regor60 said:
I don't see 1. being any different than the original question , with the answer being 2/3. You haven't collapsed the birth order question by indicating boy, much like MH. The 1/2 probab comes from the elemental probab of a women's giving birth, but how you build the experiment from there makes all the difference
And this is why there is always a controversy about these problems, no matter how they are asked. :)
First off, birth order is only important for counting the various possibilities. It sometimes is easier if you consider a smaller number cases with
unequal probability, as I did, rather than a larger number with
equal probability. The penalty is that you have to keep track of the probability associated with each case individually, rather than merely counting cases.
Here's the solution for problem #1, "collapsing" the birth order: There are eight possible cases, based on birth order and which child you picked: BBO, BBY, BGO, BGY, GBO, GBY, GGO, and GGY. Since you actually picked a boy, you can eliminate the four cases where a girl would have been picked; leaving BBO, BBY, BGO, and GBY. Of these four equally-likely cases, in two of them the family also has a girl. The probability is therefore 2/4=1/2. (This solution is a varaition of the one used for another famous "paradox," called either Bertrand's Box Paradox or Gardner's Three-Card Swindle. The only difference is that those have three equally-likely sets-of-two, where we have four.)
Essentially, my problem #1 picks a child at random. Along the way it also picked a family at random, but the information you got was only about the child (just as in Bertrand's Box, you picked a coin at random, and for the There-Card Swindle, you picked one side of a card). In particular, the observer may never even have seen the "other" child.
In my problem #2, the information is about the family. In particular, whatever observer gave you the information (1) had to look at both children in the family, and (2) had pre-decided to tell you that at least one child was a boy whenever that was true. (As CompuChip pointed out, there was a "requirement that he will tell you that [at least one is a boy] whenever there is at least one boy.")
In my #3 and #4, it is not clear whether the observer saw one or two children; or whether there was a "requirement that he will tell you that [at least one is a boy] whenever there is at least one boy." In fact, I made a point of leaving such a requirement out. And that is what makes the two cases ambiguous.
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Let me assure you that I choose the wordings of problems #1 and #2 very carefully, so that there could be no ambiguity other than by misperception. The answers are 1/2 and 2/3, respectively. You can easily write a computer simulation to verify them, if you are so inclined.
But we have not been trained properly to see what factors are important to establishing what the probability experiment is, and what is part of the smoke and mirrors. It hasn't helped that ambiguous versions of this problem have been presented, and answered as if they always had to be similar to #2 by people who should know better. That's why I pointed ou the one person, Martin Gardner, who recognized his mistake after making it
and was honest enough to admit it.
What you need to do is figure out what the information you have is "connected to," and what possibilities exist that would allow you to get that information. In my problem #1, "boy" is connected with one individual. In my problem #2, it is connected with the most liberal observation of the family. In #3 and #4, it is not clear what it is connected to.