Art said:
Let's put things in context. The UNSC resolutions were passed originally on the basis that Iran refused to come clean on their past nuclear activities. A core part of the IAEA mandate is to clear up these open historical questions.
Perhaps you are thinking of a different Security Council resolution. I was referring to the resolutions that demanded a cessation of Iran's enrichment and heavy water programs. Neither of these programs have been addressed to anyone's satisfaction and no timetable for it’s resolution has been agreed to by either Iran or el-Baradei. It is a current, not a past, activity.
Security Council Resolution 1696 demanded the immediate cessation of enrichment activities and heavy water development by August 31, 2007 (sponsored by France, Germany and UK). Iran failed to abide.
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm
Security Council Resolution 1737 enacted sanctions for Iran’s failure to halt enrichment and heavy water projects (sponsored by France, Germany and UK). Iran failed to abide.
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm
Security Council Resolution 1747 reaffirmed the two previous resolutions (1696 and 1737) after Iran had failed to abide.
Also, the various IAEA Board of Governors resolutions such as GOV/2006/14 (
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf) which details Iran’s 1) failure to halt its enrichment program, 2) failure to ratify the Additional Protocol of the NPT, 3) to provide for inspection an Agency-sealed document regarding the manufacture of uranium metal hemispheres, to 4) halt work on heavy water projects, 5) to implement transparency measures to provide inspectors access to individuals and records related to equipment procurement, dual use technologies and military equipment workshops.
El-Baradei’s report outlines some successes such as the questions related to reprocessing and the granting of visas to 219 inspectors (only 13 are multiple entry type visas, however). He also reports resolution on other minor points related to explanations of enriched uranium contamination at several locations and that the inventory of declared nuclear inventory is accurate.
In el-Baradei’s most recent report, only one sentence of his summary deals with Iran’s resolution of outstanding matters. The rest is either negative or hopelessly hopeful…
G. Summary
22. The Agency is able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has been providing the Agency with access to declared nuclear material, and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and facilities. However, the Agency remains unable to verify certain aspects relevant to the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. It should be noted that since early 2006, the Agency has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing, including pursuant to the Additional Protocol, for example information relevant to ongoing advanced centrifuge research.
23. The work plan is a significant step forward. If Iran finally addresses the long outstanding verification issues, the Agency should be in a position to reconstruct the history of Iran’s nuclear programme. Naturally, the key to successful implementation of the agreed work plan is Iran’s full and active cooperation with the Agency, and its provision to the Agency of all relevant information and access to all relevant documentation and individuals to enable the gency to resolve all outstanding issues. To this end, the Agency considers it essential that Iran adheres to the time line defined therein and implements all the necessary safeguards and transparency measures, including the measures provided for in the Additional Protocol.
24. Once Iran’s past nuclear programme has been clarified, Iran would need to continue to build confidence about the scope and nature of its present and future nuclear programme. Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme requires that the Agency be able to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material, but, equally important, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, through the implementation of the Additional Protocol. The Director General therefore again urges Iran to ratify and bring into force the Additional Protocol at the earliest possible date, as requested by the Board of Governors and the Security Council.
25. Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities, having continued with the operation of PFEP, and with the construction and operation of FEP. Iran is also continuing with its construction of the IR-40 reactor and operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant.
26. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
The bolded items were the only positive statements I could find.
That Iran shall shortly be in full compliance with the requirements of the NPT is very good news which is how the other world powers see it. It is especially good news for Israel who should feel very happy knowing Iran, unlike them, does not have a clandestine nuclear weapons program.
If only this were not complete fantasy, alas. Where did you hear this news?
With the historical questions settled the major outstanding issue now is the UNSC demand that Iran stop processing uranium but seeing as how the reason for that demand was Iran's secrecy about it's past activities and that has now been largely resolved and will likely be fully resolved by the end of the year it will be difficult to justify a war based on Iran's non-compliance with the UNSC which is what has the neo-cons in the US and ironically Israel frothing at the mouth at this time.
WTF? What
fantasy is this? (I want some too…)
If Iran did want to do serious damage to Israel or anybody else for that matter would it make sense for them to go the nuclear route? I very much doubt it when there are other equally devastating weapons that can be developed far faster and several orders of magnitude cheaper such as fuel air bombs - the 'poor man's nuclear bomb' as used by the US during the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan and by the Russians in Chechnya to devastating effect.
I doubt that Iran could successfully deploy a FAB in a hostile environment even if they had it. In your examples, two superpowers that had complete control of the sky used them. Why attack from the air when you can use car bombs and proxy militant groups at will?