Why did Churchill refuse to discuss peace with Hitler in 1940?

[SW VandeCarr]

Saying so by itself does not make a strong argument. 'Benefit' is a relative term; in the context of war it means gaining an advantage over the enemy. If I add one aircraft while the enemy gains two I have not gained an advantage. Certainly Britain could have built more aircraft and other material in Summer 1940. The point, is that Germany likely could have built many more in the same time period, and could have well used it coming off the low country campaigns. If this is the case, then Britain does not benefit by waiting.

I don't understand your argument at all. How does a disparity in strength between Germany and Britain depend on whether a truce exists or not? What do you mean by waiting? Waiting for what? Britain didn't take the offensive in Europe until 1943 in combination with the US. Britain would not be prohibited from building forces and would be protected from further losses. It's true that the Luftwaffe suffered heavy losses attacking Britain, but that's hindsight. The question is, was it wise to invite an attack before the fact when you are outnumbered four to one in combat aircraft and have no major allies?

Germany need not have completely destroyed the Soviet Union's military and forced its capitulation gain a strategic advantage. Germany also could have so weakened and reduced the SU's ability to fight, as Churchill may have calculated, that later in the war it could it take many years to recover and never have engaged Germany on an Eastern front for many years.

Perhaps, but that's not the way it happened and Britain had virtually nothing to do with the SU's success or failure. In fact, Stalin's threats to make a separate peace with the Germans was in response to Churchill's opposition to a cross-channel invasion which was first promised for 1942.

 

[mheslep]

I don't understand your argument at all. How does a disparity in strength between Germany and Britain depend on whether a truce exists or not? What do you mean by waiting? Waiting for what? [...]

I'm referring to your initial thesis, the topic of the thread:

[...]My question here regards the rationality of Churchill's position. He could have bought time by entering into discussions[...]

The question is, was it wise to invite an attack before the fact when you are outnumbered four to one in combat aircraft and have no major allies?

If one calculates that in six months time you will be outnumbered five or six to one (because the enemy has more/better infrastructure), perhaps yes.

Perhaps, but that's not the way it happened and Britain had virtually nothing to do with the SU's success or failure.

I don't accept that Hitler's loss of ~1300 aircraft and associated pilots in the Battle of Britain had no impact on the subsequent invasion of the SU without more detail.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

I'm referring to your initial thesis, the topic of the thread:

What do mean initial thesis. Nothing has changed. It isn't a matter of waiting. It's a matter of risk management. Waiting implies leaving the initiative with the enemy. Your idea is that Churchill essentially invites Germany to attack when Hitler wants to talk. The initiative then lies with Hitler. Britain was in no position to attack Germany.

If one calculates that in six months time you will be outnumbered five or six to one (because the enemy has more/better infrastructure), perhaps yes.

I must admit, this is an interesting theory of risk management. In effect you're saying "I'm at a disadvantage now, so I will invite an attack (even though I might be able to avoid an attack) because I'd be at a worse disadvantage later." In other words, "I have no idea how to gain an advantage in this situation. I'll just leave it in Hitler's hands and hope for a miracle."

Britain, in June, 1940, needed two things: time to rebuild its forces and a way to gain a powerful ally (the USSR). Hitler offered a possibility for both because of his obsession with destroying (his own words) the Soviet Union.

I don't accept that Hitler's loss of ~1300 aircraft and associated pilots in the Battle of Britain had no impact on the subsequent invasion of the SU without more detail.

From June to October 1941 the Germans made spectacular gains against the USSR. There was nothing to indicate Germany had been weakened in any way. When the advance was finally halted, it was a combination of factors: the weather, long inefficient supply lines, increasingly effective Soviet resistance and falling German morale; all the things that plagued previous invaders like Napoleon.

 

[Count Iblis]

As I understand it, Hitler wanted to unite Eastern Prussia with the rest of Germany. When the negotiations on Danzig failed and he took control of Danzig using force, Britain and France declared war on Germany. Hitler was very surprised by that, he didn't think that Danzig would be worth starting a World War over.

So, it seems to me that Hitler's original intention was never to occupy Western Europe. It looks to me more like that Hitler wanted to get Eastern Europe under control with the West agreeing not to stand in his way.

 

[mheslep]

I must admit, this is an interesting theory of risk management. In effect you're saying "I'm at a disadvantage now, so I will invite an attack (even though I might be able to avoid an attack) because I'd be at a worse disadvantage later." In other words, "I have no idea how to gain an advantage in this situation. I'll just leave it in Hitler's hands and hope for a miracle."

Sure if you want to beg the question and build an argument around an irrational Churchill but that's not useful. More likely: "I'm at a strategic disadvantage in this situation. It is beyond question this enemy will attack me sooner or later. One of the few things I can influence is when I engage the enemy; I choose to do so when I judge he is weakest in material." Engage here doesn't mean invading the continent. Britain was indeed attacking Germany since 1939 at sea, meaning it contested sea lane supply routes to all of the areas not yet locked up by Germany - Greece, N. Africa, etc - and thus had leverage via the sea and other means over Germany's timing.

... it was a combination of factors: the weather, long inefficient supply lines, increasingly effective Soviet resistance[...]

You dismiss out of hand how, for example, 1300 additional aircraft might have possibly improved that situation?

 

[SW VandeCarr]

As I understand it, Hitler wanted to unite Eastern Prussia with the rest of Germany. When the negotiations on Danzig failed and he took control of Danzig using force, Britain and France declared war on Germany. Hitler was very surprised by that, he didn't think that Danzig would be worth starting a World War over.

So, it seems to me that Hitler's original intention was never to occupy Western Europe. It looks to me more like that Hitler wanted to get Eastern Europe under control with the West agreeing not to stand in his way.

Hitler's pre-war demands concerning Poland were Danziig (today Gdansk), and a strip of land across the Polish Corridor. However, the attack beginning on Sept 1, 1939 was on the entire nation of Poland. Poland was to be divided between the Soviet Union and Germany according to the secret provisions of the Soviet-German Pact dated August 23, 1939.

Hitler was a actually surprised and upset by the declarations of war of Britain and France on Sept 3. He feared an attack from the west while his troops were tied up in Poland, It should be noted that Poland had mobilized some 2 million troops, although they were not well equipped. Very soon, however, he was able to relax as his first blitzkrieg was going according to plan and there were no signs of an attack from the west.

It's true that Hitler was following the historic German tendency to "push to the east" which is probably one reason he was obsessed with eventually invading the Soviet Union. Once the western allies declared war, the Germans had to prepare for a war on that front. However the enthusiasm for the war on the Western Front was not high on either side; hence the "Phony War" or "Sitzkrieg" until May 10, 1940.

 

[croghan27]

Hitler was a actually surprised and upset by the declarations of war of Britain and France on Sept 3. He feared an attack from the west while his troops were tied up in Poland, It should be noted that Poland had mobilized some 2 million troops, although they were not well equipped. Very soon, however, he was able to relax as his first blitzkrieg was going according to plan and there were no signs of an attack from the west.

I wonder if that explains why the casualties suffered by the Wermacht invading Poland were substantially larger than those incurred occupying France the next year.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

I wonder if that explains why the casualties suffered by the Wermacht invading Poland were substantially larger than those incurred occupying France the next year.

Well, the Germans lost over 40,000 men killed (sources vary) in the overall offensive from May 10 to June 22 when France surrendered. However I haven't seen numbers for the second phase (Fall Rot) which began June 5 from the Somme River line and essentially ended with the peaceful occupation of Paris on June 14. Germany lost some 11-16,000 men killed in the Polish campaign. Do you have any specific figures on this second phase?

EDIT: Regarding the Polish campaign, I found this reference to a Polish raid into East Prussia on Sept 2, 1939

http://books.google.com/books?id=65-v0wkrWYEC&pg=PA83&dq=Polish+cavalry+raid+into+East+Prussia,+1939&hl=en&e=ZWbiS5PiH4OsswOkga26DQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CD0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Polish%20cavalry%20raid%20into%20East%20Prussia%2C%201939&f=false page 83

It wasn't much, but the Germans couldn't guarantee the security of their own soil in this otherwise asymmetrical war.

 

[croghan27]

Do you have any specific figures on this second phase?

I must admit that was an undocumented venture of a statement - my source was a (terrifically interesting) old Pole I had worked with in the 1980s. He had been in the Polish armed forces and fought the Germans until he turned around and fought the Soviets.

Evacuated to England he ended up in the middle east, Egypt. There the British realized he was a talented linguist and eventually he was in Italy acting as an interpreter/liaison to the Yugoslav partizan's.

After the war he migrated to the US where he went to work for Disney - becoming part of a team of illustrators that won an Academy Award. (He had a Madonna and Child made of coloured mirrors that, when struck by the sun, would take your breath away.)

Unfortunately his wife then contracted cancer and passed away - in the process he went bankrupt. Life destroyed, he moved to Canada saying, he would never again live in a country without a universal health care system.

His observation of the famous cavalry charges against panzer divisions was that while anachronistic, they still resulted in 50,000 German casualties.

(Actually there was never a charge against tank formations - but it made for a good and illustrative story.)

 

[SW VandeCarr]

His observation of the famous cavalry charges against panzer divisions was that while anachronistic, they still resulted in 50,000 German casualties.

(Actually there was never a charge against tank formations - but it made for a good and illustrative story.)

Yes. I understand the film was faked by the Germans. although I don't know why. It seems it's better propaganda to make your enemy look competent so you can look more competent in defeating him.

The 50,000 total killed and wounded seems about right (if not a bit low) considering up to 16,000 killed.