Japan Earthquake: Political Aspects

  • Thread starter Thread starter jlduh
  • Start date Start date
  • Tags Tags
    Earthquake Japan
AI Thread Summary
A new thread has been created to discuss the political aspects surrounding the Fukushima nuclear disaster, complementing the existing scientific discussions. This space aims to address concerns about the transparency and communication of authorities like TEPCO regarding evacuation decisions and safety measures. Contributors are encouraged to document their opinions with sourced information to foster a respectful and informed debate. The thread also highlights the potential for tensions between Japanese authorities and international players as the situation evolves, particularly regarding accountability for the disaster. Overall, it serves as a platform for analyzing the broader implications of the accident beyond the technical details.
  • #701


NUCENG said:
I am posting a link to an article that discusses the magnitude of the Japanese Disaster from the earthquake and tsunami as compared to the public and media focus on the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.

We have discussed a lot of aspects of the nuclear issues and politics. In this forum that is totally justified. The article just brings a little balance to the discussion.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/science-news/9094430/The-world-has-forgotten-the-real-victims-of-Fukushima.html

Balance from the Telegraph , a novel idea. In the UK it is most commonly referred to as the Torygraph , who knows how such an impartial publication acquired such a reputation for bias
 
Last edited by a moderator:
Engineering news on Phys.org
  • #702


Caniche said:
Balance from the Telegraph , a novel idea. In the UK it is most commonly referred to as the Torygraph , who knows how such an impartial publication acquired such a reputation for bias

Ad Hominem (Argument To The Man): attacking the person instead of attacking his argument. Does their alleged bias make their facts incorrect? Does their reputation or nickname belie their argument? Do you believe the focus of the media has been balanced in terms of the consequences of the earthquake/tsunami compared to the nuclear consequences? Does the fact that this is a "more political" thread mean our posts do't need to raise valid points?
 
  • #703


But then something odd happened.

Here I fully agree with the author. It was also odd to me that it was so easy to knock out a nuclear power plant.

The rest of the article I will not comment.
 
  • #704


http://mainichi.jp/area/ishikawa/news/20120329ddlk17040634000c.html On 28 March, Hokuriku Electric Power announced that it started studying the installation on PCV venting equipments of filters that can reduce the dispersion of radioactive substances. The cost and installation schedule are not planned yet but it is planned to install those at Shika NPP units 1 and 2. Filters can reduce radioactive substances to 100,000th. According to Hokuriku Electric Power, whereas French and Swedish NPPs are equipped with such filters, Japanese ones are not. A Hokuriku Electric Power manager said that (as Japan is a seismic country) earthquake resistance is a problem, but he wants to study the possibility to install such filters, using Europe as a reference.

http://www.rikuden.co.jp/press/attach/12032801.pdf Hokuriku Electric Power's press release. See diagram on attachment 3 page 6/6.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #705


Azby said:
The English-language executive summary of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission was just released a few minutes ago. You can download it from here:

http://naiic.go.jp/en/

I am glad that at long last an official report from a government body makes the following clear statements on the fact that some people died at Fukushima:

http://naiic.go.jp/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/NAIIC_report_lo_res.pdf 19/88: "Others were forced to move multiple times, resulting in increased stress and health risks—including deaths among seriously ill patients." (also quoted by the BBC at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18718486 )
http://naiic.go.jp/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/NAIIC_report_lo_res.pdf 38/88 : "60 patients died in March from complications related to the evacuation"

because this exposes the denial/forgetfulness by the IAEA, ANS, NRC, WHO, and others:

Saying "To date no health effects have been reported in any person as a result of radiation exposure from the nuclear accident" (http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/missionsummary010611.pdf 3/5) and "The Japanese Government’s longer term response to protect the public, including evacuation, has been impressive and extremely well organized" (http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/missionsummary010611.pdf 4/5), The IAEA's fact finding mission (24 May - 1 June 2011) was very keen on NOT FINDING THE FACTS concerning the deaths.

In a June 28 2011 presentation at the ANS Annual Meeting, F. Caracappa mentioned "Deaths due to earthquake/tsunami: ~25,000 ; Deaths or serious injuries due to direct radiation exposures: 0 ; Cancer deaths due to accumulated radiation exposures: can’t be ruled out –conservative risk estimates ~100s cases, against an expected ~10 million cases" ( http://fukushima.ans.org/inc/docs/FukushimaSpecialSession-Caracappa.pdf 27/27) so he was forgetting the deaths by nuclear evacuation of fragile patients.

The NRC Task Force Report of 12 July 2011 said "The outcome—no fatalities" (http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML111861807.pdf page iii - 5/96)

In "Preliminary dose estimation from the nuclear accident after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami" (2012), the WHO mentions radiation exposure by the general population, but forgets about the higher exposure of nuclear workers and the non-radiation related deaths:
tsutsuji said:
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2012/9789241503662_eng.pdf
They don't seem to take the nuclear workers who worked at the plant into account (although their number is 23,000 http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20120508/index.html ).

These deaths were not mentioned either in the Japanese government's first and second reports to the IAEA in June 2011 ( http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/japan-report/ ) and September 2011 ( http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/japan-report2/ ).

They were reported until now only by Japanese news agencies and newspapers and were little reported abroad. See:
https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3351282&postcount=314
https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3352403&postcount=320
https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3352504&postcount=321
https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3404481&postcount=408

The NAIIC report's main text contains detailed explanations on this 60 people death toll and the reasons why it happened over 10 pages. It is available in Japanese only for now, on http://naiic.go.jp/pdf/naiic_honpen_honbun4.pdf page 380-389 (34/140 - 43/140).
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #706


Tsutsuji,

If we take into account the certified "disaster-related deaths" the number is over 500.
This from Feb 2012:

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T120204003191.htm

"A disaster-related death certificate is issued when a death is not directly caused by a tragedy, but by fatigue or the aggravation of a chronic disease due to the disaster...
...A disaster-related death certificate is issued when a death is not directly caused by a tragedy, but by fatigue or the aggravation of a chronic disease due to the disaster."

I believe the number has climbed since then.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #707


Azby said:
Tsutsuji,

If we take into account the certified "disaster-related deaths" the number is over 500.
This from Feb 2012:

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T120204003191.htm

Thanks. For the record, I extract the figures given in this article: "Of the 634 [applications], 573 deaths were certified as disaster-related, 28 applications were rejected, four cases had to reapply because of flawed paperwork, and 29 remain pending."

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201206300051 [30 June 2012] [Yukio Edano's exclusive interview with The Asahi Shimbun on June 29] : "From the outset, I have always called (on TEPCO) to disclose (the videos)," Edano said. "I don't understand why they won't do so." (...) "Matsumoto indicated that TEPCO has the right to erase "in-house material" at its own discretion".

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201207110023 [11 July 2012] TEPCO to release teleconference videos after all
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #708


NUCENG said:
No, I don't think the author meant anything to imply that the reactor accident was not also a "disaster." Just that the focus has been skewed and fear mongering sells news. Being displace is bad. Billions of dollarslost is bad. Depression, suicide, and worries about future health effects are bad, But 20,000 deaths are also bad and unrecoverably permanent.

I cannot comment on the author's intention, but I disagree with the focus having been skewed.

20,000 deaths due to a natural disaster are indeed absolutely horrible, just as is the fate of many, if not all the survivors. Nonetheless, however tragic the casualties are, one has to accept that it happened and move on - although that is not to say to leave the affected people to their own devices or improved disaster relief and city planning should not take place.

By contrast, the Fukushima NPP accident has posed and continues to pose a threat that affects by far more people for generations to come. In addition, the NPP itself as well as the NPP disaster to a large degree were man-made and hence preventable. People have been mistakenly, if not deliberately for reasons of profit led to believe the NPP poses no threat to them, even if a natural disaster occurs.

Personally, I'm all for the media focusing on the more far-reaching, preventable disaster.
 
Last edited:
  • #709


tsutsuji said:
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201206300051 [30 June 2012] [Yukio Edano's exclusive interview with The Asahi Shimbun on June 29] : "From the outset, I have always called (on TEPCO) to disclose (the videos)," Edano said. "I don't understand why they won't do so." (...) "Matsumoto indicated that TEPCO has the right to erase "in-house material" at its own discretion".

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201207110023 [11 July 2012] TEPCO to release teleconference videos after all

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201207310070 "However, TEPCO has no plan to review the ban on video and voice recordings and the ban on reporting the names of individuals other than the senior TEPCO officials..."
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #710


http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20120731/index.html On 31 July, the NISA completed a provisional plan establishing criteria for the relocation of the offsite centers, up to 30 km away from nuclear power plants. During the Fukushima nuclear accident, the offsite center, located within the 5 km range from the plant, had not functioned. As a precaution, backup centers located further than 30km will be provided for the case when the main center is not functional. The revision of the offsite centers won't be implemented until after the new regulatory organisation will be launched.
 
  • #711


Now an article about a number of victims whose deaths might have resulted of the combination of the natural earthquake/tsunami disaster and the man made nuclear accident:

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20120809/2140_baisho.html A lawyer representing the families of 164 victims from Namie applied on 9 August at the government's conflict resolution center, requesting Tepco a 10 million yen compensation per deceased or missing person, over the charge that as they were forced to evacuate, the families could not rescue their beloved ones, who were victims of the earthquake and tsunami, and the moral suffering of the families associated with the fact that the bodies were not searched and found until one month after the event.
 
Last edited:
  • #712


http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20120906/index.html Tepco is about to reveal the teleconference videos over the 1st month (11 March - 11 April 2011), instead of the first 5 days only. The same restrictive rules apply (journalists only, restrictions on copying, on revealing peoples' names, etc.)http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201209050060 "TEPCO videos: Sans equipment, staff, Fukushima crisis spun out of control"
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #713


http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20120914/0415_josen.html It was found by the NHK that about 3 months after the accident, when the Nuclear Safety Commission started to study the issuance of an advice to reinstate the original inhabitant decontamination criteria, which had been softened immediately after the accident, it faced opposition from the local response headquarters (a national government administration) and from the Fukushima prefecture administration, and postponed the issuance for 3 months. The opposing administrations said things like "if the criteria becomes more severe, too many cars will need decontamination" or "as there are not enough decontamination facilities, people will need to leave [the restricted zone] without their [contaminated] belongings".
 
  • #714


tsutsuji said:
The opposing administrations said t...ny sort of say in this. Japan is kinda weird.
 
  • #715


http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20120927/index.html The Cabinet's investigation committee was officially disbanded as of 28 September. As unclear points are remaining, in its final report (1) it said the investigation must go on. It is viewed that the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) will play a central role, but no concrete framework has been decided yet. It is necessary to urgently decide one.

(1) http://icanps.go.jp/eng/final-report.html Full English translation now available.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #716


tsutsuji said:
http://naiic.go.jp/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/NAIIC_report_lo_res.pdf 19/88: "Others were forced to move multiple times, resulting in increased stress and health risks—including deaths among seriously ill patients." (also quoted by the BBC at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18718486 )
http://naiic.go.jp/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/NAIIC_report_lo_res.pdf 38/88 : "60 patients died in March from complications related to the evacuation"

The Cabinet's investigation committee provides two counts of patients confirmed dead upon reaching evacuation destination:http://icanps.go.jp/eng/05IVfinal.pdf Chapter IV, (d) Rescue on March 15, notes 49 and 50, p. 277:

49 A total of 54 patients transported by the integrated mission unit and the 12th Brigade Medical Squadron, after the screening, headed for Fukushima Prefectural Medical University Hospital in private-sector buses arranged by the Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Center. As the hospital refused to accept them, the patients were then carried to the Date Fureai Center at around 1:00 on March 16. At the time, two of the patients were confirmed dead.

50 After the screening, these rescued patients were transported to Kasumiga zyo Park and Azuma Sports Park in private-sector buses arranged by the Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Center, but five of them were confirmed dead upon arrival there.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #717


tsutsuji said:
because this exposes the denial/forgetfulness by the IAEA, ANS, NRC, WHO, and others:
Yes - these organizations (and the industry) lose credibility when they dismiss the deaths of elderly and ill because they had to be evacuated. I don't think a few 100 (or 1000s) latent cancer deaths should be minimized either. Those folks trusted the government and industry to ensure such an accident wouldn't happen.
 
  • #718


http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20121003/1720_50km.html In its 3 October meeting, the NRA studied a draft revision of nuclear disaster countermeasure guidelines which proposes to expand evacuation zones from 10 km around plants to 30 km, and to plan distribution of iodine pills within the 50 km range. This would put the number of cities and villages included in an evacuation zone from 45 in 15 prefectures to 135 in 21 prefectures. According to the draft, Offsite Centers should be installed within the 30 km range (instead of 20 km), and excluded from the 5 km range, with several backup institutional sites being secured outside the 30 km range and in different directions. The NRA plans to hear the opinions of local governments in its next meeting.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20121003/index.html Fukushima Daiichi will be designated as "Special nuclear facility". While at present the decommissionning work plans are proposed by Tepco and approved by the government, under the new status, it will be possible for the NRA to become involved in the planning of the decomissionning work. NRA president Shun'ichi Tanaka said "In order to secure Fukushima Daiichi's safety, we must be actively involved". The NRA will not only propose action plans for example regarding stable cooling or preventing contamination spreading, but will also give orders to modify or improve the advancement of works or of technical development. During the press conference, president Tanaka said: "While it can be said that the disaster has been brought under control, I am well aware that an accident happened and that it is unstable. I want to secure safety by regulations that look far ahead, toward a 30 year long decommissionning work".
 
  • #719


http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20121005/index.html In response to a request by news organizations, Tepco is publicly releasing another compilation of the teleconference videos, consisting of 161 sequences put together and edited in order to hide people's names for a total of 6 hours (the raw footage for the 5 first days after the accident consists of 150 hours). In this new video, it is possible to see on 13 March before dawn how plant manager Yoshida is trying to get in touch with the prime minister's office [is it not the other way round, the cabinet's office trying to get in touch with Yoshida ?], revealing interference from outside hampering onsite crisis management. The video also shows the discussions in the night of 14 March about unit 2, where the Tokyo main office says things like "open that valve quickly!", without sufficiently knowing the onsite situation, and being argued in response by Fukushima Daiichi "Will you please stop disturbing ?". The teleconference videos of the first month after the accident will be available to journalists next month at the earliest.

http://sankei.jp.msn.com/life/news/121005/trd12100515460011-n1.htm On 5 October, Economy and Industry minister Yukio Edano said the Kaminoseki nuclear power plant will not be built, in exact application of the "no new NPP construction principle". [ There is a good article on the Kaminoseki NPP project and the debates among the inhabitants here: http://www.japanfocus.org/-Martin-Dusinberre/3805 ]. See also http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20120926p2a00m0na016000c.html "The government is planning to urge power companies to voluntarily withdraw plans to build new nuclear power plants whose construction has not started, Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Yukio Edano has revealed in an interview with the Mainichi Shimbun."
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #720


http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/10/12/us-japan-nuclear-idUKBRE89B0XK20121012 "Tokyo Electric Power Co (Tepco), the operator of the wrecked Fukushima nuclear plant, said on Friday it could have dealt better with the plant's meltdowns if broad preparations were taken, reversing the previous management's view that the disaster was unavoidable due to an unexpected force of nature."

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2012/1221806_1870.html Press Release (Oct 12,2012) Document Related to the First Nuclear Reform Monitoring Committee Meeting:The attached is a document created by the Nuclear Reform Special Task Force(Naomi Hirose: TEPCO president, director and the chairman of the Nuclear Reform Special Task Force) and used at the first Nuclear Reform Monitoring Committee Meeting.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu12_e/images/121012e0101.pdf Fundamental Policy for the Reform of TEPCO Nuclear Power Organization, October 12 2012, (English, 32 pages)

[Is it a coincidence, or is it related to the fact that Junichi Matsumoto, who had been a constant defender of the former view, doesn't seem to appear any longer at press conferences ? ]
2012101121735.jpg

As a change from Mr Ono, today's conference is done by Mr Fukuda (12 October press conference as reported by http://genpatsu-watch.blogspot.com/2012/10/201210121730-1-apdf4.html )

201210111756.jpg

Mr Ono (at October 11 press conference : http://genpatsu-watch.blogspot.com/2012/10/201210111730-1.html )

2012091112007.jpg

Junichi Matsumoto on his last press conference (11 September 2012: http://genpatsu-watch.blogspot.com/2012/09/20129111750.html) he had been doing the press conference spokesman job since April 1 2011.
 
Last edited:
  • #721
  • #722


tsutsuji said:
http://naiic.go.jp/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/NAIIC_report_lo_res.pdf 38/88 : "60 patients died in March from complications related to the evacuation"


The full English translation of the Diet's investigation report is now available at: http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/en/report/index.html

Here is an exerpt concerning the 60 deaths :

b. The sixty lives that could not be saved
According to our investigation, at least 60 people died in the seven hospitals and in
long-term care health facilities by the end of March 2011. The numbers of hospitalized
patients who died between “the time after the earthquake and before the evacuation”
and the “completion of transferring the hospitalized patients to different hospitals”
were thirty-eight from Futaba Hospital, four from Futaba Kosei Hospital, three from
Imamura Hospital, and three from Nishi Hospital.[56] The people admitted to the longterm
care health facility affiliated with Futaba Hospital evacuated together with the
hospitalized patients in Futaba Hospital, ten of whom died. More than half of the
deceased people were elderly people 65 years or older. It is apparent that Futaba Hospital,
where more than 40 people died by the end of March 2011, experienced the severest
evacuation situation, since it was relatively slow to secure evacuation shelters with
medical equipment and transportation for evacuation; in addition it had a large number
of hospitalized patients.

http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp...nt/uploads/2012/08/NAIIC_Eng_Chapter4_web.pdf page 30/115

One hundred twenty-nine seriously
ill patients were left behind in the hospital,[59] to whom only six medical professionals
at most, including the employees of the adjacent long-term care health facility
affiliated with Futaba Hospital and the doctors who returned to the hospital, provided
medical treatment and nursing care over the three days it took to complete the
evacuation. There were shortages of both daily commodities and medical supplies,
and they only had candles for lighting. Although the doctors provided the best possible
medical treatment they could at that time, four patients died in the hospital by
March 15, 2011.

http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp...nt/uploads/2012/08/NAIIC_Eng_Chapter4_web.pdf page 32/115

Three patients died in the vehicles during the
evacuation and an additional 11 patients died at the high school by early morning the
following day (refer to Figure 4.2.3-3).

http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp...nt/uploads/2012/08/NAIIC_Eng_Chapter4_web.pdf page 33/115
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #723


http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20121103/index.html Tepco is going to install a new office, called "Fukushima main office", in Fukushima prefecture with a main office function. It will have a 4000 workforce, including hundreds moved from Tokyo, the personnel that has been in charge of compensation payment, and a vice-president-level top management. The purpose is to better reflect the needs of Fukushima prefecture inhabitants and local government bodies, in response to remarks that it had been insufficient.
 
  • #725


My opinion at this point is that:

People died.

Tepco was not aware of the tsunami threat.

SBO studies, like the 1993 Japanese one were supposed to be "top of the notch" : https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=3943942&highlight=probabilistic#post3943942

Tsunami science is a young science. Nothing comparable with nuclear physics, which is an old, mathematical science, with largely predictable results when given a realistic set of causal predictions.

Almost nobody was really aware that nuclear plants relied on other sciences beyond nuclear physics. Three Miles Island and Chernobyl were nuclear physics gone wrong. Fukushima was not. Fukushima was tsunami science gone wrong.

The November 2010 IAEA-supported Masao Takao presentation, based on the Chile tsunami of 28 February 2010 saying that "we assessed and confirmed the safety of nuclear power plants" http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/3_sessionB/B-11.pdf 24/25 , was wrong.

Even the groups that are most critical about nuclear plants such as Greenpeace didn't care about scientific presentations like the one by Toshiaki Sakai (Tepco) in a public event in Miami in 2006 : http://www.asmedl.org/getabs/servlet/GetabsServlet?prog=normal&id=ASMECP002006042460000069000001&idtype=cvips&gifs=Yes&ref=no "we still have possibilities tsunami height may exceeds the determined design tsunami height due to uncertainties regarding the tsunami phenomena".

Yet, regardless the uncertainties about the 869 Jogan tsunami, the Kamtchatka tsunami of 1952 should have been regarded as relevant for Japan. Even non-specialists like you or I should have known about the Kamtchatka tsunami. Everybody should have known about the Kamtchatka tsunami. Everybody should have understood that Japan was just as vulnerable to tsunamis as Kamtchatka.

This was not so difficult to understand. Just look at a map. Just look how similar Japan and Kamtchatka are.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #726


tsutsuji said:
My opinion at this point is that:

People died.

Tepco was not aware of the tsunami threat.

SBO studies, like the 1993 Japanese one were supposed to be "top of the notch" : https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=3943942&highlight=probabilistic#post3943942

Tsunami science is a young science. Nothing comparable with nuclear physics, which is an old, mathematical science, with largely predictable results when given a realistic set of causal predictions.

Almost nobody was really aware that nuclear plants relied on other sciences beyond nuclear physics. Three Miles Island and Chernobyl were nuclear physics gone wrong. Fukushima was not. Fukushima was tsunami science gone wrong.

The November 2010 IAEA-supported Masao Takao presentation, based on the Chile tsunami of 28 February 2010 saying that "we assessed and confirmed the safety of nuclear power plants" http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/3_sessionB/B-11.pdf 24/25 , was wrong.

Even the groups that are most critical about nuclear plants such as Greenpeace didn't care about scientific presentations like the one by Toshiaki Sakai (Tepco) in a public event in Miami in 2006 : http://www.asmedl.org/getabs/servlet/GetabsServlet?prog=normal&id=ASMECP002006042460000069000001&idtype=cvips&gifs=Yes&ref=no "we still have possibilities tsunami height may exceeds the determined design tsunami height due to uncertainties regarding the tsunami phenomena".

Yet, regardless the uncertainties about the 869 Jogan tsunami, the Kamtchatka tsunami of 1952 should have been regarded as relevant for Japan. Even non-specialists like you or I should have known about the Kamtchatka tsunami. Everybody should have known about the Kamtchatka tsunami. Everybody should have understood that Japan was just as vulnerable to tsunamis as Kamtchatka.

This was not so difficult to understand. Just look at a map. Just look how similar Japan and Kamtchatka are.

Let's start by assuming every point you made is correct. They surely seem to be correct based on what has been discussed here. The only point I disagree is that no one knew that more than one science was involved.

People should understand that very little in life can be treated has a single scientific or engineering basis. Dependence on other engineering disciplines apart from nuclear physics is nothing new. Pressure Vessel engineering depends on mechanical engineering that learned from steam boiler explosions. Corrosion and flow-related erosion pipe failures have led to improvements in chemistry and metalurgy. Natural Gas pipeline explosions still happen. Computers and mathematics have evolved drastically since the days when slide rule accuracy was a limitation that required massive margins for safety. The Verazzano Narrows bridge collapsed. Seismic design and geology have applications beyonf nuclear power plants with the same sort of uncertainties as tsunamis. Meteorlogy is another science that Hurricane Sandy just tested. We could go on and on. Anything as complicated as a nuclear power plant involves almost every scientific field you can imagine.

So I move back to your post. What conclusions do you derive from the facts/opinions you list? Can mankind learn from disasters? If you conclude we need to drop the nuclear option, is it even possible to significantly reduce risks by closing nuclear plants? Even after TMI2, Chernobyl, and Fukushima over the last 50 years, the number of deaths and finasncial damages from other hazards is much worse. Consider Hurricanes and Typhoons. Consider the deaths in Japan from the Tsunami that had nothing to do with Fukushima. Pipeline accidents and mining accidents have killed more people. Warfare has killed millions and resulted in destruction beyond imagination. Transportation accidents (auto, aircraft, ships) still occur and result in loss of life and property. If we only consider the relative risk from nuclear power against the risk of mosquito-borne illnesses, the risk from nuclear doesn't even register on the same scale.

I understand that the huge impact to Japan and the disaster-related deaths are staggering, but absent a firm understanding of the impacts of the alternatives to powering our future, what should we be doing differently? I believe much of the redesign and lessons-learned underway in the nuclear industry is fully justified. So the strawman that I think doing nothing is acceptable won't wash. I am not arguing with your list, Tsutsuji, I really would like to hear how we can reduce risk other than learning from every science we have. Can we survive as a modern society if we retreat every time there is an accident?
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #727


NUCENG said:
If we only consider the relative risk from nuclear power against the risk of mosquito-borne illnesses, the risk from nuclear doesn't even register on the same scale.

Ukrainians who still pay for the Chernobyl area maintenance and who lost thousands of square kilometers of land - still not safe for habitation for years to come - are disagreeing with you.

what should we be doing differently?

Who are "we"? Humanity as a whole?
I'd like to (again) identify a much smaller "we": the nuclear industry. If "you" (nuclear industry) want "us" (the unwashed masses) to support you, you MUST stop causing Chernobyls and Fukushimas, short of truly disastrous events beyond any control and prediction (asteroid impact etc). Tsunamis in Japan ARE NOT beyond prediction.

I believe much of the redesign and lessons-learned underway in the nuclear industry is fully justified.

I see that in Fukushima some of Chernobyl "lessons learned" weren't in fact learned. This is a very troubling sign.
 
  • #728


nikkkom said:
Ukrainians who still pay for the Chernobyl area maintenance and who lost thousands of square kilometers of land - still not safe for habitation for years to come - are disagreeing with you.

You are mistaken.
We have built several nuclear power plants after the disaster and plan for the future to build another 2 blocks
But Japan, by this time, no more than 10 percent of what was done in the Soviet Union after the disaster.
When we talk about the lessons of Chernobyl, we speak of a "culture of safety."
This is the second reason for the disaster in Japan after the tsunami.

Excuse my English, I use a translator
 
  • #729


Ukrainians who still pay for the Chernobyl area maintenance and who lost thousands of square kilometers of land - still not safe for habitation for years to come - are disagreeing with you.

a.ua. said:
You are mistaken.

LOL. You don't realize that I *am* an Ukrainian. :)
I am mistaken about what exactly?
Ukrainian budget does not allocate $$$ for Chernobyl maintenance??
Chenobyl zone is not closed for habitation??

We have built several nuclear power plants after the disaster and plan for the future to build another 2 blocks

How is that relevant to what I have stated?

But Japan, by this time, no more than 10 percent of what was done in the Soviet Union after the disaster.

True. Japanese did not send people inside ruined reactor units to pick up melted fuel rods with bare hands, as was done in Chernobyl.

You know, I am *happy* they did not do anything like that. Post-accident cleanup in Fuku looks better that Chernobyl.
 
  • #731
http://www.save-children-from-radiation.org/2013/06/23/stunning-story-from-a-fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-power-plant-worker-interview-by-comedienne-oshidori-mako/
 
  • #732
TEPCO executives spared from indictment

Japanese prosecutors have decided not to indict former TEPCO executives for insufficient precautions against a massive tsunami, and their handling of the 2011 disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant.

Fukushima residents and others filed criminal complaints against Tokyo Electric Power Company and more than 40 people.

They include former TEPCO chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata and other top management, former Nuclear Safety Commission head Haruki Madarame and former Prime Minister Naoto Kan.

Prosecutors said on Monday that TEPCO, its former executives and others cannot be held criminally responsible.
They say the accused could not predict the real dangers of such a massive earthquake and tsunami.

They say TEPCO's failure to carry out countermeasure construction after it projected in 2008 a scenario of a huge tsunami of more than 15 meters, cannot be considered socially irresponsible behavior.

The plaintiffs say they do not accept the conclusions of the ruling. They plan to take the issue to a prosecution inquest panel made up of randomly selected citizens.
Sep. 9, 2013 - Updated 11:37 UTC

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/english/news/20130909_39.html

"Prosecutors said on Monday that TEPCO, its former executives and others cannot be held criminally responsible.

They say the accused could not predict the real dangers of such a massive earthquake and tsunami.

[...] They say TEPCO's failure to carry out countermeasure construction after it projected in 2008 a scenario of a huge tsunami of more than 15 meters, cannot be considered socially irresponsible behavior"

Well, based on all the cover ups that Tepco did before and after the accident, this is pretty surprising... Especially when you consider this:

http://enformable.com/2012/05/tepco-admits-to-having-ignored-more-warnings-of-fukushima-daiichi-tsunami-risk/

16 May 2012 - Tokyo Electric Power Company admitted to JiJi Press reporters on Tuesday that it was aware a tsunami could cause a total blackout 5 years before last March’s disaster, but did not act on the knowledge. TEPCO has been determined to have ignored at least one other warning years later of a possible 10-meter tsunami.

TEPCO said a public-private study panel that was attended by power companies, including TEPCO, and others, which concluded in 2006, 2 years after the Indian Ocean tsunami, that Fukushima Daiichi’s backup generators could fail if a 14-meter tsunami hit the plant.

The meeting was held as part of an unofficial seminar that the safety agency initiated in January 2006 in the wake of the December 2004 massive earthquake and tsunami off Sumatra, Indonesia, as well as a major leak of water at a U.S. nuclear plant.

At the meeting, power failure risks were discussed on the assumption of nuclear plants being hit by tsunami waves one meter higher than ground level.

The panel, which included the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and other power utilities, “hinted at the possibility of seawater entering buildings through doors and other openings.”

Following the assessment, TEPCO waterproofed seawater pumps used to cool reactors as suggested by the agency, but failed to act on any upgrades to prevent water from entering buildings.

“The result might have been different,” if the company, known as TEPCO, had taken adequate measures against the risk, said an official at the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency.

Source: JiJi Press

"TEPCO said a public-private study panel that was attended by power companies, including TEPCO, and others, which concluded in 2006, 2 years after the Indian Ocean tsunami, that Fukushima Daiichi’s backup generators could fail if a 14-meter tsunami hit the plant.

The meeting was held as part of an unofficial seminar that the safety agency initiated in January 2006 in the wake of the December 2004 massive earthquake and tsunami off Sumatra, Indonesia, as well as a major leak of water at a U.S. nuclear plant.


So this was in 2006 (2 years before the study they did in 2008!) after the 2004 massive tsunami off Sumatra and Indonesia!

But time will tell, the story is far from finished for the executives i think. Lobbies are at work, so are the victims... Tsunami is a quick wave, justice is a slow growing wave...
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #733
I add this to the previous message...

To summarize:

1) Tepco declared in 2012 that in 2006 a symposium concluded that Fukushima Daiichi’s backup generators could fail if a 14-meter tsunami hit the plant.

2) then Tepco projected in 2008 a scenario of a huge tsunami of more than 15 meters (which then would badly hit the plant and make a blackout with generators damaged). But they didn't consider countermeasures and this "cannot be considered socially irresponsible behavior."

3) but in 2010, a Tepco presentation reassessed the max height of a tsunami to 5.7m! I've posted a message about this document the 23rd of March 2011 on this forum: https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3203941&postcount=883

I would like to draw your attention to a TEPCO document that i found today in which this company reassessed in 2010 the "safety" of its plants regarding to tsunamis, especially after the Chile tsunami the 28th of February 2010. I give the direct link to where to find this document (I plan to send this info to several medias here in France):

http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-sympos...sionB/B-11.pdf

It is a presentation of a Tepco study (see logos on the doc) done in 2010, and its conclusions were presented by a certain Andou Hiroshige at a symposium held the 24th to 26th of November 2010 - SO PRETTY RECENTLY- at Niigata Institute of Technology, Kashiwazaki, Niigata, Japan ( see the site here http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/ ).

The document is called Tsunami Assessment for Nuclear Power Plants in Japan and include a study for the Fukushima Daiichi power plant.

Conclusions of the study are, based on this presentation (see page 15):

"We assessed and confirmed the safety of nuclear power plants based on the JSCE method which was published in 2002".

The simulation done relates to hypothesis ending up with a maximum tsunami wave height at Fukushima plant of... 5,7m"

DOES THIS MAKES SENSE TO YOU?

IS THERE ANY CONSISTENCY IN THE DECISIONS MADE BY TEPCO?
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #734
jlduh said:
DOES THIS MAKES SENSE TO YOU?

IS THERE ANY CONSISTENCY IN THE DECISIONS MADE BY TEPCO?

Absolutely.
Some TEPCO manager thought: "Why should I push for the construction of a bigger dam? That'll cost several $100M and spending so much on (apparently) unnecessary heap of concrete will definitely be bad for my career".
 
  • #735
I agree that it's probably what happened!

But then again, is this consistent with the conclusion: it "cannot be considered socially irresponsible behavior"?

How can it be the wise decision of the prosecutors?
 
  • #736
It was to be expected. It's also very, very unjust. There were clearly bad decisions made, those decisions clearly led to huge amounts of property damage and not a few indirect deaths (elderly&sick evacuees mostly).
 
  • #737
jlduh said:
I agree that it's probably what happened!

But then again, is this consistent with the conclusion: it "cannot be considered socially irresponsible behavior"?

How can it be the wise decision of the prosecutors?

I am more interested in "how we can fix the system so that it (such bad managerial decisions) doesn't happen in the future?"

Note that it is not so that all TEPCO managers are bad people. The problem is that "good" managers, which push for more expenses, have worse career prospects, IOW they don't reach higher levels on the corporate ladder. (This isn't uniquely TEPCO or Japanese problem, by the way).

Because of this dynamics, the problem can't be fixed by installing "better" managers.

Only competent independent oversight agency with power to force nuclear operators to implement safety measures can help here.
 
  • #738
NHK World has removed its "Data On Fukushima plant" link from first page, saw it yet at the end of August... Probably a side effect of the Olympic games strategy?You have now to click "311 Beyond stories of recovery" (nice!) logo and then the link to the "data on Fukushima plant" appears on the right:http://www.nhk.or.jp/japan311/

But anyway, the page is no more updated since end of May 2013!

http://www9.nhk.or.jp/kabun-blog/500/

Which is pretty normal in fact: japanese are no more concerned by the nuclear problem, and Japan seems to be today the safiest place in the world to be if you fear radiations, just look at this nice updated "Radiation Map" that is now above the "Data on Fukushima Plant" link!

http://www.nhk.or.jp/japan311/311-nuclear.html

Great numbers, all lower than in the rest of the international towns listed. Message is clear: don't worry anymore...

I reference this here because my feeling is that the decommissioning of the information will be a more effective (and easy) task than the decommissioning of the real stuff...

A step by step process.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #739
Well, what to say to this kind of article?

http://www.cfact.org/2013/10/12/physicist-there-was-no-fukushima-nuclear-disaster/

Some "nuclear people" should consider how to stay credible after that kind of event. I saw a lot of them sincerely reconsidering their position after the "impossible" Fukushima accident, accepting to revise some of their positions. This article shows that it's not true for everyone. Not a surprise, in fact.
 
  • #740
jlduh said:
Well, what to say to this kind of article?

http://www.cfact.org/2013/10/12/physicist-there-was-no-fukushima-nuclear-disaster/

Some "nuclear people" should consider how to stay credible after that kind of event. I saw a lot of them sincerely reconsidering their position after the "impossible" Fukushima accident, accepting to revise some of their positions. This article shows that it's not true for everyone. Not a surprise, in fact.
Though somewhat egaggerated in wording, it is nevertheless factually accurate, though with two minor caveats:
1. Evacuations are at least temporarily depriving people of property.
2. It will probably eventually kill some people.

But I wholeheartedly agree with him that people have lost perspective and let hysteria take them over when they talk like the nuclear "disaster" was the biggest/worst part of what the earthquake caused.
 
  • #741
russ_watters said:
Though somewhat egaggerated in wording, it is nevertheless factually accurate, though with two minor caveats:
1. Evacuations are at least temporarily depriving people of property.
2. It will probably eventually kill some people.

But I wholeheartedly agree with him that people have lost perspective and let hysteria take them over when they talk like the nuclear "disaster" was the biggest/worst part of what the earthquake caused.



Well, comparing a technological "disaster" or "accident" (as you want) to a natural disaster is somewhat a flawed way to represent things. We all know that natural disasters can be terrible in numbers of victims, and especially in a short amount of time: this tsunami was terrible, yes , and killed many people (around 16000 deaths), and for example the tsunami that hit Indonesia, Sri Lanka and India in 2004 was 15 times even worse (around 235 000 dead people).

BUT, this doesn't mean ANYTHING when you start to talk about a nuclear accident like Fukushima, because:

1- we talk about a technological accident caused by a natural disaster, and not a natural disaster itself
2- this accident/disaster is the result of human technological choices/decisions/designs facing a natural disaster
3- the consequences of this accident are NOT assessable only in terms of "number of people killed in a short amount of time". The consequences are and will be for a long long loooooooong time (on the scale of a human life) way more various and wider for the people than just : "killed or not killed by radiations". I hope that i don't need to develop this point...

Something else has to be added to this: the Fukushima accident is a "lucky accident" in a certain way. A lot of luck has played a role to make it "smaller" (relatively!) than it could have been. Many experts agreed about this fact, because:

- when you are in a situation like that, with a total loss of power with no more backups on the nuclear plant, which is a scenario which was not even considered as possible by designers and engineers ("beyond design basis", as they say), with heavy hydrogen explosions resulting from this out of control situation,

- when you consider that in this scenario, nothing was designed to secure spent fuel from being ejected from top pools and/or being exposed to air after leaks from the pools damaged from explosions (which didn't happen BY CHANCE, and ONLY BY CHANCE)

- when you imagine a very very very possible scenario where exposed fuel to air creates heavy radiations, that can be even increased by criticality created by ejected fuel laying on the ground with no moderation or water on it (again this didn't happen by CHANCE, not by design, as design was not even daring considering this scenario!)

- when you imagine the direct consequence of this: total impossibility to approach the site to try to regain some control over the situation (no more injection of water in reactor buildings and remaining pools, etc.), and so a plant with tons of spent fuel and 6 reactors left to themselves with no power on site

then you can imagine what would have been the situation in Japan: a large area totally out of human control for sufficient time to create a situation where other plants around (like Daini; only 12 kms away from Daiichi!) would need to evacuate also (this is no science fiction, this was very close to be reality if any criticality and/or heavy radiation was released because of this "no human present" situation), i let you imagine the consequences for Japan and not only for Japan in this development of events in domino effects.

Again, this didn't happen but only by CHANCE, not by intentional design in any way.

When you consider this, you are a bit shocked by that kind of article. Yes tsunami killed MUCH MORE people than radiations so far. SO WHAT? The potential for making Japan a no man's land was real in the scenario i describe above, and again, this is no absurd science fiction, nor "hysteria", it is fiction, yes, but based on scientific facts that are difficult to negate: a totally out of power nuclear plant is not able by design to stabilize itself, and especially with no human left, if human had to leave because of too high radiations. Can you negate the fact that this domino effect was very possible based on the situation we had the 3/11?

By the way, I personnaly consider that based on the current situation on site, this scenario is still possible, considering the time during which the plant will be vulnerable to new natural disasters for example (new earthquakes, new tsunamis, heavy typhoons, etc.), and less than efficient management and manpower in very difficult working conditions...

So please, Mister KELMM, be a bit modest in the way you treat facts. You are maybe "factually" right, but you lack honesty and modesty, considering that:

- the goal of humans is not to be worse than nature when creating disaster,
- in this specific case, humans could have beaten nature. It was very very close to, with a bit of luck missing...
 
Last edited:
  • #742
South Korea :

http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/artic...le-back-reliance-nuclear-power-wake-fukushima (14 October 2013)

Nuclear energy should account for between 22 per cent and 29 per cent of power generation capacity by 2035, compared with a 41 per cent goal introduced in the previous long-term plan in 2008, South Korea's energy ministry said.
(...)
The government last week promised tighter regulation of the nuclear industry after indicting 100 officials on corruption and bribery charges relating to the use of components with faked quality-control certificates.

The probe found 277 faked certificates for parts used in 20 operating reactors as well as 2,010 false documents at eight plants that were offline or under construction, according to the government.
 
  • Like
Likes 1 person
  • #743
jlduh said:
Fukushima accident is a "lucky accident" in a certain way. A lot of luck has played a role to make it "smaller" (relatively) than it could have been.

...which is a scenario which was not even considered as possible by designers and engineers...
Sure, but no possible additional bad luck can trump the bad luck that caused the accident, right? That would be the bad luck of having one of the worst earthquakes and worst tsunamis in recorded history so near the plant. And in addition to ignoring the bad luck that caused the accident, you are also trivializing the engineering that contributed to the "good" luck that limited it. In engineering, part of the point of a "safety factor" is extra strength to deal with problems you don't think of - because enginers know they can't think of everything. But either way, you don't get to score "maybes" and "almosts" on your scorecard. If you did, you wouldn't be putting Fukushima (or Chernobyl or TMI) on your scorecard at all!

Like the author, I agree that this accident shows just how safe nuclear power is, not how unsafe: given a natural disaster way outside the bounds of what was anticipated, the plant did little damage beyond what it did to itself.
-the goal of humans is not to be worse than nature when creating disaster.
I think you mean "no worse". Anyway, the author never makes such a claim. You can't fault him for something he didn't say. All he's saying is that he is of the perception that - based on the attention each are given - the media and many in the public consider Fukushima to be the worst result of the earthquake/tsunami.
 
  • #744
jlduh said:
Well, what to say to this kind of article?

http://www.cfact.org/2013/10/12/physicist-there-was-no-fukushima-nuclear-disaster/

Some "nuclear people" should consider how to stay credible after that kind of event. I saw a lot of them sincerely reconsidering their position after the "impossible" Fukushima accident, accepting to revise some of their positions. This article shows that it's not true for everyone. Not a surprise, in fact.

Ex-Skf's reply

http://ex-skf.blogspot.com/2013/10/fukushima-i-npp-accident-was-nuclear.html
 
  • #745
The french newspaper Le Monde (considered as "moderate" and balanced in France) just published an article about the workers of Fukushima, the french version is here:

http://www.lemonde.fr/japon/article...l-enfer-des-liquidateurs_3493382_1492975.html

A less than perfect translation by Google, but better than nothing for those who don't understand french language:

http://translate.google.fr/translat...l-enfer-des-liquidateurs_3493382_1492975.html

Almost the same music from an article about the current morale and organisation of the workers on Daiichi site, from the Guardian:

http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/oct/15/fukushima-nuclear-power-plant-cleanup

"I'm particularly worried about depression and alcoholism," said Takeshi Tanigawa, a professor in the department of public health at Ehime University in western Japan. "I've seen high levels of physical distress and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder."

Many of the casual labourers employed by subcontractors live in cheap accommodation in places such as Yumoto, a hot-spring resort south of the exclusion zone around the plant. The number of workers has declined in the past year amid complaints from hoteliers and inn-keepers about drink-fuelled fights. These days, more seem to prefer the bars and commercial sex establishments of nearby Onahama port.

A 42-year-old contract worker, who asked not be named, confirmed that alcohol abuse had become a problem among workers. "Lots of men I know drink heavily in the evening and come to work with the shakes the next day. I know of several who worked with hangovers during the summer and collapsed with heatstroke."

In the long term, Tepco and its partner companies will struggle to find enough people with specialist knowledge to see decommissioning through to the end, according to Yukiteru Naka, a retired engineer with General Electric who helped build some of Fukushima Daiichi's reactors.

"There aren't enough trained people at Fukushima Daiichi even now," he said. "For Tepco, money is the top priority – nuclear technology and safety come second and third. That's why the accident happened. The management insists on keeping the company going. They think about shareholders, bank lenders and the government, but not the people of Fukushima."

Naka, who runs a firm in Iwaki, just south of Fukushima Daiichi, that provides technical assistance to Tepco, said the lack of expertise afflicts the utility and general contractors with a pivotal role in the cleanup.

"Most of their employees have no experience of working in conditions like these, and all the time their exposure to radiation is increasing," he said. "I suggested to Tepco that it bring in retired workers who said they were willing to help, but the management refused."

"Tepco is spending its money on fixing the technical problems, but it also needs people to carry out that work. I'm very worried about the labour shortage. If they don't do something about it soon, the employment system at Fukushima Daiichi will collapse first, not the plant."

"The real work at Fukushima Daiichi is being done by the general contractors, with the smaller companies picking up the crumbs," Yoshikawa said. "They outbid each other for contracts and so end up with less money to pay their workers. They have no choice but to hire cheap labour."
 
Last edited:
  • #746
russ_watters said:
In engineering, part of the point of a "safety factor" is extra strength to deal with problems you don't think of - because enginers know they can't think of everything.

Hi again Russ, i agree with you on this matter (I'm an engineer!) and i have to add that engineers are even better when they openly and honestly recognize that "they can't think about everything" ;o)

Now, back to the "safety factor". I agree that this is part of intelligent design, but of course the "wise amount of safety factor" is by definition something very difficult to assess from scratch, and in reality, the errors and accidents are big contributors to weight the amount of safety factor to put in a specific -future or improved- design. No doubt that some additional safety factors -and new scenarios considered as impossible until now!- will be added in the future (i hope!) by nuclear engineers.

But never forget that safety factors cost money, and that money is what ultimately drives companies like Tepco or others. Companies are not only made by engineers, financial guys (defending the interest of shareholders of course) are often the one who ultimately decide, you know that like me.

But you must admit that, considering the root cause of the accident (total loss of main and backup power because of earthquake and tsunami), it seems that Tepco put a lot of energy to also include an "unsafety factor" in the design of the Daiichi plant, as i mention it here:

https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=4497672&postcount=733

So 6.4m design instead of 15m real wave (and not reconsidering it after they even imagined it in 2008) seems to be the definition of what i call a "2.34 unsafety factor"...

Saying that "safety factors" avoided a much worse scenario once the accident initiated (avoiding the domino effect that i mention) imply to recognize also that a big unsafety factor (with no willingness to correct it when it was considered this could happen) initiated the accident.

Alternatively if you say that bad luck initiated the accident, then you have to say that good luck avoided to make it much worse! But it's difficult to say that, on one hand, the bad luck initiated the accident, but that on the other hand, intelligent safety factors avoided to make it a complete nightmare in case of domino effects scenario (scenario which i think you recognize could have been, and was not far from being in fact, plausible and possible?)

Safety factors exists, unsafety factors also, let's recognize them BOTH in the Fukushima case. Or bad luck and good luck... if you prefer? But not one in one case (the root cause) and the other in the other case (the development of the accident). This wouldn't be balanced in my mind...
 
Last edited:
  • #747
russ_watters said:
All he's saying is that he is of the perception that - based on the attention each are given - the media and many in the public consider Fukushima to be the worst result of the earthquake/tsunami.

I still wanted to respond to this point from your post. Again, if the perception of public and media is like that, there are some reasons, whether you will find them good or bad. In my opinion, some are related to some kind of psychology, and some are facts related.

1- The tsunami is quick and as a natural disaster, only little can be done against it: it happens so violently that everyone is shocked and then of course sad for the death of so many citizens, friends, family members. After the shock, what stays in mind is sadness, but not fear.

2- On the other hand, the nuclear accident is not so shocking at first (some explosions are not visually so shocking than the images of this gigantic wave) BUT it creates of course a climate of deep fear among people because nuclear stuff is frightening (more on this below) and also because that's an ongoing situation that has to be managed by humans for the next years/decades with anxiety created by all the risks that stay present like a "Damoclès sword" (not sure about the english translation of this french expression!) over the head of Japanese. Japanese, but not only japanese. There are more than 500 reactors in the world, people can imagine better with Tchernobyl or Fukushima accidents what would happen to their families if such an accident would happen in the reactor next to them. That's why in global opinion, this nuclear accident is frightening for a lot of people, and medias reflect this.

3- This perception is increased by two factors:

3.1 After Tchernobyl, everybody (experts and politicians mainly) said that the accident was very specific to RBMK reactors, by nature more unstable than the technology used everywhere else. So basically it was said: no need to worry, our tech is much better and moreover, these russians were stupid and did stupid things to create the accident, such an accident is not possible in US, EUrope, France, etc. Still Fukushima happened, and it was in Japan with a tech that was mainly american. This creates confusion and fear in the mind of citizens, because it happened again with "top tech and no stupid russians"... So it can happen next to us?

3.2 Nuclear stuff is frightening in the minds of many people because "nuclear" is associated with bombs, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, etc, which were very impressive images, a kind of "nuclear tsunami" in fact. Of course, a nuclear plant is NOT a nuclear bomb (there are misconceptions around this very often i admit) BUT people have this representation because civil nuclear has been more or less created for military reasons by military people (getting plutonium for the bombs and missiles). The first applications of nuclear power have been military, then, as a "son tech", it has been for civil (energetic mainly) applications. This stays in mind of most people, and so, civil nuclear is in general associated in people minds with destruction, death, illness, and (last but not least) SECRECY, which was the culture inherited from military years.

That's why this is frightening ALSO (in adition to the facts above, keeping in mind that a plant like Fukushima IS still a dangerous beats for a long time of course) for many people.

This is psychology, but psychology doesn't mean pure invention or "it's wrong". It's based on facts that are associated (sometimes with misconceptions, it's true) all together to create this perception... Mr KELMM can be upset by this, but it's also a fact.
 
Last edited:
  • #748
Still Fukushima happened, and it was in Japan with a tech that was mainly american.
This creates confusion and fear in the mind of citizens, because it happened again with "top tech and no stupid russians"...

You can not imagine how surprised us.:wink:
Everything is relative, we say.
But, wait, wait, we can go very far their fabrications.
 
  • #749
Nuclear compensation fund recovery to take decades

Japan's Board of Audit says it could take more than 30 years for the government to recover funds it has invested to help compensate victims of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident.

The government has issued bonds worth 5 trillion yen, or 50 billion dollars, to help the plant's operator Tokyo Electric Power Company pay compensation. It is for people who've had to evacuate, and farmers and fishermen who've lost their livelihood.

The government plans to recover the funds through an annual pay-back by TEPCO and contributions from other nuclear power companies.

But the Board of Audit says if TEPCO does not go into the black, recovery would not end until 2044.
Even if the utility's profits improve, the funds would not be fully recovered until 2030.

The Board of Audit expects the need for government assistance to balloon further as demands for decontamination and real estate compensation increase.

The board wants TEPCO to quickly balance its finances, because the longer it takes for recovery, the heavier the burden on the national budget and taxpayers.

The board is also urging the utility to sell off its property assets and subsidiaries to minimize the burden on the public.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/english/news/20131016_40.html
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #750
russ_watters said:
Though somewhat egaggerated in wording, it is nevertheless factually accurate, though with two minor caveats

I spotted at least one serious error. Article claims that water tanks contain only tritium as a contaminant. It is obviously not true - they contain everything sans Cs.
 

Similar threads

Replies
5
Views
4K
Replies
2K
Views
447K
Replies
12
Views
49K
Replies
28
Views
10K
Replies
1
Views
3K
Replies
11
Views
4K
Back
Top