arildno said:
This seems to contain your so-called "argument".
Note that in as much as the two persons should have EXACTLY the same experiences, then they must be the same person.
Thus, your argument is as follows:
Suppose that two persons are the same individual.
Then it follows that the two persons are the same individual.
It is certainly a correct reasoning, I'll give you that much..
not exactly..the problem is in the definition of "person".
we take as postulates:
1) a person is nothing more than a collection of atoms in a particular configuration
2) the configuration of these atoms will be subject to change over time according to the laws of physics - and that this is allowed in the definition. for example, the atoms that make up a human's body are turned over several times within the average lifespan - yet the configuration is roughly the same, or at least follows a typical progression with age. at no point would we consider an organism at age 10 to no longer be the same organism at age 70.
so here is what i am getting at: twins (or a clone) represent the same starting configuration of atoms, but due to each separate twin being subject to different events, the configurations amongst the two will diverge - but will not diverge more so than what we would consider the "same person".
changes in their brain configuration, ala "personality", will be different but not more different than what may be considered with any other single person.
therefore, as individualistic and different as two twins may be, it is logical fallacy (if one accepts the definition of a "person" as strictly being atomic) to claim that they are not the same person - they are the same person whose current conditions have diverged from the same initial condition.
to not accept this would lead to the following: because the atoms that make up my body at age 32 are not the same as they were at age 10, then i am no longer the same person. to negate my argument would be to imply the previous sentence.