A Meta-Metaphysical Question

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In summary, metaphysical questions are undecidable in a formal mathematical sense, meaning that all reasonable answers to these questions give rise to contradictions within the formal systems of reasoning used to ask them. This presents a dilemma where the true explanation for the existence of the universe either contradicts reason or all questions about ultimate reality are undecidable by reason. This leads to three possible views: the universe arises from something undefinable, the true explanation is reasonable but unable to be understood, or the assumptions behind these questions are false.
  • #1
Canute
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My question is - why are metaphysical questions undecidable?

Don't feel obliged to read any more of this before answering, it's a bit long, but I wanted to put the question in some sort of context and so focus any discussion, and also see what objections are made to my thoughts on the issues.

Metaphysical questions are defined as coming ‘after’ Physics, or as having answers that lie ‘beyond’ Nature. Now, if such questions were simply beyond the reach of science to answer then we could argue that the existence and intractability of these questions is evidence for the inadequacy of the scientific method, the falsity of the ‘scientific view’, or the incoherence of the beliefs of many scientists. This is not an uncommon argument.

However metaphysical questions are not simply undecidable in this sense. They are undecidable in a formal mathematical sense. That is, all reasonable answers to a metaphysical question give rise to contradictions within the formal systems of reasoning that give rise to the question. That is to say, metaphysical questions cannot be decided within the system of reasoning used by the person who is asking the question. This is for the same reasons that ‘Gödel-sentences’ cannot be decided within the formal systems in which they arise.

What this means is that if it were found to be the case that either answer to a metaphysical question were true or false then this would contradict our reason and call into question our whole notion of logic and illogic, consistency and inconsistency. It would mean that the explanation of our existence contradicts our reason. This presents us with a stark choice of view. Either we must conclude that metaphysical questions are formally undecidable or that the true explanation for the existence of our universe contradicts reason.

This dilemma can be illustrated by looking at the question ‘did the universe arise from something or nothing?’ This is a pretty simple question, and it appears to be a perfectly reasonable and meaningful one. On the surface there seems no reason why it should be undecidable in principle.

Yet it is. This simple little question has baffled thinkers for millenia. Both answers to it give rise to logical contradictions, so neither answer can be correct according to common sense. No reasonable answer to it is given anywhere in western metaphysics or the scientific literature. It is such an impossible question that some philosophers have argued that it's not a question at all.

It doesn’t take much analysis to uncover the paradoxes that appear if we try to answer this question by deductive reasoning. If the universe arose from something that existed already then clearly this just begs the question. What did this ‘something that already existed’ itself arise from, something or nothing? And if spacetime comes into existence with this universe, as most scientists seem to believe, then how can something have existed ‘before’ this universe? In what sense can something be said to ‘exist’ if it has no extension in either time or space?

Perhaps some kind of God predated the universe. But if so where did He, She or It appear from? To appeal to a divine miracle begs the question again. Why isn’t there just nothing at all?

Perhaps philosophical idealism is true, in which case consciousness is fundamental and we are all figments of our own imagination. But this doesn’t help. Whose imagination is doing this imagining? If, as in Berkeley’s idealism, to be is to be perceived and to perceive is to be, then it is not possible for the perceiver to exist before the perceived, nor for the perceived to exist before the perceiver, nor possible for them to come into existence at the same time except by coincidence. And what did this perceiving or perceived entity arise from?

Does ex nihilo creation make sense? Cosmologist Alan Guth has conjectured that it might be possible, and even necessary, to devise a theory of how the universe comes into being from nothing. However, and perhaps this is a just matter of opinion, there seems to be an air of desperation about the idea, and I can't help feeling that any such theory would be bound to contradict reason at some point, mine anyway.

It’s hopeless. Metaphysical questions are always questions about ultimate reality, what it is that lies outside the cave, behind the world of appearances, and they have no reasonable answers. There are no exceptions to this rule for this is how we define 'metaphysical questions'.

I’ve run through all this before asking my question because sometimes metaphysical questions are thought to be simply undecidable by physics, when in fact they are undecidable in a much stronger sense than this. One of the most secure pieces of knowledge about reality that we have is that metaphysical questions, questions about what is ultimately real or ultimately true, have no reasonable answers, cannot be answered without causing logical contradictions.

The situation we find ourselves in is one in which either the existence of the universe contradicts reason, or all questions about what is ultimate and fundamental, ‘ultimate reality’ if you like, are undecidable by reason. If this is the case then there seem to be only three possible views as to why this might be the case.

The first possiblility, or possible view, is that it is not true to say that we and our universe arise from something or nothing. In this view the universe arises from ‘something’ undefinable that cannot be properly characterised as being either something or nothing, and the 'something-nothing' question, and other such questions about reality, embody false assumptions and therefore cannot be answered non-contradictorily.

The second possibility is that the true explanation for the existence of ourselves and our universe makes complete sense, is perfectly reasonable, is self-consistent in a formal mathematical sense, but that for some reason it does not appear to be so to human beings. Equivalently, the explanation is logically consistent, but in a way that is beyond the ability of human reasoning to understand.

The third possibility is that we and our universe exist for reasons that would, if we knew them, contradict our reason. This seems unlikely to me, but I notice that respected science-writer Paul Davies speculates on this possibility in his book 'The Mind of God'.

To me these seem to be the only three possibilities, and all explanations of the universe seem in the end to rest on one of these three views. However, I'm sure not everyone will agree (I hope not anyway).

My question is then, (and sorry for the length of it), why are metaphysical questions undecidable? And would you agree that the three answers to it I've outlined above are the only possibilities?
 
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  • #2
Is it possible that there's another dimension, more akin to the realm of thought let's say, which gave rise to the material dimension?
 
  • #3
I'd say very possible. But why would this make metaphysical questions undecidable?

By the way, sorry about the ridiculously long question. I can see now that I wrote far too much, but I can't get back to it to delete any of it. Is there a time limit on edits?
 
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  • #4
"If the conclusion is absurd and the logic is correct then the premises must be re-examined." The obvious logical answer is that at least one or our assumed premises must be wrong. IMHO the most likely candidates are that the universe must have a beginning, must have arisen at all much less from something or from nothing. The other is that the universe is all that there is.

If there is an "Ultimate Reality" of which the universe is part then the Ultimate reality must either have arisen or be eternal. This again begs the question as you said; so, if there must be an answer then the answer must be that something is eternal. As hard as that is to except it is more logical or reasonable than something haven arisen spontaneously without reason or cause from nothing.

To answer your question, I would say that all reasonable metaphysical questions have reasonable answers; but, as they are metaphysical questions so are the answers; that is, outside of or beyond physics.

It is not reasonable to expect a physical answer that can be empirically tested and proven to a metaphysical question. Nor is it reasonable to apply physical, scientific methodology to a metaphysical question.

I fully realize that this is not a satisfactory answer to most physicalist; but, would one reasonable use mechanical or carpentry tools to bake a cake? Physics, science and logic are after all only tools that we use to learn, know and reason. They, like all tools, are useless even harmful when misapplied.

When asking metaphysical questions we must expect, look for and accept metaphysical answers. This is perfectly logical, reasonable and acceptable to me. This is, however, totally illogical, unreasonable and unacceptable to most physicalist. This says something about physicalist but I will refrain from saying any more as I do not want to start that old fight again.
 
  • #5
I agree with a lot of that. But I feel you've slightly dodged the question. Certainly there can be no scientific answers to metaphysical questions (not unless we decide to redefine science anyway) but why are there no answers at all? This is why I wrote so much at the start, to get away from the idea that questions about reality are simply beyond science. That isn't too hard to live with, but the situation is worse than that. Why is it that, according to reason, it is impossible for any answer to these questions to ever be given?
 
  • #6
Canute said:
Why is it that, according to reason, it is impossible for any answer to these questions to ever be given?

You will have to define what you mean by reason. If you mean formal logical reasoning then the answer to your question is that most of the questions do not lend themselves to formal logical reasoning as there is no inductive or deductive proofs. That is why it is metaphysics.

There is no way that the existence of anything can be proven empirically in metaphysics because there is no empirical reasoning in metaphysics. If there is empirical reasoning then it is physics. Logic can be used but can only be used if we make assumptions that can not be proved.

In other words, to answer your question directly, if there are proven answers it isn't metaphysics. If it is metaphysics then there are no provable or reasonable answers without prior unprovable assumptions.

It is the nature of the beast, a built in catch 22. If there are reasonable answers it ain't metaphysics. If there are no reasonable answers then it is metaphysics.

The wonderful thing about metaphysics is that it is an area of pure speculation. We are free to make assumptions of any sort and go from there and there is no end, no conclusion, no restrictions and no rules. Given the beginning assumptions we should use the rules of reason and logic but that doesn't mean that there is any satisfactory conclusion to be made or even possible. If you want answers stick with mathematics or formal logic. Even physics has more questions than answers and the boundary between physics and metaphysics is blurring more and more the more we learn.
 
  • #7
Metaphysical questions have traditionally been about either being or knowledge. Those which are about knowledge risk the trap of self reference, which could lead to undecidability in the formal sense (but I am not aware of any proof that this is so). Questions about being turn on individual definitions of being, which is vague, and entails the definition of non-being, which is even more vague than being. So I don't think philosophers' sayings about being can be anything more than an art form.
 
  • #8
Canute said:
Why is it that, according to reason, it is impossible for any answer to these questions to ever be given?


The human brain may never be able to understand and answer metaphysical questions because it is bi-polar in its nature of thinking. It can only take a measurement from a position of analyzing opposite ends, based on an unchanging set of laws. Why we may never know where the universe came from, what matter is made of, or what is the mind matter relationship is, demands the question, is there something outside of physical systems? There may be but as long as it is inside of a body, analyzing the outside, we will not know what it really is, nor know the answers to which it is related. If there is a after life maybe this non-physical being will be able to analyze a holistic metaphysical existence and know those answers.
 
  • #9
Royce said:
You will have to define what you mean by reason. If you mean formal logical reasoning then the answer to your question is that most of the questions do not lend themselves to formal logical reasoning as there is no inductive or deductive proofs. That is why it is metaphysics.
Yes, that is what I mean by 'reason'.

It seems true that these questions do not lend themselves to inductive or deductive solutions, the question is why this is so.

There is no way that the existence of anything can be proven empirically in metaphysics because there is no empirical reasoning in metaphysics. If there is empirical reasoning then it is physics.
It's not correct to say that metaphysics is not empirical. The facts about the world that we know empirically are the basis for metaphysical speculation, and so are all the facts of physics. One cannot speculate metaphysically without the knowledge gained through ones sense, and it would be odd to ignore the empirically confirmed findings of physicists. These days most philosophers are pretty knowledgeable about physics, they have to be.

Logic can be used but can only be used if we make assumptions that can not be proved.
Yes, there is no other form of formal logic but the construction of systems based on unproven assumptions. But you seem to be saying that formal logic cannot be used in metaphysics, which I cannot agree with. It is formal logic that tells us that metaphysical questions are undecidable.

In other words, to answer your question directly, if there are proven answers it isn't metaphysics. If it is metaphysics then there are no provable or reasonable answers without prior unprovable assumptions.
I agree that there are no provable or reasonable answers to these questions, whether or not we make assumptions. Metaphysical questions just do not have reasonable answers. But my question was not about whether this is so, but why.

The wonderful thing about metaphysics is that it is an area of pure speculation. We are free to make assumptions of any sort and go from there and there is no end, no conclusion, no restrictions and no rules.
Here I very much disagree. Doing metaphysics isn't an excuse to give up rationality.

Given the beginning assumptions we should use the rules of reason and logic but that doesn't mean that there is any satisfactory conclusion to be made or even possible.
Yes, but why not? The questions are simple enough, why can't they be answered? For example, if materialism is true (is the case) then why can't we falsify idealism. What is it about 'reality' that prohibits us from deciding these quetions one way or the other, even if only in principle. Whether we can prove things one way or the other is not the point here. These questions cannot be answered even hypothetically without contradiction.

If you want answers stick with mathematics or formal logic. Even physics has more questions than answers and the boundary between physics and metaphysics is blurring more and more the more we learn.
Yes, I have no intention of giving up formal logic, and see no need to. I would say that formal logic suggests that metaphysical questions cannot be answered because none of their answers are correct, not because there's something logically inconsistent about our existence.
 
  • #10
Canute said:
It seems true that these questions do not lend themselves to inductive or deductive solutions, the question is why this is so.

They do, as I said. It is just that the premises and/or conclusions are not acceptable to most, primarily because the premises are speculative, subjective and not provable. For example: The universe is eternal or had a beginning. We cannot prove either way but once we accept that it had a beginning we can argue what that beginning was, the Big Bang or Created.
In ether case it had to come from somewhere or something or from nothing.
Somewhere or some hing brings another questions of where that something came from etc. This is no answer so that leaves the choice of either the universe is eternal or that from which it came is eternal. That is a valid reasonable conclusion and an answer. Is it acceptable? Most would say, no.
Yet it is a reasonable logical answer reached by reason and logic once a speculative premise is agreed upon for the sake of the argument. It is a classical method of deductive reasoning via reductio ad absurdum.

It's not correct to say that metaphysics is not empirical. The facts about the world that we know empirically are the basis for metaphysical speculation, and so are all the facts of physics. One cannot speculate metaphysically without the knowledge gained through ones sense, and it would be odd to ignore the empirically confirmed findings of physicists. These days most philosophers are pretty knowledgeable about physics, they have to be.

The word "empirical" mean to experience, measure or test. Most metaphysical questions cannot be measured or tested. That leaves experience. I and others report that we have personally experienced God in our lives. It is consistent, reproducible, verifiable, and supported by similar claims from many others. That is empirical evidence that God exists and is active in our lives. Is this scientific proof? Do you accept this as proof of the existence of God? No, of course not. Nor would (or did) I unless and until I experienced it myself. That is metaphysics. The question of the existence of God is as metaphysical as it get. We have evidence that is consistent, verifiable, reproduce able and substantiated but it is not acceptable scientific proof. Why? Because that kind of experience is not considered empirical or scientific. It is meta physical. Yet it is as I said a metaphysical answer to a metaphysical question.

Yes, there is no other form of formal logic but the construction of systems based on unproven assumptions. But you seem to be saying that formal logic cannot be used in metaphysics, which I cannot agree with. It is formal logic that tells us that metaphysical questions are undecidable.

No, I am not saying that at all. I am saying just the opposite; however, regardless of the quality of the logic or reasoning it is neither acceptable to most nor is is scientific because it is a metaphysical answer to a metaphysical question regardless of the validity of the process or conclusion because the premises must be by their very nature metaphysical speculation and therefore unprovable.

I agree that there are no provable or reasonable answers to these questions, whether or not we make assumptions. Metaphysical questions just do not have reasonable answers. But my question was not about whether this is so, but why.

I do not agree with any of this statement; nor; is is what I said in my previous or this post. Just the opposite is true in my opinion. All metaphysical questions have reasonable metaphysical answers They just don't have reasonable scientific, physical answers. Why? BECAUSE THEY AIN'T SCIENTIFIC, PHYSICAL QUESTIONS! Do you get reasonable mathematical answers when answering a logic question? No. Why? Because logic isn't mathematics.

Here I very much disagree. Doing metaphysics isn't an excuse to give up rationality.

No it isn't and I never said it was. It is a reason (not excuse) to think outside the very limited scientific box. If is isn't science, then how does one ask these questions at all unless one delves into the metaphysical? Once we have dove in why do you insist one looking for nice neat wrapped up in the the box scientific answers? All the answers are right there all around you and perfectly reasonable and acceptable withing the realm of metaphysics which is an important part of our reality whether you like it or not. If it were not real then and rational then how could you ask a real rational question about it in the first place?

Yes, but why not? The questions are simple enough, why can't they be answered? For example, if materialism is true (is the case) then why can't we falsify idealism.

Answer your own question using logic. If we cannot falsify idealism them idealism must be real. If idealism is real then materialism cannot be all there is, cannot be all inclusive and therefore must not be the case, the whole case and nothing but the case. If Idealism and Materialism are real then they both must be part of reality. Simple!

What is it about 'reality' that prohibits us from deciding these questions one way or the other, even if only in principle. Whether we can prove things one way or the other is not the point here. These questions cannot be answered even hypothetically without contradiction.

There is no contradiction. The material world, universe exists. This cannot be denied. The non-material, subjective, ideal, metaphysical world also exists. This too cannot be denied. Intent, purpose, feeling, awareness and consciousness exist, are real, cannot be denied and cannot be completely satisfactorily explained by pure materialism. Where Materialism make its fatal flaw is that it maintains that materialism is all inclusive to the exclusion of everything else. Nothing that is not material or of the material world exists or can be real. This in itself is a contradiction because Materialism is an idea, a philosophy that is purely subjective. The contradiction is contained within Materialism itself not between the material and ideal realms of reality. They are both parts of the one reality and not mutually exclusive at all but merely different aspects of the same, the one reality.

Yes, I have no intention of giving up formal logic, and see no need to. I would say that formal logic suggests that metaphysical questions cannot be answered because none of their answers are correct, not because there's something logically inconsistent about our existence.

This is not correct. I would say that formal logic (itself an ideal concept) suggests that metaphysical questions cannot give material answerers because it isn't a material subject. There is nothing inconsistent about our existence or about all of reality. It is just that there is more to reality than the physical, material and Materialism.
 
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  • #11
But we do know that everything came from or was caused by a/the eternal universal mind by whatever name or term you choose to use. Is it still metaphysics? Yes because our empirical evidence though overwhelming is not deemed scientific, material empirical evidence and therefore is not physical but metaphysical. Go figure. Oh well, so much for the mythical open, inquisitive, scientific mind.

Remember back in the good old days when the world was flat and the Earth was motionless at the center of the universe. We used to burn, hang and torture open minded inquisitive scientist. We must have got all of them, huh? Or at least taught them a lesson.
Of course now our scientist figuratively do the same thing to all of those who think outside of their neat little boxes and textbooks. I guess we have nobody to blame but ourselves.
 
  • #12
This is silly. Scientists have defined their enterprize to be based on objective checkable evidence; nullius in verbo. To slam them for not accepting your subjective, uncheckable evidence is like critcising a horse for not being a cow.

Scientists are truly open minded as a culture for things that can be checked (pace Kuhn, who distorts history to make his points). If the scientists gave up this voluntary restriction on the evidence they will take seriously, then they wouldn't be any better than the wooly dreamers and charlatans who have infested the world since the stone age, and produced nothing that can be generally used.
 
  • #13
I'm sure I posted an answer here along the lines of it is not undecideable, we just can't reach consensus on an answer.

Subjective interpretations would have you make up your own answers and be happy with them cos they are right for you as when it comes right down to it all there is is YOU.

So what happened to my posts ?
 
  • #14
RingoKid said:
So what happened to my posts ?

I deleted your posts because they were off-topic. You are using a colloquial definition of the word "undecidable", when Canute explained exactly what he meant by the term in his opening post:

Canute said:
However metaphysical questions are not simply undecidable in this sense. They are undecidable in a formal mathematical sense. That is, all reasonable answers to a metaphysical question give rise to contradictions within the formal systems of reasoning that give rise to the question. That is to say, metaphysical questions cannot be decided within the system of reasoning used by the person who is asking the question. This is for the same reasons that ‘Gödel-sentences’ cannot be decided within the formal systems in which they arise.
 
  • #15
well actuallyTom

However metaphysical questions are not simply undecidable in this sense.

The implication is there are 2 definitions of the sense in which he framed his question. In line with that my answer is perfectly on point.

I think it is an assumption on his part that there is no answer. Just because he doesn't have an answer doesn't mean the rest of us don't.
 
  • #16
...perhaps he should define what the term undecidable means or seeing as how you obviously have a handle on it's meaning then maybe you could enlighten me

I can't seem to find an accurate definiton let alone a colloquial one...
 
  • #17
RingoKid said:
However metaphysical questions are not simply undecidable in this sense.

The implication is there are 2 definitions of the sense in which he framed his question. In line with that my answer is perfectly on point.

Yes, and your responses don't refer to either definition. By one definition of "undecidable", he is saying that the answers to metaphysical questions cannot be decisively found because they cannot be found scientifically. But that's not what the thread is about. This thread is about formal undecidability, as that undecidability referred to in Goedel's theorem. Your answer is not "on point" with this at all.

I think it is an assumption on his part that there is no answer. Just because he doesn't have an answer doesn't mean the rest of us don't.

It isn't an assumption on his part. It's not a matter of opinion, it's a matter of logic.

I repeat my previous statement: Let's stay on topic, please.
 
  • #18
RingoKid said:
...perhaps he should define what the term undecidable means or seeing as how you obviously have a handle on it's meaning then maybe you could enlighten me

He did say what he meant by it. I quoted the passage.

If you are still unclear, then read this page, and follow the links therein:

Undecidable, from MathWorld

That's what he's talking about.
 
  • #19
OK then...

how about the system of reasoning and logic aren't all they are cracked up to be and one should be reluctant to rely on them solely to provide answers that cater for everybody.

I don't think they are "undecideable" . I think it is Canute that is undecided about his answers as the reasoning he is using is faulty.
 
  • #20
BTW thanks for the definition...
 
  • #21
RingoKid said:
how about the system of reasoning and logic aren't all they are cracked up to be and one should be reluctant to rely on them solely to provide answers that cater for everybody.

So you're attacking first order logic now? On what basis?

I don't think they are "undecideable" . I think it is Canute that is undecided about his answers as the reasoning he is using is faulty.

:rofl:

So basically your response is, "You're wrong because your reasoning is wrong," without a word of explanation.

That's not philosophy, and if you keep up this line of "argumentation", then you needn't wonder where your posts have disappeared to, because I am going to delete them.
 
  • #22
Royce said:
There is no contradiction. The material world, universe exists. This cannot be denied. The non-material, subjective, ideal, metaphysical world also exists. This too cannot be denied.

But this is not consistent with the antecedent condition set forth by Canute. He said that if materialism is true, then idealism remains unfalsifiable. Materialism doesn't allow for what you describe here. Materialism says that knowledge of the physical state of existents is the only knowledge that there is. So if such a thing is true, then why is idealism not falsifiable, even in principle?
 
  • #23
selfAdjoint said:
This is silly. Scientists have defined their enterprize to be based on objective checkable evidence; nullius in verbo. To slam them for not accepting your subjective, uncheckable evidence is like critcising a horse for not being a cow.

Yes it is. It was meant to be satire, you know funny; but, failed miserably. I was out of sorts when I posted it and couldn't resisted taking a jab at materialist and scientist in general. I apologize and would rathe see that part of the post deleted.

Scientists are truly open minded as a culture for things that can be checked (pace Kuhn, who distorts history to make his points). If the scientists gave up this voluntary restriction on the evidence they will take seriously, then they wouldn't be any better than the wooly dreamers and charlatans who have infested the world since the stone age, and produced nothing that can be generally used.

Scientist are people and some people are open minded and some are not. It often take ten years or so before a new theory is accepted whether fully supported by evidence and fully substantiated or not. It is often a bitter and dirty fight. Sometime this is a good thing some time not so good. People hate change and hate to see their life long work go into the trash can. I can understand that but expect more from scientists who pride themselves for being so open minded. This is my problem not theirs I guess.
 
  • #24
Royce said:
They do, as I said. It is just that the premises and/or conclusions are not acceptable to most, primarily because the premises are speculative, subjective and not provable. For example: The universe is eternal or had a beginning. We cannot prove either way but once we accept that it had a beginning we can argue what that beginning was, the Big Bang or Created.
In either case it had to come from somewhere or something or from nothing.
But this is precisely the problem. These three answers are not reasonable. If one of them was reasonable then philosophers would have realized this long ago. Instead the question is deemed undecidable, in other words it has no reasonable answer.

Somewhere or something brings another questions of where that something came from etc. This is no answer so that leaves the choice of either the universe is eternal or that from which it came is eternal. That is a valid reasonable conclusion and an answer. Is it acceptable? Most would say, no.
Exactly.

Yet it is a reasonable logical answer reached by reason and logic once a speculative premise is agreed upon for the sake of the argument. It is a classical method of deductive reasoning via reductio ad absurdum.
I'm not sure what premise you are referring to here. But in any case this line of reasoning ends up showing that the idea of the universe arising from something that has existed eternally is either absurd or simply begs the question.

Most metaphysical questions cannot be measured or tested.
Not sure what you mean here.

That leaves experience. I and others report that we have personally experienced God in our lives. It is consistent, reproducible, verifiable, and supported by similar claims from many others. That is empirical evidence that God exists and is active in our lives. Is this scientific proof? Do you accept this as proof of the existence of God? No, of course not. Nor would (or did) I unless and until I experienced it myself. That is metaphysics. The question of the existence of God is as metaphysical as it get.
I agree that if one reasons about the existence of God then one is doing metaphysics. However if one experiences God directly this is not metaphysics, it is revelation. I have no problem with the idea of revelation through direct experience. But that doesn't address my original question.

We have evidence that is consistent, verifiable, reproduce able and substantiated but it is not acceptable scientific proof. Why? Because that kind of experience is not considered empirical or scientific. It is meta physical. Yet it is as I said a metaphysical answer to a metaphysical question.
I feel this is a confusing use of the term 'metaphysical', but I see what you mean. However the issue here is a little more subtle than this. I completely agree with you that metaphysical questions can only be dealt with by transcending metaphysics, but this does not alter the fact that these questions are undecidable. That is, through experience one may discover why metaphysical questions are undecidable, but one cannot decide them by any method.

it is neither acceptable to most nor is is scientific because it is a metaphysical answer to a metaphysical question regardless of the validity of the process or conclusion because the premises must be by their very nature metaphysical speculation and therefore unprovable.
But you have not yet given an answer to any metaphysical question, scientific or not. Asserting that God exists does nothing at all to address such questions. Even if He does exist the questions remain. This is why A. N. Whitehead characterised Christianity as 'a religion in search of a metaphysic'.

All metaphysical questions have reasonable metaphysical answers

I don't think you'll find any philosophers who agree with you. It is the lack of reasonable answers to such questions makes them undecidable.

They just don't have reasonable scientific, physical answers. Why? BECAUSE THEY AIN'T SCIENTIFIC, PHYSICAL QUESTIONS!
They have no reasonable answers, scientific or not. I feel that you're missing this important point.

No it isn't and I never said it was. It is a reason (not excuse) to think outside the very limited scientific box. If is isn't science, then how does one ask these questions at all unless one delves into the metaphysical? Once we have dove in why do you insist one looking for nice neat wrapped up in the the box scientific answers?
I was trying to avoid getting into a anti-science thing here. One cannot blame science for not being able to answer metaphysical questions when nobody at all can answer them.

If we cannot falsify idealism them idealism must be real. If idealism is real then materialism cannot be all there is, cannot be all inclusive and therefore must not be the case, the whole case and nothing but the case. If Idealism and Materialism are real then they both must be part of reality. Simple!
I can't follow your argument here. Philosophical idealism is also unverifiable, but it doesn't follow from this that idealism is not the case. A thing isn't true just because we cannot show that it's false.

There is no contradiction. The material world, universe exists. This cannot be denied.
Don't count on it. Many people assert that in the final analysis it's an illusion.

Where Materialism make its fatal flaw is that it maintains that materialism is all inclusive to the exclusion of everything else. Nothing that is not material or of the material world exists or can be real. This in itself is a contradiction because Materialism is an idea, a philosophy that is purely subjective.
Yes, materialism is a metaphysical doctrine. As such it gives rise to contradictions, just like most forms of idealism. It is not, and never will be, a testable scientific theory.

This is not correct. I would say that formal logic (itself an ideal concept) suggests that metaphysical questions cannot give material answerers because it isn't a material subject. There is nothing inconsistent about our existence or about all of reality. It is just that there is more to reality than the physical, material and Materialism.
Perhaps. But again you are criticising science for its limits, when it precisely those limits that makes science do-able. I agree that science cannot explain the existence of the physical universe or consciousness. But how does this help explain why metaphysical questions are undecidable?
 
  • #25
Tom Mattson said:
But this is not consistent with the antecedent condition set forth by Canute. He said that if materialism is true, then idealism remains unfalsifiable. Materialism doesn't allow for what you describe here. Materialism says that knowledge of the physical state of existents is the only knowledge that there is. So if such a thing is true, then why is idealism not falsifiable, even in principle?

Yes, Tom of course you are right if materialism is true and idealism remains unfalsifiablethen there is a contradiction.

However, if a statement contains a contradiction or is self contrdictory then the statement itself cannot be true.

If the statement is not true then both of the premises cannot be true.

idealism is unfalsifiable is true.

Therefore Materialism as stated must be false.

"Materialism says that knowledge of the physical state of existents is the only knowledge that there is."

Knowledge is subjective, non-material
If the non-material can exist is one form it can logically exist in principle in another form.
The Materialistic statement cannot logically deny its own existence.
If it is true then it is possible for idealism to be true.
There is no contradiction because Materialism as stated is false.

Practically speaking it is obvious and cannot be denied that the material universe exists and is real. It also cannot be denied that knowledge exists and is real. It is the tenet of materialism that one and only one form of knowledge can exits. Materialism is all inclusive and excludes the possibility of anything else existing. Therefore if materialism is true and idealism is unfalsifiable then either idealism is materialistic knowledge or Materialism is false. Take your choice. There can be no contradiction.
 
  • #26
selfAdjoint said:
Metaphysical questions have traditionally been about either being or knowledge. Those which are about knowledge risk the trap of self reference, which could lead to undecidability in the formal sense (but I am not aware of any proof that this is so). Questions about being turn on individual definitions of being, which is vague, and entails the definition of non-being, which is even more vague than being. So I don't think philosophers' sayings about being can be anything more than an art form.
I'm not sure that you're right about this, but there's probably more than one way of looking at it. To me metaphysics does not deal with Being, but with beings, which is a rather different thing. This was Heideggers view, and I wish I could express myself like he could on this. His lecture 'What is Metaphysics', which is online here and there, is worth a read.

It seems true that metaphysical questions nearly always raise epistemilogical issues, but as questions they are not generally about knowledge. If we ask 'is materialism the case' then this is very nearly a scientific question. It does raise questions about what is knowable, but the question in itself is about cosmology. It's a simple question really, and in principle at least one would expect it to be decidable. It is true that immediately one attempts to decide it one becomes enmired in questions of how we know things and what we can know, but the question itself is not about knowledge.

Tom - thanks for the stuff about undecidability. I should have been more clear about this at the start.
 
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  • #27
Tom Mattson said:
But this is not consistent with the antecedent condition set forth by Canute. He said that if materialism is true, then idealism remains unfalsifiable. Materialism doesn't allow for what you describe here. Materialism says that knowledge of the physical state of existents is the only knowledge that there is. So if such a thing is true, then why is idealism not falsifiable, even in principle?
No, I don't believe that's what he said at all. Indeed, it sounded very much like he was inquiring as to why this should be true. Which of course is not the same thing.
 
  • #28
Iacchus32 said:
No, I don't believe that's what he said at all. Indeed, it sounded very much like he was inquiring as to why this should be true. Which of course is not the same thing.
You're right, that isn't quite what I wrote. However Tom's version is better in a way. If materialism is true then we will never be able to know it, because however hard we try we will never be able to show that idealism is false.

This entails that science will never be able to explain what matter is made out of, which is what is the case according to most philosophers, western and eastern. In western philosophy this conclusion is reached by all those who attempt to solve the old 'problem of attributes', of what it is that underlies the observable attributes of 'physical' objects. There is no reasonable answer. It is a metaphysical question, not just beyond science but beyond reason.

Our reason tells us that the question is a fair one, for surely there must be something that exists that is fundamental. But what do we mean by 'exists'. The term implies physical attributes like extension, size, location and so on. Does it make sense to say that matter is made out of something that has the properties of matter? This would be to say that matter is made out of matter. But does it make sense to say that matter is made out of something that isn't matter but that exists?

Yet the alternative is that matter is made out of nothing, and this is no better. All the answers contradict reason, and the question is deemed 'metaphysical'. We can prove that it cannot be decided. Inevitably it is impossible to give a consistent and complete explanation of what matter is made out of, never mind consciousness.

But idealism (of anything like Berkeley's kind anyway) is unfalsifiable whether or not materialism is true. It is unfalsifiable according to everybody's reason, not just those who make materialist assumptions. When we try to construct a logically consistent 'Explanation of Everything that Exists' that is predicated on the idea that either mind or matter is fundamental, we find that it cannot be done, for according to our reason it wouldn't make sense. So it's a metaphysical question.

I suspect that that philosophical materialism is also unfalsifiable, but I've never seen this argued anywhere, so maybe I'm wrong.

P.S. Philosophical Idealism is unfalsifiable because the question 'is philosophical idealism false?' is undecidable. Whether this is because idealism is not entirely false or a consequence of the way we reason is a matter of opinion. Philosophers are divided, and it may well be both.
 
  • #29
Canute said:
You're right, that isn't quite what I wrote. However Tom's version is better in a way. If materialism is true then we will never be able to know it, because however hard we try we will never be able to show that idealism is false.
But are you sure this isn't just a way of dismissing it and washing your hands of it entirely? Of course this is my own opinion here. :smile: Surely we can't be left with the possibility that something stems from nothing can we?


This entails that science will never be able to explain what matter is made out of, which is what is the case according to most philosophers, western and eastern. In western philosophy this conclusion is reached by all those who attempt to solve the old 'problem of attributes', of what it is that underlies the observable attributes of 'physical' objects. There is no reasonable answer. It is a metaphysical question, not just beyond science but beyond reason.
So, was there in fact nothing before the Big Bang? Or, nothing in the physical sense? While the fact is we are all here which, to me can only suggest one thing, that the material does extend from the immaterial, which must have existed prior to the Big Bang. In which case I think we have to ask, what is this immaterial realm that we're speaking of? And what, if any, is the difference between it and the realm of our thoughts? ... which of course is abstract and metaphysical.
 
  • #30
Iacchus32 said:
No, I don't believe that's what he said at all. Indeed, it sounded very much like he was inquiring as to why this should be true. Which of course is not the same thing.

Nope. He specifically put it in the form of a conditional.
 
  • #31
Royce said:
However, if a statement contains a contradiction or is self contrdictory then the statement itself cannot be true.

What Canute is talking about here are propositions that are undecidable. So the thing on the table right now are precisely those propositions about which you cannot say whether or not they "cannot be true", in the context of the formal system in which they are derived.

If the statement is not true then both of the premises cannot be true.

idealism is unfalsifiable is true.

Therefore Materialism as stated must be false.

Again, you are assuming decidability. This is the very thing under discussion!

There can be no contradiction.

I agree that there is no contradiction to reality, but I don't think that that is what this thread is about. This thread is about the conceptual tools that are used to analyze reality, and the question, "Why, to what extent, and in what capacity do those tools break down?"

The way I understand Canute's posts, that is the central question here, and what you are saying doesn't seem to address it.
 
  • #32
Canute said:
You're right, that isn't quite what I wrote.

I didn't mean to misrepresent. Here's the bit I was referring to.

Canute said:
For example, if materialism is true (is the case) then why can't we falsify idealism. What is it about 'reality' that prohibits us from deciding these quetions one way or the other, even if only in principle. Whether we can prove things one way or the other is not the point here. These questions cannot be answered even hypothetically without contradiction.

I thought I had interpreted it as you meant it. :confused:
 
  • #33
Iacchus32 said:
But are you sure this isn't just a way of dismissing it and washing your hands of it entirely? Of course this is my own opinion here. :smile: Surely we can't be left with the possibility that something stems from nothing can we?
Very little of what I've said so far is just my opinion. In fact I meant to steer clear of my opinions completely. All I have meant to do so far is outline the situation we are in regarding metaphysical questions.

We are very confronted with the idea that something stems from nothing. I don't believe it makes sense, but as I said earlier, at least one respected cosmologist is hoping for a theory of ex nihilo creation. But we are not forced to accept ex nihilo creation. The problem is that it makes no more and no less sense than the other candidates for a logically consistent explanation of the existence of the universe. This is the defining characteristic of metaphysical questions.

By the way, the fact that these questions are undecidable does not necessarily mean that there is anything irrational about the explanation of existence, but it does suggest that there are assumptions hidden in these questions which makes them unanswerable as they stand.

So, was there in fact nothing before the Big Bang? Or, nothing in the physical sense? While the fact is we are all here which, to me can only suggest one thing, that the material does extend from the immaterial, which must have existed prior to the Big Bang. In which case I think we have to ask, what is this immaterial realm that we're speaking of? And what, if any, is the difference between it and the realm of our thoughts? ... which of course is abstract and metaphysical.
Yep, this where one ends up, with immateriality. But the trouble is that in itself this doesn't solve the problem. Even if we say that the universe arises from 'something' that is immaterial the question of why we cannot reach this conclusion by reason remains. After all, if it made sense that the material world had immaterial origins then the question of its origins, while it would still be metaphysical, would not be formally undecidable. It would just be scientifically untestable, which is a different thing.
 
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  • #34
Tom Mattson said:
I didn't mean to misrepresent. Here's the bit I was referring to...I thought I had interpreted it as you meant it. :confused:
Your interpretation was fine by me, but I didn't originally mean to say that if materialism is true then this would imply the unfalsifiability of idealism. Idealism is unfalsifiable whether or not materialism is true. I linked them simply because it is the unfalsifiability of idealism that allows us to know that we cannot construct a proof of materialism. However I can see that the sentence can read in the way you did. It's not an important point. You didn't really misrepresent, and I agree with everything you've posted so far.
 
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  • #35
Canute said:
Yep, this where one ends up, with immateriality. But the trouble is that in itself this doesn't solve the problem. Even if we say that the universe arises from 'something' that is immaterial the question of why we cannot reach this conclusion by reason remains. After all, if it made sense that the material world had immaterial origins then the question of its origins, while it would still be metaphysical, would not be formally undecidable. It would just be scientifically untestable, which is a different thing.
And yet the fact is we're here, so something must have happened in order to bring that about. So, what else could we conclude then, except that the immaterial is another dimension, and perhaps we should try to examine it in that respect? ... i.e., how one dimension has an effect upon another. Perhaps we can begin with our very own thinking process which, no doubt entails the immaterial (as well as the metaphysical) housed within the material. Isn't this in fact what we're looking for? Indeed, maybe it all boils down to our ability to think and, reason about things? In fact, how would we know anything, without the ability to do this?

So what is the truth (not to say it doesn't exist) without a mind which is capable of recognizing it? Whereas at what point does the mind recognize it ... within this immaterial dimension we're speaking about here? Certainly the recognition of truth is not external is it? ... albeit what we recognize may be external or, for that matter internal.
 
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