What makes a liquid liquid questions.

[Mentat]

"What makes a liquid liquid" questions.

This is sort of a spin-off of my thread, Faulty Expectations of a theory of Consciousness, but I felt there was something that needed direct addressing, and that thread didn't seem the appropriate place to post it...

Anyway, I'm noticing a very serious problem in many philosophical discussions of scientific inquiry, that is most painfully obvious in the issue of conscious experience: People still seem to want to know what makes water so wet.

What I mean is, it doesn't seem to be enough for philosophers that a scientist can explain what is and is not a liquid, what causes solids or gases to become liquids, and that interaction with liquids makes things wet. No, they want to know what causes this particular level of freedom among particles to be "liquid".

This is a very serious problem because not only is Science not equipped to answer these questions but, more importantly (IMHO), these questions really appear to have no merit at all, and are merely standing in the way of otherwise rational inquiry.

Your thoughts?

 

[Rader]

Originally posted by Mentat
This is sort of a spin-off of my thread, Faulty Expectations of a theory of Consciousness, but I felt there was something that needed direct addressing, and that thread didn't seem the appropriate place to post it...

Anyway, I'm noticing a very serious problem in many philosophical discussions of scientific inquiry, that is most painfully obvious in the issue of conscious experience: People still seem to want to know what makes water so wet.

What I mean is, it doesn't seem to be enough for philosophers that a scientist can explain what is and is not a liquid, what causes solids or gases to become liquids, and that interaction with liquids makes things wet. No, they want to know what causes this particular level of freedom among particles to be "liquid".

This is a very serious problem because not only is Science not equipped to answer these questions but, more importantly (IMHO), these questions really appear to have no merit at all, and are merely standing in the way of otherwise rational inquiry.

Your thoughts?

Water might be wet, only because we perceive it to be. Maybe we perceive it to be, only because of anthropic fine tuneing. That could indicate "Intellegent Design"

http://www.shorstmeyer.com/wxfaqs/float/watermolec.html
http://www.lsbu.ac.uk/water/molecule.html

 

[Royce]

Water is a very special substance. It has a number of properties that no other compound has. One of its most unique properties is that is is lighter, less dense, as a solid, ice, than it is as a liquid. It is also the nearest thing to a universal solvent that there is.
Any solid becomes a liquid when its atoms or molecules have enough energy to break its bonds with each other yet not enough to escape completely and become a gas. This is the simple explanation and I'm sure that there are QM principles involved also.
The thing that make water so wet is the way that the molecules are made up with the two hydrogen atoms one one side of the molecule. The hydrogen nucleus is not well covered by its single electron and the positive charge still has some effect making hydrogen bonds possible.
This makes water sort of sticky making it stay liquid at a relatively high temperature and also the reason that water has so much latent heat. The molecules having some polarity effects due to its structure also makes it such a good solvent. So much for a simple scientific explanation.
How we perceive or feel wet is usually nothing more that the feeling of coolness. It is hard to tell if a piece of cloth is wet or just cold. This too is simplistic but the best that I can do my friend.

 

[Rader]

Intelllegent Design?

Originally posted by Royce
Water is a very special substance. It has a number of properties that no other compound has. One of its most unique properties is that is is lighter, less dense, as a solid, ice, than it is as a liquid. It is also the nearest thing to a universal solvent that there is.
Any solid becomes a liquid when its atoms or molecules have enough energy to break its bonds with each other yet not enough to escape completely and become a gas. This is the simple explanation and I'm sure that there are QM principles involved also.
The thing that make water so wet is the way that the molecules are made up with the two hydrogen atoms one one side of the molecule. The hydrogen nucleus is not well covered by its single electron and the positive charge still has some effect making hydrogen bonds possible.
This makes water sort of sticky making it stay liquid at a relatively high temperature and also the reason that water has so much latent heat. The molecules having some polarity effects due to its structure also makes it such a good solvent. So much for a simple scientific explanation.
How we perceive or feel wet is usually nothing more that the feeling of coolness. It is hard to tell if a piece of cloth is wet or just cold. This too is simplistic but the best that I can do my friend.

Water is a very special substance. It has a number of properties that no other compound has.

Thats true, without which, we would not be saying much here. Water has a fundamental basic necessitated biological use. If it was not wet, fluid and non-toxic, it would not be of much use to us. Water is H2o,
it did not exist, in theory, at the primordial birth. Only after the death of our first star, was enough oxygen produced to combine with hydrogen and form water. It took two generations of suns, to produce water, to eventualy give rise to humans. Humans, which have a very close simularity, in chemical elements, to a dying red giant sun. Might there be "Intellegent Design" in the formation of stars, without them there would be no wet water.

 

[Dissident Dan]

I can't remember ever coming across questions like mentat apparently has, but they sound pretty silly to me. They also seem to be the types of questions that give the bad rap to "philosophers".

 

[Fliption]

I don't even understand the question. I've participated in several of the consciousness threads and I don't remember this type of question getting in the way.

 

[Canute]

Mentat

You didn't define 'wet'. In your question you change the term into 'liquid' but these are not equivalent.

The reason the question is significant is that it is very difficult to define 'wet' without a definition of consciousness. Thus the problem becomes how to define that.

It is completely clear what makes water a liquid, but it is not at all clear why it seems to be wet.

 

[Dissident Dan]

There's a very simple distinction that you have to recognize.

There are:

A) The objective description of the physical properties of being wet
B) The subjective experience of wetness

The first part is very easy to define.
The second part is not really at all concerned with wetness, but the nature of what an experience is. Being concerned with this should not be getting in the way of mathematical descriptions of phenomena.

 

[Canute]

There's a very simple distinction that you have to recognize.

There are:

A) The objective description of the physical properties of being wet
B) The subjective experience of wetness

The first part is very easy to define.

Quite. But 'A' is trivial. It is 'B' that raises all sorts of questions about wetness, which is why it is much discussed philosophically.

 

[hypnagogue]

I believe Mentat is trying to draw an analogy between wetness and consciousness as physically describable emergent phenomena. The reasoning roughly says that

a) both consciousness and water are emergent phenomena; that is, they are both properties belonging to the macroscopic behavior of physical systems but not the microscopic constituents of these systems;

b) therefore, to the extent that we can explain wetness in terms of a liquid's physical constituents, we can explain consciousness in terms of a brain's physical constituents.

This would seem to force us to accept that consciousness must be explainable in terms of physical constituents of the brain, lest we accept the seemingly absurd notion that wetness cannot be explained in terms of a liquid's physical constituents.

But this argument fails to recognize the key distinction between wetness (or any other purely objective emergent phenomenon) and consciousness. First we must note that in explaining wetness, we must be posing a question purely in terms of a liquid's objective, physical properties; if we mean the subjective sensation of wetness, then we are no longer inquiring about a property of a liquid, but rather about a property of consciousness. Now we note that in the case of consciousness, we are primarily concerned with subjective, 1st person experience, and this simple fact alone makes any inquiries into consciousness quite distinct from inquiries into phenomena with only an objective component in need of explaining.

For a detailed consideration of why these two cases are indeed distinct, please see http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/(en)/philosophie/personen/beckermann/broad_ew.pdf, by Ansgar Beckermann.

 

[Rader]

koan

The question is like a koan. Answer the quesion, to what you are.

The wetness of liquid water, is a learned experience through perception, that has a direct relationship between the physics of nature, the mind and experience.

The wetness of water plays its part in the wholeness of all, through our conscious experience, whos physcial contruct is the physical properties of nature.

The wetness of water is not always so, even in liquid state.
How wet is it to, a helium atom, or an ant being rained on, or a man in a parachute that does not open. The transformation of conscious experience makes it what it is.

The wetness of water needs both A and B. The wetness of water is then a consious experience.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I believe Mentat is trying to draw an analogy between wetness and consciousness as physically describable emergent phenomena. The reasoning roughly says that

a) both consciousness and water are emergent phenomena; that is, they are both properties belonging to the macroscopic behavior of physical systems but not the microscopic constituents of these systems;

b) therefore, to the extent that we can explain wetness in terms of a liquid's physical constituents, we can explain consciousness in terms of a brain's physical constituents.

This would seem to force us to accept that consciousness must be explainable in terms of physical constituents of the brain, lest we accept the seemingly absurd notion that wetness cannot be explained in terms of a liquid's physical constituents.

I'm glad to see you understood what I was getting at.

But this argument fails to recognize the key distinction between wetness (or any other purely objective emergent phenomenon) and consciousness. First we must note that in explaining wetness, we must be posing a question purely in terms of a liquid's objective, physical properties; if we mean the subjective sensation of wetness, then we are no longer inquiring about a property of a liquid, but rather about a property of consciousness. Now we note that in the case of consciousness, we are primarily concerned with subjective, 1st person experience, and this simple fact alone makes any inquiries into consciousness quite distinct from inquiries into phenomena with only an objective component in need of explaining.

But you are not me, are you? We are separate entities. Indeed you are a separate entity from anything else you ever come across. Worse yet, every constituent particle of "you" is a distinct and separate entity. So, is it not logical that I study this mass of constituent particles objectively (since they are not part of "me")?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
Quite. But 'A' is trivial. It is 'B' that raises all sorts of questions about wetness, which is why it is much discussed philosophically.

Actually, as Dan and Hypna have pointed out, "B" raises questions about our experience of wetness, not about wetness itself.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
I don't even understand the question. I've participated in several of the consciousness threads and I don't remember this type of question getting in the way.

It's funny you say that...I don't really think most people who ask questions such as "how is it that solidity 'arises' from the rigid formation of particles" realize their asking that kind of question, but rather mean to be asking a question about the nature (and definition) of solids.

I'm not saying you are one of those people, as you have been rather creditably objective in most of those discussions. I'm just suggesting the possibility that, in the search for an answer to a very "deep" question, we do not always step back and contemplate whether the question itself really "holds water" (pun intended but failed ), or is - instead - a "why is liquid liquid" question.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
I'm not saying you are one of those people, as you have been rather creditably objective in most of those discussions. I'm just suggesting the possibility that, in the search for an answer to a very "deep" question, we do not always step back and contemplate whether the question itself really "holds water" (pun intended but failed ), or is - instead - a "why is liquid liquid" question.

I'm not suggesting that this question is not worthy of being asked as you have implied. Merely that I don't understand exactly what it means.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
I'm not suggesting that this question is not worthy of being asked as you have implied. Merely that I don't understand exactly what it means.

I know. When I said we sometimes don't stand back to contemplate "the question's" actual value, I wasn't referring to my question, but to the "hard problem", which I don't find tenable.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
But you are not me, are you? We are separate entities. Indeed you are a separate entity from anything else you ever come across. Worse yet, every constituent particle of "you" is a distinct and separate entity. So, is it not logical that I study this mass of constituent particles objectively (since they are not part of "me")?

'Wetness' in the objective sense is completely logically entailed by a reductive explanation in terms of H2O molecules, given materialistic assumptions. But, again, the problem is that the analogous case is not true for consciousness. Consciousness in the subjective sense is not logically entailed at all by a reductive explanation in terms of neurons, given materialistic assumptions.

We can try to get around this by postulating some sort of fundamentally subjective nature to existence (eg your proposal of a fundamental law along the lines of "whenever neurons do this, there is conscious experience X"). But then we no longer have a truly reductive explanation of consciousness since on some level it is taken for granted that subjective experience is a fundamental, irreducible entity. It becomes an axiom taken for granted in its own right, rather than a phenomenon entirely explicable in terms of other (materialistic) axioms. Note that we do not have to postulate such an extra axiom in order to explain wetness, since it is entirely explicable in terms of the basic materialistic axioms.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
I know. When I said we sometimes don't stand back to contemplate "the question's" actual value, I wasn't referring to my question, but to the "hard problem", which I don't find tenable.

Then once again we have a bad analogy.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
'Wetness' in the objective sense is completely logically entailed by a reductive explanation in terms of H2O molecules, given materialistic assumptions. But, again, the problem is that the analogous case is not true for consciousness. Consciousness in the subjective sense is not logically entailed at all by a reductive explanation in terms of neurons, given materialistic assumptions.

That may or may not be true. Try it out with my proposed new definition of consciousness.

Also, think in terms of perspective. Objectively, a certain relation of H2O molecules must be "liquid". However, what if, subjectively, a certain configuration of processing units (neurons in our case) must be conscious...in this case, we'd simply have the wrong perspective (unless it were our own consciousness we were studying).

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
Then once again we have a bad analogy.

Could be. Or we could have the wrong definition of consciousness. Check it out.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
Objectively, a certain relation of H2O molecules must be "liquid". However, what if, subjectively, a certain configuration of processing units (neurons in our case) must be conscious...in this case, we'd simply have the wrong perspective (unless it were our own consciousness we were studying).

That certainly could be the case. However, the distinction remains that the wetness of water is completely entailed by a physical description of the behavior of H2O molecules. A physical description of neurons in the brain completely entails higher order brain activity, but it says nothing about consciousness. In order for a description of neurons to say something about consciousness, we must create a further assumption that the existence and nature of neuronal activity is somehow intrinsically associated with the existence and nature of consciousness.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
That certainly could be the case. However, the distinction remains that the wetness of water is completely entailed by a physical description of the behavior of H2O molecules. A physical description of neurons in the brain completely entails higher order brain activity, but it says nothing about consciousness. In order for a description of neurons to say something about consciousness, we must create a further assumption that the existence and nature of neuronal activity is somehow intrinsically associated with the existence and nature of consciousness.

Much like the assumption we've already made that the nature of molecules and covalent bonds is somehow intrinsically associated with the existence and nature of "wetness" or "liquidity".

In logic:

Proposition = P; Conclusion = C

P1: A group of molecules in a configuration less rigid than a "solid" more so than a "gas" is a "liquid".
P2: The H20 molecules in my glass have a configuration less rigid than a "solid" but more so than a "gas".
C: Therefore, the configuration of H20 molecules in my glass is "liquid".

Here there is no mention of some intrinsic relationship between "liquidity" and that particular configuration of molecules. The only relationship they have is that they are exactly the same thing. Sure, they may not seem the same in one's mind; you might imagine a bunch of little balls (molecules) floating around in close proximity, and then imagine a glass of water, and see two very different things. But it remains foolish to ask "if I can imagine that configuration of molecules without getting the idea of 'liquid', there must be some new postulate which shows the intrinsic relationship between that configuration of particles and 'liquidity'".

Why is this case not equivalent to the "hard problem" of consciousness?

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
Much like the assumption we've already made that the nature of molecules and covalent bonds is somehow intrinsically associated with the existence and nature of "wetness" or "liquidity".

In principle, we do not need such an assumption; the macroscopic 'liquidity' of the H2O molecules will automatically fall out of a sufficiently detailed analysis, without any need for ad hoc assumptions.

Why is this case not equivalent to the "hard problem" of consciousness?

If one analyzed the behavior of H2O molecules to a sufficient extent one would find that they logically entail a macroscopic property that is identical to 'wetness.' But there is no reason to think that analyzing the behavior of molecules/neurons in the brain to any extent would logically entail a macroscopic property like subjective experience. For subjective experience it appears that we need precisely the sort of ad hoc assumptions that we don't need for wetness.

Again, I strongly recommend you read Beckermann's paper on the hard problem, because it explains it quite clearly and thoroughly, and even deals with this exact same analogy of water and H2O molecules.

http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/(en)/philosophie/personen/beckermann/broad_ew.pdf

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
In principle, we do not need such an assumption; the macroscopic 'liquidity' of the H2O molecules will automatically fall out of a sufficiently detailed analysis, without any need for ad hoc assumptions.

First off, philosophers can still demand this kind of explanation; even if it is not logical for them to do so.

Secondly, and more importantly, yes, the liquid looks like a liquid when taken as a whole, but it doesn't look "liquid" at the molecular level. Yet, this doesn't hinder us from concluding that "such-and-such configuration of molecules" = liquid...and putting aside all such possible philosophical arguments as "how does this configuration of molecules, which are not (themselves) liquid, produce liquidity" or "I can imagine these molecules, which are (themselves) not really liquid, going into such-and-such configuration without it producing liquidity".

I'm trying not to sound insulting, as I happen to know that Chalmers' argument has a lot of strength to it, and is a well thought-out argument. I just don't think that, on deeper analysis of similar possible arguments, it really has any meaning at all (or, at least, only as much meaning as the "why is a liquid liquid?" question).

If one analyzed the behavior of H2O molecules to a sufficient extent one would find that they logically entail a macroscopic property that is identical to 'wetness.' But there is no reason to think that analyzing the behavior of molecules/neurons in the brain to any extent would logically entail a macroscopic property like subjective experience. For subjective experience it appears that we need precisely the sort of ad hoc assumptions that we don't need for wetness.

But does it not also appear this way with regard to "life"? What is there about the microscopic workings of cells that necessitates that a functioning cell is "alive"?

The answer is, of course, those functions of the cell and the term "life" are definitively synonymous. And (as mentioned before) this is what Dennett and others are saying about consciousness.

Again, I strongly recommend you read Beckermann's paper on the hard problem, because it explains it quite clearly and thoroughly, and even deals with this exact same analogy of water and H2O molecules.

http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/(en)/philosophie/personen/beckermann/broad_ew.pdf

Really? I'll check it out then...but of course you already know I'm going to post whatever things I disagree with here...I hope you don't mind me having even more questions/complaints/arguments than I already have (unless, of course, the paper can resolve my current problems...in which case, I will have to post my reverence of the paper).

 

[Mentat]

Hypnagogue, after reading the first page and a half of that paper, the objections in my mind are screaming over each other (note: that was a symbolism, nothing more) so I feel that I should (at least) post the most important one (IMO):

He keeps referring to the finding of either a mechanistic or emergent explanation of something that he takes for granted as existing in the first place. Why must we assume that, just because we percieve the stimuli of the outside world, that that means we have complete subjective experiences (which must then be explained). It almost seems like a straw-man argument, since we could just as easily deny the existence of a "Final Draft" of the "actual 'experience'", and think of all of experience and consciousness as functions of the computational ability of the brain, couldn't we? What we be missing?

 

[hypnagogue]

Read the whole paper before you form an opinion.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Read the whole paper before you form an opinion.

I thought that's what I should do, but it's pretty hard to continue reading through something if the writer seems to be taking something for granted from the start, with no intention of justifying his assumption. It's like when I tried to read the book Show Me God, by Fred Heeren (which I'm not promoting, btw), which was trying to show evidence of the existence of a Creator, from the things that can be observed in the Universe (the "Creation"). The problem was that Heeren kept making statements that were scientifically inaccurate, or that assumed something that had not been proven yet, and then was trying to infer some truth from them. That really bothers me (so much so, in that case, that I couldn't bring myself to finish the book (and it only had about 350 pages or so...not a big task)).

 

[hypnagogue]

I had my own difficulties with how the paper begins, but they are resolved later on (for me at least). Besides, if you're not willing to listen, then to what extent are you really willing to converse and consider the other side?

 

[Canute]

Hmm. Must read some more of Broad.

I thought the article was good, and can't see where the author makes any improper assumptions.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I had my own difficulties with how the paper begins, but they are resolved later on (for me at least). Besides, if you're not willing to listen, then to what extent are you really willing to converse and consider the other side?

You're right. I'll read the rest of it soon (hopefully today).

 

[Mentat]

Alright, I have to get off-line soon, but I read up to page 5 (not so pathetic as it seems when you realize that I've got 4 other windows open, and am multi-tasking constantly (the basic idea is that, any time I would spend just scratching my chin, thinking about the implications of what the paper said, I spend - instead - responding to some casual E-mail or mathematical question that I could pretty much do in my sleep)), and am getting more and more irritated.

Broad had an excellent way of presenting his theory (I've come to this conclusion just from what I've seen so far). The problem, however, is this: He is basically instructing us as to how to properly construct a straw-man argument.

I don't say this to be derogatory, but merely as an observation of the nature of what he is saying. He's talking about the difference between mechanistic and emergent explanations right from the start, thus pre-assuming that there are "emergent" properties that need explaining. I did appreciate the part about forces, and how you can either explain what happens when one force is active on an object, or you can explain what happens when many forces are active on that object, and the explanations are of a different kind, since the second one is an explanation of that which emerges after all individual parts are taken into account. There is no real problem with this except in it's potential to mislead. You see, it is one thing to say (as Broad did) that all factors taken into consideration at once is different, in principle, from one factor taken into consideration at a time; and quite another to say that there is some emergent property of those numerous factors that arises from their interaction (the difference being that the first postulate still allows for a purely mechanistic approach, since the only difference between this many-factors consideration and a single-factor consideration is in the possible counter-actions between each single-factor).

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
I don't say this to be derogatory, but merely as an observation of the nature of what he is saying. He's talking about the difference between mechanistic and emergent explanations right from the start, thus pre-assuming that there are "emergent" properties that need explaining.

This is merely a matter of defining terms, not presuming that anything necessarily fits into these terms. I can define a set of criteria by which we would identify a purple unicorn without assuming that purple unicorns actually exist.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
This is merely a matter of defining terms, not presuming that anything necessarily fits into these terms. I can define a set of criteria by which we would identify a purple unicorn without assuming that purple unicorns actually exist.

But if his system for defining terms is flawed, then the conclusions drawn therefrom will also be flawed.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
But if his system for defining terms is flawed, then the conclusions drawn therefrom will also be flawed.

This is an entirely different objection than the one you presented before.

Besides, how is it that a definition in itself can be flawed? A definition can be thought of as a linguistic placeholder that allows certain concepts or phenomena to be placed into it. The placeholder itself is arbitrary and cannot be flawed; there can only be flaws if a certain concept does not 'fit' into the placeholder into which it is placed. You may wind up rejecting the notion that consciousness 'fits' into Broad's definition of an emergent phenomenon, but such a flaw would be a result of a mismatch between definition and concept, not a flaw in the definition itself.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
This is an entirely different objection than the one you presented before.

Besides, how is it that a definition in itself can be flawed? A definition can be thought of as a linguistic placeholder that allows certain concepts or phenomena to be placed into it. The placeholder itself is arbitrary and cannot be flawed; there can only be flaws if a certain concept does not 'fit' into the placeholder into which it is placed. You may wind up rejecting the notion that consciousness 'fits' into Broad's definition of an emergent phenomenon, but such a flaw would be a result of a mismatch between definition and concept, not a flaw in the definition itself.

OK, but is it really good philosophy to arbitrarily create new definitions and then try to fit certain phenomena into them?

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
OK, but is it really good philosophy to arbitrarily create new definitions and then try to fit certain phenomena into them?

Like the term "Sub-experiences"?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
Like the term "Sub-experiences"?

While I didn't coin the term, I also didn't invent the definition. It's definition existed and was being discussed long before I assigned a word to it. It's actually just another part of Chalmer's "easy problems".

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
While I didn't coin the term, I also didn't invent the definition. It's definition existed and was being discussed long before I assigned a word to it. It's actually just another part of Chalmer's "easy problems".

But it can't possibly mean the same thing to Chalmers as it could never be the bridge to solve the hard problem as it has been presented here.

 

[Canute]

Good point. Besides which it seems completely obvious that to explain a 'sub-experience' presents exactly the same problem as explaining an experience, unless it's now going to argued that a sub-experience is not a sub-experience.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Canute
Good point. Besides which it seems completely obvious that to explain a 'sub-experience' presents exactly the same problem as explaining an experience, unless it's now going to argued that a sub-experience is not a sub-experience.

I'd like to emphasize that this is a very succint and powerful way of stating the problem of 'sub-experiences' that somehow combine to make experiences as we perceive them. Using 'sub-experiences' in this way only begs the question (a recurring theme when one tries to explain consciousness via only physical reductionism), because it presumes that these sub-experiences themselves really have properties such that we can coherently see how they account for the properties of experience. (In this sense explaining experience in terms of sub-experience is not unlike explaining the sense of self in terms of a homunculus-- it merely pushes the real problem onto another level of analysis without adequately addressing it.) The whole problem to begin with is that materialism does not-- indeed, cannot-- mention any properties on any physical level that have a binding logical connection to the properties of subjective experience.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I'd like to emphasize that this is a very succint and powerful way of stating the problem of 'sub-experiences' that somehow combine to make experiences as we perceive them. Using 'sub-experiences' in this way only begs the question (a recurring theme when one tries to explain consciousness via only physical reductionism), because it presumes that these sub-experiences themselves really have properties such that we can coherently see how they account for the properties of experience. (In this sense explaining experience in terms of sub-experience is not unlike explaining the sense of self in terms of a homunculus-- it merely pushes the real problem onto another level of analysis without adequately addressing it.) The whole problem to begin with is that materialism does not-- indeed, cannot-- mention any properties on any physical level that have a binding logical connection to the properties of subjective experience.

I see your point. However, I must thank you for using the homunculus analogy, as it almost saves sub-experiences from irrelevance. You see, Dennett has used a reductive explanation involving homunculi that are, themselves collections of much more "stupid" homunculi, eventually reducing down to the level of a single neuron (the most "stupid" homunculus). Thus, if an experience is comprised of sub-experiences, and has no existence beyond the combination of these sub-experiences, and each sub-experience is composed of a set of even simpler computations...you see what I'm getting at?

Here's an example: When one experiences a red ball, flying toward them...the experience altogether is composed of many sub-experiences (including - but probably not limited to - the color red, the round shape of a ball, the increasing size (or apparent increase...caused by the approach) of the ball, and the knowledge that it will hit them), these being composed of much more simple computations ("round" is a categorization of all objects who have no sides (remaining "smooth" all around), red is a particular wavelength (or set of wavelengths) of light, increase in apparent size doesn't need much reduction, and the knowledge that it will hit you comes from the memory of previous occasions wherein something was thrown at you), these being (in Hume's terms) either mere "impressions" or "simple ideas" that are identical to previous "impressions".

The question then becomes (as it always seems to do) "How does the person become conscious of the 'impression' in the first place?", IOW, "Why doesn't the brain simply compute the 'impressions' instead of broadcasting them as a visual image?". My answer, of course, is that a visual cortex doesn't have any other way to process and store "impressions". It calls 'em like it sees 'em. What is your explanation?

 

[Canute]

Yes, and Terry Pratchett uses a similar explanation to account for the continuing existence of Discworld, although in his case it's turtles rather than sub-experiences.

You have to make up your mind. Either a neuron is a neuron or it is a sub-experience. If it a sub-experience then a priori we are experiencing it, and the problem remains unchanged.

Unfortunately it is no easier to explain how a single neuron gives rise to a sub-experience than it is to explain how a brain gives rise to a unified collection of them.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
Yes, and Terry Pratchett uses a similar explanation to account for the continuing existence of Discworld, although in his case it's turtles rather than sub-experiences.

You have to make up your mind. Either a neuron is a neuron or it is a sub-experience. If it a sub-experience then a priori we are experiencing it, and the problem remains unchanged.

Unfortunately it is no easier to explain how a single neuron gives rise to a sub-experience than it is to explain how a brain gives rise to a unified collection of them.

First off, it's now single neurons, they are the most "stupid" demons, which do nothing but get stimulated, and stimulate their neighbors (though they have the odd property of tending toward synchronous self-restimulation...that is, if they're a pyramidal neuron in the neocortex).

Secondly, I don't want to call the demons "sub-experiences" but what they are doing together is a "sub-experience" at different levels of complexity. Dennett called it the "question/answer" game (I really suggest that you all read his book, since I probably won't do it justice, no matter how hard I try), but I prefer the Selectionist approach of a Darwinian struggle for new territory. Anyway, it is the process that is a sub-experience, the "stupid demons" are just "experiencers" at different levels of complexity (down to the level of a single demon which can't be said to "experience" at all (though, of course, we haven't even defined "experience", so he could be "experiencing" more than a human for all I know...this cannot be discussed logically until we define the most integral term in the discussion).

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
First off, it's now single neurons, they are the most "stupid" demons, which do nothing but get stimulated, and stimulate their neighbors (though they have the odd property of tending toward synchronous self-restimulation...that is, if they're a pyramidal neuron in the neocortex).

I'll take your word for it.

Secondly, I don't want to call the demons "sub-experiences" but what they are doing together is a "sub-experience" at different levels of complexity.

Ok so experience does not reduce to single neurons, but interactions between groups of them. What machanism turns the physical interaction into a subjective experience?

Dennett called it the "question/answer" game (I really suggest that you all read his book, since I probably won't do it justice, no matter how hard I try), but I prefer the Selectionist approach of a Darwinian struggle for new territory.

I've read his books very carefully.

Anyway, it is the process that is a sub-experience, the "stupid demons" are just "experiencers" at different levels of complexity (down to the level of a single demon which can't be said to "experience" at all (though, of course, we haven't even defined "experience", so he could be "experiencing" more than a human for all I know...this cannot be discussed logically until we define the most integral term in the discussion). [/B]

So why not define 'experience' once and for all? According to you it can be defined as an interaction between neurons which act as 'experiencers', although these 'experiencers' cannot be said to experience at all, since we can't define experience.

However if we could define experience then we might be able to define it as an interaction between neurons, which we will define as 'experiencer's who can't really be said to 'experience' anything since 'experience' is an interaction between a group of neurons, which entails the neurons cannot be 'experiencers' unless we redefine experience in such a way that they can be, which may be possible since we cannot define experience, even though ex hypothesis we have defined it as an interaction between a group of neurons.

I don't buy it, and I find it genuinely hard to believe that you do. I prefer to think that the existence of consciousness has a rational explanation.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
The question then becomes (as it always seems to do) "How does the person become conscious of the 'impression' in the first place?", IOW, "Why doesn't the brain simply compute the 'impressions' instead of broadcasting them as a visual image?".

More difficulties. What do you mean by "broadcasting them as a visual image"? It sounds suspiciously like you are begging the question by once again assuming something about brain function.

My answer, of course, is that a visual cortex doesn't have any other way to process and store "impressions". It calls 'em like it sees 'em. What is your explanation?

Q: Why is the sky blue?
A: Because it can't be any other color except blue.

I don't find that answer very helpful.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
I'll take your word for it.

Ok so experience does not reduce to single neurons, but interactions between groups of them. What machanism turns the physical interaction into a subjective experience?

What's a subjective experience?

I've read his books very carefully.

I'm glad...I too, in the effort to keep an open-mind, have read some of the opposition (I'm reading a book by Chalmers now).

So why not define 'experience' once and for all? According to you it can be defined as an interaction between neurons which act as 'experiencers', although these 'experiencers' cannot be said to experience at all, since we can't define experience.

However if we could define experience then we might be able to define it as an interaction between neurons, which we will define as 'experiencer's who can't really be said to 'experience' anything since 'experience' is an interaction between a group of neurons, which entails the neurons cannot be 'experiencers' unless we redefine experience in such a way that they can be, which may be possible since we cannot define experience, even though ex hypothesis we have defined it as an interaction between a group of neurons.

I don't buy it, and I find it genuinely hard to believe that you do. I prefer to think that the existence of consciousness has a rational explanation.

It only seems irrational because of the way it was written. The groups of neurons are not "experiencers", they are "processers"; discreet units of computation. They compute on higher and higher levels of complexity. "Experience" is just a very high-complexity computation (at least, that's a paraphrased version of my definition which is, I think, better than no definition at all).

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
More difficulties. What do you mean by "broadcasting them as a visual image"? It sounds suspiciously like you are begging the question by once again assuming something about brain function.

Well, how would you phrase the emergent question...I was really just trying to state what your side would probably ask in that situation, but you would certainly do a better job at that...

And you're right, btw, my phrasing does beg the question.

Q: Why is the sky blue?
A: Because it can't be any other color except blue.

First off, the scientific answer is actually "It just is", since "why" is not a scientific question.

OTOH, if your question had been, what causes the sky to appear blue, the scientific answer would be something like: "The refraction of light waves from the sun by the particles that make up the atmosphere".

A question of "what cause" can be answered by science, but "why" has not meaning at all in the Scientific Method.

I don't find that answer very helpful.

Because you asked the wrong question. Ask the "freer" philosopher (one not confined to the bounds of the Scientific Method) and you will get their personal opinion, and that isn't very helpful either.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
Well, how would you phrase the emergent question...I was really just trying to state what your side would probably ask in that situation, but you would certainly do a better job at that...

You said:

The question then becomes (as it always seems to do) "How does the person become conscious of the 'impression' in the first place?", IOW, "Why doesn't the brain simply compute the 'impressions' instead of broadcasting them as a visual image?".

I think your first phrasing was fine, but not the second. The question is not "Why does the brain do this computation and not that computation?" but rather "Why should any neural computation be associated with subjective experience?" If we already assume that 'that computation' is responsible for consciousness, we have only assumed what we set out to explain in the first place.

And you're right, btw, my phrasing does beg the question.

But this is the same kind of phrasing you have been repeatedly using. Are you admitting that you are assuming what you are supposed to be showing?

First off, the scientific answer is actually "It just is", since "why" is not a scientific question.

I addressed this in another thread, but perhaps you hadn't read it yet when you replied.

Because you asked the wrong question. Ask the "freer" philosopher (one not confined to the bounds of the Scientific Method) and you will get their personal opinion, and that isn't very helpful either.

The point was that you were still answering in a manner that didn't address the question (essentially a "how" or "what cause" question).

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I think your first phrasing was fine, but not the second. The question is not "Why does the brain do this computation and not that computation?" but rather "Why should any neural computation be associated with subjective experience?" If we already assume that 'that computation' is responsible for consciousness, we have only assumed what we set out to explain in the first place.

I could probably ask ad nauseum, "Why should I associate A with B, when B isn't properly defined, and so cannot even be assumed to exist?"

But this is the same kind of phrasing you have been repeatedly using. Are you admitting that you are assuming what you are supposed to be showing?

I haven't been talking about "broadcasting images" the whole time, have I?

Besides, you may want to turn this question on yourself, during one of those times that you happen to think about our conversations. Ask yourself, "If I can't define 'subjective experience' without assuming it within the definition, how do I know there is such a thing? How do I know mine is a tenable position, when I'm trying to associate things that are readily definable with something that isn't?"

The point was that you were still answering in a manner that didn't address the question (essentially a "how" or "what cause" question).

In the end, while I still don't agree that "why this way and not some other way" = "how this way", it is irrelevant viz a viz the enormous problem that would exist if the child didn't demand to know how the sky appeared "blue", but demanded to know why it appeared "eulb", and refused to defined "eulb" in none-circular terms (his definitions would probably look something like, "eulb is any of a vast array of different shades of eulb").