A local deterministic theory that violates Bell's inequaities

[WaveJumper]

The principal mode of action of emergent properties is AFAIK something that we might consider to be 'magic'. They are not explainable, but they do exist. They might also be a signal of ignorance of the underlying process, but i don't believe everything is explainable by human reasoning.

 

[ueit]

It is NOT generally agreed that free will is incompatible with all physical theories.

It doesn't matter if it is "generally agreed" or not. It follows logically from the application of relevant physical theories (this means QM) to the human brain.

And it certainly has not been falsified. Do you have a reference?

Please check this transcript (page 9):

http://www.google.ro/url?sa=t&sourc...UmrEV&usg=AFQjCNGbm30a54BNnsMISm5vpDYfbPugSg"

(Please tell me it's not Kochen's Free Will Theorem.)

I wouldn't reference such a paper as I consider it one of the worst examples of bad logic.

 

[kote]

It doesn't matter if it is "generally agreed" or not. It follows logically from the application of relevant physical theories (this means QM) to the human brain.

Whether or not it follows logically has been studied by professional logicians and philosophers for thousands of years. Wikipedia's intro to compatibilism: "Compatibilism, as championed by the ancient Greek Stoics, Hobbes, Hume and many contemporary philosophers, is a theory that argues that free will and determinism exist and are in fact compatible.[3] Determinists argue that all acts that take place are predetermined by prior causes, including human actions."

To sum up the problem... determinism is the idea that there is a cause/reason/explanation for everything that happens. Surely humans have a rational basis for doing the things they do. Is an arbitrary (uncaused/unreasoned/unexplainable) action any more "free" than a rational decision based on antecedent factors?

One way to reconcile free will with the causal closure of the physical realm is through the concept of identity. My rational actions are determined by who I am and the events that take place around me. Given the same situations, I will always make the same choices. "Who I am" evolves with time and depends on my mood etc, but given the exact same situation, it doesn't seem unbelievable to me that as a person with a consistent identity, I will make the same choices. Denying this seems to conflict with the concept that there is anything that makes you you or makes you capable of reason.

The who you are may very well be reducible to or supervenient on purely physical configurations. If you believe that two exact physical copies of a person in two exactly similar physical situations will have the same thoughts, then you believe this.

BTW the view above is not the general compatibilist view (there isn't one), but it is a way to get at least as far as establishing moral responsibility and some level of self-determination in a determined world. I have yet to hear an explanation of free choice that truly overcomes the "arbitrary or determined" divide. Definitions of free will not satisfied by the above explanation are generally not satisfied by any description and are simply incoherent in any type of world, determined or not.

 

[DrChinese]

1. It doesn't matter if it is "generally agreed" or not. It follows logically from the application of relevant physical theories (this means QM) to the human brain.

2. Please check this transcript (page 9):

http://www.google.ro/url?sa=t&sourc...UmrEV&usg=AFQjCNGbm30a54BNnsMISm5vpDYfbPugSg"

3. I wouldn't reference such a paper as I consider it one of the worst examples of bad logic.

1. Well of course it matters here. Making statements as fact for things which are actually speculative personal theories is not allowed generally.

2. You surprise me on this one, not much of any kind of argument about Free Will being proven. It's more of a stimulus-response argument. So again I would ask that you retract your statement and replace it with an appropriate qualification.

3. I likely wouldn't quote it either. I don't think it really means anything.

 

[DrChinese]

DrChinese, I think it would be really interesting if you could outline a concrete proposal explaining how known physical theories might be compatible with free will. Of course, I do not ask you to say how free will really works (nobody knows that), but how it MIGHT work. It may be a pure speculation, but it should be compatible with the physical laws we know. I am not saying that it is not possible, I'm sure it is, but I'm just curious to see how YOU imagine that free will might work.

That's a great question. I'm not sure I am up to the task.

First, I cannot say for an absolute fact that free will exists. We certainly believe we have freedom of choice, but do we? I have struggled for years to try to define consciousness, without much success. Certainly, our conscious thought convinces us of our own free will. But clearly that wouldn't count as evidence if the cells in our brain are actually operating as deterministic machines at some very low level. But generally, I would make the "unscientific" argument that my consciousness implies my free will.

Second, should indeterminism exist as a necessary requirement for true free will? Possibly, and again I do not think this can be demonstrated as an actual requirement for free will. But let's suppose it is. Is nature indeterministic in some respects? We know about some important physical laws which appear indeterministic - such as QM. But as you know, it may be possible to connect the apparent randomness with unknown initial conditions. Those initial conditions, plus deterministic laws, could actually be a prescription for absolute cause and effect - and then we wouldn't really have free will. I personally choose to believe that the randomness in nature is without prior cause. But again I would not call this a scientific argument.

Thirdly, do animals have free will? Does my dog? Is my dog conscious? I think so, but can I be sure? And if so, at what level of creature - going down the chain - does free will disappear? It certainly gets messy as you move down that slope.

And yet with those arguments made - and they are certainly not very strong ones - I am not sure I am any closer to answering your main question: how would free will work? Perhaps our brain acts like a quantum magnifier. Somehow, a small quantum fluctuation is amplified within our neurons and that gives an unpredictable element to our actions. We call that free will. But even in that case, would it be? Or would a random external stimulus be the culprit, and we are back to being "robots" that act in a knee-jerk reaction to the stimuli we are presented with.

Sticky problem to be sure. I see consciousness and indeterminism as somehow important to the notion of free will, but I can't make get very far without resorting to questionable reasoning - reasoning which involves belief more than knowledge. I certainly don't expect anyone to be persuaded by this.

 

[WaveJumper]

So where should 't Hooft's Noble Prize, he got in 1999, go? To the initial conditions? Or to the creator of the Matrix?

Does SD attempt to explain quantum fluctuations? I think Einstein went too far with his "God doesn't play dice". It might be the most quoted statement in modern physics but its over-exposure doesn't lend it any more credibility than a personal preference for how reality ought to be.

 

[Demystifier]

DrChinese, thanks for the honnest answer! Perhaps it will surprise you, but I am satisfied with it.

 

[ueit]

DrChinese and kote,

Maybe I wasn't clear but I am only interested in free will in the context of our present discussion about QM, Bell tests and such. The only relevant form of free-will is the one that claims that a human action is some sort of "first cause". This type of free-will is in direct contradiction with the fact that a human (or animal or whatever) has shown no measurable properties that other non-conscious objects do not have. There is no evidence that the electrons and quarks in a human brain should be treated differently than those in a quartz crystal. But if the human brain is describable by QM it follows that it cannot qualify as a "first cause" of anything, its evolution being predictable (even if only in probabilistic terms).

I see no reason to even discuss the possibility of free-will in the absence of any evidence for it (I do not count our feelings as being evidence), especially given the fact that such evidence should be easy to get.

If you claim that there is no agreement on that, I'd like to see a reference to a physics experiment that contradicts what I have said above.

 

[kote]

If you claim that there is no agreement on that, I'd like to see a reference to a physics experiment that contradicts what I have said above.

The "first cause" idea of free will may very well be incoherent, and we don't need physics to tell us that. Choices without reasons (causes) are arbitrary and undermine rational thought. Free will must be something else then.

Not everything can be described by physics, and physics uses assumptions about more basic principles. Physics requires math, but math is a priori. It requires induction, another logical principle. Physics also, for the most part, requires determinism. It requires that there are actually reasons that we observe what we do and that we can describe those reasons.

All of these topics are foundational to physics. Physics can't decide the issue in regard to any of them, but all physics experiments and theories depend on them. Asking for an experiment to show evidence for them is circular.

I'll save a discussion about the value of feelings as evidence for another thread, but Cartesian doubt and cogito ergo sum come to mind .

 

[Halcyon-on]

The problem in quantum mechanics, as long as physicists are concerned, is not the free-will. This rather a philosophy. In physics one should speech about the variational principle. This is the free will counterpart in physics. Thus the question is whether it is possible to describe fundamental physics in agreement with the variational principle as in deterministic theory or not, relaxing the variational principle as in QM. Deterministic models are showing that quantum mechanics could be not a fundamental theory, but a statistical approximation of underlying determinist dynamics.

 

[WaveJumper]

There is no evidence that the electrons and quarks in a human brain should be treated differently than those in a quartz crystal.

Those are the same electrons, but they do not act in the same way. Are you claiming the electrons in your brain are acting the same, regardless if you are dead or alive? Life, being an emergent phenomenon, is just that - a process that introduces completely new behaviour to constituent parts - quarks, electrons, etc. Those same constituent parts in a living entity carry bits of information(just the human DNA molecule carries 3.2Gb). How much information does a molecule in a quarz crystal carry?

This might be the whole point of free will - it is likely another emergent phenomenon, after a certain stage of intellectual development is reached.

BTW, why would anyone be against free will? What is driving this trend?

 

[kote]

Those are the same electrons, but they do not act in the same way. Are you claiming the electrons in your brain are acting the same, regardless if you are dead or alive? Life, being an emergent phenomenon, is just that - a process that introduces completely new behaviour to constituent parts - quarks, electrons, etc. Those same constituent parts in a living entity carry bits of information(just the DNA molecule carries 3.2Gb). How much information does a molecule in a quarz crystal carry?

Are you saying that different laws of physics apply to particles in the brain? If we entangle measured electrons with brain electrons would we see different correlations than usual?

"Information" is also a matter of context and isn't anything physical itself. We could design a machine that interprets a quartz crystal and behaves differently depending on the properties of that crystal. In that case the crystal would hold just as much information as DNA, even if it started out just as a normal rock.

 

[WaveJumper]

Are you saying that different laws of physics apply to particles in the brain?

Yes. Life is an emergent phenomenon that governs constituent parts in a whole new way. Life is the 'Ghost' in atoms.

If we entangle measured electrons with brain electrons would we see different correlations than usual?

Probably. See Schroedinger's "What is Life?"

"Information" is also a matter of context and isn't anything physical itself.
We could design a machine that interprets a quartz crystal and behaves differently depending on the properties of that crystal. In that case the crystal would hold just as much information as DNA, even if it started out just as a normal rock.

I'll believe this, when you prove that a certain configuration of quartz crystal can on its own and by itself, carry and communicate vast amounts of information. Until i see that crystal, i maintain, that life processes cannot be explained by the laws of physics as we know them.

 

[alxm]

Those are the same electrons, but they do not act in the same way. Are you claiming the electrons in your brain are acting the same, regardless if you are dead or alive?

Yes. I think most here would claim exactly that. That the electrons of a given molecule are going to act the exact same way as long as the external conditions like temperature, etc.

Those same constituent parts in a living entity carry bits of information(just the human DNA molecule carries 3.2Gb).

There's nothing particularly special about how DNA carries information.

This might be the whole point of free will - it is likely another emergent phenomenon, after a certain stage of intellectual development is reached.
BTW, why would anyone be against free will? What is driving this trend?

People aren't against free will. They're against pseudoscientific blather like this, the mingling of metaphysics and speculative nonsense with real science.

Yes. Life is an emergent phenomenon that governs constituent parts in a whole new way. Life is the 'Ghost' in atoms.

There is no 'ghost' in atoms. We understand atoms quite well without any need to invoke the actions of specters and spirits. What is this 'ghost' supposed to be?

I'll believe this, when you prove that a certain configuration of quartz crystal can on its own and by itself, carry and communicate vast amounts of information.

You just moved the goalposts. First you talk about DNA and how it's supposedly fundamentally different from a quartz crystal. Now you're saying that the crystal must "by its own and by itself" carry and 'communicate' (whatever THAT's supposed to mean) the information? A piece of DNA can not do ANYTHING by itself. Plenty of viruses consist of little more than a strand of DNA, which requires another living organism to execute its instructions.

https://www.amazon.com/dp/B000P1O73A/?tag=pfamazon01-20 an example of more information than what your average DNA has, in a silicon crystal. It can't reproduce itself. But you can put a program on it that will reproduce itself if inserted into the correct machine.

Until i see that crystal, i maintain, that life processes cannot be explained by the laws of physics as we know them.

There are thousands of scientists around the world explaining and elucidating the processes of life every day, and they're all using the laws of physics as we know them. None of them has run into anything that cannot be explained by the laws of physics as we know them or anything generally believed unexplainable by the laws of physics as we know them.

We know how DNA replicates for instance, down to each specific chemical reaction. Thousand and thousands of engineers repeat that process artificially in PCR machines every day.

So why would anyone care what you think? You're the one who thinks there's a 'ghost' that makes what's going on in the cell somehow fundamentally different from what's going on in the PCR machine.

 

[Dmitry67]

Reading the last page:

I think you all have an impression that if nothing "magic" happens in our brains (so all processes in our brains are goverened by the QM laws) then ours consciousness have the same attributes QM has.

For example, if QM is deterministic then our consciousness is deterministic too, et cetera.

This is not true for purely mathematical reasons - on some level of complexity composite systems can have properties which can not be derived - in principle - from the properties of the parts they consists of.

Let me know if you need more details. In that case I will explain it, but I will have to learn LATEX a little bit. Usually i use just pure handwaving, but not in this case.

 

[WaveJumper]

Yes. I think most here would claim exactly that. That the electrons of a given molecule are going to act the exact same way as long as the external conditions like temperature, etc.



There's nothing particularly special about how DNA carries information.



People aren't against free will. They're against pseudoscientific blather like this, the mingling of metaphysics and speculative nonsense with real science.



There is no 'ghost' in atoms. We understand atoms quite well without any need to invoke the actions of specters and spirits. What is this 'ghost' supposed to be?



You just moved the goalposts. First you talk about DNA and how it's supposedly fundamentally different from a quartz crystal. Now you're saying that the crystal must "by its own and by itself" carry and 'communicate' (whatever THAT's supposed to mean) the information? A piece of DNA can not do ANYTHING by itself. Plenty of viruses consist of little more than a strand of DNA, which requires another living organism to execute its instructions.

https://www.amazon.com/dp/B000P1O73A/?tag=pfamazon01-20 an example of more information than what your average DNA has, in a silicon crystal. It can't reproduce itself. But you can put a program on it that will reproduce itself if inserted into the correct machine.



There are thousands of scientists around the world explaining and elucidating the processes of life every day, and they're all using the laws of physics as we know them. None of them has run into anything that cannot be explained by the laws of physics as we know them or anything generally believed unexplainable by the laws of physics as we know them.

We know how DNA replicates for instance, down to each specific chemical reaction. Thousand and thousands of engineers repeat that process artificially in PCR machines every day.

So why would anyone care what you think? You're the one who thinks there's a 'ghost' that makes what's going on in the cell somehow fundamentally different from what's going on in the PCR machine.

So, basically your whole point was that you can explain away emergent properties via reductionism. Are you serious? Your post is nonsensical.

So your logic leads you to believe a dead person's atoms behave entirely in the same way as as those of a live one. Well done! So, we are all dead.

 

[kote]

Yes. Life is an emergent phenomenon that governs constituent parts in a whole new way. Life is the 'Ghost' in atoms.

I would just like to point out that, while the interactionist substance dualism you are proposing is still alive to some degree, it is not required even by nonreductive dualism. Also, emergence is not compatible with interactionism. If the mind intervenes on physical causation then it is not emergent from the physical but is independent at least to some degree. Emergence implies at least a sort of reductionism.

See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/#Int and
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#9

Scientists (and apparently ueit ) typically identify with physicalism, although that is by no means a statement of its worth - just an observation. Physicalism is also not incompatible with free will.

 

[WaveJumper]

I would just like to point out that, while the interactionist substance dualism you are proposing is still alive to some degree, it is not required even by nonreductive dualism. Also, emergence is not compatible with interactionism. If the mind intervenes on physical causation then it is not emergent from the physical but is independent at least to some degree. Emergence implies at least a sort of reductionism.

See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/#int and
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#9

Scientists (and apparently ueit ) typically identify with physicalism, although that is by no means a statement of its worth - just an observation. Physicalism is also not incompatible with free will.

It's not about dualism, kote. It's about,for example, what law of physics dictates that a protein would move a single atom in a cell to its target, to repair a broken cell wall? The cell operates according to its own laws, the emergent properties of Life. There is a clear difference between dead and living matter(Am I even supposed to say this on a science forum?) that reaches all the way down to how individual atoms behave. This is offtopic and if someone chooses to continue this argument, i'll start a new thread.

 

[kote]

It's not about dualism, kote. It's about,for example, what law of physics dictates that a protein would move a single atom in a cell to its target, to repair a broken cell wall?

From the interactionism section I linked: "If physical laws are deterministic, then any interference from outside would lead to a breach of those laws. But if they are indeterministic, might not interference produce a result that has a probability greater than zero, and so be consistent with the laws?"

Isn't this exactly what you're talking about? Anyway, there are no such things as cells or proteins in physics. Are you asking how chemistry emerges from physics and biology emerges from chemistry? I thought it was generally accepted that higher level sciences are reducible to physics and never violate the laws of physics.

 

[WaveJumper]

From the interactionism section I linked: "If physical laws are deterministic, then any interference from outside would lead to a breach of those laws. But if they are indeterministic, might not interference produce a result that has a probability greater than zero, and so be consistent with the laws?"
Isn't this exactly what you're talking about?

No.

Anyway, there are no such things as cells or proteins in physics. Are you asking how chemistry emerges from physics and biology emerges from chemistry? I thought it was generally accepted that higher level sciences are reducible to physics and never violate the laws of physics.

I am sure that you understand that I am talking about Life and how Life as an emergent property of a certain configuration of atoms, cannot be confined by the laws of physics(as we know them). The laws of physics, as we know them, cannot explain the bahaviour of living organisms(the vast information transfer and the resultant interactions, the self-awareness, etc.).

If i had to sum up my position, that started this argument, it'd be - atoms in the human body do not behave in the same way 5 seconds after the person dies(when the emergent property of life is gone).

What law of physics dictates that a particular configuration of matter should be 'alive' and move about according to its own will and agenda? No one knows of such a law and that's why life is regarded as 'emergent property' and all the constituent parts in the system behave according to this new emergent property. And this emergent property may well harbour the notion of free will(as another emergent property) in a deterministic universe, aka compatibilism, which, in turn, goes against the idea of superdeterminism, Matrix style simulations, sealed-fate robots, consiparcy theories, etc, etc.

 

[Descartz2000]

That's a great question. I'm not sure I am up to the task.

First, I cannot say for an absolute fact that free will exists. We certainly believe we have freedom of choice, but do we? I have struggled for years to try to define consciousness, without much success. Certainly, our conscious thought convinces us of our own free will. But clearly that wouldn't count as evidence if the cells in our brain are actually operating as deterministic machines at some very low level. But generally, I would make the "unscientific" argument that my consciousness implies my free will.

Second, should indeterminism exist as a necessary requirement for true free will? Possibly, and again I do not think this can be demonstrated as an actual requirement for free will. But let's suppose it is. Is nature indeterministic in some respects? We know about some important physical laws which appear indeterministic - such as QM. But as you know, it may be possible to connect the apparent randomness with unknown initial conditions. Those initial conditions, plus deterministic laws, could actually be a prescription for absolute cause and effect - and then we wouldn't really have free will. I personally choose to believe that the randomness in nature is without prior cause. But again I would not call this a scientific argument.

Thirdly, do animals have free will? Does my dog? Is my dog conscious? I think so, but can I be sure? And if so, at what level of creature - going down the chain - does free will disappear? It certainly gets messy as you move down that slope.

And yet with those arguments made - and they are certainly not very strong ones - I am not sure I am any closer to answering your main question: how would free will work? Perhaps our brain acts like a quantum magnifier. Somehow, a small quantum fluctuation is amplified within our neurons and that gives an unpredictable element to our actions. We call that free will. But even in that case, would it be? Or would a random external stimulus be the culprit, and we are back to being "robots" that act in a knee-jerk reaction to the stimuli we are presented with.

Sticky problem to be sure. I see consciousness and indeterminism as somehow important to the notion of free will, but I can't make get very far without resorting to questionable reasoning - reasoning which involves belief more than knowledge. I certainly don't expect anyone to be persuaded by this.

I'm not sure consciousness equates to free-will. One is biologically based and the other is conceptual. If you look at recent studies in neuroscience you will find that the unconscious part of the brain is triggered first, and the conscious experience (alleged free will) is the result of this triggering. So, a physical process is the initiator. The loophole here is to say consciousness is not physical and then nothing more can be said about the argument. I think it is established in neuroscience that for true free-will to exist, consciousness must be immaterial. A mental world being immaterial seems like an insane proposition to me. I thought physics was in the business of refuting metaphysics and getting back to the basics of testable research.

 

[kote]

I thought physics was in the business of refuting metaphysics and getting back to the basics of testable research.

Physics can't refute metaphysics, only particular metaphysical theories. There are foundational issues in physics that can't be answered by experiments. See, for example, the interpretational divide in QM. Whether to assume theory realism (Bohm) or entity realism (Bohr), determinism or locality, etc, can never be decided by physics.

Physics makes assumptions about math and induction about other things. Metaphysics studies these assumptions.

Also, neuroscience makes the metaphysical assumption that minds are reducible to brains. Its findings, correspondingly, can only provide circular (read: non-) evidence for the reducibility of minds to brains.

 

[Descartz2000]

Physics can't refute metaphysics, only particular metaphysical theories. There are foundational issues in physics that can't be answered by experiments. See, for example, the interpretational divide in QM. Whether to assume theory realism (Bohm) or entity realism (Bohr), determinism or locality, etc, can never be decided by physics.

But, I think one day we will know which one of these existing models (or new ones that are yet to be discovered), will correlate with our Universe in explicit ways. I think the answers will be found in time, and I think physics can answer these questions.

Physics makes assumptions about math and induction among other things. Metaphysics studies these assumptions.

Also, neuroscience makes the metaphysical assumption that minds are reducible to brains. Its findings, correspondingly, can only provide circular (read: non-) evidence for the reducibility of minds to brains.

Maybe minds are not reducible to brains, maybe this will be answered in my lifetime and maybe it won't. But, I am more inclined to buy into a theory that is based on some kind of consistent reality. I think the only option left if we do not accept a physical basis for consciousness, is one in which an adequate definition can not be applied. The argument for a non-physical mind falls apart in your hands because you are left with answering questions like: Where did it come from? Is there a process behind free choice? What is the physical stuff going on in the brain if it does not correlate to the mind? What is free-will free of, as it seems we are our biology and heredity, and our experiences? And so, my mind is free of my experiences and of my genetics? I think the only realistic option is to accept a biologically based mind. I do not think the mind has an exact correlate for physical properties, But, I do think through emergence, there is a higher order process that develops when neurons fire in assembly. But, I do not think this emergence allows for a system to guide itself (brain); it is still guided by a larger system (Universe).

 

[Descartz2000]

"But, I think one day we will know which one of these existing models (or new ones that are yet to be discovered), will correlate with our Universe in explicit ways. I think the answers will be found in time, and I think physics can answer these questions."

Sorry Kote. my quote. I thought I could interject when responding to your quote and I did it incorrectly.

 

[Descartz2000]

Physics can't refute metaphysics, only particular metaphysical theories. There are foundational issues in physics that can't be answered by experiments. See, for example, the interpretational divide in QM. Whether to assume theory realism (Bohm) or entity realism (Bohr), determinism or locality, etc, can never be decided by physics.

But, I think one day we will know which one of these existing models (or new ones that are yet to be discovered), will correlate with our Universe in explicit ways. I think the answers will be found in time, and I think physics can answer these questions.

Physics makes assumptions about math and induction among other things. Metaphysics studies these assumptions.

Also, neuroscience makes the metaphysical assumption that minds are reducible to brains. Its findings, correspondingly, can only provide circular (read: non-) evidence for the reducibility of minds to brains.

Maybe minds are not reducible to brains, maybe this will be answered in my lifetime and maybe it won't. But, I am more inclined to buy into a theory that is based on some kind of consistent reality. I think the only option left if we do not accept a physical basis for consciousness, is one in which an adequate definition can not be applied. The argument for a non-physical mind falls apart in your hands because you are left with answering questions like: Where did it come from? Is there a process behind free choice? What is the physical stuff going on in the brain if it does not correlate to the mind? What is free-will free of, as it seems we are our biology and heredity, and our experiences? And so, my mind is free of my experiences and of my genetics? I think the only realistic option is to accept a biologically based mind. I do not think the mind has an exact correlate for physical properties, But, I do think through emergence, there is a higher order process that develops when neurons fire in assembly. But, I do not think this emergence allows for a system to guide itself (brain); it is still guided by a larger system (Universe).

 

[WaveJumper]

But, I do not think this emergence allows for a system to guide itself (brain); it is still guided by a larger system (Universe).

So the rate of spin of Andromeda galaxy is influencing my wife's choice whether to wear black or pink underwear?

 

[ueit]

I don't consider GR to be superdeterministic. It would take a theory of everything (TOE) to contain superdeterminism, by definition. (Because there are unexplained variables acting that are not part of GR.)

Let's consider a system that is completely described by GR. Is it possible to separate this system into 2 or more independent subsystems or not?

 

[Descartz2000]

So the rate of spin of Andromeda galaxy is influencing my wife's choice whether to wear black or pink underwear?

I would say 'yes', at least indirectly. I think the issue is with a mind (or brain for that matter) being a first cause of a particular action. I think my brain, where I make decisions, is based on a lengthy evolutionary process. I did not create this process of brain development, the larger system of the Universe did. The Universe supports our galaxy, which supports our solar system, which in turn, supports life on Earth and the choices that we make. I am not sure what would happen if Andromeda spontaneously disappeared from the Universe; but chances are good it would in some way effect every body on Earth and their decisions about underwear.

 

[DrChinese]

Let's consider a system that is completely described by GR. Is it possible to separate this system into 2 or more independent subsystems or not?

1. Of course, we have that situation in the current universe. There are volumes of space that have never been in causal contact.

2. Now, for the sake of argument, suppose everything had been in causal contact at one time. How would that change the situation? You would next probably ask if there were other physical laws that might contribute to the dynamics.

3. But for the sale of argument again, suppose all we had was mass which exhibited no further dynamics. In this case, we would have a deterministic evolution.

Of course, that would not make it a superdeterministic evolution.

4. And yes, that system could evolve into subsystems which were independent. That too has actually happened. Most of the universe is isolated from most of the universe at this point.

 

[Count Iblis]

Let's not forget that the MWI is also a local deterministic theory.