Why did Churchill refuse to discuss peace with Hitler in 1940?

[SW VandeCarr]

I would think the 'industrialization of western Siberia' would be intimately tied to the fall of Moscow. If this was a 'contingency plan', rather than part of Stalin's "X year plans" I would appreciate the link.

No. The industrialization of Siberia goes back at least to the 1928 Five Year Plan. The contingency plan for Moscow was apparently to destroy much of it before the Germans could take possession. The government was officially transferred to Kujbysev on Oct 16, 1941 but Stalin stayed behind to direct the city's defense (or destruction if necessary). Much of Soviet war production had already been relocated to western Siberian cities like Celjabinsk, Magnitogorsk, and Sverdlovsk. Tank production was heavily concentrated at Kirov, which is west of the Urals, but well east of Moscow You can look up Soviet arms production figures in the Wikipedia for the war years. They're pretty impressive.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wor...-to-destroy-Moscow-if-the-Nazis-moved-in.html.

 

[D H]

My question here regards the rationality of Churchill's position. He could have bought time by entering into discussions.

You make some good points. My point was that Churchill took a huge risk by not accepting Hitler's offer to at least talk.

In both of the above, you are ignoring politics and are ignoring the even huger risks that such discussions would have entailed.

Churchill was appointed Prime Minister precisely because he had been a long-time vocal opponent of Hitler. By May 10, 1940, it had become quite apparent that treaties with Germany were written in vanishing ink. Neville Chamberlain's appeasement had obviously failed. Insanity is "doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results." Negotiating a surrender (and that is essentially what you are talking about) with Germany would not have been rational. It would have been insane.

Suppose Churchill had gone against everything for which he stood and did entreat with Hitler. The primary beneficiary would have been Germany, not England. Germany had not yet broken its pact with the Soviet Union. Entreating with Germany would have given Germany time to rebuild from its attack on Europe. Germany would have been able to marshall the resources of a continent while England would have had the resources of a little island plus those from some severable connections in their (distant) fellow Commonwealth nations. Breaking that treaty with Germany would have been rather difficult in Great Britain without an attack from Germany. Germany had proven that they had no such restrictions. A treaty with Germany would have given Germany time to rebuild until they decided that time was ripe to break the treaty and attack Great Britain.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

In both of the above, you are ignoring politics and are ignoring the even huger risks that such discussions would have entailed.

Churchill was appointed Prime Minister precisely because he had been a long-time vocal opponent of Hitler. By May 10, 1940, it had become quite apparent that treaties with Germany were written in vanishing ink.

True. But Britain and Germany had already been at war since Sept 3, 1939 for precisely that reason and Britain was losing.

Suppose Churchill had gone against everything for which he stood and did entreat with Hitler. The primary beneficiary would have been Germany, not England. Germany had not yet broken its pact with the Soviet Union. Entreating with Germany would have given Germany time to rebuild from its attack on Europe. Germany would have been able to marshall the resources of a continent while England would have had the resources of a little island plus those from some severable connections in their (distant) fellow Commonwealth nations

There was nothing Britain could do in Europe anyway. Churchill took power on the day the invasion of the Low Countries began. The British Expeditionary Force had to retreat to the coast at Dunkirk where they managed to escape only because Gen von Rundstedt inexplicably halted his column for two days. After the fall of France Britain faced a very dire situation.

.

A treaty with Germany would have given Germany time to rebuild until they
decided that time was ripe to break the treaty and attack Great Britain.

I never mentioned a treaty. I've been talking about a truce only. North and South Korea operate under a truce. They are still technically at war and have been since 1950. My whole point is that a truce at this point in time would have been to Britain's advantage given that continuing hostilities would have only increased Britain's losses (as it in fact did). If you read all the prior posts you saw that in June, 1940 Britain had about 640 serviceable fighters. Germany had over 2200 fighters and bombers. Churchill, IMO risked the possible destruction of his nation at a time when it was the only viable opponent of Germany still standing. Hitler was about to make a big mistake by invading the Soviet Union. My whole argument is that this was bound to fail regardless of what Britain did. A glance at a map shows the insanity of this endeavor.

If you want to argue that Germany could have conquered (not merely defeated) the Soviet Union, then I would have to agree with you given that premise. But I don't accept that this was possible. Mere defeat is when a nation agrees to end hostilities on unfavorable terms. Conquest is tantamount to the destruction of a nation. I've argued that a truce need not have been unfavorable to Britain given the circumstances.

 

[Astronuc]

As far as an invasion of Britain goes, it couldn't have happened unless the RAF was destroyed; and if the RAF was destroyed, an invasion might not have been necessary. Hitler wanted to invade Russia, not Britain. In his mind, an Anglo-German alliance against the USSR was the goal; but Churchill was being irrational. If he made another peace offer after destroying the RAF, and Churchill refused, his government might have fallen, and new, more reasonable PM might have done a deal; or so Hitler thought.

This would seem to indicate that Hitler was being irrational, but nothing about Churchill. Churchill took a calculated risk.

Clearly, Chamberlain's approach of appeasement failed miserably.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appeasement

There was a 'state of war' between Britain and Germany as of 3 September 1939.

Declaration of war: Chamberlain's radio broadcast, 3 September 1939, 11am
I am speaking to you from the cabinet room at 10 Downing Street. This morning the British ambassador in Berlin handed the German government a final note stating that unless we heard from them by 11 o'clock that they were prepared at once to withdraw their troops from Poland, a state of war would exist between us. I have to tell you now that no such undertaking has been received, and that consequently this country is at war with Germany.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/06/second-world-war-declaration-chamberlain

See also - http://www.guardian.co.uk/theobserver/2009/sep/06/second-world-war

If Churchill (England) were to be 'talking' with Hitler, ostensibly they would have lost support from the US and other sources. Over what period of time would Churchill and Hitler 'talk' - weeks, months? Hilter's actions on the continent proved him untrustworthy.

One could argue that England would have time to arm, but then Germany would have time to maneuver as well.

Besides, Churchill had a rather dim view of Hitler.
http://www.archive.org/details/WinstonChurchill-onHitler

Furthermore, Roosevelt and Churchill had been corresponding since September 1939.

On September 11, 1939, just a few scant days after Hitler inaugurated the Second World War by unleashing the German Army in Poland, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt penned a brief but important message to Britain's First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. Roosevelt did not know it at the time, but his initiative would mark the beginning of one of the most extraordinary relationships in political history, a relationship marked by an intimate correspondence unparalleled among national leaders, a relationship which, in due course, would lead to the establishment of a military alliance unique among sovereign states.

FDR wrote to Churchill because he was looking for information about the War, and because he wished to establish contact with a British leader who appeared to be a likely candidate for Prime Minister, in the event that the current Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, should resign or be forced from office. FDR's intuition would prove correct. On May 10 1940, the very day on which the German Army finally launched its long anticipated attack on France and Low Countries following the six-month period known as the "phony war," Winston Churchill became Prime Minister of Great Britain.

From the start, the correspondence between the two men was marked by an easy and affable writing style that foreshadowed the friendship that was to come. In his very first letter, FDR noted their common experience in Naval matters, (FDR had served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy under U.S. President Woodrow Wilson during World War I), as well as their common interest in history. . . .

I can't imagine Churchill telling Roosevelt that Churchill would be in favor of talking with Hitler.

I can imagine that if Churchill had made such a comment to Roosevelt, Roosevelt's response would have been something on the order of "What?! Are you nuts!?".

This might be of interest for those wishing to understand Churchill.
Churchill and Roosevelt, the Complete Correspondence:
https://www.amazon.com/dp/0691056498/?tag=pfamazon01-20

Or drop into the FDR library.

Finally, Churchill was aware of developments on the continent via the intelligence services.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

This would seem to indicate that Hitler was being irrational, but nothing about Churchill. Churchill took a calculated risk.

I would argue that it was reflective of Churchill's combative personality and his blinding personal hatred of Hitler more than any calculation. The calculation would be have been to start talks between plenipotentiaries somewhere like Lisbon and get the "Jerries" off your back for a while. This was the man who failed to assess the risks of the Gallapoli fiasco in WWI. That ruined Churchill's career for quite some time.

I can't imagine Churchill telling Roosevelt that Churchill would be in favor of talking with Hitler.

I can. From Churchill's point of view, it might have been a good ploy to get the US into the war.

 

[mheslep]

There was nothing Britain could do in Europe anyway.
[...]
If you read all the prior posts you saw that in June, 1940 Britain had about 640 serviceable fighters. Germany had over 2200 fighters and bombers.

To make the argument that there was no down side to Churchill holding a few months of talks with Hitler you need to engage the two points above in more detail. As DH pointed out above, Hitler could also resupply himself and in 1940 likely could have increased the size of his airforce faster than could Britain hers. If Britain could increase to 1000 aircraft with another three months, perhaps Germany would have increased to 3500.

Likewise, giving Germany a breather after France would have allowed it a free hand elsewhere in Europe which was still far from locked up. What about Greece, in 1940 a non-occupied and possible allied invasion point? North Africa? Med. islands? European guerilla resistance? Talking with Hitler may have given Churchill a couple months, but it would also have given Hitler a free hand elsewhere.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

To make the argument that there was no down side to Churchill holding a few months of talks with Hitler you need to engage the two points above in more detail. As DH pointed out above, Hitler could also resupply himself and in 1940 likely could have increased the size of his airforce faster than could Britain hers. If Britain could increase to 1000 aircraft with another three months, perhaps Germany would have increased to 3500.

Likewise, giving Germany a breather after France would have allowed it a free hand elsewhere in Europe which was still far from locked up. What about Greece, in 1940 a non-occupied and possible allied invasion point? North Africa? Med. islands? European guerilla resistance? Talking with Hitler may have given Churchill a couple months, but it would also have given Hitler a free hand elsewhere.

Where did I say there was no downside? I said Britain had no real power or influence in Europe in June, 1940 and couldn't really hinder Germany's actions on the continent. My argument was, given the risk Churchill assumed looking prospectively, talking under a truce was more rational, provided the British kept their options open. A truce does not abrogate a state of war.

You mention Greece. When the time came (April, 1941), the Germans pushed the British out of mainland Greece and then took Crete with an airborne invasion. Perhaps if the British had been building forces instead of continuing to sustain losses, both civilian and military, it might have fared better in this situation. In any case, under a truce, the Germans and Italians would be not have been attacking the British in the Mediterranean, North Africa, or anywhere else.

 

[croghan27]

Maybe slightly off topic, but in June, 1941 (important as it is before Pearl Harbour, but after Barbarossa):

"...the Admiralty proposed to form a fleet consisting of 7 capital ships, 1 aircraft carrier, 10 cruisers and 24 destroyers, which was to assemble in the Indian Ocean and then proceed to Singapore. This proposal, however, could not be implemented before March, 1942, both on account of necessary refits and alterations to the ships allocated, and because the light craft required would not be available before then.

seems sort of counter-productive way to oppose Hitler on the European continent.

Churchill was certainly a member of the Join Planning Committee that made this decision. I do not think that when he made his "We will fight them on the beaches" speech anyone thought he meant those beyond Suez.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

Maybe slightly off topic, but in June, 1941 (important as it is before Pearl Harbour, but after Barbarossa): seems sort of counter-productive way to oppose Hitler on the European continent.

Churchill was certainly a member of the Join Planning Committee that made this decision. I do not think that when he made his "We will fight them on the beaches" speech anyone thought he meant those beyond Suez.

Britain was always strong in terms of its surface naval assets, so I'm not surprised the government would want to shore up its Far Eastern position. The Admiralty probably could afford to do it and keep sufficient assets in home waters and in the Mediterranean. By March of 1942 however, Singapore had fallen to the Japanese, so I'm not sure where this particular task force might have actually gone. Possibly it was involved in the seizure of Madagascar in May, 1942. That island had been under Vichy French control and might have been hospitable to the Axis powers.

 

[Astronuc]

In any case, under a truce, the Germans and Italians would be not have been attacking the British in the Mediterranean, North Africa, or anywhere else.

This is rather speculative. What about Hitler would convince one that he was trustworthy and reliable with regard to honoring a truce?

I think we need to digress to the Treaty of Versaille, and see what happened with Germany and Europe as a result, and what developed in Germany and Europe between 1919 and 1937/1939.

I would recommend David Andelman's A Shattered Peace: Versaille 1919 and The Price We Pay Today. http://www.ashatteredpeace.com/

I'm not sure how Churchill could have bargained or entreated in good faith while knowing full well that England would eventually confront the Third Reich. The German Empire certainly threated the British Empire.

 

[mheslep]

My argument was, given the risk Churchill assumed looking prospectively, talking under a truce was more rational,

How is it more rational? To decide that one has to look at the evidence both for and against negotiating with Hitler to gain more time. In favor you've cited Britain would have gained more time, which I doubt would have helped Britain as much as Germany. I've not see you engage any arguments against a Britain-German truce.

Regarding Greece, it is commonly held that Hitler's invasion delayed the German invasion of the Soviet Union, missing the nice weather window and contributing to the ultimate failure there.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

How I've not see you engage any arguments against a Britain-German truce.

Of course I have, over and over. Churchill risked the existence of his nation when it might have been avoided. We'll never know what Britain might have gotten or not gotten from Germany in truce talks. Germany was going to continue building its forces no matter what Britain did. We know that Hitler was anxious to turn eastward. As it was. some 40,000 civilians died in the Blitz. The RAF came within a hair of being wiped out. British cities were devastated, Coventry nearly obliterated. In the end, Britain survived. But it was unable to wage effective war against Germany by itself. It remained for the USSR and the US together with Britain to tip the scales. Do you think Britain alone could have defeated or even seriously set Hitler back? If not, why stick your chin out so your enemy can knock you down (if not, luckily, out).

Regarding Greece, it is commonly held that Hitler's invasion delayed the German invasion of the Soviet Union, missing the nice weather window and contributing to the ultimate failure there.

The reason for the invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece was the defection of Yugoslavia from Hitler's anti-Soviet alliance, not anything Britain did. Hitler was furious when King Carol refused to cooperate, so he and he sent his panzers in. While they were at it, they overran Greece including Crete. It's strange you would cite this as an example of British effectiveness against Germany. It's a clear demonstration of ineffectiveness

You've said that Germany's invasion if the USSR was not a good thing for Britain. It dramatically changed the entire character of the war. Explain why this was not ultimately to Britain's advantage. Do you really think Britain and its Commonwealth partners could have won the war by themselves?

My entire argument rests on the situation as it existed in June, 1940 when Hitler made the offer. Having won the Battle of Britain, there would have been little reason for Churchill to seek a truce despite the punishment Britain was taking. Besides, I'm sure Hitler took that option off the table once the bombs began to fall.

 

[mheslep]

[...] I've not see you engage any arguments against a Britain-German truce.

Of course I have, over and over.

Where? All of this below, for example:

Churchill risked the existence of his nation when it could have been avoided. As it was. some 40,000 civilians died in the Blitz. The RAF came within a hair of being wiped out. British cities were devastated, Coventry nearly obliterated. In the end, Britain survived. But it was unable to wage effective war against Germany by itself. It remained for the USSR and the US together with Britain to tip the scales.

Is more recap of arguments for a truce.

The reason for the invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece was the defection of Yugoslavia from Hitler's anti-Soviet alliance, not anything Britain did. Hitler was furious when King Carol refused to cooperate, so he and he sent his panzers in. While they were at it, they overran Greece including Crete. It's strange you would cite this as an example of British effectiveness against Germany. It's a clear demonstration of ineffectiveness

I didn't. I mentioned it as an example of how lost time in Greece cost Hitler a great deal.

Finally, you've said that Germany's invasion if the USSR was not a good thing for Britain

?? Not me. If you mean this

[...]Hitler gains more control of Europe, as you point out Hitler would have a free hand to attack the Soviets (a con, not a pro),

then I meant that had the German invasion of the USSR been allowed without other distraction, such as fighting Britain and Greece, then that would have been to the detriment of all the allies.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

Reread my previous post. I've made some edits. Germany was going to build its forces no matter what Britain did. Show me one example, up to June 22, 1941 where Britain seriously interfered with major German plans or actions in Europe, with the possible exception of the sinking of the Bismark off the French coast.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

This is rather speculative. What about Hitler would convince one that he was trustworthy and reliable with regard to honoring a truce?

I think Hitler would have honored agreements when he thought it to his advantage and violated them when he thought that that was to his advantage. Beside, any truce between Germany and Britain could have been more safely voided by Churchill once he had an ally in the USSR.

I'm not sure how Churchill could have bargained or entreated in good faith while knowing full well that England would eventually confront the Third Reich. The German Empire certainly threated the British Empire.

The German Empire (1871-1918) was WWI. The Third Reich was WWII. I'm sure you know that. I'm just a stickler for details.

A successful truce benefits both. It's broken when it no longer benefits at least one side. It was clear that Britain and the world would have to deal with the winner of the Soviet-German war. Choose your bloody tyrant. As it was, we got Stalin and his successors along with a 45 year Cold War. I've argued that it had to turn out this way and Hitler was bound to lose. I can't imagine the Germans marching to the Urals which are further from Moscow than Poland is.

 

[mheslep]

Reread my previous post. I've made some edits. Germany was going to build its forces no matter what Britain did.

You are missing my point. If Germany builds at a rate X greater than Britain's Y, then the longer Britain gives Germany to build without distraction the worse the problem becomes. At least this point argues against Britain engaging in a truce. Agreed?

 

[SW VandeCarr]

You are missing my point. If Germany builds at a rate X greater than Britain's Y, then the longer Britain gives Germany to build undistracted the worse the problem becomes. At least this point argues against Britain engaging in a truce. Agreed?

No. The downside for Britain might have been that they could no longer bomb or blockade Germany. That's the only way they might have interfered with war production. The fact is that British bombing and blockading of Germany did not interfere with war production in any significant way. In fact years later, in 1944 when the British and Americans were massively bombing Germany, German war production peaked. They produced the powerful new Tiger II tanks that would rip through the American lines in the Battle of the Bulge. They were producing the first jet fighters and a prototype jet bomber (called the New York) that was apparently capable of reaching New York and returning the Germany. Also there were the V1 buzz bombs and the fearsome V2 ballistic missile.

Like I said, we can never know what Britain might have gotten from a truce. We know that Hitler was intent on invading the USSR. As I stated in my response to Astronuc, once Britain had an ally as powerful as the USSR, I believe it would have been safer for Britain to void its truce with Germany than the other way around.

http://www.hmforces.co.uk/news/articles/1133-counting-the-cost-of-the-second-world-war

http://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=409

 

[mheslep]

No.

No what? Everything else was a irrelevant to the point about who benefits most from a truce.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

No what? Everything else was a irrelevant to the point about who benefits most from a truce.

How many times must I say it. Britain benefits from gaining a respite at a critical low point in its fortunes when it was particularly vulnerable.

Germany benefits(or at least Hitler so believed) from being able to turn its full attention to the destruction of the Soviet Union.

If you think Germany actually could have done that, then we fundamentally disagree. If you don't, the apparent benefits to both sides should be clear.

Again, this is in June, 1940 without the benefit of hindsight.

 

[mheslep]

How many times must I say it. Britain benefits from gaining a respite at a critical low point in its fortunes when it was particularly vulnerable.

Saying so by itself does not make a strong argument. 'Benefit' is a relative term; in the context of war it means gaining an advantage over the enemy. If I add one aircraft while the enemy gains two I have not gained an advantage. Certainly Britain could have built more aircraft and other material in Summer 1940. The point, is that Germany likely could have built many more in the same time period, and could have well used it coming off the low country campaigns. If this is the case, then Britain does not benefit by waiting.

Germany benefits(or at least Hitler so believed) from being able to turn its full attention to the destruction of the Soviet Union.

Germany need not have completely destroyed the Soviet Union's military and forced its capitulation gain a strategic advantage. Germany also could have so weakened and reduced the SU's ability to fight, as Churchill may have calculated, that later in the war it could it take many years to recover and never have engaged Germany on an Eastern front for many years.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

Saying so by itself does not make a strong argument. 'Benefit' is a relative term; in the context of war it means gaining an advantage over the enemy. If I add one aircraft while the enemy gains two I have not gained an advantage. Certainly Britain could have built more aircraft and other material in Summer 1940. The point, is that Germany likely could have built many more in the same time period, and could have well used it coming off the low country campaigns. If this is the case, then Britain does not benefit by waiting.

I don't understand your argument at all. How does a disparity in strength between Germany and Britain depend on whether a truce exists or not? What do you mean by waiting? Waiting for what? Britain didn't take the offensive in Europe until 1943 in combination with the US. Britain would not be prohibited from building forces and would be protected from further losses. It's true that the Luftwaffe suffered heavy losses attacking Britain, but that's hindsight. The question is, was it wise to invite an attack before the fact when you are outnumbered four to one in combat aircraft and have no major allies?

Germany need not have completely destroyed the Soviet Union's military and forced its capitulation gain a strategic advantage. Germany also could have so weakened and reduced the SU's ability to fight, as Churchill may have calculated, that later in the war it could it take many years to recover and never have engaged Germany on an Eastern front for many years.

Perhaps, but that's not the way it happened and Britain had virtually nothing to do with the SU's success or failure. In fact, Stalin's threats to make a separate peace with the Germans was in response to Churchill's opposition to a cross-channel invasion which was first promised for 1942.

 

[mheslep]

I don't understand your argument at all. How does a disparity in strength between Germany and Britain depend on whether a truce exists or not? What do you mean by waiting? Waiting for what? [...]

I'm referring to your initial thesis, the topic of the thread:

[...]My question here regards the rationality of Churchill's position. He could have bought time by entering into discussions[...]

The question is, was it wise to invite an attack before the fact when you are outnumbered four to one in combat aircraft and have no major allies?

If one calculates that in six months time you will be outnumbered five or six to one (because the enemy has more/better infrastructure), perhaps yes.

Perhaps, but that's not the way it happened and Britain had virtually nothing to do with the SU's success or failure.

I don't accept that Hitler's loss of ~1300 aircraft and associated pilots in the Battle of Britain had no impact on the subsequent invasion of the SU without more detail.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

I'm referring to your initial thesis, the topic of the thread:

What do mean initial thesis. Nothing has changed. It isn't a matter of waiting. It's a matter of risk management. Waiting implies leaving the initiative with the enemy. Your idea is that Churchill essentially invites Germany to attack when Hitler wants to talk. The initiative then lies with Hitler. Britain was in no position to attack Germany.

If one calculates that in six months time you will be outnumbered five or six to one (because the enemy has more/better infrastructure), perhaps yes.

I must admit, this is an interesting theory of risk management. In effect you're saying "I'm at a disadvantage now, so I will invite an attack (even though I might be able to avoid an attack) because I'd be at a worse disadvantage later." In other words, "I have no idea how to gain an advantage in this situation. I'll just leave it in Hitler's hands and hope for a miracle."

Britain, in June, 1940, needed two things: time to rebuild its forces and a way to gain a powerful ally (the USSR). Hitler offered a possibility for both because of his obsession with destroying (his own words) the Soviet Union.

I don't accept that Hitler's loss of ~1300 aircraft and associated pilots in the Battle of Britain had no impact on the subsequent invasion of the SU without more detail.

From June to October 1941 the Germans made spectacular gains against the USSR. There was nothing to indicate Germany had been weakened in any way. When the advance was finally halted, it was a combination of factors: the weather, long inefficient supply lines, increasingly effective Soviet resistance and falling German morale; all the things that plagued previous invaders like Napoleon.

 

[Count Iblis]

As I understand it, Hitler wanted to unite Eastern Prussia with the rest of Germany. When the negotiations on Danzig failed and he took control of Danzig using force, Britain and France declared war on Germany. Hitler was very surprised by that, he didn't think that Danzig would be worth starting a World War over.

So, it seems to me that Hitler's original intention was never to occupy Western Europe. It looks to me more like that Hitler wanted to get Eastern Europe under control with the West agreeing not to stand in his way.

 

[mheslep]

I must admit, this is an interesting theory of risk management. In effect you're saying "I'm at a disadvantage now, so I will invite an attack (even though I might be able to avoid an attack) because I'd be at a worse disadvantage later." In other words, "I have no idea how to gain an advantage in this situation. I'll just leave it in Hitler's hands and hope for a miracle."

Sure if you want to beg the question and build an argument around an irrational Churchill but that's not useful. More likely: "I'm at a strategic disadvantage in this situation. It is beyond question this enemy will attack me sooner or later. One of the few things I can influence is when I engage the enemy; I choose to do so when I judge he is weakest in material." Engage here doesn't mean invading the continent. Britain was indeed attacking Germany since 1939 at sea, meaning it contested sea lane supply routes to all of the areas not yet locked up by Germany - Greece, N. Africa, etc - and thus had leverage via the sea and other means over Germany's timing.

... it was a combination of factors: the weather, long inefficient supply lines, increasingly effective Soviet resistance[...]

You dismiss out of hand how, for example, 1300 additional aircraft might have possibly improved that situation?

 

[SW VandeCarr]

As I understand it, Hitler wanted to unite Eastern Prussia with the rest of Germany. When the negotiations on Danzig failed and he took control of Danzig using force, Britain and France declared war on Germany. Hitler was very surprised by that, he didn't think that Danzig would be worth starting a World War over.

So, it seems to me that Hitler's original intention was never to occupy Western Europe. It looks to me more like that Hitler wanted to get Eastern Europe under control with the West agreeing not to stand in his way.

Hitler's pre-war demands concerning Poland were Danziig (today Gdansk), and a strip of land across the Polish Corridor. However, the attack beginning on Sept 1, 1939 was on the entire nation of Poland. Poland was to be divided between the Soviet Union and Germany according to the secret provisions of the Soviet-German Pact dated August 23, 1939.

Hitler was a actually surprised and upset by the declarations of war of Britain and France on Sept 3. He feared an attack from the west while his troops were tied up in Poland, It should be noted that Poland had mobilized some 2 million troops, although they were not well equipped. Very soon, however, he was able to relax as his first blitzkrieg was going according to plan and there were no signs of an attack from the west.

It's true that Hitler was following the historic German tendency to "push to the east" which is probably one reason he was obsessed with eventually invading the Soviet Union. Once the western allies declared war, the Germans had to prepare for a war on that front. However the enthusiasm for the war on the Western Front was not high on either side; hence the "Phony War" or "Sitzkrieg" until May 10, 1940.

 

[croghan27]

Hitler was a actually surprised and upset by the declarations of war of Britain and France on Sept 3. He feared an attack from the west while his troops were tied up in Poland, It should be noted that Poland had mobilized some 2 million troops, although they were not well equipped. Very soon, however, he was able to relax as his first blitzkrieg was going according to plan and there were no signs of an attack from the west.

I wonder if that explains why the casualties suffered by the Wermacht invading Poland were substantially larger than those incurred occupying France the next year.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

I wonder if that explains why the casualties suffered by the Wermacht invading Poland were substantially larger than those incurred occupying France the next year.

Well, the Germans lost over 40,000 men killed (sources vary) in the overall offensive from May 10 to June 22 when France surrendered. However I haven't seen numbers for the second phase (Fall Rot) which began June 5 from the Somme River line and essentially ended with the peaceful occupation of Paris on June 14. Germany lost some 11-16,000 men killed in the Polish campaign. Do you have any specific figures on this second phase?

EDIT: Regarding the Polish campaign, I found this reference to a Polish raid into East Prussia on Sept 2, 1939

http://books.google.com/books?id=65-v0wkrWYEC&pg=PA83&dq=Polish+cavalry+raid+into+East+Prussia,+1939&hl=en&e=ZWbiS5PiH4OsswOkga26DQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CD0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Polish%20cavalry%20raid%20into%20East%20Prussia%2C%201939&f=false page 83

It wasn't much, but the Germans couldn't guarantee the security of their own soil in this otherwise asymmetrical war.

 

[croghan27]

Do you have any specific figures on this second phase?

I must admit that was an undocumented venture of a statement - my source was a (terrifically interesting) old Pole I had worked with in the 1980s. He had been in the Polish armed forces and fought the Germans until he turned around and fought the Soviets.

Evacuated to England he ended up in the middle east, Egypt. There the British realized he was a talented linguist and eventually he was in Italy acting as an interpreter/liaison to the Yugoslav partizan's.

After the war he migrated to the US where he went to work for Disney - becoming part of a team of illustrators that won an Academy Award. (He had a Madonna and Child made of coloured mirrors that, when struck by the sun, would take your breath away.)

Unfortunately his wife then contracted cancer and passed away - in the process he went bankrupt. Life destroyed, he moved to Canada saying, he would never again live in a country without a universal health care system.

His observation of the famous cavalry charges against panzer divisions was that while anachronistic, they still resulted in 50,000 German casualties.

(Actually there was never a charge against tank formations - but it made for a good and illustrative story.)

 

[SW VandeCarr]

His observation of the famous cavalry charges against panzer divisions was that while anachronistic, they still resulted in 50,000 German casualties.

(Actually there was never a charge against tank formations - but it made for a good and illustrative story.)

Yes. I understand the film was faked by the Germans. although I don't know why. It seems it's better propaganda to make your enemy look competent so you can look more competent in defeating him.

The 50,000 total killed and wounded seems about right (if not a bit low) considering up to 16,000 killed.