Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?

[Fliption]

innovation, building a more advanced social structure than any other animal on the planet...
the ability to express ourself in more depth than any other animal, and the ability to reason oneself out of an instinctive reaction... not usefull at all
yes, a robot could do that... because we would have programmed it.

All these things are the result of brain processes. None of which are attributed to consciousness.

you tell me why consciousness is indicative of "something else" because it isn't necessary, if it is not the same case with the appendix...

I'm saying it has no evolutive purpose and never has had one. Unlike the appendix.

 

[Fliption]

i'm not confusing anything... what comes with this knowledge is the ability to know you're having these feelings, and not act on them... the ability to analyze and take advantage of those feelings and thoughts...
that is tremendously helpfull in a society.

I understand what you're saying but I don't think you quite see where I'm drawing the semantic lines yet. One more time...everything you have mentioned above, analyzing feelings and acting upon it are all brain processes. None of these processes are attributed to consciousness.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I'm saying it has no evolutive purpose and never has had one. Unlike the appendix.

The thing is, even if the self-aware aspect can be shown to be attractive to natural selection, we are still left with the question of how a nervous system can produce it. What materials did nature have to work with according to physicalist theory? We have nerves for conduction of information and interconnectivity, we have complexity, and we have electro-chemical energy. From those materials we can see how an environmentally sensitive system could have been established in biology, and given what we know today about computers, we also can see how computing ability and memory might develop. So sensitivity, computing ability, and memory are covered.

Those most certain consciousness is purely neurological are encouraged by developments in AI. Some believe when the right algorithms are combined with sensitivity, computing ability and memory, it will eventually result in the self-aware aspect of consciousness. Actually, they think complexity is the key, and guess what? They can’t get a computer to stop acting like a computer. If the proper level of complexity is what’s needed, then shouldn’t the best AI programs already be showing some sort of self awareness? Even snails seem to have the self-aware aspect (as primitive as it is) because one can observe them asserting their will. Surely AI is currently able to produce a program as complex as snail awareness, and therefore demonstrate a computer with will. Put it on wheels, give it a system for initiating self-propulsion, and then show us a willful computer equaling, say, the willfulness of a snail. That is a very simple test of the physicalist theory of consciousness.

So far, it ain’t happening primarily because of one wrench stuck in the works: repetitiveness. It’s not the presence of repetitiveness that’s the problem (yes, living and conscious processes are full of repetitiveness); the problem is the inability of non-living physical operations to escape repetitiveness, which the physical processes associated with life, and functions associated with consciousness both do with ease (e.g., as manifested respectively in evolution and will). That computer on wheels above, for instance, might move around, but it will only “repeat” its programming, and will never escape it (and random variation programmed in isn’t “will”).

Thus physicalist theories for origin of life and consciousness share a common nemesis (mechanistic repetitiveness). So at least one physicalist skeptic asks for a small but very specific bit of evidence before expressing faith in physicalism. When asked for such evidence, all we hear is what physicalness can do, while the evidence being requested is what matter CAN’T be shown to do. The evidence isn’t to show that matter can self-organize itself for a few steps or be coaxed (by conscious chemists) to combine into highly complex molecules. The test isn’t to show that a computer can “think.” The two tests are: 1) demonstrate the potential of chemistry to progressively self-organize on its own (no, not into life, just show the ability to perpetually organize in harmony with the environment), and 2) demonstrate that any sort of physical construction can exhibit will. Very modest requests if you ask me.

 

[Fliption]

After reading the strength of my last post, I should probably clarify a bit. I'm not reallly saying that consciousness has no purpose. I suspect it does play a role in the scheme of things. What I'm saying is that in a strictly physical explanation of things, consciousness would have no known purpose or usefulness. And we can never know whatever usefulness it may truly have under such assumptions because there are so many philosophical issues associated with consicousness in a physical world. This is why I've suggested that anyone who claims that consciousness has definite advantages in evolution are making statements that would solve some of the oldest philosophical issues on this topic.

 

[loseyourname]

But what I have been saying is that there are no advantages of being conscious so this point doesn't mean much to me.

Fliption, you can't be serious. What are you capable of accomplishing, as a human, when you are unconscious? How long do you think you would last as a sleepwalker?

 

[Fliption]

Fliption, you can't be serious. What are you capable of accomplishing, as a human, when you are unconscious? How long do you think you would last as a sleepwalker?

I don't think you are understanding the issue you are raising.

Are you saying that my brain processes are not altered when I am unconscious? Is it not a fact that the altered brain processes are the reason I wouldn't be able to function? If my brain began to function as it would when I was conscious then I could function perfectly well, I just wouldn't know I was doing it. Of course this never happens because whenever my brain functions this way I just happen to be aware of it. This tells us that the two are closely connected somehow. Yet you know nothing about this connection of awareness to any of the physical processes that you are attributing so much usefulness to. This connection without an explanation is why it's called the hard problem. If you can make this connection you can end centuries of debate.

What you have just done is equate my consciousness to all the brain process differences between a sleeping and a conscious person. This is a physicalist theory with very little to stand on. How could anyone argue for solipsism when all we have to do is argue that if they didn't have consciousness then they would just go to sleep?

 

[balkan]

I understand what you're saying but I don't think you quite see where I'm drawing the semantic lines yet. One more time...everything you have mentioned above, analyzing feelings and acting upon it are all brain processes. None of these processes are attributed to consciousness.

well, indirectly they definitely are (at least according to the definition you wrote earlier)... cause you would necessarily have to be aware of your feelings in order to analyze them.

 

[balkan]

1) Those most certain consciousness is purely neurological are encouraged by developments in AI. Some believe when the right algorithms are combined with sensitivity, computing ability and memory, it will eventually result in the self-aware aspect of consciousness. Actually, they think complexity is the key, and guess what? They can’t get a computer to stop acting like a computer. If the proper level of complexity is what’s needed, then shouldn’t the best AI programs already be showing some sort of self awareness? Even snails seem to have the self-aware aspect (as primitive as it is) because one can observe them asserting their will. Surely AI is currently able to produce a program as complex as snail awareness, and therefore demonstrate a computer with will. Put it on wheels, give it a system for initiating self-propulsion, and then show us a willful computer equaling, say, the willfulness of a snail. That is a very simple test of the physicalist theory of consciousness.

2) So far, it ain’t happening primarily because of one wrench stuck in the works: repetitiveness. It’s not the presence of repetitiveness that’s the problem (yes, living and conscious processes are full of repetitiveness); the problem is the inability of non-living physical operations to escape repetitiveness, which the physical processes associated with life, and functions associated with consciousness both do with ease (e.g., as manifested respectively in evolution and will). That computer on wheels above, for instance, might move around, but it will only “repeat” its programming, and will never escape it (and random variation programmed in isn’t “will”).

3) Thus physicalist theories for origin of life and consciousness share a common nemesis (mechanistic repetitiveness). So at least one physicalist skeptic asks for a small but very specific bit of evidence before expressing faith in physicalism. When asked for such evidence, all we hear is what physicalness can do, while the evidence being requested is what matter CAN’T be shown to do. The evidence isn’t to show that matter can self-organize itself for a few steps or be coaxed (by conscious chemists) to combine into highly complex molecules. The test isn’t to show that a computer can “think.” The two tests are: 1) demonstrate the potential of chemistry to progressively self-organize on its own (no, not into life, just show the ability to perpetually organize in harmony with the environment), and 2) demonstrate that any sort of physical construction can exhibit will. Very modest requests if you ask me.

1) no... they aren't even at cockroach yet. or ant for that matter, i believe. but they are slowly progressing towards insectlike intelligence... comupter brains today are still incredibly linear compared even to that of a snail.
and exactly what selfawareness does a snail have, if you don't mind me asking?

2) well... that's where things like quantum mechanics come in handy... it's a neat way of escaping repetitiveness, but unfortunately, that can't yet be simulated on a computer.

3) yes... very modest... especially the "any physical construction can exhibit will" part... i like that... it's not like it took evolution a million years to do it, no... that's just a bad excuse for us not stepping right up and showing it...
one step at a time...

more about the "consciousness" not being neccessary...
evolution isn't choosing... it's random... how many times do i have to say this? is it hard to comprehend or what?
if you go to a club with a 50$ entrance fee, but you have crooked teath and are wearing leather pants, you won't get in or what? of course you will... and you'll have crooked teeth and be wearing leather pants on when you do...

if our mind was enough for us to survive, what the hell does it matter that we got more than necessary? i really don't get it...
and how can you honestly say that you can analyze your emotions without being aware of them?

 

[loseyourname]

I don't think you are understanding the issue you are raising.

Are you saying that my brain processes are not altered when I am unconscious? Is it not a fact that the altered brain processes are the reason I wouldn't be able to function? If my brain began to function as it would when I was conscious then I could function perfectly well, I just wouldn't know I was doing it. Of course this never happens because whenever my brain functions this way I just happen to be aware of it. This tells us that the two are closely connected somehow. Yet you know nothing about this connection of awareness to any of the physical processes that you are attributing so much usefulness to. This connection without an explanation is why it's called the hard problem. If you can make this connection you can end centuries of debate.

What you have just done is equate my consciousness to all the brain process differences between a sleeping and a conscious person. This is a physicalist theory with very little to stand on. How could anyone argue for solipsism when all we have to do is argue that if they didn't have consciousness then they would just go to sleep?

Who said anything about going to sleep? I said an unconscious human. Sleeping humans are still conscious of their dreams, at least in part.

Again, you are iterating what a hypothetical brain could do if it were capable of performing all of the normal human functions without consciousness. That is not the brain we have. The brain we have benefits from consciousness. You're still making an argument analagous to "Penguins could have fins that perform all of the functions that their wings do, and so wings are of no benefit to them." Surely you can see the fallacy here.

 

[Fliption]

well, indirectly they definitely are (at least according to the definition you wrote earlier)... cause you would necessarily have to be aware of your feelings in order to analyze them.

The process of identifying and analyzing anything is done by brain processes, none of which are attributed to consciousness.

 

[loseyourname]

Identifying and analyzing cannot be put to productive use until we become conscious of the analysis and identity.

 

[Fliption]

Who said anything about going to sleep? I said an unconscious human. Sleeping humans are still conscious of their dreams, at least in part.

You asked me if I could function when I was unconscious. The only time I am usually considered unconsiousness is when I am asleep. So how else was I to answer your question? And you also specifically mentioned sleepwalking.

Again, you are iterating what a hypothetical brain could do if it were capable of performing all of the normal human functions without consciousness. That is not the brain we have. The brain we have benefits from consciousness.

You definitely aren't seeing the point I'm making or the cans of worms you're opening. I am not creating a hypothetical brain. What I am trying to point out is that we have a feature that is not addressed by any physical process of the brain. Yet, all the behavior that is being referenced as "useful" can be mapped to a brain process. You are only making an assumption that consciousness is useful because that is the way it seems to be working to you subjectively. How else could you possibly know this?

You're still making an argument analagous to "Penguins could have fins that perform all of the functions that their wings do, and so wings are of no benefit to them." Surely you can see the fallacy here.

Yes I can easily see the fallacy here. But this is not what I am doing. I have already responded to this comment by saying that this only works if consciousness is useful to begin with! Wings are useful regardless of whatever else one might have evolved to replace wings with. But you haven't given any examples of how consciousness is useful. To do this, you will need to point to an activity that cannot be fully explained by some other process that has nothing to do with consciousness. Everything that has been listed here can be completely explained by physical processes of the brain that are not attributable to consciousness.

 

[Fliption]

Identifying and analyzing cannot be put to productive use until we become conscious of the analysis and identity.

Lol, or so it seems to you. Where is the scientific evidence?

So in a scientific description of the process of Identifying, analyzing and then putting into productive use, you're saying that there is a mystery process in there into which we can plug conscious activity? I still contend that all of this activity is the result of known brain processes, none of which are attributable to consciousness.

 

[balkan]

The process of identifying and analyzing anything is done by brain processes, none of which are attributed to consciousness.

once again: how can you honestly say that you can analyze your emotions without being aware of them?

 

[Fliption]

once again: how can you honestly say that you can analyze your emotions without being aware of them?

Because the process of anlyzing emotions can be attributed to brain processes that have nothing to do with consciousness. You only think it does because it seems that way to you subjectively. I feel like a broken record.

It is stated so boldly here yet there is no scientific evidence of such a thing.

 

[balkan]

Because the process of anlyzing emotions can be attributed to brain processes that have nothing to do with consciousness. You only think it does because it seems that way to you subjectively. I feel like a broken record.

It is stated so boldly here yet there is no scientific evidence of such a thing.

yes, you do sound like a broken record... you only focus on specific things, and avoid the rest like the plague to avoid having to answer them... you have done this from the beginning...
and look who's talking about scientific evidence... do you have evidence, that you can consciously analyze your emotions and thoughts without being aware of them? i'd really like to see that.

the analysis itself is not necessarily a conscious process, but if you weren't conscious of your feelings, you would simply react... this isn't hard to understand.
you have to be aware about your thoughts as well in order to analyze them... otherwise you would have to do trial and error until you got something right.
you would have to be aware of a thought in order to realize that it demands analysis...

 

[Fliption]

who's talking about scientific evidence... do you have evidence, that you can consciously analyze your emotions and thoughts without being aware of them? i'd really like to see that.

So now you're suggesting that a computer cannot, in principle, accomplish these acts without being aware? Even loseyourname concedes that there may be other ways to accomplsih these things but consciousnesss is just the way we happen to do it.

the analysis itself is not necessarily a conscious process, but if you weren't conscious of your feelings, you would simply react... this isn't hard to understand.

It isn't? Show me where I can find that in a science book that actually refers to consciousness as it is defined in this discussion. You are just saying what seems like common sense to you. But this isn't good enough to base science on as I'm sure you know.

you have to be aware about your thoughts as well in order to analyze them... otherwise you would have to do trial and error until you got something right.
you would have to be aware of a thought in order to realize that it demands analysis...

LOL Put needle on record... say it again... Naaa I'm tried of saying it because I'm either not saying it effectively enough or no one really cares to understand it. I think I've learned through this whole process to appreciate the time it takes to understand these concepts. I've been studying this stuff in some form or another for some time now and I think it's gotten into my brain through some process of osmosis, apparently, because it doesn't seem to be obvious to people who haven't been exposed to it long.

I have repeated the same comment because it is a comment that is so key to understanding the philosophical issues that are so carelessly being swept aside here. I may have focused only on specific things but I have not avoided anything that was relevant. I actually understand exactly what you are saying because I would have said the same thing...before I understood the issues. I hate to say it that way but it's honestly true.

 

[balkan]

lol... you're amazing...
you all the time base everything on thought experiments, lack of scientific evidence and the insufficiensy of science to explain something, but when confronted with an argument, you want it based on scientific evidence...

and you can't compare a computer in any way with anything living that has a brain... it's programmed in premade steps... no i don't think a computer can consciously react on an emotion... 1st of all, it doesn't have any, 2nd, it would be a programmed reaction (no quantum uncertainty involved anywhere). 3rdly, if it should analyze feelings and thoughts it would have to discover them first, which means that it would have an idea that they existed.

i would like you to define consciousness once again... cause last time, you defined it as being aware of your thoughts and feelings...
well, for the last time, tell me how you can analyse a thought or a feeling without being aware that its there... how would you set your thought processes in motion? how would you prioritize and how would you get the idea that this particular thought or emotion should be analysed?
and i would especially like to see some scientific evidence for what you have to say.

and avoid posting another question back about a computer please...

 

[Philocrat]

Modes of Consciousness

In the 'Book of nature' Consciousness is classed under a set of things called 'Unnecessary necessities' and the causal and relational laws which govern it are classed under the same set of things.

It seems that no one takes any notice of my classification of consciounes into three fundamental mods; (1) Inquisitive, (2) Acquisitive and (3) Precautionary. For those who claim that consciousness is an unnecessary or irrelevant sustaining device in the intelligible being of the human, but they still haven't explained why consciousness became or becomes part of the current human form. How can it be useless if it's part of the human nature? Now I am suggesting that not only is consciousness important and neceassry but also that it is divided into three fundamentally useful parts.

Ok, some of you seem to also argue that things get dumped or thrown away on the evelutionary pathways even when we see and find them to be very usefully and necessary. But how can evolution dump things that are constantly but quantifiably progressive? It would mean that the entire creative processes are pointless and mindless ventures? That everything is mindlessly going around in a circle? Either we say that CIRCULARISM is perfection itself or alternatively that given any creative process in spcacetime, things, or at least some things, resulting from this process ought to be able to physically progress to a perfect state? So which one is viable now: circularism or progressive existence?

Well, my own suggestion is that:

1) We should treat consciousness as purposive, regardless of if this is originally or subsequently realized.

2) We should classify it into three purposive parts as listed above and treat some parts as ephemerally relevant or necessary and the rest as originally and permanently necessary.

The question now is which of these three modes of consciousness is ephemerally necessary and which one is permanently or eternally necessary? Or simply which mode of consciousness will outlast the rest or survive destruction, given that it may be possible for human beings or a human being to survive physical destruction in the first place?

What do you guys think? My bet is on 'Acquisitive Mode of Consciousness', given that human beings are capable of physically progressing on their mutational pathways in the first place.

 

[Fliption]

lol... you're amazing...
you all the time base everything on thought experiments, lack of scientific evidence and the insufficiensy of science to explain something, but when confronted with an argument, you want it based on scientific evidence...

You say these things because you do not understand what my position is. I am not claiming the truth of anything! Based on scientific evidence or not. It is you and loseyourname who are demanding that things work a certain way(with NO scientific evidence). I have actually clarified in a previous post that I do believe that consciousness is serving a useful function. But what I've been trying to illustrate is that when you claim that consciousness is useful to a "physical" theory, you are introducing and forcing yourself to confront the hard problem of consciousness. You cannot make such statements without solving this problem first.

and you can't compare a computer in any way with anything living that has a brain... it's programmed in premade steps... no i don't think a computer can consciously react on an emotion... 1st of all, it doesn't have any, 2nd, it would be a programmed reaction (no quantum uncertainty involved anywhere). 3rdly, if it should analyze feelings and thoughts it would have to discover them first, which means that it would have an idea that they existed.

Yes I understand that these things cannot be done in practice. But I said in principle. Are you suggesting that quantum computers cannot ever be created? Are you claiming that artificial intelligence is just a dream? If you are, then you'll be lining up against a lot of physicalists/scientists. The odd thing is that you keep arguing that there is "nothing more" but yet you claim that we cannot duplicate the very same physical processes going on in the brain with a computer. It just doesn't make sense to me

i would like you to define consciousness once again... cause last time, you defined it as being aware of your thoughts and feelings...

There is absolutely no known reason, in princple, why all of the physical processes of the brain cannot be performed and the resulting entity not be conscious. So if we actually did this, the only difference between the conscious and non-conscious beings is that the conscious being "knows" he is performing the physical processes. From a 3rd party perspective, you cannot tell the difference between these two beings. It is the feature of "knowing" that I am referring to.

well, for the last time, tell me how you can analyse a thought or a feeling without being aware that its there... how would you set your thought processes in motion? how would you prioritize and how would you get the idea that this particular thought or emotion should be analysed?
and i would especially like to see some scientific evidence for what you have to say.

I just do not know how to say this any other way. All the activities you have mentioned above are directly related to physical processes in the brain. None of these physical processes can be attributable to consciouness. These are just the facts. You assume they are connected because it seems that way to you. Don't worry it seems that way to me too. I'm just telling you that this "seeming" is the only evidence we have and it is completely subjective.

You are under the impression through common sense that you consciously do these things that you mentioned above, but there is no connection scientifically between the two. This is why there is so much discussion about a "hard problem". How can two things that seem so connected have no connection when we look at it from a purely physical, reductionsist view? This is all part of the hard problem. Again, I'm not telling you that consciousness serves no purpose. I'm telling you that the hard problem prevents us from knowing any such fact. To suggest that you can map a specific physical process in the brain to the feature I called "knowing" is to suggest a MAJOR find of outlandish proportions.

 

[Fliption]

For those who claim that consciousness is an unnecessary or irrelevant sustaining device in the intelligible being of the human, but they still haven't explained why consciousness became or becomes part of the current human form. How can it be useless if it's part of the human nature?

I don't disagree in the end. I've tried to clarify my position by saying that consciousness cannot be useful in a purely physical theory. To insist that it is so and then have no way to show the connection is what introduces the hard problem. The hard problem goes away with many of the suggestions from the likes of Chalmers, who suggest introducing consciousness as a fundamental property of nature, as opposed to an emerging property of physical processes. The latter view is what causes all the problems.

But it's seems obvious to everyone that it is a property that does exists so therefore probably exists for a good reason. Which is why there is all the effort to explain it.

My only point is that we cannot claim there is a connection (that consciousness is useful) without dealing with the issues that stand in the way of us knowing such things.

 

[Philocrat]

Computers (within the AI Principle and consciousness argument) are already capable of 98% of what the humans are capable of. The other 2% is only a matter of further science. If anyone of you understand computers to programming level, you should know that the only thing that is left to be programmed into computers is 'Introspective self-awareness'. Well, my own investigation into this suggests that computers lack introspective self-awareness because of the 'Instruction Set limitations' in programs and programming languages. According to the 'INTRUCTION SET THEORY', all instructions in every program are fixed. Introspective self-awareness is possible only if you make instruction set in programs (especially in programming languages) fully dynamic. This will also enable us to answer the questions:

1) Can a Machine Think?

2) Can a Machine have Consciousness?

On the question as to whether biological form of intelligence could be rendered redundant, I would answer yes to this but with substantial clauses attached to it, of course. And one of such clauses is that we treat biological form of intelligence not only as inconclusive but aslo as actually physically improveable!

 

[Philocrat]

I don't disagree in the end. I've tried to clarify my position by saying that consciousness cannot be useful in a purely physical theory. To insist that it is so and then have no way to show the connection is what introduces the hard problem. The hard problem goes away with many of the suggestions from the likes of Chalmers, who suggest introducing consciousness as a fundamental property of nature, as opposed to an emerging property of physical processes. The latter view is what causes all the problems.

But it's seems obvious to everyone that it is a property that does exists so therefore probably exists for a good reason. Which is why there is all the effort to explain it.

My only point is that we cannot claim there is a connection (that consciousness is useful) without dealing with the issues that stand in the way of us knowing such things.

I am as puzzled as everyone else about the whole idea of there being a hard problem in the first place. Curse me under your breath if you like. My own private investigation into the whole 'hard problem' episode suggests to me (perhaps naively) that there is none. Although this process is substantially still primitive in structure and in scope, subjective experience is almost wholly public, that is, objective. To say that it is causally and relationally exclusive to the beholder and inexplicable to the outside world, or to even a bystander is absurd.

Or even if we wanted to take alterantive route and claim that consciousness or aspect of it is over and above the physical, we still haven't answered the questions as to its fundamental relevance to the overall human existence. For example could we do without it and what is its place in the end state of things or of the causal scheme of man? Supposing zombies and mary could survive purely within the physical without any emergent properties of any special kind to interplay?

There is equally the puzzle as to why we want to explain any hard or soft problem of consciousness at all? Supposing our physical bodies are already able to communicate the perculiar nature of consciousness to each other independent of our actually knowing this. If the physical bodies are already capable of this, it seems we owe no one any oral, physical or quantitative explanation.

On the next note, if the explanation of consciousness at soft and hard levels is relevant in science and needed in order to improve the entire human nature, may be we should think of redesigning the human visual faculty first before attempting such an explanation, for all we know we may have exhausted our very intellectual limits, and who knows.

Then finally, there is the vague term 'Physical' or 'Physical Explanation'; most of the people are limiting the scope of its meaning to what physics or science in general dictates. What stops us from widening the scope of its connotation? For we could say that what appears over above is physical. Is it only when causes, events, relations and any other properties of natural forms are mathematically accounted for that they are physical? Or are materially substantiated or instantiated that they are physical? My suggestion is that the term needs further expansion in scope and in substance. I have asked these questions before:

1) Does the invisibility or unobservability of things make them non-physical?

2) Does the invisibility or unobservability of things make them non-existent?

 

[Philocrat]

One priniciple that may be relevant to all this is the 'DEPRIORITISING PRINCIPLE' which attempts to fully synchronise 'CONSCIOUS-LEVEL VISUAL ATTENTION' with 'PASSIVE-VISUAL LEVEL ATTENTION. The former is mapped co-extensively into the external world and the latter mapped internally likewise up to the genetic level. I can't say very much about this as yet, but I am currently working on it to see in what way it could assist in the overall explanation of consciousnes without the over-demandedness of Physicalism, which I still believe is vaguely valued.

 

[Fliption]

I am as puzzled as everyone else about the whole idea of there being a hard problem in the first place.

Well first of all "everyone else" is not puzzled about it. There are a few tormented souls who don't agree with it or understand it but there are many people contributing here that do. Since I think I understand what the issue is and why it is not "absurd", perhaps I can help and discuss it with you. It's really hard to do this without more specific points on what you find difficult to accept. You may already have a laundry list of items but if not perhaps a place to start is the Scientific American article that I referenced earlier in this thread. It's a good summary. You could take a look at that and pick it apart. If it isn't detailed enough then we can move on to something else.

For example could we do without it and what is its place in the end state of things or of the causal scheme of man? Supposing zombies and mary could survive purely within the physical without any emergent properties of any special kind to interplay?

This is what we've been discussing here in the last few pages I think.

Then finally, there is the vague term 'Physical' or 'Physical Explanation';
1) Does the invisibility or unobservability of things make them non-physical?

2) Does the invisibility or unobservability of things make them non-existent?

I couldn't agree more. If you've read any of my particpation in threads like this you'll see that this is one of my soap boxes. I think I even discussed it in this very thread pages and pages ago. I personally dislike the concepts of physical versus non-physical. I don't have a clue what they mean. That's because everyone uses them in different ways. Personally I don't know why this distinction is even important. Who cares if something is physical or non-physical? Hard to know why it's important when you don't know what it means. lol

I suggested earlier that perhaps the distinction should be that a non-physical thing is something that has a causal relationship to things that lend themselves to objective inquiry but yet does not lend itself to objective inquiry. So in this definition, "something more" simply means something existing beyond our ability to objectively understand it.

But since that post I think I have another suggestion that could also work. At times I see people referring to non-physical things as if they have physical attributes. To say things like "non-physical substance" is a contradiction in terms and just blurs the distinction. So another suggestion that I have is that non-physical things are things that have some sort of mental value only. I'm talking about data, information, intelligence. For example, to look at a fractal is to see the mechanical and physical manifestation of an algorythm. The fractal is physical. The algorythm is non-physical. When people entertain the question "What is the connection between the physical and the non-physical?", they see a contradiction because they are attempting to mentally connect a "physical substance" with a "non-physical sybstance", whatever that is. The contradiction is in their definitions. No where else. But what is the relationship between a fractal and it's algorythm? It's kind of abstract and hard to explain but it's there nonetheless. In this particular definition "something more" is meaningless. The two concepts also loose all the biased preferences as everyone agrees that both these things exist.

These are just suggestions. It all depends on which definition best represents where people disagree. Currently, I have no idea where people disagree because all disagreement seems to be based on having different definitions. So it appears we have constructed this process backwards.

But it would be so nice if people would decide to either avoid these distinctions or come to a common understanding of what they mean.

 

[Philocrat]

A Purposive Approach to the Interpretation of Visual Data

Types of Visual Data

The visual data are products of the entire human visual faculty and they are used for conducting and administering safe human existence. They are classified into three fundamental types:

(1) Inquisitive Visual Data (IVD)

They are newly derived visual information from diverse visual organs such as the eye, nose, tongue, ears, skin etc. Inquisitive Visual Data are administered by the ‘Inquisitive Mode of the human visual faculty or consciousness’ and they are usually earmarked as unsafe as they enter or find their ways into the human visual faculty for conscious or passive visual attention and assessment. They remain in unsafe mode until such times as when they are given visual clearance via a mechanism of understanding from the ‘Precautionary Mode’ of the human visual faculty or consciousness. Inquisitive Visual Data are life-critical in that they require high-level of visual attention both at the conscious decision-making level and at the passive decision-making level.

(2) Acquisitive Visual Data (AVD)

They are the sort of visual information administered by the ‘Acquisitive Mode of the human visual faculty or consciousness’ and they include (1) Temporary Visual Data such as qualia and ‘extra-sensory’ ones used in real time thinking or visual awareness within the conscious-level or passive-level decision system, (2) Archived or Historical Data consisting of past and present experiences stored for subsequent or future recall or remembering and (3) Hereditary Visual Data carried genetically from one generation to the next. In my own thinking, visual faculty extend to cover visual information genetically transmitted from parents to their children in the furtherance of a safe and successful life. .

(3) Precautionary Visual Data (PVD)

These are visual data that are constantly monitored and validated in real-time visual processing for continual visual accuracy. This includes life-critical visual data brought into the visual faculty via the inquisitive mode or those recalled from memory via the acquisitive mode. All visual data that enter into the visual faculty are initially earmarked as unsafe until immediately or subsequently declared safe. That is they are treated at the initial stage of first entry as unsafe. Those that are immediately visually analysed and understood are declared safe until proven otherwise. Both those that are partially understood and those not understood at all are given the same level of precautionary visual alert. And throughout their stay and administration in the acquisitive section of the human visual faculty or consciousness they are constantly visually reviewed and reassessed towards understanding them. Things understood as good and useful to our lives are earmarked for constant use to service the human life and existence. Both those things that are understood as bad and dangerous to our lives and those that are not properly or fully understood at all are earmarked as things to be feared and avoided.

Life-critical visual data such as qualia and other physical information that are critical to the human survival are given high-level visual attention at the higher conscious decision-making level. For example, all the visual information and physical parameters needed to successfully perform a substantially dangerous act as crossing a street with moving vehicles are classed under life-critical data and unfortunately this is the sort of the physical activity that we cannot afford to pay less attention to.

How Does the Purposive Theory deal with Qualia?

The Purposive Theory always invokes from the ‘Book of Nature’ the Principle of Continuing Causation to explain qualia. I have used this principle before above to reverse the logic of interpretation of God. My argument is that it is this same principle that governs the interpretation and understanding of qualia. According to the Principle of continuing Causation, the slightest causal and relational error found in things renders them structurally and functionally inconclusive, and therefore, continuous both in substance and in scope. According to this principle, qualia, like all other sustaining parts or properties of a given entity or life form, should be interpreted purposively since there is no guarantee that, as a mere part, it may form part of the final state of that entity or life form. In the Book of Nature there are two fundamental types of properties: (1) those that serve ephemeral sustaining purposes to any thing in which they are parts and (2) those that survive destruction with any thing in which they are parts. For personal convenience and simplicity, I always call those things, be they laws, relations or properties of any kind, that fall under (1) ‘Unnecessary Necessities’, and those that fall under (2) ‘Necessary Necessities’. According to the Principle of Continuing Causation, since (2) is already naturally technically over-demanding by rigorously forcing properties and their immediate governing laws to fully synchronise causally and relationally as things in which they are parts head towards their final perfect states, there is no need to worry about their explainable causal roles since they may be mutated out of place in (2) and banished into (1). That if qualia cannot be fully synchronised with the other sustaining parts of man it will be structurally and functionally abandoned within the causal and mutational pathway of the human existence.

However, this is not a way of saying that all category (1) Properties and their governing laws are completely useless in the book of nature. Rather, what it all means is that they serve only ephemeral sustaining purposes in their overall outward values. Or simply that they are merely compensatory in their overall outward values. They temporally stand for the best sustaining properties to come!

Finally, according to the principle of continuing causation, Qualia is explainable, valued and measured by the level of its functional success in the public realm. There is no life for qualia outside the public realm. For example, in terms of the road-crossing example that we mentioned above, qualia is explainable, valued, understood and measured by the number of people that succeed in crossing the road with equivalent number of dangers without being harmed. Who cares whether two road-crossers see an on-coming car differently, one seeing it as red and the other seeing it as blue! So long as by balance of probability they both succeed in (1) visually identifying the car and know that it is a car and not something else, (2) recognise it as a danger to be avoided and (3) physically escape being harmed or killed, then none of the two road-crossers owe neither themselves nor any bystander any explanation as to what qualia is or as to its exact nature. According to this principle, the only significant visual data are those relevant to the actual physical danger and not any arbitrary ones that pose no danger at all. For example, in the road-crossing case, one of the road crossers visualising and correctly recognising an on-coming car as a danger and the other one erroneously seeing and interpreting it as a sexy woman or man coming to embrace him or her. This would be very significant and according to the principle of continuing causation, if this sort of causal and relational error were to be widespread and persistent, it would trigger the mutational system to interplay and invoke corrective measures or in some very nasty cases to abandon the whole human form of life altogether.

In fact this is one of the key reasons why I think we are better off concentrating on the science of man than on the science of needs. I will expand on this later.

NOTE: Purposive Theory treats causal and relational errors in things, especial in life forms such as ours, as correctable by structural re-engineering. It does not believe in explaining things beyond their actual structural and functional limits.

 

[Royce]

The original question was; "Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?"
Some of us answered, yes. They have been designated in this discussion as "physicalist" and their point is that everything that exist is either physical and thus reducible to Pure Physics or a product of physics and therefore at least in principal reducible.
Some of us answered, no and can be called "non-physicalist" or "something-others." Of this group some say that everything can not be reduced to Pure Physics because there are some things that Pure Physics does not address, investigate or acknowledge, there are somethings that exist that are outside the purview of science which of course includes pure physics. Others say that there are something that by their very nature are irreducible, to attempt to reduce them destroys them or we lose sight of what we are attempting to study in the first place.
The "something-others" point mainly to two different but related things known to exist that cannot be explained, reproduced or demonstrated by physical science and they are life itself and consciousness which includes self awareness. Some of us might add evolution also as it demonstratively moves from less complex to more complex eventuating in sentient beings such as ourselves. This indicated an arrow, direction and/or included purpose to evolution.
The "physicalist" say that all of the above are simply products of random physical processes, emergent properties inevitable due to increased complexity and that there is scientific and technological indications that in principle this is true.
The "something-others" deny that neither science nor technology have proven or demonstrated the points satisfactorily as the indications are meager, simplistic and reaching for conclusions not in evidence. They state that purpose, intent and free will inherent in life, consciousness and self awareness cannot be explained or demonstrated by the simple, inconclusive and limited, repetitive processes given by the physicalist as evidence.
This, I think, sums up this discussion to date. All of these points have been discussed at length in a number of other threads and no satisfactory conclusion or consensus has been reached either here in the PF's or out there in the real world of Philosophy and Physics although each group will claim proof just as vehemently as we do here.
It is my opinion the we, mankind, do not yet know enough or understand enough to come to a satisfactory conclusion or consensus. Science will have to expand its horizons to include non-physical phenomena in its studies before it can say for sure one way or the other. So long as science limits itself to physical and empirical studies it can not explain nor understand all of reality, especially life and consciousness.
Science has already breeched the realm of philosophy and consciousness in its exploration of Quantum Mechanics, Super String and Big Bang Theory even though many will deny that this is so. The hard questions keep rising up and slapping investigative and theoretical scientists in the face and they are finding it harder and harder to ignore.
I predict that before science can make much more substantial and significant progress it is going to have to face the hard questions of life, consciousness, awareness and their interaction with the physical realm of reality. We can not know all of reality by simply looking at one aspect of it simply because it is the easiest to study and measure.

 

[BoulderHead]

How true is the claim that everything in the whole universe can be explained by Physics and Physics alone?

‘Everything’ makes this question all-inclusive. As such, I think it too broad to withstand philosophical attack.

Does our ability to mathematically describe physical things in spacetime give us sufficient grounds to admit or hold this claim?

I don’t believe it does.

Or is there more to physical reality than a mere ability to matheamtically describe things?

The problem with this question is that ‘everything’ has, of a sudden, been replaced by ‘physical reality’. It now becomes unclear what exactly is asked. Still, a short answer strictly to this last question can be given as “No”, and then justified by considering that only describing things mathematically omits the aspect of experiencing physical reality. IOW, it is one thing to mathematically describe going through a loop on a roller coaster, quite another to actually experience riding such a contraption. There are other considerations, but hopefully this one will make sense to the reader.

I see in reading the replies that definitions of ‘physical’ and ‘consciousness’ proved problematic. My reply, therefore, will be pursuing a different line in order to suggest the answer to the first question is also “No”.

Originally posted by Imparticle;
I should probably note as well that we cannot tell what anything is really; we can only infer what something may be by its characteristics.

Imparticle has put forward a foundation upon which I desire to build. Those ‘characteristics’ spoken of do not necessarily have to be all-inclusive of what exists to be known about an object. For example; one can know various aspects of certain phenomena by sight, by feel, by smell, etc. Consider what a sunset might be like for us were we only in possession of the senses attributed to an earthworm; do you suppose, in such capacity, our science might lead us to conclude it was possible for us to know everything about a sunset (let alone the universe)?


I do not intend in this thread to break experience into parts as I see Les has done. That is; speaking of ‘sense experience’ as distinguished from ‘other types of experience’. This is because regardless of the source we are ultimately limited to what the totality of our bodily apparatus can deliver to us (that which can be experienced, and that which cannot). I do not find sufficient reason for assuming the sum total of what we are capable of experiencing must necessarily be the sum total of all that is. Remove one of your senses and how much less would you know? Now remove another and yet another. In this manner I think it can be seen what we may know about the universe (and therefore attempt to explain) is dependant upon the hardware we have for experiencing same, and what any given piece of hardware provides us with is not a complete knowledge at all, but a specific aspect of what may exist to be known about a particular phenomena.
This can be expanded to suggest if we should lack what is required even to detect a single aspect of something, we will not be in a position to have any knowledge of it at all (indeed, we may never even be aware we’re missing out). Now, are we simply going to assume we may possesses (now or in the future) all the apparatus needed for knowing (and then being able to explain mathematically) everything there is to know about the universe? And even if we actually were in possession of such capability, I’m not convinced it would be possible for us to know such must be the case. Neither does it seem reasonable to me that an inability, or just a simple failing, to detect any/all aspects of something should qualify to rule same out of all possible existence (although in at least the case of inability I would argue lack of knowledge makes it impossible even to imagine what might be missed). Accordingly, I am compelled to accept there may exist, not only the unknown, but even the unknowable (So to hell with all you people who would deny me a unicorn! ).

At any rate, science will no doubt develop a great many devices to aid in our ability to experience hitherto unknown facets of the universe. Theories will go, more accurate theories will come, overall ‘knowledge’ will increase, and many fantastic creations of innovation and technology will improve the lives of the living, but everything explained? You mean for example to ‘guess’ from a position of absolutely no experience, an unknown cause from its supposed effect? Cho !

*but enough of that disgusting little prophecy hour, haha*

 

[Les Sleeth]

I do not intend in this thread to break experience into parts as I see Les has done. That is; speaking of ‘sense experience’ as distinguished from ‘other types of experience’. This is because regardless of the source we are ultimately limited to what the totality of our bodily apparatus can deliver to us (that which can be experienced, and that which cannot). . . . In this manner I think it can be seen what we may know about the universe (and therefore attempt to explain) is dependant upon the hardware we have for experiencing same . . .

I don't think it can be assumed that "what we may know about the universe . . . is dependant upon the hardware we have." I say that not only because of my own experiences, but also because there is a huge body of writing by people who claim we are need not be totally dependent on our hardware. Let me try a counter "for instance."

What if we, as consciousness, are inside the CSN, and using the mechanisms of the brain and senses to experience through biology. In that case, consciousness has the innate ability to experience, and the senses/brain are simply one avenue which sends information to experience. If the ability to experience really is innate, then it might be possible to actually withdraw from the senses and see if there is something else to experience besides sensory input. I say there is, and in fact, that is exactly the source of the most reliable reports about "something more."

 

[BoulderHead]

I don't think it can be assumed that "what we may know about the universe . . . is dependant upon the hardware we have."

Ok

I say that not only because of my own experiences, but also because there is a huge body of writing by people who claim we are need not be totally dependent on our hardware. Let me try a counter "for instance."

What if we, as consciousness, are inside the CSN, and using the mechanisms of the brain and senses to experience through biology. In that case, consciousness has the innate ability to experience, and the senses/brain are simply one avenue which sends information to experience. If the ability to experience really is innate, then it might be possible to actually withdraw from the senses and see if there is something else to experience besides sensory input. I say there is, and in fact, that is exactly the source of the most reliable reports about "something more."

I would say that you may have at least partly failed to understand my meaning when I said; “regardless of the source” and “That which we can experience, and that which we cannot”, as you go on to speak of experiencing things...
I might dispute that consciousness has been successfully demonstrated to exist 100% independently of brains, but this doesn’t effect the position there are things we may experience and things we may not. Perhaps if you were to consider consciousness a metaphysical hardware item it might help?

 

[Les Sleeth]

I might dispute that consciousness has been successfully demonstrated to exist 100% independently of brains, but this doesn’t effect the position there are things we may experience and things we may not. Perhaps if you were to consider consciousness a metaphysical hardware item it might help?

Yes, I should have answered your main point which was that there may things we do not and cannot experience. And yes, if by "hardware" you mean any sort of consciousness system, physical or not, then I could agree.

 

[BoulderHead]

Yes, I should have answered your main point which was that there may things we do not and cannot experience. And yes, if by "hardware" you mean any sort of consciousness system, physical or not, then I could agree.

Well, I may not share your view of consciousness (suspecting a physical system is required), but I certainly would/do want to take into account any and all means by which experience is delivered. Whatever the extent of the ‘devices’ we posses with which to experience, it would be to just such extent I would place our limits as human beings. I’m predisposed, in these matters, to considering the mind as a metaphysical object, regardless of how I view the connection to a physical brain, and it is certainly my intention to include anything deliverable to the mind, be it conscious, subconscious, or even unconscious, haha. I'll cogitate on how to word my statements so as to make this better understood in the future, though as worded I believe (hope) that it will be effective to at least get my point across to those only contemplating the physical.

 

[Philocrat]

Well, I may not share your view of consciousness (suspecting a physical system is required), but I certainly would/do want to take into account any and all means by which experience is delivered. Whatever the extent of the ‘devices’ we posses with which to experience, it would be to just such extent I would place our limits as human beings. I’m predisposed, in these matters, to considering the mind as a metaphysical object, regardless of how I view the connection to a physical brain, and it is certainly my intention to include anything deliverable to the mind, be it conscious, subconscious, or even unconscious, haha. I'll cogitate on how to word my statements so as to make this better understood in the future, though as worded I believe (hope) that it will be effective to at least get my point across to those only contemplating the physical.

Your 'devices' of experience consist in the very natural form that we take - that is, the 'human form'. One of the problems that we need to turn our attention to is for us to investigate and find out if there are natural forms wholly devoid of causal and relational limitations. I have pondered in my head over it for years and I haven't seem to find any. What I am trying to say is that the forms that things take when they are 'self-created' or 'randomly created' or even created by the so-called 'intelligent designer', carry with them all the natural limitations (relational and causal) that are specific to those forms. As a thing, by taking a form you are limiting yourself in one way or the other. This raises another fundamental question as to whether it is possible to have 'formless entities'. Can things exist without taking any specific form, e.g the human form or life form?

VISUAL PERSPECTIVE...WHAT'S THE PROBLEM?

Yes, visual persepctive decsively appears as a hindrance but evidence shows that it never completely undermines successful existence...that is, things successfully occupying space and moving harmlessly about that space. Well, yes, admittedly mindless entities do aimlessly move about the space that they occupy and tend to collide and get destroyed, but the conscious ones even when they rely nearly entirely on visual persepctive, do succeed getting arround their chaotic environment. The issue about qualia should not be about 'how what we find in all the visual persepctives are identical or explainable' but solely about 'how much of the content of a given number of visual persepctives' succeed in helping the conscious beings involved lead a normal life. If for an example, three people saw a dangerous bull charging towards them, the question is not about what each man in each visual frame of reference see or what it is like to see a bull, but wholly about how each one of them in a public domain is able to see the bull, recognise not only that it is a bull but also that it is a danger to be physically avoided, and actually able to physically avoid being injured or killed by this on-charging bull. I Think that the whole argument about qualia (hard or soft problem) is fundamentally very misleading and heading intellectually in the wrong direction.

 

[BoulderHead]

This raises another fundamental question as to whether it is possible to have 'formless entities'. Can things exist without taking any specific form, e.g the human form or life form?

I think this is interesting because I must admit my complete inability to conceptualize something which doesn’t exist in either space or time. I do not know for certain if this what you’re considering, but I’m inclined to run with Schopenhauer in at least the area of thought that a multiplicity of being cannot exist under such conditions.

 

[Philocrat]

Multiciplicity of things is a mere safety device in originally defective process...and there is no guarantee that this 'habit' or possibility will have a place in the final sum totality of things. Who says that the population of things could not range between many and one? To depart many into one, yes, I can accept that, but to depart further into nothingness, that I am very much against.

Now my answer to your posting...what you are suggesting seems like perfection itself...or perhaps another kind of perfection. But what I am not sure of is whether taking a form in any creative process always involves occupying space and time. Can't you be formless and still blend in with time and space?