry, but it's not really the electrons that matter) hit my retina and stimulate whatever reaction they stimulate, I see whatever it was that sent the photons my way. I don't see anything that is inside of my brain (how could I, when I don't have eyes in there?).

And what does it mean to be connected? If two things, A and B, interact via a thing connecting them, C, then A must interact with C. But this can only be if D is connecting A and C. An infinite regress shows your position absurd. You would have to accept that one some level, there just is interaction, without a connecting thing.

Nope. When two things interact, by definition of the term "interact", A produces a reaction (not an interaction) in B, which, in turn, produces another reaction in A.

For my example with the neutrons and protons: A gluon is "passed back and forth" (not a perfectly accurate statement, but close), but the gluon does not interact with the receiving hadron, it reacts with it.

An interaction, thus requires a bridge, but there's no reason to assume that a reaction does.

Things of different ontology are of different nature, and in that respect, I will say that mind and body are of different ontology. But to say that they are of different "realities" is absurd.

Tell it to someone who doesn't already agree with you. I know it's absurd. Why the heck else would I be debating the thing. But I'm debating it with the understanding that it is a conventionally-held truth that should be attacked, not some nascent pet-concept of a fellow PF member. This concept (of ontologies being "different realities") is very old and very deeply entrenched in philosophy.

Suppose I look to my right and see my co-worker. Suppose she leaves, then I hallucinate and she appears to be there again.

Stop right there. She doesn't appear there again, just because you believe she does. It would not be a "hallucination" if the person were there in any sense.

So when I see something, I don't mean to say that I experience her atoms/molecules since I have the same experience whether her atoms/molecules are physically there or not. Whether her molecules are there or not, it looks the same, and that is precisely the same as saying that I have the same experience (the cause is simply different).

What "experience"? Yes the same process occurs (and the identity of the two processes could be argued to not really be exact), and yes the cause is all that is different, but that doesn't add the concept of an "image" of her. After all, if you only saw "images" of her in the first place, then it could be considered the "cause" of those neo-cortical processes, but (by your own postulates) that process should be able to occur without "actually seeing" the image.

In case one, whatever happens in the cortex happens because it was caused by light from my coworker hitting my retina, and in the second, there was no external stimulus.

True. I could explain what happens in the second case, at least in terms of current neuroscience, but you indeed correct (the stimulus was, in a sense, internal, rather than external).

But whatever happens in the cortex is perhaps still the same. So here we may have something which we can equivocate with experience. The experience I have of "seeing" my coworker may be equivalent to the process going on in the visual cortex. But that's absurd. The cortex is a bunch of flesh. There are simply moving electrons and flesh in my cortex, so that's certainly not my coworker. I could mail you a piece of my cortex, I could not mail you the image of the coworker that I experience or apprehend or see.

First off, what is this "experience" to which you keep referring?

Secondly, I never claimed that your co-worker was a process of the cortex. Seeing her is a process of the cortex. That process can self-initiate, regardless of the absence of external stimulus. But that doesn't imply anything special.

 

[Mentat]

Well, I'm not putting a lot of rigor into this question Mentat. I can't honestly say that this is an exhaustive list but they are the major ones that come to mind.

The purpose was to flesh out those things which you possesses that have some relation to your ability to behave consciously. What does a person need in order to be aware of his/her surroundings and interact with them?

Sure they are different things in themselves but what I meant was that those differences don't have anything to do with philosophical issues that I see.

But they do. A person does not ponder the essence of being unique, unless someone has let them know that things have essences and that they are unique (and what it means to be "unique").

I don't think I agree with that. My ability to "talk" about them is due to those books, forums and conversations. I didn't learn how to think from a book.

You learned how to think the way you do from those books. Is it really so strange a statement that you would think differently if you'd not been exposed to the same learning as you have been? Is it, in turn, so strange to say that you would not think at all if you never learned anything? Perhaps you could learn from other sources (besides people, books, forums, etc), but would you ever learn the same things?

Yes, without a doubt. I do not have to learn a persons name or even talk to them to make observations about their appearance, their behavior relative to their surroundings etc etc.

Fine, but my dog can tell me apart from other humans. My dog can also consider herself individually to a sufficient extent to eat her food but not her arm.

However, my dog cannot wonder about whether physical (mechanical, materlial, etc) explanations of her nature can fully explain her. Why is that?

Of course I could. Where do you think the concept of "more" came from? The first man on Earth found a dictionary just laying around with the word in it?

Ok, but the concept of something being "more" in the sense that there is more to it, regardless of the fact that it has been quite exhaustively and reductively explained. IOW, the ability to just believe (for no real reason) that there must be "more to it" than what was given in a perfectly rigorous explanation. Where does that come from?

The beef I have with what I've heard of this "language" view of the world is that it places way too much emphasis on language. This theory would have me believe that without learning how to utter words I would be nothing but a mindless zombie.

"Mindless"...what is "mind"?

Langauge is nothing but a verbal label that we place on the distinctions that we experience. Experience comes first, language second.

What is "experience"? "Use" comes before language. Distinguishing can come before language. But what is "experience"?

The only thing that I can admit to you is that I have a conception of what current science tells me and I'm claiming that this conception isn't consistent with what I experience.

Current science tells you such things in words. They are playing language-games with you (such as pointing to a picture of an atom, and saying "atom", and expecting you to understand that they are naming something; conducting though-experiments; teaching you some things as axioms and others as doubtable, etc)...it's language.

Could my conception be wrong? Sure it could! But all this means is that physicalist actually agree with me and I just don't know it!

"Wrong" in an absolute sense?

 

[Fliption]

What does a person need in order to be aware of his/her surroundings and interact with them?

The ability to gather information about the world and process it.

But they do. A person does not ponder the essence of being unique, unless someone has let them know that things have essences and that they are unique (and what it means to be "unique").

A person would not call it "unique" but they certainly could be capable of observing where they fit into the scheme of things. I'll say it again, words like "unigue" and "more" were created by man to fulfill a need to verbally label a concept that already existed. How else could language ever get started?

You learned how to think the way you do from those books. Is it really so strange a statement that you would think differently if you'd not been exposed to the same learning as you have been? Is it, in turn, so strange to say that you would not think at all if you never learned anything? Perhaps you could learn from other sources (besides people, books, forums, etc), but would you ever learn the same things?

Of course I wouldn't have the same knowledge as I do now if I had learned from other sources. The only claim I am making is that I have the ability to think even if I had never been exposed to books, forums etc. I still have the ability to make distinctions and develop a view of the world based on my experiences of it. Once we have language, then the "hard problem" is created because I'm trying to reconcile that view to a "concept"(physicalism) communicated to me through words. My understanding of that concept could be inaccurate, for all the semantic reasons you propose, but the same argument cannot be made about my experience of the world. It is what it is, with or without language.

Fine, but my dog can tell me apart from other humans. My dog can also consider herself individually to a sufficient extent to eat her food but not her arm.
However, my dog cannot wonder about whether physical (mechanical, materlial, etc) explanations of her nature can fully explain her. Why is that?

The difference between these activities is just a matter of degree with regard to reasoning abilties. You attribute the difference to language and I am attributing it to the differences in the ability of the brains. This difference in the abilities of the brains also happens to be the reason we can invent language to begin with. Advanced brains invent language, language doesn't invent advanced brains. How can a language be developed around concepts that don't exist because we don't have the ability to conceive of them without a language? It just seems backwards.

Ok, but the concept of something being "more" in the sense that there is more to it, regardless of the fact that it has been quite exhaustively and reductively explained. IOW, the ability to just believe (for no real reason) that there must be "more to it" than what was given in a perfectly rigorous explanation. Where does that come from?

I can only guess that you ask this question because you don't understand what it's like to have my position. Otherwise you wouldn't ask. This need for something more comes from the fact that it is obvious! For these things have NOT been reductively explained at all. The explanation truly is lacking when compared to what I "experience" in my world. Again, I concede that the problem arises when I try to reconcile my experience of the world to a concept(physicalism) expressed in language. I could be misunderstanding that concept which means the problem goes away. But then it means all physicalists actually agree with me about the nature of reality and not the other way around as I assume you intend this view to suggest.

"Mindless"...what is "mind"?

It's just a figure of speech. It's not important to any of my positions. My only point here is that people have to have a need for language in order to develop it. The view you're suggesting assumes we are a "lump of raw meat" without language. We eventually just invent words and wait to see if some meaning magically jumps into them so that we can progress beyond "raw meat" status.

What is "experience"? "Use" comes before language. Distinguishing can come before language. But what is "experience"?

For the purposes of this discussion, experience can simply mean the process of receiving information about the external world. I'm claiming that distinctions are derived from experience and we place verbal labels on various distinctions because we found it useful to communicate. For example, I don't need language to know my place in the jungle relative to a tiger. There may even be specific things that humans can do when encountered by a tiger to save themselves and I still don't need language to execute these things. But if I can yell "tiger" so that other humans can hear, then this will be useful for the survival of my family/species; not just myself. Langauge is useful to communicate to others concepts that already exist.

"Wrong" in an absolute sense?

I meant that if you could compare my understanding of what reality is all about with a physicalist's understanding without the use of words, you may find that we agree on everything. But it would only mean that my view of what the physicalist believes is wrong (in that my view doesn't really represent what he actually believes). My view of the world would still be accurate even in this case.

 

[Fliption]

Why? It does not. I also do no possess, anywhere on my person, the image (photographic or otherwise) of anything meeting the aforementioned qualifications for "elephant".

First off, what is this "experience" to which you keep referring?

Mentat, I think you're being a bit to extreme in this discussion. You're going to end up debating on the word "image" for 10 pages when it is clear that it is nothing more than a semantic debate. It should be obvious to you that most people refer to "image" as the result of the process of seeing. Most people attach the word "image" to the "qualia" or "experience" of collecting vision information. No one else but you is going to deny that it is like something for the process of vision to operate. AKG is labeling "what it is like" for the vision process to operate as an "image". You're just being picky about the language because you think it leads to or implies things that you don't believe in.(A belief that you haven't come out and clearly stated) So why not just stop beating around the bush, end the torture, and tell AKG that you don't believe he experiences anything ?

 

[AKG]

In the case where I see my co-worker who is physically there, and the case where I see her and she is not physically there (i.e. I hallucinate her), what is the difference, and what remains the same? The only thing that we might say remains the same is the process that happens in the cortex. But my co-worker has bright green clothes. Nothing in my cortex is bright green. The activity in my cortex causes me to see (an image of) bright green clothes, the activity itself is not bright green.

There is a subjective mental image that I have. You seem to be equivocating processes occurring in the cortex with qualia, the two are very clearly not the same. Experiencing qualia includes experiences of redness and heat, etc. Chemical reactions in the brain are not experiences of redness or heat, they simply cause them.

Now, when I hallucinate, I can refer to my co-worker as a thing, as a noun, an object. I can refer to that hallucination of the co-worker, so what is its ontological status? When I say that I see purple clothes on my co-worker, I don't mean that I see purple clothes on my brain or on my electrons, I am referring to something entirely different. To what is it that I'm referring? Keep in mind that to me, my referrant is no different from my co-worker in the case that she is physically there. As far as I'm concerned I am referring to the same thing. Am I referring to nothing when I hallucinate, and the physical body that is my co-worker when I'm not hallucinating? No. I am referring to the exact same thing both times, and that is the co-worker that I see.

You say that when I hallucinate and say that she appears there, that she really doesn't appear there. That's wrong. Physically, she is not there, but she really does appear there. I do see her there, despite the fact that she is not physically there. I should point out that "see" can be used in different senses. In one sense, it implies physical existence, and in the other, you could say that it implies that I think there is physical existence, although that's not the best definition.

When I dream/hallucinate/imagine/"actually" see my co-worker, all these count as seeing her in the second sense. Only "actually" seeing her counts as seeing in the first sense. But surely, you can see what is common in all four cases, whether it be dreaming, hallucinating, imagining, or "actually seeing." Note that when I imagine here to be in that physical location, I don't believe that she is there. I can imagine myself flying without actually believing that I'm flying. So "belief" is not what is common there. What is common, is what I refer to as "the image." Since, whenever I use the word "image," the only thing you seem to understand is "photograph," I have had to try the above, roundabout way to try to get you to see what I'm referring to. Does it help? Do you know what I'm talking about when I speak of the common thing that is part of actually seeing her, dreaming her, imagining her, and hallucinating her?

Reality is all that exists. To speak of multiple realities is to speak of multiple groups of all that exists. If reality 1 contains all that exists (by definition of reality), and x is in reality 2, which we assume to be distinct from reality 1, then, since x is in a reality, it exists (by definition), and x is not in reality 1, by assumption, therefore, there is an x which exists which is not contained in the set of all that exists (reality 1). This contradiction implies reality 1 and reality 2 are not distinct, and in fact, no "two" realities are distinct, i.e. there is only one reality. I would say that "ontology" refers to nature.

A rock is an element of the set of solids, which is a subset of all matter, which is a subset of all that is physical, which is a subset of all that is real. Rocks can interact with other solids. Solids can interact with other matter (like liquids). Matter can interact with other physical things (space? time? energy?). Physical things can interact with non-physical thigns (mind, perceptions, beliefs).

If it makes you feel better, let's just say that when something happens in my brain that causes me to have a mental (non-physical) perception, then there is simply a reaction between my brain and my mind, and not an interaction.

I claim that the mind and body are distinct (or rather, that there are things that are not physical, especially perceptions and that which accesses them, the mind), and I have shown this. I don't claim to know how or why the mind and brain react with one another, nor is that relevant. It is as important for me to explain how or why the mind and brain react with one another, when I'm only asserting that they do, as it is for someone who's head is injured to explain how or why it got injured, when all he asserts is that it is injured. I have shown that there is something non-physical because I have made reference to a thing called a perception or image, therefore given an ontological status, and since it is obvious that this things is not in any physical place, it is not physical. That thing to which I refer is that thing which is common in my hallucination of my co-worker, my physically seeing her, my dreaming of her, and my imagining of her. Her physical presence is not common. The photons reflecting off her body is not common. The belief that she is physically there is not common. The neurophysiology is probably not even common (I doubt the images we see in our dreams are caused by activity in the visual cortex). Even if it were, that which is common is the image of my co-worker, and that image includes bright-green clothes. My brain and the electrons and chemical reacting in it don't include bright-green clothes. If, after all this, you still think an "image" is a "photograph" in the sense of the word I'm using, or otherwise don't have the correct interpretation of "image", I can't continue this discussion.

I've had this discussion many times, never has anyone had trouble with what I meant by "image," especially not to this degree.

Now, you claim that ontologies can't interact, and that this follows from something, but it doesn't, you just assume it. One hint might be that philosophers have been discussing ontologically distinct things for a very long time, and discussing the ways in which they interact without treating this as problematic. It seems that the conditions you are reading into the words "ontology" or "interact" are too strong, and as a result, are coming to contradictory, absurd, or otherwise problematic definitions, resulting naturally in your position of the same character.

Suppose that there is nothing in the universe, then suddenly, a white square, a black square, and a black-and-white stiped square pop into existence. The black and white square just is that way, it wasn't made by mixing the other two squares. But since it is part black, it can interact with the black square, and since it is part white, it can interact with the white square. In a sense, the black-and-white square is of mixed colour. This is not to say that it was the result of a mixture (perhaps the word "mixed" is confusing you) but simply that it has some properties of both other things, and it has these properties not necessarily resulting from a process of mixing. When I say metaphysical duct tape is mixed, I just mean that it has characteristics of both ontologies, not that two ontologies were taken separately then, at some later point in time, mixed together in God's mixing bowl.

If you argue that the reason ontologically different things can't interact is tied into the "fact" that they are of different realities, and "different realities" is inherently contradictory, then perhaps you should requestion the "fact" that is forming the basis of your argument. Maybe that's not a "fact," maybe you're just interpreting "ontologically different" incorrectly. Or perhaps you're interpreting it correctly, in which case we'll just have to make up a new word to fill in the blank in "perceptions are ________ly different from physical things" such that "_________" is not inherently contradictory and such that it doesn't prevent perceptions and physical things from interacting, since they do.

How do solids and liquids interact if they are of different states of matter? Well, it doesn't matter, since they're both physical. How do physical and non-physical things interact if they're not both physical? Well, it doesn't matter, since they're both real, i.e. they both exist, i.e. they are both part of the one reality.

What sees the image? The mind. How do we know the mind doesn't see an image of an image, or something like that, ad infinitum? The mind clearly does see something. You see something, and not nothing, right? Whatever you see, call that an image. We can then speculate as to the causal process that leads up to it. Physical object reflects light, light hits retina, electrical signals sent to brain, part of brain interprets electrical signals, ...?..., mind sees image. The mind directly sees the image, that's essentially how we defined it. Whatever you see (or as you would say, whatever you "think you see") is obviously something you can be certain of. You know, with certain, what you think you see. You don't know if it was caused by something really there or if you're hallucinating, but you know what you "think you see," or, as I would put it, simply, you know what you see. Note that we are using "see" in different senses here, so if you don't like that I say, "you know what you see," then just go with, "you know what you think you see." Not only does this explain why I see a purple sweater when all that is going in is electrons are whizzing around in a hunk of flesh, it also provides something of an Archimedean Point which we cannot be skeptical about. Skeptics cannot question that they see something (or as you would say, that they think they see something), although I've run into my fair share of idiots and sophists who did question that fact.

 

[Mentat]

Mentat, I think you're being a bit to extreme in this discussion. You're going to end up debating on the word "image" for 10 pages when it is clear that it is nothing more than a semantic debate.

What else would it be?

You've debated with me before (for well over 10 pages, IIRC ). I don't reduce things to semantics because it helps me in any way, or because I really care about words. I talk about words in order to elucidate the views that my "opponent" thinks s/he holds, and then to see if they hold any water beyond "mere semantics".

It should be obvious to you that most people refer to "image" as the result of the process of seeing. Most people attach the word "image" to the "qualia" or "experience" of collecting vision information. No one else but you is going to deny that it is like something for the process of vision to operate.

"Like something"? Hypnagogue used to use this term alot, but never really explained what it means, since he assumed every conscious being would know that from experience.

I see now, however, that you are indeed wrapped up in a lot of philosophical jargon, and just don't realize it (I was wondering for a while there). You are using "experience" in the same way as AKG (et al) have been using it (in the philosophical sense), rather than in the sense it takes in every other pursuit of man.

You are talking about "images" and the final results of collecting information, as though you would quantize the behaviors of the brain. Is it not a continual process of information-collection?

AKG is labeling "what it is like" for the vision process to operate as an "image". You're just being picky about the language because you think it leads to or implies things that you don't believe in.

It's not about belief. He is using a term that has no meaning, in this context. My brain does not need images of the things I perceive in order to perceive them. His brain might, but then he'd have to answer the questions/problems I've already posed (such as what it is that beholds this new "image" within the mind, and whether that "eye" has a mind of its own, who (in turn) observes the image of the image, et cetera ad infinitum).

So why not just stop beating around the bush, end the torture, and tell AKG that you don't believe he experiences anything ?

Because I have yet to understand what you really mean by "experience", as though "experiencing" were some grand and vital process that transcends explication. I can't tell him he doesn't do "A" if I don't yet know a good definition of "A". I can, however, tell him that I've gotten along quite well without this thing that he believes he has (and believes that I have, though I should think I would know if I did), and so I see no need to invoke it in conversation.

 

[Mentat]

In the case where I see my co-worker who is physically there, and the case where I see her and she is not physically there (i.e. I hallucinate her), what is the difference, and what remains the same?

You have successfully missed the point once again, AKG. In the second instance you don't "see her when she's not physically there". You don't see her at all. A similar process to that which happens when you do see her, occurs of its own accord, but that does not necessitate that you are actually seeing anything at all (indeed, it is perhaps more likely to occur when your eyes are shut).

The only thing that we might say remains the same is the process that happens in the cortex. But my co-worker has bright green clothes. Nothing in my cortex is bright green. The activity in my cortex causes me to see (an image of) bright green clothes, the activity itself is not bright green.

And what are "you"? Your cortex "causes" nothing more than the continual self-re-stimulation of arrays of neurons (pyramidal ones, in this case). It doesn't even really "cause" this, as it is partly composed of such arrays. Activities in your cortex don't "cause you to see" anything, indeed they are the process of "seeing". What causes those processes to occur can either be external stimulus (your co-workers presence, and the correlate light reflections) or can be internal stimulus (self-re-stimulation by a series of such neurons as the aforementioned).

There is a subjective mental image that I have. You seem to be equivocating processes occurring in the cortex with qualia, the two are very clearly not the same.

Ok, but I was certainly not equivocating them. I don't even recognize the existence of these "qualia" or "subjective mental images". I do, however, recognize the confirmed existence of cortical processes.

Experiencing qualia includes experiences of redness and heat, etc. Chemical reactions in the brain are not experiences of redness or heat, they simply cause them.

An ad hoc (or, perhaps, ad hominem) assumption with no grounds in any field of study whatsoever.

Now, when I hallucinate, I can refer to my co-worker as a thing, as a noun, an object. I can refer to that hallucination of the co-worker, so what is its ontological status?

I can also "refer to" a unicorn, or to Zeus, or to Einstein. The purpose of this "reference" is to stimulate a similar reaction to those which occurred upon your first having learned of such things. It does not conjure (ex nihilo?) some new creature that fits the descriptions of such beings, nor does it conjure up (again, from where?) any "image" thereof.

Once again, you are making too many assumptions, and will bear the burden of proof for all of them.

When I say that I see purple clothes on my co-worker, I don't mean that I see purple clothes on my brain or on my electrons...

Why do you keep saying this? Of course you can't see your brain, you don't have any eyes in there!

You say that when I hallucinate and say that she appears there, that she really doesn't appear there. That's wrong. Physically, she is not there, but she really does appear there. I do see her there, despite the fact that she is not physically there.

No you don't.

{We could go on like that for a while, if you don't substantiate your claims...after all, that's all it really amounts to, for a person to conduct such sloppy philosophy as what you are currently doing: you make a claim, without substantiation, and I can do nothing but utter the opposite claim (or the negation of the claim) since you haven't given me anything else (of substance) to attack}.

I should point out that "see" can be used in different senses. In one sense, it implies physical existence, and in the other, you could say that it implies that I think there is physical existence, although that's not the best definition.

Sure it is. It is a perfect definition. You do indeed think that there is a physical presence when no such thing is there. You believe it to varying degrees, but belief is itself nothing more than the degree of argument your willing to put into defending a notion.

Note that when I imagine here to be in that physical location, I don't believe that she is there. I can imagine myself flying without actually believing that I'm flying. So "belief" is not what is common there. What is common, is what I refer to as "the image."

And you believe, with all your might, that such an image exists. It is nothing more than belief.

Since, whenever I use the word "image," the only thing you seem to understand is "photograph," I have had to try the above, roundabout way to try to get you to see what I'm referring to. Does it help? Do you know what I'm talking about when I speak of the common thing that is part of actually seeing her, dreaming her, imagining her, and hallucinating her?

The only thing common to seeing her, dreaming about her, imagining her, hallucinating about her, etc is that it is the same process with different origins of stimuli.

Reality is all that exists. To speak of multiple realities is to speak of multiple groups of all that exists.

Tell that to the philosophers who came up with ontological dichotomies.

It's not my problem (for the millionth time). I don't need to address your arguments against ontology, because I don't hold the concept myself. I agree with you. However, I do not agree that our not liking or agreeing with a notion has any effect on the "actual" state of things.

A rock is an element of the set of solids, which is a subset of all matter, which is a subset of all that is physical, which is a subset of all that is real.

But one can (as I have in a recent post...hopefully you'll recognize this, or else I'm going to assume you're not paying attention to my posts) show that the physical/non-physical distinction is exactly as problematic as any other ontological distinction, and that it does indeed fall back on what is "real" in one sense and "real" in another. Indeed, this is the most commonly-discussed ontological dichotomy.

However, by the reasoning(?) you've been using throughout this thread, the physical/non-physical distinction is ridiculous and should be thrown out since there is hardly even a vague concept/definition of what it means to be "physical".

If it makes you feel better, let's just say that when something happens in my brain that causes me to have a mental (non-physical) perception, then there is simply a reaction between my brain and my mind, and not an interaction.

There cannot be a "reaction" between two things. If it occurs continually between any two things, it is an "interaction", by definition.

 

[Tournesol]

The only thing common to seeing her, dreaming about her, imagining her, hallucinating about her, etc is that it is the same process with different origins of stimuli.

But I can know that there is a commonality between a perception of a horse, a dream about a horse, etc, without having any idea at all of what the neural
"process" is. The way things seem to me is no the neural process per se,
because the things do not seem to be neural processes. (The way things seem to me may well really be the the way the neural process seems to itself, however. Then the mind is the way the brain appears to itself,
and the brain is the way the mind appears form the outside.)

 

[Mentat]

But I can know that there is a commonality between a perception of a horse, a dream about a horse, etc, without having any idea at all of what the neural
"process" is.

This comment is deeply entrenched in philosophical jargon, and it's very hard to make sense of it in any real terms.

I don't mean that to be offensive, it's just that you are referring to the "perception of a horse" as though it were a quantitative entity, rather than a process of perceiving a horse. There are no "quantum perceptions", but there is indeed a process of "perceiving", provided the right stimulus is available.

Therefore, there is no "commonality" between "a perception of a horse" and anything else, since there's no such thing as "a perception". Perception is not quantum (if it were, you'd be able to tell me the exact beginning and end of "a perception", the Final Draft (to use Dennettian terms)).

That we can understand the difference between perceiving a horse and believing that we perceive a horse while no such horse is present is, without the knowledge of neurology, is nothing surprising at all. We can also speak of points of light in the sky without any knowledge of the internal physics of stars.

The way things seem to me is not the neural process per se,
because the things do not seem to be neural processes.

Come on, Tournesol. You should know better than this. The way something seems to you is a way that you process that thing itself. It won't seem like neural process unless you are oberving a neural process (and you can't observe your own, since you don't have eyes inside your head (not that eyes would be sufficient, you'd also need a brain that connected to those eyes...but you get my drift, don't you?)).

 

[AKG]

Mentat

The biggest problem you're having here is a semantic one. For clarification, let us define see, and another word, see'.

When I see my co-worker, and she is physically there, or when I hallucinate her, or when I imagine her, or when I dream her, the experience is the same. Define see by

I see iff I have the common experience described above

and define see' by

I see' iff I have the common experience described above AND this experience is the result of physical stimulus resulting from the physical presence of whatever it is I experience (see).

From now on, when I say see I mean see and not see'. Now, when we use see' in the transitive sense, when I say "I see' x", then x usually refers to the physical thing which is stimulating the experience. We can use see in a transitive sense as well, but clearly, when we say "I see x", x will not refer to the physical stimulus, since no physical stimulus is required for seeing (by the definition above).

Consider the dictionary.com definition for hallucination given below:

a) Perception of visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, or gustatory experiences without an external stimulus and with a compelling sense of their reality, usually resulting from a mental disorder or as a response to a drug.
b) The objects or events so perceived.

Also, the definition for perception:

a) The process, act, or faculty of perceiving.
b) The effect or product of perceiving.

Definitions b) (for both hallucination and perception) are the "image" that I keep talking about. When I say, "I see x" then x refers to the product of perception, or the object that is hallucinated (perceived without external stimulus causing the perception), the image, etc.

And what are "you"? Your cortex "causes" nothing more than the continual self-re-stimulation of arrays of neurons (pyramidal ones, in this case). It doesn't even really "cause" this, as it is partly composed of such arrays. Activities in your cortex don't "cause you to see" anything, indeed they are the process of "seeing". What causes those processes to occur can either be external stimulus (your co-workers presence, and the correlate light reflections) or can be internal stimulus (self-re-stimulation by a series of such neurons as the aforementioned).

This is false. When I see my co-worker, I see a purple shirt. Nothing in my cortex is a purple shirt. Keeping in mind my use of the word "see", even if I'm hallucinating, I see a purple shirt even if there is no physical purple shirt. So the purple shirt being referred to in seeing (not see'ing) is not a physical shirt, and is certainly not a part of the cortex, since the cortex is a piece of brain with chemical reactions going on, there are no purple shirts there.

Ok, but I was certainly not equivocating them. I don't even recognize the existence of these "qualia" or "subjective mental images". I do, however, recognize the confirmed existence of cortical processes.

Well, "qualia" includes things like redness and hotness. Cortical processes are neither red nor hot. The sensations/images I experience may indeed be red or hot. Even if I'm hallucinating, I can see red or feel (and not feel') hot, so we can't equivocate these things to external physical stimulus. Nor can we equivocate these things with cortical processes, quite simply, because they are neither red nor hot.

An ad hoc (or, perhaps, ad hominem) assumption with no grounds in any field of study whatsoever.

That's wrong. It is shown that when certain parts of the brain are stimulated, i.e. when certain activity is induced in the brain, then the experience that a person has is affected. Science suggests a causal relationship. Of course, this does hinge on the idea that the experience and the brain activity are distinguishable. Indeed, they are, but you don't seem to want to understand. The idea of "image" is quite simple, you seem to have tremendous difficulty.

I can also "refer to" a unicorn, or to Zeus, or to Einstein. The purpose of this "reference" is to stimulate a similar reaction to those which occurred upon your first having learned of such things. It does not conjure (ex nihilo?) some new creature that fits the descriptions of such beings, nor does it conjure up (again, from where?) any "image" thereof.

Once again, you are making too many assumptions, and will bear the burden of proof for all of them.

It was your claim that anything that can be referred to has ontological status. But there's nothing make-believe about the image. The image is in fact "most real", or rather, that which we can be most certain of. We don't know whether or not we're perpetually hallucinating, and we can't be certain that there actually is external stimulus causing our experiences, but we can be certain that we do have these experiences. Most reasonable people will also accept that they have external causes. However, the nature of the experience and the nature of the external stimulus are different.

No you don't.

{We could go on like that for a while, if you don't substantiate your claims...after all, that's all it really amounts to, for a person to conduct such sloppy philosophy as what you are currently doing: you make a claim, without substantiation, and I can do nothing but utter the opposite claim (or the negation of the claim) since you haven't given me anything else (of substance) to attack}.

You seem to, as Fliption suggested, purposely trying to take the least generous interpretation of my words in order to refute them more easily. As he pointed out, it is quite clear what I'm referring to when I speak of this image. Either you have trouble with English and just can't understand, or are commiting the "Socratic Fallacy" and not trying to understand. For your consideration, definition 3 of see from dictionary.com:

To have a mental image of

You make it sound like I'm using words like "see" and "image" in an unfathomable way, but clearly, it's something that is very natural. I believe Fliption even mentioned something to that effect, that people in normal conversation refer to their experiences as images, or something like that.

Sure it is. It is a perfect definition. You do indeed think that there is a physical presence when no such thing is there. You believe it to varying degrees, but belief is itself nothing more than the degree of argument your willing to put into defending a notion.

No, it's not a perfect definition. With the given definitions of see and see', to see is not exactly to think you see'. To see' is to have an experience and believe it to be caused by external physical stimulus. But when I imagine my co-worker, I see her, but I don't think I see' her, i.e. I don't believe that this image of her that I experience is a result of external physical stimulus. In some cases, when I see her, I think I see' her (for example, when I hallucinate), but not in all cases, so it is certainly not a perfect definition.

The only thing common to seeing her, dreaming about her, imagining her, hallucinating about her, etc is that it is the same process with different origins of stimuli.

No, that process is one thing. Another thing that is common is the effect of the process, i.e. definition b) of perception. That effect is an image, and it is not physical, since we can't put it in any physical place. Not only do we know that the image exists because we can see it, but we know that the image is not the brain activity (it is caused by it, it is not identical to it) because the brain activity is a process, and the image is a thing, and also because the brain activity is not purple or hot or loud, but the image can be purple, the sensation can be hot or loud.

Tell that to the philosophers who came up with ontological dichotomies.

It's not my problem (for the millionth time). I don't need to address your arguments against ontology, because I don't hold the concept myself. I agree with you. However, I do not agree that our not liking or agreeing with a notion has any effect on the "actual" state of things.

It is your problem. The philosophers who came up with ontological dichotomies did not come up with the dichotomies you are coming up with. You are coming up with unique (uniquely absurd) dichotomies. If philosophers ever stated that things were of two realities, they were either insane, or meant that things were of two natures, not that they were elements of two disjoint sets of all that exists, because that would be a contradiction. Perhaps the Socratic Fallacy is symptomatic of your style of argumentation. Try to assume the most reasonable, strongest interpretation of another's argument. If two realities means, to me and to you, that there are two sets of all things, and philosophers go on talking about multiple realities, then we ought to assume that they meant something different from what we interpret. Not only is that more reasonable, it is also more generous, and in being generous, you make your opponent's position seem as strong as possible, thus when defending your position against it, you put your own position through a better test.

Things of different ontologies, or, as some would put it, different realities, does not imply that things are of different realities as you and I interpret, it is a weaker statement that perhaps implies little more than that the things are different in nature, and not the contradiction we interpret it to imply. This interpretation, the one that doesn't lead to blatant contradictions, is the more reasonable one, don't you think? Given this interpretation, the problem you pose for dualists vanishes.

There cannot be a "reaction" between two things. If it occurs continually between any two things, it is an "interaction", by definition.

If we have a proton and an electron very far apart, then they continually undergo an interaction in which the two accelerate towards each other. Now, is there a gluon passing back and forth between the two, or what? Anyways, what is different between what is going on between the proton and electron that doesn't require an infinite regress of intermediary things to carry the interaction, and what would happen between body and mind?

Also, another example that came to mind today with regards to "mixtures." An electron is said to have a dual nature, or, as you could put it, "mixed" nature. This doesn't mean that one thing that was entirely a wave and one thing that was entirely a particle were put into a blender and out came a dual-natured wave-particle called an electron. It simply is of both natures, and this doesn't requires any previous mixing of waves and particles. It can interact with waves, and we can see this when we observe the interference patterns created when it does interact with other waves. However, we can talk about electrons undergoing elastic collisions with particles, something that things of particle nature do. It interacts with particles and with waves. It is of both natures, and so, in a sense, yes, it is of a third nature, but it is also both previous natures, and can interact with them without requiring a mixing process.

 

[Mentat]

Mentat

The biggest problem you're having here is a semantic one.

And what else would it be?

For clarification, let us define see, and another word, see'.

When I see my co-worker, and she is physically there, or when I hallucinate her, or when I imagine her, or when I dream her, the experience is the same. Define see by

I see iff I have the common experience described above

and define see' by

I see' iff I have the common experience described above AND this experience is the result of physical stimulus resulting from the physical presence of whatever it is I experience (see).

All nonsense. You still haven't defined "experience" (in spite of having been asked, more than once) and so its use in the definitions is only an obstruction to clarity, nothing more.

There is no "experience" that is common to hallucinating and seeing your co-worker. To see requires visual stimulus. However, to believe that see something that you do not actually see, requires only internal stimuli.

I will not work with these definitions, as they have been added ad hominem, and as yet have no coherent meaning.

a) Perception of visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, or gustatory experiences without an external stimulus and with a compelling sense of their reality, usually resulting from a mental disorder or as a response to a drug.
b) The objects or events so perceived.

Also, the definition for perception:

a) The process, act, or faculty of perceiving.
b) The effect or product of perceiving.

Definitions b) (for both hallucination and perception) are the "image" that I keep talking about. When I say, "I see x" then x refers to the product of perception, or the object that is hallucinated (perceived without external stimulus causing the perception), the image, etc.

These definitions are also stuck on post-Kantian notions. Granted, I have deferred to dictionaries (among other sources) as points of authority in semantics throughout this debate. However, unless someone can explain to me why there should be such a "final product" of perceiving, and what use it would serve, I will not hold that it is there at all. In fact, this concept (or misconception) only further clouds the issues it touches. After all, would the concept of hallucination be so problematic (and it is, in philosophy, quite problematic), if it weren't for the questions about the nature of these "final products"?

This is false. When I see my co-worker, I see a purple shirt. Nothing in my cortex is a purple shirt.

For the last time, you do not see your cortex, and I never claimed that you did. You do not have eyes inside your head, or any other such apparatus which would allow you access to the inner workings of your cortex.

Keeping in mind my use of the word "see", even if I'm hallucinating, I see a purple shirt even if there is no physical purple shirt. So the purple shirt being referred to in seeing (not see'ing) is not a physical shirt, and is certainly not a part of the cortex, since the cortex is a piece of brain with chemical reactions going on, there are no purple shirts there.

And there are no purple shirts elsewhere either. You seem to be missing the fact that your assumptions will eventually lead one to the conclusion that everything you believe in must have some kind of existence, or else it would be impossible for you to believe in them. But this is preposterous! A person who believes in Zeus does not expect Zeus to become real simply because of that person's belief. They think they are talking about something that was already real. However, to follow your reasoning, every time I believe I am perceiving unicorns or gods, these must come into (some form of) existence in order for me to be able to believe in them.

Well, "qualia" includes things like redness and hotness. Cortical processes are neither red nor hot.

So, what? The fact remains: you could not know about redness or hotness had you not first processed such things cortically.

The sensations/images I experience may indeed be red or hot. Even if I'm hallucinating, I can see red or feel (and not feel') hot, so we can't equivocate these things to external physical stimulus.

Actually, I would like you to try to "feel" hot, right now, if you please. Without outside stimulus, attempt to make any part of your body "feel hot".

That's wrong. It is shown that when certain parts of the brain are stimulated, i.e. when certain activity is induced in the brain, then the experience that a person has is affected. Science suggests a causal relationship.

No, that is wrong. Science has never suggested a relationship (causal or otherwise) between brain activity and "experiences". Science doesn't even suggest that there are "experiences", let alone what they are related to.

It was your claim that anything that can be referred to has ontological status.

Anything which can be referred to (or, perhaps, one that cannot be referred to, for whatever reason) does have ontological status, simply by virtue of its being "something". If there is an empty reference (one that doesn't actually refer to anything, even though the speaker believes that it does), then there need be no ontological status assigned to anything except the reference itself (since there is nothing else to speak about).

But there's nothing make-believe about the image. The image is in fact "most real", or rather, that which we can be most certain of.

I wish you'd post that in my "Wrong Turns" thread. The concept of mind-body distinctions, and the difference between "images of the mind" and their related objective stimuli, were devised specifically to establish that about which the speaker could be incorrigible. But such incorrigibility will never be found in any meaningful sense, and that is why I think the inventing of these empty terms was a mistake.

I do not, however, deny that the terms exist. So, your reference to the dictionary will change nothing. I know that these terms exist and are in wide use. My confusion springs, not from an unfamiliarity with the terms, but from an unfamiliarity with anything to which these terms might conceivably refer.

You make it sound like I'm using words like "see" and "image" in an unfathomable way, but clearly, it's something that is very natural.

Not natural. Normal.

Yes, people use these terms constantly. But these terms are no less empty for use.

No, it's not a perfect definition. With the given definitions of see and see', to see is not exactly to think you see'. To see' is to have an experience and believe it to be caused by external physical stimulus. But when I imagine my co-worker, I see her, but I don't think I see' her, i.e. I don't believe that this image of her that I experience is a result of external physical stimulus. In some cases, when I see her, I think I see' her (for example, when I hallucinate), but not in all cases, so it is certainly not a perfect definition.

You missed the point completely. I'm sorry if I'm explaining this badly, but I can't think of any better ways. But hear me out...

You only devised the distinction between "see" and "see' " because you want to hold on to the concept that something (though not physical) must exist whenever you believe you are perceiving it. After all, it would be shameful indeed to be wrong about what you are perceiving. However, belief is indeed the most important part of this discussion. Whether or not you believe that you "see' " her is irrelevant. That you believe you "see" her in any way is the root fallacy.

It is your problem. The philosophers who came up with ontological dichotomies did not come up with the dichotomies you are coming up with. You are coming up with unique (uniquely absurd) dichotomies. If philosophers ever stated that things were of two realities, they were either insane, or meant that things were of two natures, not that they were elements of two disjoint sets of all that exists, because that would be a contradiction.

Yes it would be; you are correct. They meant "realities" in the sense that "physical" and "non-physical" are of "different realities", not different "sets of all that exist" (since the clearly believe that both kinds of entity exist).

When I say it's not my problem, it's because I didn't come up with such dichotomies, nor the words to describe them. That "reality" was misused by those same philosophers is also not my problem.

Things of different ontologies, or, as some would put it, different realities, does not imply that things are of different realities as you and I interpret, it is a weaker statement that perhaps implies little more than that the things are different in nature, and not the contradiction we interpret it to imply. This interpretation, the one that doesn't lead to blatant contradictions, is the more reasonable one, don't you think? Given this interpretation, the problem you pose for dualists vanishes.

No, it doesn't. I do not mean to construct strawmen, I have indeed given the opportunity for others here to give a more generous definition of "ontology". That you did not do so until now is (once again) not my problem. My definition of it does make seem more blatantly absurd than it would otherwise, but that doesn't change the absurdity of the actual cases. For example: physical/non-physical.

If an action/entity is physical, and it wishes to interact with something non-physical, it will not require some other physical thing to connect it with that non-physical one. Nor will it require something non-physical, as it would have equal difficulty interacting with that non-physical entity as the previous. It would require something that was neither physical nor non-physical, which is obviously (semantically, logically, etc) absurd.

If we have a proton and an electron very far apart, then they continually undergo an interaction in which the two accelerate towards each other. Now, is there a gluon passing back and forth between the two, or what?

Between a proton and an electron? No. Their interaction is to do with their opposite electrical charges.

Anyways, what is different between what is going on between the proton and electron that doesn't require an infinite regress of intermediary things to carry the interaction, and what would happen between body and mind?

Both a proton and a neutron (as used in my example) are of the same ontology.

Also, another example that came to mind today with regards to "mixtures." An electron is said to have a dual nature, or, as you could put it, "mixed" nature. This doesn't mean that one thing that was entirely a wave and one thing that was entirely a particle were put into a blender and out came a dual-natured wave-particle called an electron. It simply is of both natures, and this doesn't requires any previous mixing of waves and particles.

I know that. But it cannot serve as an intermediary between waves and particles any better than a wave or particle could on its own (though, this is clearly distinct from ontological difficulty).

When I spoke of the problems with mixing ontologies, I was speaking of the fact that either the third ontology was created by a previous interaction of the two, or else it was as distinct from the others as each of them are from one another.

Aside from the fact that a "mixed ontology" would imply something composed of parts that cannot interact (as per my aforementioned problems of ontological interaction), which is a worse problem than any I've posed, think of this: The third ontology is just that, a third ontology. Why should its being composed of parts that are of different ontologies make it a good bridge?

 

[AKG]

All nonsense. You still haven't defined "experience" (in spite of having been asked, more than once) and so its use in the definitions is only an obstruction to clarity, nothing more.

There is no "experience" that is common to hallucinating and seeing your co-worker. To see requires visual stimulus. However, to believe that see something that you do not actually see, requires only internal stimuli.

I will not work with these definitions, as they have been added ad hominem, and as yet have no coherent meaning.

I have to assume you're terribly thick-headed and simply can't figure out what I mean when I talk of this experience, or the experienced thing (the image). It is the common things you see (or at least think you see) when you see', imagine, hallucinate, and dream. Either that, or your sophistic approach to this topic won't let you understand. I asked my 14 year old sister if she understood what I'm talking about when I talk about the common image in those four situations, she understood with no problem. The sophist in you is demanding a definition for something a 14-year-old has no trouble understanding. Fliption also indicated that he knows what I'm talking about. Didn't we already go over the fact that we don't need such definitions to understand each other? Either you're too hard-headed to understand me (or if it's a language problem, I apologise), or you're your unwilling to understand.

However, unless someone can explain to me why there should be such a "final product" of perceiving, and what use it would serve, I will not hold that it is there at all.

What use does it serve? It is exactly what you see. If there were no final product of perception, there would be nothing to perceive. Perhaps my doctor can argue, "Unless I know why you were kicked in the back of the head, and what the purpose of you being kicked in the head was, I have no reason to believe you were kicked in the head, and I will not treat you." You're focusing on something entirely irrelevant.

For the last time, you do not see your cortex, and I never claimed that you did. You do not have eyes inside your head, or any other such apparatus which would allow you access to the inner workings of your cortex.

You don't get it, and you're really not paying attention. Assuming that there is a common image/experience in those four situations (see'ing, hallucinating, ...), then the object of the experience is certainly not the physical thing, since there is no physical thing when you hallucinate. But if it were the activity in your cortex, then activity in your cortex would be a green shirt, but it's not. You see a green shirt, not your cortex (nor the light entering your eyes, nor the physical object, since you can see - not see' - a green shirt without it being physically there). So whatever it is you see is none of those physical things.

And there are no purple shirts elsewhere either. You seem to be missing the fact that your assumptions will eventually lead one to the conclusion that everything you believe in must have some kind of existence, or else it would be impossible for you to believe in them. But this is preposterous! A person who believes in Zeus does not expect Zeus to become real simply because of that person's belief. They think they are talking about something that was already real. However, to follow your reasoning, every time I believe I am perceiving unicorns or gods, these must come into (some form of) existence in order for me to be able to believe in them.

I'm not just conceptualizing these images, I am seeing them. I can be certain of these images, and in fact can't be certain of the brain I think is causing them, or the physical objects that they represent. Simply conceiving a unicorn doesn't make it exist, but the image of a unicorn thus exists, or rather, the concept. And the concept is not physical. Your belief must exist in order for you to believe it, and your belief is not physical because you may have some beliefs about what is in your drawer, but your brain and the chemical reactions aren't about anything, they are just physical processes. If you have a hallucination of a red shirt, nothing in your brain is a red shirt, so the hallucinated shirt is not some part of the brain, or brain activity, etc.

So, what? The fact remains: you could not know about redness or hotness had you not first processed such things cortically.

Right, cortical processes cause the mind to experience these qualia. But cortical process are not identical to qualia since cortiacl processes are neither red nor hot. They cause qualia corresponding to redness or hotness, they aren't identical to them.

Actually, I would like you to try to "feel" hot, right now, if you please. Without outside stimulus, attempt to make any part of your body "feel hot".

I don't have that power of imagination, but if I were hallucinating, I could. There have certainly been times when I felt much hotter than I actually was. There was a time when I was sitting at my computer and a spider was crawling up my leg. It surprised me, and I for the next few days, I often got the feeling that spiders were crawling on my legs, even though I was feel'ing no such thing. Sometimes people will claim to hear things when there is nothing to hear'. My sister will sometimes tell me I smell like smoke when it is impossible for her to smell' smoke on me, as there was no smoke on me for her to smell'. People have sensations identical to sensations' even though their causes are different. Something is common to both situations (whether you're sensing or sens'ing) even though the physical causes are not. That common thing is the experience, or the thing you "think" you sense', or the thing you imagine you sense'.

No, that is wrong. Science has never suggested a relationship (causal or otherwise) between brain activity and "experiences". Science doesn't even suggest that there are "experiences", let alone what they are related to.

When a scientist pokes a certain part of my brain, I experience some change in what I see (not see'). What I see is what I experience. Science shows that activity in the brain effects what I experience. The only way you could deny that is to do what Fliption said, and tell me that I don't have experiences. This is only true to you because you're either hard-headed or sophistic, but everyone else in the world, including my 14-year-old sister, knows exactly what I mean when I talk about those experiences.

I wish you'd post that in my "Wrong Turns" thread. The concept of mind-body distinctions, and the difference between "images of the mind" and their related objective stimuli, were devised specifically to establish that about which the speaker could be incorrigible. But such incorrigibility will never be found in any meaningful sense, and that is why I think the inventing of these empty terms was a mistake.

I do not, however, deny that the terms exist. So, your reference to the dictionary will change nothing. I know that these terms exist and are in wide use. My confusion springs, not from an unfamiliarity with the terms, but from an unfamiliarity with anything to which these terms might conceivably refer.

You are indeed familiar with these things. In fact, these things are the only things with which you are undeniably, directly familiar. Everything else you know of you know from inference. The existence of the computer in a physical world independent from what you happen to see is something you infer from the image you have of the computer. You infer that there is something independent of your perception, and that it causes your perception, and that the thing in your experience (the computer) corresponds to some independent physical object. That's a rather reasonable inference, but an inference nonetheless. You need to make no inference to know that you see a computer, you must make inference to think you see' the computer.

You are familiar with these things, and either you are uncapable of noticing it, or, more likely, you are unwilling to admit it.

You missed the point completely. I'm sorry if I'm explaining this badly, but I can't think of any better ways. But hear me out...

You only devised the distinction between "see" and "see' " because you want to hold on to the concept that something (though not physical) must exist whenever you believe you are perceiving it. After all, it would be shameful indeed to be wrong about what you are perceiving. However, belief is indeed the most important part of this discussion. Whether or not you believe that you "see' " her is irrelevant. That you believe you "see" her in any way is the root fallacy.

No, it is the root of the argument, it is a true premise, and the argument is sound. Your belief that I don't "see" her in any way is the root of your problem. Everybody else understands what I mean when I say that I see her in some way. Clearly, "see" does have some meaning in this context if everyone understands it. It is distinct from see', and I don't see' her in any way, but I do see her in some way. What does "see" mean in this context? Well, everyone else seems to know what it means, so either you're unwilling or unable to understand what it means.

No, it doesn't. I do not mean to construct strawmen, I have indeed given the opportunity for others here to give a more generous definition of "ontology". That you did not do so until now is (once again) not my problem. My definition of it does make seem more blatantly absurd than it would otherwise, but that doesn't change the absurdity of the actual cases. For example: physical/non-physical.

If this is all it is, then I can choose a sufficiently generous definition of ontology such that the problem goes away. Solid and non-solid can interact, because they are of the same ontology, but that depends on how "ontology" is defined. Let's just define "ontology" such that it is little different from "state of matter" so that of physical ontology can interact with non-physical ontology.

If an action/entity is physical, and it wishes to interact with something non-physical, it will not require some other physical thing to connect it with that non-physical one. Nor will it require something non-physical, as it would have equal difficulty interacting with that non-physical entity as the previous. It would require something that was neither physical nor non-physical, which is obviously (semantically, logically, etc) absurd.

Just as a solid cannot interact with a non-solid. Of course they can interact, there is nothing in the definition of "solid" that makes it so that solid and non-solid can interact. All I'm asserting is that mind is non-physical, and just as solid and non-solid can interact, so can physical (body/brain) and non-physical (mind). Either categorize mind as the same ontology as physical things, or categorize them of different ontologies, but define ontology such that ontologically distinct things interacting is as problematic as solid and non-solid things interacting. Of course, I can do either of these things because it depends entirely on how I define ontology, and since you seem to define ontology in a completely arbitrary, unconventional manner for the sole purpose of making your argument work, I shall do the same thing so that my argument works.

Between a proton and an electron? No. Their interaction is to do with their opposite electrical charges.

Isn't this still action at a distance? There is no medium that passes the interaction from one thing to another, the two things are separate and just happen to have an effect on one another. If this is acceptable, then Newton's gravity shouldn't be problematic either. Two separate masses just happen to have an effect on one another. Anyways, an electron and proton interact with each other without any thing connecting them, and so do mind and body, or if you want, duct tape connects them, it really doesn't matter.

Both a proton and a neutron (as used in my example) are of the same ontology.

So what? What's so big about being of the same ontology that allows them to interact, but if they were of different ontologies, they couldn't? That ontologically similar things can interact and that ontologically distinct things can't interact is a baseless assumption you make.

I know that. But it cannot serve as an intermediary between waves and particles any better than a wave or particle could on its own (though, this is clearly distinct from ontological difficulty).

Of course it can. An electron can collide with a proton (particle) and then later on interfere with a wave, thereby intermediating between particle and wave.

When I spoke of the problems with mixing ontologies, I was speaking of the fact that either the third ontology was created by a previous interaction of the two, or else it was as distinct from the others as each of them are from one another.

Aside from the fact that a "mixed ontology" would imply something composed of parts that cannot interact (as per my aforementioned problems of ontological interaction), which is a worse problem than any I've posed, think of this: The third ontology is just that, a third ontology. Why should its being composed of parts that are of different ontologies make it a good bridge?

What would prevent it from being a good bridge? It is a third ontology, and it is partially both previous ontologies. You seem to think that since it is of a third ontology, the underlined stuff is irrelevant.

Let A be the set of all only-English speakers
Let B be the set of all only-French speakers
Let C be the set of all English-and-French speakers

Clearly, C is distinct from A and B, the intersection of any two sets is empty, so in that sense, C is a third, distinct thing from the other two. But in another sense, it is like a mix of the previous two, and people in set C can interact with both A and B, and perhaps act as translators and facilitate interaction between A and B, mediating some discussion. Metaphysical duct tape does the same thing.

Anyways, I'm done with this discussion. Your argument is based on a bunch of nonsensical assumptions and definitions of ontology, interaction, reaction, and a number of other things. Moreover, you either can't or won't understand something that my 14 year old sister, and probably everyone else who speaks English, understands, and unfortunately, understanding this thing is the root of understanding my argument. I didn't have to convince my sister or explain anything to her, she understood what I was referring to, it was very natural. It's not as though we are all referring to something we believe exists, but really doesn't, we are reffering to something that we can't help but believe exists. We are in fact referring to something we can't doubt exists. We can't, but somehow, you can. Anyone who is so thick-headed and/or sophistic as to be able to doubt such a thing is not worth arguing with. Pages and pages of posts won't make this plainly simple thing any clearer. Once it becomes clear, there will be nothing left to debate, but since you seem to be uncapable of seeing this thing clearly, I won't waste any more time.

 

[Mentat]

Well, AKG, I have asked pointed questions; I have reasoned pointedly. If you can't see that you are biased toward a view that has nothing to do with anything provable (or disprovable) or useful, then I have failed and apologize. I have countered every point. I have listened to the new points you added later, which could have been rejected out-right as ad hoc defenses of a PoV you couldn't defend without them (ergo, anti-Ockham's Razor), and have reasoned on such points. None of them hold any water, in the light of my arguments against them, nor do I (still, after three pages of this) see why you choose to invoke them in the first place. Why fix an understanding of perception that isn't broken?

If you think I've been thick-headed, you should look back at the posts, and see that I have been all but begging you to give my points (and counter-points) consideration, and you have done nothing but repeat your assertions or attempt to back them up with yet another ad hoc/hominem assumption, which you (in turn) cannot defend.

I, too, am tired of this, but I have a right to be. As to this...

All I'm asserting is that mind is non-physical, and just as solid and non-solid can interact, so can physical (body/brain) and non-physical (mind).

That is certainly not all you are asserting, but I'm done kicking this particular dead horse. All I have to say to this is that "solid" and "non-solid" are both physical concepts. "Non-physical" is (by semantic necessity) the set of all things that are "not...physical". That we don't have a perfectly good definition of "physical" becomes irrelevant to the discussion of the abstract truth that something physical (if there are such things which can be rigorously defined as such) could not, in principle, interact with something non-physical, for the reasons I have already stated.

If you want a better explanation of that particular point, read the first chapter of Dennett's Consciousness Explained.

 

[Tournesol]

Mentat

But I can know that there is a commonality between a perception of a horse, a dream about a horse, etc, without having any idea at all of what the neural
"process" is.

This comment is deeply entrenched in philosophical jargon, and it's very hard to make sense of it in any real terms.

What jargon ? 'Perception' ?

I don't mean that to be offensive, it's just that you are referring to the "perception of a horse" as though it were a quantitative entity, rather than a process of perceiving a horse. There are no "quantum perceptions", but there is indeed a process of "perceiving", provided the right stimulus is available.

No I am not. It doesn't make the slightest differnce to what I am
actually saying whether a perception is a process or a
"quantitative entity". (That's not
philosophical jargon?)

Therefore, there is no "commonality" between "a perception of a horse" and anything else, since there's no such thing as "a perception". Perception is not quantum (if it were, you'd be able to tell me the exact beginning and end of "a perception", the Final Draft (to use Dennettian terms)).

Why can't there be commonalities between processes ? ANyway, you are
missing a the basic point. What seeing a horse and reaiming a horse have in common is horses. (Note the completely non-technical non-jargon nature of that sentence. Note also that the proverbial schoolchild could easily understand it).

That we can understand the difference between perceiving a horse and believing that we perceive a horse while no such horse is present is, without the knowledge of neurology, is nothing surprising at all. We can also speak of points of light in the sky without any knowledge of the internal physics of stars.

Yep. We can have the prima-facie experience of a point of light without
knowing astrophysics, and our neural activity somehow tells us what is
goign on in our heads with another bunch of prima facie experience that
shomehow hides the neurological details of its implications. And
that might be explained neurologicaly too...but it never will be
unless we acccept that there are experiences, appearances and seemings
being produced; consciousness-denial will never explain it.

The way things seem to me is not the neural process per se,
because the things do not seem to be neural processes.

Come on, Tournesol. You should know better than this. The way something seems to you is a way that you process that thing itself. It won't seem like neural process unless you are oberving a neural process (and you can't observe your own, since you don't have eyes inside your head (not that eyes would be sufficient, you'd also need a brain that connected to those eyes...but you get my drift, don't you?)).

Nonetheless, there is no simple equation between the nerual process
per se and the seemings it generates. And , no, that does not mean
seemings are 'quantitative entitites'.

 

[Mentat]

What jargon ? 'Perception' ?

Not "perception", "a perception". I assure you, the concept of individual perceptions (as though perceiving was a quantized process) is never used in any other field of study.

No I am not. It doesn't make the slightest differnce to what I am
actually saying whether a perception is a process or a
"quantitative entity". (That's not
philosophical jargon?)

It makes all the difference. How can you refer to a comparison made between a horse (which is a singular, quantum entity) and "a perception of a horse", without assuming quantized perception?

Why can't there be commonalities between processes ? ANyway, you are
missing a the basic point. What seeing a horse and reaiming a horse have in common is horses.

"Reaiming"?

You are referring to the process of perceiving a horse, as compared to the process of believing that you perceive one when you do not?

(Note the completely non-technical non-jargon nature of that sentence. Note also that the proverbial schoolchild could easily understand it).

I am a school-child (until I finish this last credit of high school). Try harder.

Yep. We can have the prima-facie experience of a point of light without
knowing astrophysics, and our neural activity somehow tells us what is
goign on in our heads with another bunch of prima facie experience that
shomehow hides the neurological details of its implications. And
that might be explained neurologicaly too...but it never will be
unless we acccept that there are experiences, appearances and seemings
being produced; consciousness-denial will never explain it.

There don't need to be raw "seemings" or "appearances" to account for us simply being wrong about what we perceive.

Nonetheless, there is no simple equation between the nerual process
per se and the seemings it generates. And , no, that does not mean
seemings are 'quantitative entitites'.

It doesn't matter, in this particular sentence, whether or not they are quantized, since you are assuming that neural processes "generate" "seemings". Neuroscience has yielded no good reason to believe that neural processes "generate" anything (except, of course, actions of the body (verbal reports, etc)).

 

[Tournesol]

Not "perception", "a perception". I assure you, the concept of individual perceptions (as though perceiving was a quantized process) is never used in any other field of study.

I am not at all convinced it is used in any field of study, let alone any other.
It looks like a straw-man on your part.

No I am not. It doesn't make the slightest difference to what I am
actually saying whether a perception is a process or a
"quantitative entity". (That's not
philosophical jargon?)

It makes all the difference. How can you refer to a comparison made between a horse (which is a singular, quantum entity) and "a perception of a horse", without assuming quantized perception?

I was actually comparing a veridical perception of a horse with a dream of
a horse. Are dreams and perceptions distinguishable ? Yes. Do we have to
take them to be irreducable building-blocks of the world to assert that ?
no.

Yep. We can have the prima-facie experience of a point of light without
knowing astrophysics, and our neural activity somehow tells us what is
goign on in our heads with another bunch of prima facie experience that
shomehow hides the neurological details of its implications. And
that might be explained neurologicaly too...but it never will be
unless we acccept that there are experiences, appearances and seemings
being produced; consciousness-denial will never explain it.

There don't need to be raw "seemings" or "appearances" to account for us simply being wrong about what we perceive.

There don't need to be to account for wrong reports, but my reports
don't just emerge from nowhere; they are reports of my experience.
Believe it or not, there is a middle way between the reified ("quantitative entity") seemings, which you don't like, and the consciousness-denial which you wrongly believe to be the only alternative.

Nonetheless, there is no simple equation between the nerual process
per se and the seemings it generates. And , no, that does not mean
seemings are 'quantitative entitites'.

It doesn't matter, in this particular sentence, whether or not they are quantized, since you are assuming that neural processes "generate" "seemings". Neuroscience has yielded no good reason to believe that neural processes "generate" anything (except, of course, actions of the body (verbal reports, etc)).

Consciousness-denying philosophers like Dennett make this sort of comment,
but you really have to look at what the neuroscientists themselves say:-

http://www.ini.unizh.ch/~kiper/Ramachandran_1997_qualia.pdf

 

[Mentat]

I am not at all convinced it is used in any field of study, let alone any other.
It looks like a straw-man on your part.

Then what the heck do you think a "quale" is? I've just finished responding to another post of yours, and my patience with your denial is wearing quite thin. I didn't study the history and current standing of PoM so rigorously just to be told "you're wrong" by somebody on the PFs. If I'm wrong, you need to prove it.

I was actually comparing a veridical perception of a horse with a dream of
a horse.

You. Are. Still. Quantizing.

Don't you see that that which we perceive (our "veridical perceptions of a horse") is an actual, physical, quantum entity? There is no "horseness" in the general surroundings, such that we cannot determine where the horse begins and ends in any meaningful way. Therefore, the horse is not a process, but a singular entity.

To compare a "hallucination of a horse" or a "dream of a horse" with an actual, veritable, perceived horse is to quantize the process of hallucinating (or dreaming) simply by virtue of the comparison with something that is, in fact, quantum.

There don't need to be to account for wrong reports, but my reports
don't just emerge from nowhere; they are reports of my experience.

And that is yet another report. If you believe that there is something more to your beliefs than that which you reported than you should explain why you witheld that additional information. If, OTOH, you believe there is something ineffable about your experience, than that is yet another belief that requires explanation.

Believe it or not, there is a middle way between the reified ("quantitative entity") seemings, which you don't like, and the consciousness-denial which you wrongly believe to be the only alternative.

If there is, then you should be able to make your statements without constantly leading right back to "quantitative seems", and you have yet to do so. I know you don't ever actually say that that's where your reasoning leads, by I have reasoned on all your statements and that is indeed where they lead.

Consciousness-denying philosophers like Dennett make this sort of comment,
but you really have to look at what the neuroscientists themselves say:-

http://www.ini.unizh.ch/~kiper/Ramachandran_1997_qualia.pdf

Unfortunately, my computer was unable to load that link. I tried twice. However, I have indeed read numerous studies on neuroscience that directly related to consciousness, and never invoked "mind-body", "quale", "subjective experience", or any other such thing. Gerald Edelman would probably be a good start (perhaps A Universe of Consciousness, or Bright Air, Brilliant Fire). Joseph LeDoux is also good (particularly Synaptic Self). William Calvin is a bit more advanced (which just means that I had more trouble understanding him than most of the other popular literature I've read on the topic), but The Cerebral Code is an excellent book on consciousness from a neurological perspective, if you're interested.

Neuroscience is conducted on a daily basis without reference to any of the extra terms that PoM has created. That some neuroscientists believe in the existence of such phenomena as PoM describes is quite irrelevant to the actual nature of the science, or the experiments and theories that it deals with.

 

[Fliption]

What else would it be?

You've debated with me before (for well over 10 pages, IIRC ).

Yes, it took me that long to figure out what you're all about. With that knowledge in hand, I am trying to shorten this useless semantic debate as if it has any meaning at all beyond language.

I see now, however, that you are indeed wrapped up in a lot of philosophical jargon, and just don't realize it (I was wondering for a while there). You are using "experience" in the same way as AKG (et al) have been using it (in the philosophical sense), rather than in the sense it takes in every other pursuit of man.

This is a philosophical forum, so it makes sense that we would use the definitions most appropriate for philosophy. There are many cases where a word will have different meanings across multiple disciplines. Just look in any dictionary and most words have multiple definitions. I'm not sure why you want to use such a fact as a reason to debate for 20 pages.

You are talking about "images" and the final results of collecting information, as though you would quantize the behaviors of the brain. Is it not a continual process of information-collection?

How does knowledge manifest itself in you? How do you "know" that a computer is in front of you now? Because you see it? What are you seeing? A computer. AKG is calling it an image and you are calling it a process. Who cares? What is your point if you are not assuming some other "meaning" that AKG has for the word "image"?

It's not about belief. He is using a term that has no meaning, in this context. My brain does not need images of the things I perceive in order to perceive them. His brain might, but then he'd have to answer the questions/problems I've already posed (such as what it is that beholds this new "image" within the mind, and whether that "eye" has a mind of its own, who (in turn) observes the image of the image, et cetera ad infinitum).

But this is what I'm trying to get at. Words don't have absolute meaning. Words have meaning if someone is using them. "You" cannot say it doesn't have meaning. If the word image does not have meaning then why would AKG be using it? AKG obviously uses it because he/she intends for that word to represent something. If it has no meaning to you then you won't use it but that doesn't equate to AKG.

Because I have yet to understand what you really mean by "experience", as though "experiencing" were some grand and vital process that transcends explication. I can't tell him he doesn't do "A" if I don't yet know a good definition of "A". I can, however, tell him that I've gotten along quite well without this thing that he believes he has (and believes that I have, though I should think I would know if I did), and so I see no need to invoke it in conversation.

I have given you a definition of experience in a post you didn't respond to. I said that for now just assume experience is the process of collecting information about the external world. AKG represents that information with the word "image" and you call it something else. So what is your point?

 

[Tournesol]

"In contrast to the views of philosopher Daniel Dennett, Edelman accepts the existence of qualia and incorporates them into his brain-based theory of mind."

http://members.tripod.com/~xtro1666/gerald_edelman.htm

 

[Fliption]

As info the title of the article is:

"Three Laws of qualia - What Neurology Tells us about the Biological functions of consciousness, qualia and the self"

I also think that claiming "science" doesn't do something simply because only a minority of scientists actually do it is nonsense and somewhat disingenuous to use in a discussion.

What's happening in this thread, for those who are particpating, is the same thing that I found myself mired in. Mentat's position is to deny the existence of all things that will give rise to philosophical problems of what is normally referred to as "physicalism". Therefore he will deny the existence of experiences, qualia, and subjectivity. His main argument has always been ( and does not seem to have changed one bit even though we are supposed to be talking about a new way of looking at things via Wittgenstein) that these things do not exist because no one can give him a definition of them that doesn't refer to other vague terms. I have stated numerous times that to get the definition that Mentat is looking for would require us to be able to reductively explain the term. This is exactly what the hard problem of consicousness is all about! If we could reductively explain consciousness then this whole discussion would just go away. So Mentat uses the hard problem of consciousness to deny the hard problem of consciousness. In other words, he uses the rules of physicalism to judge a criticism of physicalism. This approach is obviously flawed and most people will just ignore this viewpoint once they understand it.

I'm disappointed because I thought I was going to get another chance to understand this claim that the hard problem is all language. But so far this is just more of the same. To be honest, the quality of discussions in the philosophy forums here has gone up tremendously in the last few months. It's a shame we could get mired in this nonsense again. For good (and more legitimate) examples of people questioning the problems of consicousness, see posts from Loseyourname.

 

[Mentat]

Yes, it took me that long to figure out what you're all about. With that knowledge in hand, I am trying to shorten this useless semantic debate as if it has any meaning at all beyond language.

You are far from "figuring me out". I suggest reading Sextus Empiricus, for starters.

This is a philosophical forum, so it makes sense that we would use the definitions most appropriate for philosophy.

They are not appropriate for philosophy or anything else (at least, that is the position I'm defending...currently). That they are used in philosophy is another matter completely, which I have addressed in "Wrong Turns".

There are many cases where a word will have different meanings across multiple disciplines. Just look in any dictionary and most words have multiple definitions. I'm not sure why you want to use such a fact as a reason to debate for 20 pages.

You missed the point. This term only has special meaning in philosophy because of the history of the discipline (philosophy of mind), which has taken horribly bad turns ever since Descartes tried to establish incorrigibility.

How does knowledge manifest itself in you? How do you "know" that a computer is in front of you now? Because you see it? What are you seeing? A computer. AKG is calling it an image and you are calling it a process.

No, I'm calling it a computer...you are missing the point in the same manner as AKG.

But this is what I'm trying to get at. Words don't have absolute meaning. Words have meaning if someone is using them. "You" cannot say it doesn't have meaning. If the word image does not have meaning then why would AKG be using it?

Because AKG, is using a set of terms that have a long history in philosophy in spite of having no meaning in our actual experience at all (note: in this case, "experience" has its usual meaning: I've done it for a while, so I know what I'm doing).

BTW, "image" does have meaning, just not the one that AKG (and much of the PoM community) wants it to have.

I have given you a definition of experience in a post you didn't respond to. I said that for now just assume experience is the process of collecting information about the external world.

That's an arbitrary defining, and is quite distinct from the uses it typically has. Therefore you should defend the use of this term in this way.

AKG represents that information with the word "image" and you call it something else. So what is your point?

My point is that "image" makes it appear as though there is something more than the computer to observe. I am observing a computer. If there were an image of that computer, and I were observing that instead, then we would simply be begging the question of how I observe ITFP.