Vitalist nonsense versus Science.

[Mentat]

I don't normally lump all of scientific discovery and inquiry into just "science", nor do I normally call an idea "nonsense", but I have reasons on this particular occasion.

Vitalism was the idea that, no matter how well science and philosophy could explain the function that produce "life", they could never explain what the "life" itself was. This is nonsense. It was shown, through many different fields of science and philosophy (hence the lumping together..."science"), that "life" had no meaning except for those exact functions that the vitalists had deemed unsatisfactory.

So, science has discovered that some supposed "mysteries" are not mysteries at all, but there simply needs to be a re-intuiting of the concept being studied - such that the function that were said to "produce" the mysterious phenomenon can now be seen to be the phenomenon, and there is nothing more to add.

The reason I bring this up is because of the current problems with consciousness. People constantly say that scientific explanations of the functions of the brain will not be enough to explain how they "produce" consciousness. Well, I say (in agreement with Daniel Dennett and many cognitive scientists) that these functions are the consciousness, and there's nothing more (mysterious) to find.

Indeed, I'm surprised that the proponents of the vitalist view of consciousness can't see that they are doing just what the previous vitalists did with regard to "life". In fact, one philosopher has gone so far as to mention these previous vitalists, but then to say that he was different in his view of consciousness, since no physical function could ever be shown to be "subjective awareness"...isn't that exactly what the "life" vitalists said?!? It's not like people with such views are saying that you can't explain these mysteries because the physical functions can't be explained well enough. No, they are/were saying exactly what Chalmers (the aforementioned philosopher was David Chalmers, btw) said: "You can explain all of the physical functions, but you can never explain why this produces the mysterious phenomenon.

 

[Canute]

Ok. You think Dennett is right and Chalmers is wrong, and there's a few non-philosophers who agree with you. What's your point? And what's vitalism got to do with anything?

Do you actually have an answer to Chalmers, or have you just made your mind up?

Are you aware that Dennett has no impact at all on the debate, other than to generate more of it?

 

[Canute]

Ok. You think Dennett is right and Chalmers is wrong, and there's a few non-philosophers who agree with you. What's your point?

And what's vitalism got to do with anything?

 

[selfAdjoint]

In other words our posts are futile unless we can "Fisk" Chalmers? Nuts to that. And be careful what you ask for.

Without any refereence to Dennett, Chalmers or anybody else's favorite guru there is indeed a lot of unexamined vitalism in the debates on consciousness. And it is right to show it up.

 

[Sikz]

The reason I bring this up is because of the current problems with consciousness. People constantly say that scientific explanations of the functions of the brain will not be enough to explain how they "produce" consciousness. Well, I say (in agreement with Daniel Dennett and many cognitive scientists) that these functions are the consciousness, and there's nothing more (mysterious) to find.

But see, it ISN'T like that. Life is not a feeling, that's the difference. We can look at something and say "That is alive" or "That is not alive", but we can't look at something and say "That is conscious" and "That is not conscious". That's the first big clue that it is something more than a process.

What it ties into is the question of "Do concepts exist?". When you think, for example, of a horse- is that thought only a pattern of electrons in your brain (technicly if your answer is no, it isn't a PATTERN either, since patterns are concepts), or is it something else? The image of a horse that you have in your mind, is that image simply some electricity (I use ideas like "electricity" and "patterns" here, but be aware that if concepts are not real these things are not real either, since their definitions are concepts. They would still "exist" in a way... Maybe. Heh.), or is it an image produced by electricity?

This question ties into yet another, "Are subjective experiences the only things that matter, or is there some sort of objective reality? What is reality?". Two, actually. I'm not going to go into all of this, we would simply travel along a vast chain of philosophical questions. You see my point though, I hope?

You can easily imagine yourself without consciousness. You would not have a field of vision; your eyes would take in information and transmit it to your brain as electrical impulses, but there is no reason you would actually "see" the image (you might argue that the definition of "see" is what I have just described. However, you can imagine the same function being carried out without the actual "image" being percieved- therefore there must be some seperation). Variables would be extracted from the image and fed into the programs of your brain (like a computer). Complex equations would take place, chemicals would be released and affect these equations, neurons would fire all over the place... And then a signal would be transmitted to the group of cells known as an "arm" or a "leg" or whatever other part of the body they might be, and it would carry out a task. You can imagine this entire process without the actual quality of "seeing" or of "feeling". There is no reason why you should FEEL an emotion instead of just having the chemicals effect your behaviour. That is what consciousness is, and that is why it is not defined simply as the processes.

I realize that you might just deny this... It is not undeniable fact. Consciousness isn't the processes occurring, it is FEELING the processes occurring. You can deny that you feel anything, but that doesn't serve much purpose. Whether you feel anything or not(or whether you understand the distinction of experiencing and feeling or not- I've talked to some people about this who simply could NOT understand me, but they showed up a day or two later and said they thought and thought and finally got it) is irrelevant, because other people do. You can deny that all you want, but it won't make a difference, because people know they do feel. And feeling is not a function of these processes- self awareness is, experience is, but not feeling. It's impossible for it to be a physical function.

Anyway, I shall stop now. Hopefully you understand what I'm saying. :)

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by selfAdjoint
In other words our posts are futile unless we can "Fisk" Chalmers? Nuts to that. And be careful what you ask for.

Did I say that? Uh, no.

I asked what the point of the post was. It's an interesting topic but there's nothing to say to someone who just asserts their opinion with no reasoning to accompany it.

Without any refereence to Dennett, Chalmers or anybody else's favorite guru there is indeed a lot of unexamined vitalism in the debates on consciousness. And it is right to show it up. [/B]

Perhaps, but vitalism in its old form is dead. It just muddles the issues to lump it together with the the issue of consciousnes. A bit of rigour wouldn't go amiss around here imho. Too much temperamental opinion.

It's a fascinating and difficult topic, one which baffles everyone in science at the moment. People post here as if they've never looked into, but are certain of the answer. This stifles sensible discussion.

 

[selfAdjoint]

You say that vitalism is dead, and that the consciousness discussion is not about vitalism. I say that any position that claims outright that "there are some things scientists will never know" is pure vitalism, unless it's superstition. And that is what I read Chalmers as saying.

And yes I do go back a long way with the arguments of Searle and Nagle and all, and I dearly hope we're not going to retrace that whole weary road again.

 

[Canute]

The claim that there are some things that science will never be able to know has got nothing at all to do with vitalism. Try reading Colin Mcginn and 'mysterianism', and he's a materialist.

 

[Sikz]

You say that vitalism is dead, and that the consciousness discussion is not about vitalism. I say that any position that claims outright that "there are some things scientists will never know" is pure vitalism, unless it's superstition. And that is what I read Chalmers as saying.

"there are some things scientists will never know"... Science can never provide an understanding of itself. Science is a set of laws describing the physical universe, not a description of those laws. Saying that a certain set of these laws being realized in a certain way IS something else makes no sense. There could be laws governing the laws of science, and laws governing those laws. Without knowledge of such, we can't provide an unquestionable description of any final result (in this case consciousness). Here is how it appears:

consciousness
sciencelaw1 sciencelaw2 sciencelaw3

You can easily say, if we know this to be correct, that the correct combination of sciencelaws produces consciousness, and you are equally validated in saying that these sciencelaws ARE consciousness. A definition or a description of production- they are essentially the same. For instance:

triangle
3lines intersectinglines

That is a definition AND a description of production. Both mean the same thing. However, since science does not describe itself, our consciousness definition could look like this:

consciousness
otherlaw6 otherlaw7
law1 law2 law3 law4 law5
sciencelaw1 sciencelaw2 sciencelaw3

 

[Sikz]

Of course, that could apply to our triangle example as well... However, triangles are man's creation- so we know all the laws that apply to them (seeing as we created those laws). Consciousness is not our creation... so we don't know all the laws. Also, no one has ever (to my knowledge) actually provided a definition of consciousness (or the functions that produce/define it). What would they be? Everyone's brain is different, yet we are all conscious... Are animals conscious? Computers? Rocks? These discussions aren't very productive without an actual specification of the things that produce/define consciousness itself.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Sikz
But see, it ISN'T like that. Life is not a feeling, that's the difference. We can look at something and say "That is alive" or "That is not alive"...

Ah, but we can't. Have you been to my other thread "Why call it 'alive'?"? There is no working definition of life. However, there is the biological definition, and from that we can say "this is alive and that is not alive", but this speaks only of functions, which the vitalists thought was not enough. Consciousness, as per the intentional stance, is also "just a function" which the current vitalists don't seem to think is enough.

What it ties into is the question of "Do concepts exist?". When you think, for example, of a horse- is that thought only a pattern of electrons in your brain (technicly if your answer is no, it isn't a PATTERN either, since patterns are concepts), or is it something else? The image of a horse that you have in your mind, is that image simply some electricity (I use ideas like "electricity" and "patterns" here, but be aware that if concepts are not real these things are not real either, since their definitions are concepts. They would still "exist" in a way... Maybe. Heh.), or is it an image produced by electricity?

I actually (currently) think that the image of a horse is a spatial stimulation of synchronously-firing interneurons in the neocortex, which was begun in response to the observation of a horse.

You can easily imagine yourself without consciousness. You would not have a field of vision; your eyes would take in information and transmit it to your brain as electrical impulses, but there is no reason you would actually "see" the image (you might argue that the definition of "see" is what I have just described. However, you can imagine the same function being carried out without the actual "image" being percieved- therefore there must be some seperation). Variables would be extracted from the image and fed into the programs of your brain (like a computer). Complex equations would take place, chemicals would be released and affect these equations, neurons would fire all over the place... And then a signal would be transmitted to the group of cells known as an "arm" or a "leg" or whatever other part of the body they might be, and it would carry out a task. You can imagine this entire process without the actual quality of "seeing" or of "feeling". There is no reason why you should FEEL an emotion instead of just having the chemicals effect your behaviour.

But this is a vitalist-type statement, and flies in the face of the Scientific Method. This Method would dictate that there "FEELings" are "just" chemicals that effect your behavior. Why should there be anything else?

I realize that you might just deny this... It is not undeniable fact. Consciousness isn't the processes occurring, it is FEELING the processes occurring.

But "feeling" is also a process.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
The claim that there are some things that science will never be able to know has got nothing at all to do with vitalism. Try reading Colin Mcginn and 'mysterianism', and he's a materialist.

The claim that there are some things that science will never be able to know isn't exactly my definition of "vitalism". It is, IMHO, the claim that some mysteries exist on a plain beyond that of the physical processes that "produce" them. The problem with this is that, in the first instance (the instance to do with "life"), it was shown that the supposed "mystery" really was (not "was produced by", but was) the physical processes involved; and, in the second case (with regard to consciousness) it is now stunting science's ability to do what it does, since so many people are still holding to the vitalist view that "you may explain all of the physical processes involved, but you will never explain the mysterious phenomenon that they produce.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
The claim that there are some things that science will never be able to know isn't exactly my definition of "vitalism". It is, IMHO, the claim that some mysteries exist on a plain beyond that of the physical processes that "produce" them.

That is not vitalism, that is mysticism.

The problem with this is that, in the first instance (the instance to do with "life"), it was shown that the supposed "mystery" really was (not "was produced by", but was) the physical processes involved;

Nobody has shown that (if I understand you right). It's the just the scientifically orthodox hypothesis.

and, in the second case (with regard to consciousness) it is now stunting science's ability to do what it does, since so many people are still holding to the vitalist view that "you may explain all of the physical processes involved, but you will never explain the mysterious phenomenon that they produce. [/B]

You're muddling vitalism with a load of other things here. Vitalism is a claim about life, not about the epistemlogy of science.

I'm sure it's a nuisance that some people's opinions about the limits of science are stunting science's growth. However they are not all vitalists, most of them, like Plato, Popper, Kant, McGinn, Plank, Penrose and Hawkings, are just very aware of the difficult logical relationship between scientific hypothesising, indeed all hypothesising, and what all these hypotheses are about, namely reality itself and what is really true.

I don't think many of these folk would be pleased to be called a vitalist.

 

[Jeebus]

Originally posted by Canute
...You're muddling vitalism with a load of other things here. Vitalism is a claim about life, not about the epistemlogy of science.

While I agree with Canute here, I also think that vitalism is the metaphysical doctrine that living organisms possesses a non-physical inner force or energy that gives them the property of life of organic matter. Maybe this helps, maybe it doesn't.

The belief dating to around 1600 that matter was divided into two classes based on behavior with respect to heat: organic and inorganic. Inorganic material could be melted but could always be recovered by removing the heat source. Organic compounds changed form upon heating and could not be recovered by removing the heat source. The proposed explanation for the difference between organic and inorganic compounds was the Vitalism Theory, which stated that inorganic materials did not contain the "vital force" of life and lasted until the mid-nineteenth century.

© Eric W. Weisstein

I'm sure it's a nuisance that some people's opinions about the limits of science are stunting science's growth. However they are not all vitalists, most of them, like Plato, Popper, Kant, McGinn, Plank, Penrose and Hawkings, are just very aware of the difficult logical relationship between scientific hypothesising, indeed all hypothesising, and what all these hypotheses are about, namely reality itself and what is really true.

Why are the people you selected pretty much all dead? I have a question. What's wrong with mysticism? To begin, mysteries about life persist in the face of reductionist science.

 

[selfAdjoint]

I'm sure it's a nuisance that some people's opinions about the limits of science are stunting science's growth. However they are not all vitalists, most of them, like Plato, Popper, Kant, McGinn, Plank, Penrose and Hawkings, are just very aware of the difficult logical relationship between scientific hypothesising, indeed all hypothesising, and what all these hypotheses are about, namely reality itself and what is really true.

Not one of these worthy gentlemen has stunted the growth of science. No, not even Plato. Nor have the philosophers who have erected "The Hard Problem" into job security. Science ignores them and goes about its business.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
That is not vitalism, that is mysticism.

I see. So vitalism was just a form of mysticism (to do with the essence of "life")?

Nobody has shown that (if I understand you right). It's the just the scientifically orthodox hypothesis.

Yes, it is the scientific answer. And since it was the scientific answer in this case, why should we not assume (as has Dennett) that the scientific answer to the problem of consciousness is that it is the process?

You're muddling vitalism with a load of other things here. Vitalism is a claim about life, not about the epistemlogy of science.

I'm sure it's a nuisance that some people's opinions about the limits of science are stunting science's growth. However they are not all vitalists, most of them, like Plato, Popper, Kant, McGinn, Plank, Penrose and Hawkings, are just very aware of the difficult logical relationship between scientific hypothesising, indeed all hypothesising, and what all these hypotheses are about, namely reality itself and what is really true.

I don't think many of these folk would be pleased to be called a vitalist.

Well, I won't state my personal opinions about those particular people; however, I know that Chalmer's view looks just like the vitalist view of life, and that's why I posted this thread: To see if the consciousness problem can be gotten rid of by a more scientific approach.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by selfAdjoint
Not one of these worthy gentlemen has stunted the growth of science. No, not even Plato. Nor have the philosophers who have erected "The Hard Problem" into job security. Science ignores them and goes about its business.

Of course your're right. I was pointing out to Mentat that it was a bit daft to think that they had.

As you say, science has no way of addressing the hard problem, but must carry on regardless.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
I see. So vitalism was just a form of mysticism (to do with the essence of "life")?

I suppose so. I'm not quite sure of the defintions of these things.

Yes, it is the scientific answer.

Science doesn't have an answer. It has a hypothesis.

And since it was the scientific answer in this case, why should we not assume (as has Dennett) that the scientific answer to the problem of consciousness is that it is the process?

Because nearly everybody else thinks the idea doesn't make any sense. Science would love to adopt Dennett's view, but it can't. It doesn't add up, even to most scientists.

Well, I won't state my personal opinions about those particular people; however, I know that Chalmer's view looks just like the vitalist view of life,

I doubt that Chalmers would agree.

and that's why I posted this thread: To see if the consciousness problem can be gotten rid of by a more scientific approach. [/B]

The evidence of science, and the analysis of the logic of the situation by philosophers suggests that it can't. Perhaps science can 'get rid' of it if decides to redefine itself slightly, but not otherwise, at least according to most people who don't earn a living looking for it scientifically.

 

[metacristi]

Mentat

No, they are/were saying exactly what Chalmers (the aforementioned philosopher was David Chalmers, btw) said: "You can explain all of the physical functions, but you can never explain why this produces the mysterious phenomenon.

Actually Chalmers' position is much more complex,he doesn't claim that science cannot explain consciousness,he is only skeptical that neurology alone will be able to explain it.I have saved once from the net an interview with Chalmers,here is an excerpt from it:

You argue in your work that neuroscience will not be able to give a complete theory of consciousness. Do you think that current scientific work on consciousness is misguided?


Chalmers:Sometimes the sort of non-materialist view I put forward is seen as anti-scientific, but I don't see it that way at all. I argue that neuroscience alone isn't enough to explain consciousness, but I think it will be a major part of an eventual theory. We just need to add something else, some new fundamental principles, to bridge the gap between neuroscience and subjective experience. Actually, I think my view is compatible with much of the work going on now in neuroscience and psychology, where people are studying the relationship of consciousness to neural and cognitive processes without really trying to reduce it to those processes. We are just getting much more detailed knowledge of the associations and correlations between them. Things are still in early stages, but one can imagine that as we build up and systematize our theories of these associations, and try to boil them down to their core, the result might point us toward the sort of fundamental principles I advocate. Of course that's a long way off yet.

Basically he argues,without making positive claims,that the actual knowledge is necessary but not sufficient to explain all features of consciousness as we know it.His position is rational the 'zombies','Mary's chamber' or 'Chinese room' philosophical arguments against the computational emergentist approach are enough to back a rational skepticism.Indeed,nonwithstanding Dennet's brave attempt,we are far from having sufficient reasons that the emergentist computational theory of consciousness is (approximatively) correct.I would name it a conjecture,we are only at the beginning of our quest to find a 'holistic' theory of consciousness (any unbiased scientist will recognize this).


I would argue also that vitalists do not make the generic claim that science cannot understand life,maybe some of them but not all,many of them merely doubt that the current known facts can lead to a successful theory of life.A sort of 'interactionist dualism' (we cannot put in evidence currently,the interaction being too weak) is still a feasible posibility (though we have no dualist scientific hypothesis as of now).Indeed,at most,Dennet's arguments are efficient against the cartesian type of dualism,but not against all types of dualism.Eccles' hypothesis (though it does not attain the status of scientific hypothesis) is a good example:dualism neither needs a 'cartesian theatre' nor break the conservation of energy law...The mistery remains...only time will settle things...

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
Science doesn't have an answer. It has a hypothesis.

What's the difference?

Because nearly everybody else thinks the idea doesn't make any sense. Science would love to adopt Dennett's view, but it can't. It doesn't add up, even to most scientists.

And yet all of the scientific attempts at explaining consciousness have fallen right into Dennett's predicted standards (and I've read at least 4 by now).

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
What's the difference?

An hypothesis is not a theory.

And yet all of the scientific attempts at explaining consciousness have fallen right into Dennett's predicted standards (and I've read at least 4 by now). [/B]

This is not surprising. All scientific attempts to explain it can be expected to fail, for reasons Metacristi outlined.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
An hypothesis is not a theory.

No one mentioned theory. You said "answer". And scientists have indeed come up with theories of consciousness (Edelmann and Calvin are the two I mention more often, but there are others)...that's true theories, ones that have made pre-/post-dictions that turn out to be true.

This is not surprising. All scientific attempts to explain it can be expected to fail, for reasons Metacristi outlined.

Falling into Dennett's standards indicates failure? No, no, the fact that they all follow the line of reasoning that Dennett predicted they'd follow is all I was pointing out...there is no failure in this.

 

[hypnagogue]

I've said this elsewhere, but I suppose it bears stating again since this thread is exclusively devoted to the 'vitalist' issue. The claims surrounding the 'hard problem' of consciousness and the vitalist theory of life are not analogous.

The problem of explaining life involves explaining objectively observable structures and functions such as growth, reproduction, etc. To vitalists, it was inconceivable that these structures and functions could be explained via physical processes, so they posited the existence of the immaterial spirit. However, the central problem nonetheless remained one of explaining objectively observable structures and functions; once these had been explained, there was nothing else that needed explaining, and so the explanatory problem was solved. The explanatory posit of the immaterial spirit was no longer needed, and thus discarded.

The problem of explaining consciousness involves explaining first person subjective experience. It is obvious that consciousness is associated with brain functioning, but the nature of the link between these two is far from obvious. In particular, for any purely physical explanation of consciousness, we will still be left with the question of why consciousness should be associated with physical processes at all; there is nothing in our understanding of time, space, matter, and energy that makes it conceivable that these things arranged in the proper way should somehow result in conscious experience. This problem is not raised by way of explanatory posits, as with the vitalists, but rather is the central issue in need of explanation.

Thus we have a persistent question built into any attempts at explaining consciousness: Why are the physical structures and functions of the brain accompanied by consciousness? There is no analogous built-in question in explaining life; it is meaningless to ask "why are the structures and functions of growth, reproduction, etc. accompanied by life?" since here there is no reason to suppose that anything above and beyond the structures and functions needs explaining. With consciousness there is reason to suppose just this, since any purely physical account of consciousness leaves us with an epistemic gap.

[edit for phrasing error]

 

[selfAdjoint]

Thus we have a persistent question built into any attempts at explaining consciousness: Why are the physical structures and functions of the brain accompanied by consciousness? There is no analogous built-in question in explaining life; it is meaningless to ask "why are the structures and functions of growth, reproduction, etc. accompanied by life?" since here there is no reason to suppose that anything above and beyond the structures and functions needs explaining. With consciousness there is reason to suppose just this, since any purely physical account of consciousness leaves us with an epistemic gap.

And here is where the philosopher departs from the scientist. For science does not propose to answer, or ask, why questions. Except in the trivial sense of "The neurochemical structure of the brain supports consciousness because it can".

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by selfAdjoint
And here is where the philosopher departs from the scientist. For science does not propose to answer, or ask, why questions. Except in the trivial sense of "The neurochemical structure of the brain supports consciousness because it can".

Let me rephrase that then. Science can and does answers questions of the general formulation "How is it that X can account for Y?", such as "How is it that the microscopic structures and functions of H2O can account for the macroscopic properties of water?" However, it appears that a purely physically reductive account of consciousness cannot answer the question "How is it that physical structures and functions can account for consciousness?"

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
No one mentioned theory. You said "answer". And scientists have indeed come up with theories of consciousness (Edelmann and Calvin are the two I mention more often, but there are others)...that's true theories, ones that have made pre-/post-dictions that turn out to be true.

I suppose one could argue ad nauseum about what is a theory and what is a hypothesis and what is a conjecture and what is an answer. But certainly there is as yet nothing one could call a scientific explanation of consciousness. There are just conjectures, including Edelmann's process based ideas, Dennett's hetero-phenomenology, Crick's oscillations, Blackmore's memes, Penrose's quantum decoherence in tubules, etc etc.

I don't know Calvin but Edelmann, in his book written with Guilio Tononi, makes it very clear from the start that the fact that consciousness has a scientific explanation is an assumption only. He states this a number of times. He is perfectly up-front about acknowledging that he has no proof and no evidence for it.

Falling into Dennett's standards indicates failure? No, no, the fact that they all follow the line of reasoning that Dennett predicted they'd follow is all I was pointing out...there is no failure in this. [/B]

Hetero-phenomenology does not explain feelings. Philosopher Geoffrey Harnard has tirelessly pointed this out to Dennett, but with no answer yet. A theory of consciousness that says nothing about feelings is not very impressive. It's a throwback to Watson and Skinner, but a little more sophisticated than behaviourism.

Hypnogogue states the case clearly. There is an explanatory gap that no scientific theory has yet managed to cross, even speculatively. It cannot be crossed by science, as Chalmers and Mcginn argue, since there is a category mismatch.

Chalmer's is quite right when he says that scientific attempts to explain consciousness almost invariably use one of two strategies. Either the 'hard problem' is ignored, or consciousness is arbitrarily redefined in such a way as to obscure it. If you read any current journal on consciousness you can see this happening in nearly every scientific paper.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Let me rephrase that then. Science can and does answers questions of the general formulation "How is it that X can account for Y?", such as "How is it that the microscopic structures and functions of H2O can account for the macroscopic properties of water?"

I don't think it does. Are you talking about statistical mechanics? That's just a calculating system for getting numbers. Where does science concern itself with "how is it" that small scale physics causes big scale physics?

The small scale physics happens, and we see big scale physics as a result; there is no separate "how" question. Similarly neurochemistry happens and we experience consciousness. There's no category in between, for me.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by selfAdjoint
The small scale physics happens, and we see big scale physics as a result; there is no separate "how" question. Similarly neurochemistry happens and we experience consciousness. There's no category in between, for me. [/B]

You seem to be saying that neuroscientific data and conscious experience are two different categories of things, with no category between. Isn't this counter to your main argument?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
I suppose one could argue ad nauseum about what is a theory and what is a hypothesis and what is a conjecture and what is an answer. But certainly there is as yet nothing one could call a scientific explanation of consciousness. There are just conjectures, including Edelmann's process based ideas, Dennett's hetero-phenomenology, Crick's oscillations, Blackmore's memes, Penrose's quantum decoherence in tubules, etc etc.

Calvin's theory, is indeed (by the scientific definition of "theory") a theory. Dennett's heterophenomenology is a theory also, but not a theory of consciousness - instead, it is a theory of what a theory of consciousness should look like.

I don't know Calvin but Edelmann, in his book written with Guilio Tononi, makes it very clear from the start that the fact that consciousness has a scientific explanation is an assumption only. He states this a number of times. He is perfectly up-front about acknowledging that he has no proof and no evidence for it.

Sure, but he also shows that philosophical attempts will go on forever without answering the question of consciousness, and so, for those of us who want results, there should instead be a scientific answer, and this one will not be confined by epistemic or other such metaphysical bounds. It will, instead, only be bound by the usual boundaries of science.

Hetero-phenomenology does not explain feelings. Philosopher Geoffrey Harnard has tirelessly pointed this out to Dennett, but with no answer yet. A theory of consciousness that says nothing about feelings is not very impressive. It's a throwback to Watson and Skinner, but a little more sophisticated than behaviourism.

Dennett's theory does address feelings. It simply lumps them in with the rest of conscious experience.

Hypnogogue states the case clearly. There is an explanatory gap that no scientific theory has yet managed to cross, even speculatively. It cannot be crossed by science, as Chalmers and Mcginn argue, since there is a category mismatch.

Chalmer's is quite right when he says that scientific attempts to explain consciousness almost invariably use one of two strategies. Either the 'hard problem' is ignored, or consciousness is arbitrarily redefined in such a way as to obscure it. If you read any current journal on consciousness you can see this happening in nearly every scientific paper.

Might you state what the "hard problem" is, in terms that restrict a scientific inquiry into the matter?

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
Dennett's theory does address feelings. It simply lumps them in with the rest of conscious experience.

Feelings, in the way Harnard uses the term, is not something to be lumped in with the rest of conscious experience. Harnard uses the term "feelings" synonymously with "conscious experience" to highlight the idea that every conscious experience feels like something-- after all, if it did not, it wouldn't be a conscious experience in the first place.

Dennet's theory aims to systematically bring out the associations between physical processes and feelings, but it does not coherently explain how physical processes should feel like something in the first place.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by selfAdjoint
I don't think it does. Are you talking about statistical mechanics? That's just a calculating system for getting numbers. Where does science concern itself with "how is it" that small scale physics causes big scale physics?

Precisely by explaining the properties of macroscopic physics in terms of the properties of microscopic physics. For instance, the macroscopic liquidity of a liquid can be explained in terms of the chemical bonding structure of the atoms/molecules which compose the liquid.

The small scale physics happens, and we see big scale physics as a result; there is no separate "how" question. Similarly neurochemistry happens and we experience consciousness. There's no category in between, for me.

But we have a clear conceptual picture of how the small scale physics accounts for the large scale physics. We do not have a clear conceptual picture of how physics at any scale can account for consciousness, and there are strong reasons to believe that we never will unless we accept that our fundamental ontology (those things which are taken to exist axiomatically, without further explanation: spacetime and matter/energy) is somehow altered or expanded to take the existence of consciousness into account.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
Calvin's theory, is indeed (by the scientific definition of "theory") a theory. Dennett's heterophenomenology is a theory also, but not a theory of consciousness - instead, it is a theory of what a theory of consciousness should look like.

Ok. Let's just say that none of these theories have gained any degree of acceptance.

Sure, but he also shows that philosophical attempts will go on forever without answering the question of consciousness, and so, for those of us who want results, there should instead be a scientific answer,

Precisely what philosophers argue, in reverse. Take your pick.

and this one will not be confined by epistemic or other such metaphysical bounds. It will, instead, only be bound by the usual boundaries of science.

Boundaries which are of course epistemilogical and metaphysical.

Dennett's theory does address feelings. It simply lumps them in with the rest of conscious experience.

What, you mean verbal signals and the like? He leaves them out, that is the overwhelming concensus.

Might you state what the "hard problem" is, in terms that restrict a scientific inquiry into the matter? [/B]

It's here - http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Feelings, in the way Harnard uses the term, is not something to be lumped in with the rest of conscious experience. Harnard uses the term "feelings" synonymously with "conscious experience" to highlight the idea that every conscious experience feels like something-- after all, if it did not, it wouldn't be a conscious experience in the first place.

Dennet's theory aims to systematically bring out the associations between physical processes and feelings, but it does not coherently explain how physical processes should feel like something in the first place.

No, instead he goes further into the heart of the matter, not treating feeling as some mysterious process, but as yet another physical process. Thus, in identifying feeling, itself, as such-and-such physical processes, he gets rid of the question of why such-and-such process is related to feeling, and allows for potential scientific understanding.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
Boundaries which are of course epistemilogical and metaphysical.

The boundaries of science itself are indeed metaphysical, you're right. However, the theory would not have to deal with such boundaries, because anyone questioning the validity of the theory based on a problem with such boundaries is questioning the validity of Science, as a whole, not of any particular theory.

What, you mean verbal signals and the like? He leaves them out, that is the overwhelming concensus.

Maybe we should worry about what he says about his own theory, rather than what other people have said.

It's here - http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html

Well, I didn't read the whole thing, but I did read his explanation of the hard and easy problems, and I'm moved to repeat what Edelman and Calvin and even Dennett, have been saying for so long: there really is no hard problem.

If one can explain these things (and Chalmers seems to think we can):

the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
the integration of information by a cognitive system;
the reportability of mental states;
the ability of a system to access its own internal states;


Then one will have explained conscious experience. All one has to do is by-pass the philosophical question of "what makes this physical process 'produce' this outcome" and look at it scientifically (see my thread on Faulty Expectations of a Theory of Consciousness.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
No, instead he goes further into the heart of the matter, not treating feeling as some mysterious process, but as yet another physical process. Thus, in identifying feeling, itself, as such-and-such physical processes, he gets rid of the question of why such-and-such process is related to feeling, and allows for potential scientific understanding.

I agree that this is exactly what he does. The question is whether this approach might lead to an explanation or whether it just begs the question. I'd say the latter.

The boundaries of science itself are indeed metaphysical, you're right. However, the theory would not have to deal with such boundaries, because anyone questioning the validity of the theory based on a problem with such boundaries is questioning the validity of Science, as a whole, not of any particular theory.

Not sure I quite understand you here but I think I agree. To explain consciousness requires crossing the epistemilogical and metaphysical boudaries of science, not simply producing a new scientific theory. (If that's what you meant). I suspect you see this as a argument aagainst any such 'non-scientific' theory, and from a scientific perspective it is. However it may yet be the only way to an understanding. Until science can define consciousness there is no secure footing from which anybody can argue that it has a scientific explanation.

Maybe we should worry about what he says about his own theory, rather than what other people have said.

Ok. As far as I can see he leaves out consciousness from his explanations. I find his writing convoluted in the extrame so I may have misinterpreted him. However I don't seem to be alone in concluding this.

Well, I didn't read the whole thing, but I did read his explanation of the hard and easy problems, and I'm moved to repeat what Edelman and Calvin and even Dennett, have been saying for so long: there really is no hard problem.

Ok, but you've got some healthy opposition.

If one can explain these things (and Chalmers seems to think we can):

the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
the integration of information by a cognitive system;
the reportability of mental states;
the ability of a system to access its own internal states;

I would say that, more simply put, Chalmer's position is that we need to expain the existence of 'what it is like to be'. As this is not a meaningful scientific description or defintion he argues that science needs to consider redefing itself in order to include consciousness, and thus have a chance of explaining it. In a sense the 'hard problem' is finding a scientific definition for consciousness, for only if we can find one can we say that it is a scientific entity. Calling it physical is a sort of bulldozer of a strategy, and is completely ad hoc and counterintuitive. Many people, me incuded, cannot make sense of this hypothesis.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
Not sure I quite understand you here but I think I agree. To explain consciousness requires crossing the epistemilogical and metaphysical boudaries of science, not simply producing a new scientific theory. (If that's what you meant). I suspect you see this as a argument aagainst any such 'non-scientific' theory, and from a scientific perspective it is. However it may yet be the only way to an understanding.

Or, it may be indicative that so many philosophers of the mind have been asking the wrong questions for all these years (centuries? millenia?). Yes, you're right that, in order to answer the philosophical questions that people constantly ask about consciousness - thus creating the "hard problem", where no problem would otherwise exist - you need to leave the realm of science. But then, when you think about it, if I asked those same questions about...anything, I would have to leave the scientific method. Yet I ask you, is it truly logical to ask "what is it that causes a hurricane to arise from counter-acting winds, when I can imagine such a physical process with no hurricane actually occurring" and calling it the "hard problem" of meteorology?

Until science can define consciousness there is no secure footing from which anybody can argue that it has a scientific explanation.

Of course this is true, but what makes you think they haven't already defined it as thoroughly as they've defined everything else?

Ok. As far as I can see he leaves out consciousness from his explanations. I find his writing convoluted in the extrame so I may have misinterpreted him. However I don't seem to be alone in concluding this.

You are certainly not, and perhaps this is indicative that there is something really wrong with his theory...but then, nobody seemed to want to agree with Copernicus or Galileo or Darwin. Dennett could be wrong, or everyone else could be wrong...again.

 

[confutatis]

Or, it may be indicative that so many philosophers of the mind have been asking the wrong questions for all these years (centuries? millenia?). Yes, you're right that, in order to answer the philosophical questions that people constantly ask about consciousness - thus creating the "hard problem", where no problem would otherwise exist - you need to leave the realm of science. But then, when you think about it, if I asked those same questions about...anything, I would have to leave the scientific method. Yet I ask you, is it truly logical to ask "what is it that causes a hurricane to arise from counter-acting winds, when I can imagine such a physical process with no hurricane actually occurring" and calling it the "hard problem" of meteorology?

That is an interesting observation, but isn't Dennett also wrong in indirectly asserting that such a thing as "consciousness" exists and is capable of being scientifically explained? Isn't "consciousness" itself a nonsensical entity/phenomenon which can't possibly exist? As far as I can tell, the really hard problem is to explain how something which can't possibly exist arises out of physical processes. That is not even a hard problem, it's an impossible one.

Here's my criteria for accepting an explanation of "consciousness" as meaningful and possibly true:

- 'X' is a computer that can communicate with humans in English
- X is programmed to never lie, but because of that it often fails to answer a question
- X knows the meaning of some 50,000 words, including the word "consciousness"
- when asked "X, are you conscious?", X gives an answer

A truly meaningful explanation of consciousness must allow us to understand how it's possible to buid a machine that knows how to answer the question "are you conscious" without lying (nevermind what the answer is, it's beside the point). Dennett's theory spectacularly fails that. And so do all theories.

Chalmers is right, but for the wrong reasons.

 

[TENYEARS]

Mentat, long time no talk kid. Little story. When I was in sixth grade a teacher of mine did an experiment relating to what is now still called a supernatural pheno. The class was slowly eliminated one by one until it was only me. I was extremely focused and I knew I could do it and did because I believed I could so I tried extremely hard. I was two rounds past what my teacher said was beyond statistcal probability when I realized I was the only one left with all eyes on me. Being aware of that ended the next round quite quickly. It was not that I was any smarter than the other kids, but it was that I belived that I could so much so that it boardered I knew I could. It was strange that with that in mind I went two rounds past statistical deviation. Of course the teacher could have been wrong, science is not math, the writer of the comparative results could have been off in the analysis calculations and and and so it will always be with the word proof.

Conciousness extends beyond the skin. Science will prove this to be the case, and a new science will be formed. This is not that far off and it will be in your life time.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by confutatis
That is an interesting observation, but isn't Dennett also wrong in indirectly asserting that such a thing as "consciousness" exists and is capable of being scientifically explained? Isn't "consciousness" itself a nonsensical entity/phenomenon which can't possibly exist? As far as I can tell, the really hard problem is to explain how something which can't possibly exist arises out of physical processes. That is not even a hard problem, it's an impossible one.

But what is it that makes you think consciousness doesn't exist?? Is not your very contemplation of this subject a reflection of your conscious ability to think?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by TENYEARS
Mentat, long time no talk kid.

How've you been?

Little story. When I was in sixth grade a teacher of mine did an experiment relating to what is now still called a supernatural pheno. The class was slowly eliminated one by one until it was only me. I was extremely focused and I knew I could do it and did because I believed I could so I tried extremely hard. I was two rounds past what my teacher said was beyond statistcal probability when I realized I was the only one left with all eyes on me. Being aware of that ended the next round quite quickly. It was not that I was any smarter than the other kids, but it was that I belived that I could so much so that it boardered I knew I could. It was strange that with that in mind I went two rounds past statistical deviation. Of course the teacher could have been wrong, science is not math, the writer of the comparative results could have been off in the analysis calculations and and and so it will always be with the word proof.

Conciousness extends beyond the skin. Science will prove this to be the case, and a new science will be formed. This is not that far off and it will be in your life time.

If you're right, I'm sure it will make for an interesting new paradigm of discovery.

 

[confutatis]

Originally posted by Mentat
But what is it that makes you think consciousness doesn't exist?? Is not your very contemplation of this subject a reflection of your conscious ability to think?

Strange as this may sound, I don't understand your question. What is the difference between my "conscious ability to think" as compared to my "ability to think"? Is consciousness something that gets added to thought? On the other hand, if all thought is conscious, what is the sense in adding "conscious" to "thought"?

What needs to be clearly delineated is where "consciousness" differs from "ability to think". To a good extent my computer is perfectly capable of thinking, but I suspect you don't believe my computer is capable of thinking in a conscious manner. Can you explain why?

 

[TENYEARS]

Confused us, why did you choose such a name, probably for the same reason you ask such questions. He was not enlightened. These are good questions, but you must answer them. If you have not, have you asked them yet? To think of them on your own means there is is a smell in the air, so follow your nose.

Mentat, you are making good progress or are you realizing what is already there?

Keep the ball rolling, you never know what you may stumble into.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by confutatis
Strange as this may sound, I don't understand your question. What is the difference between my "conscious ability to think" as compared to my "ability to think"? Is consciousness something that gets added to thought? On the other hand, if all thought is conscious, what is the sense in adding "conscious" to "thought"?

Consciousness is a collection of thought.

You say that consciousness must be differentiated from the ability to think. I say it's much more synonymous than it appears.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by TENYEARS
Mentat, you are making good progress or are you realizing what is already there?

This is an interesting statement, TENYEARS. What's the difference?

 

[confutatis]

Originally posted by Mentat
Consciousness is a collection of thought.

You say that consciousness must be differentiated from the ability to think. I say it's much more synonymous than it appears.

I wish you would address what I consider the only relevant issue: do computers think, and if so are they conscious in any sense?

If computers do not think, then we're not computers and this whole algorithmic/mechanistic view of consciousness is nonsense. If computers do think, then how can we know if they are conscious?

Imagine a practical scenario where a computer claims to be conscious, and imagine how you would react to it. I suspect you don't accept that the ability to claim to be conscious is any evidence for consciousness. So what constitutes evidence?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by confutatis
I wish you would address what I consider the only relevant issue: do computers think, and if so are they conscious in any sense?

If computers do not think, then we're not computers and this whole algorithmic/mechanistic view of consciousness is nonsense. If computers do think, then how can we know if they are conscious?

Imagine a practical scenario where a computer claims to be conscious, and imagine how you would react to it. I suspect you don't accept that the ability to claim to be conscious is any evidence for consciousness. So what constitutes evidence?

You want my opinion? What would constitute evidence of consciousness, for me, would be if the computers processing routines were working in a Selectionist manner, producing Multiple Drafts of each sub-experience by interaction between the discreet processing units.

But that's just because I like Dennett's approach.

Aside from this, if the computer could think (and there's no reason, IMO, to say it couldn't), then it would conscious. It might not be sentient, or even have a particularly high level of consciousness, but it would be conscious to some degree.

 

[TENYEARS]

There are many forms of enlightening experiences, some if scientifically observable would prove that which is argued about. There is one experience or form of enlightenment in which there is not nessecarily a socalled supernatural experience, and yet I say without question this expereince can be better than all of them. There is a member on the forum who I believe had this experience before your eyes. If you continue, be honest in your observations, do not settle on answers truly assault the questions there can only be one result maybe it could be this experience or one of the others for you.

What I said was a riddle, if you answer it you will become enlightented. That's why to read logic is no good, until you yourself have had an experience. Then and only then would the perspective of anothers experience like some of the philos, scientists, saints, etc... be of help. Unless of course you realize that what you read although your mind connects the dots, it is a two dimensional experience to you. In order for it to become the real thing, you must go into a state in which you know that the two dimensional experience is not the experience. This in itself if realized is a step on the path when it appears that there is none.

Then again, maybe I just lie.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by TENYEARS
There are many forms of enlightening experiences, some if scientifically observable would prove that which is argued about. There is one experience or form of enlightenment in which there is not nessecarily a socalled supernatural experience, and yet I say without question this expereince can be better than all of them. There is a member on the forum who I believe had this experience before your eyes. If you continue, be honest in your observations, do not settle on answers truly assault the questions there can only be one result maybe it could be this experience or one of the others for you.

What I said was a riddle, if you answer it you will become enlightented. That's why to read logic is no good, until you yourself have had an experience. Then and only then would the perspective of anothers experience like some of the philos, scientists, saints, etc... be of help. Unless of course you realize that what you read although your mind connects the dots, it is a two dimensional experience to you. In order for it to become the real thing, you must go into a state in which you know that the two dimensional experience is not the experience. This in itself if realized is a step on the path when it appears that there is none.

Then again, maybe I just lie.

It is not a lie if you believe it, TENYEARS.

 

[TENYEARS]

Belief is always a lie no matter what you believe.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by confutatis
What is the difference between my "conscious ability to think" as compared to my "ability to think"?

If you are conscious of a thought, you will be aware of it directly or indirectly. You will hear words in your mind, or see symbols that you manipulate in your mind, or experience an emotion related to a wordless thought, etc. You will not be aware of an unconscious thought, by definition. (And yes, they do exist.)