A A Realization of a Basic Wigner's Friend Type Experiment

  • #151
DarMM said:
It does, because it is central to how QBism and Neo-Copenhagenism resolve this point. Why would the friend using the ##|00\rangle## state after his measurement believe the outcome of such an interferometry experiment on the entire lab to have 50:50 odds? To obtain these odds for the entire lab he'd have to ascribe it the state ##|000\rangle##, but why would he do this on the basis of the ##|00\rangle## state for the device and system alone? He didn't observe the lab down to the atomic level.

Any other system in the lab (which can be arbitrarily small apart from F) has no significance. It either records the |0> outcome via decoherence (and then is controlled in recombination) or it remains isolated/irrelevant/in its preparation state, and plays a trivial role in the experiment. Interference effects are not predicted based on other subsystems in the lab. They come from the relative phase of the|1> term, same as any double slit or MZI. The only relevant question for predicting interference is if you think the |1> term still exists or was genuinely "collapsed away."
 
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  • #152
charters said:
Any other system in the lab (which can be arbitrarily small apart from F) has no significance. It either records the |0> outcome via decoherence (and then is controlled in recombination) or it remains isolated/irrelevant/in its preparation state, and plays a trivial role in the experiment. Interference effects are not predicted based on other subsystems in the lab.
Of course they're not, the superposition is for the entire lab. However I don't see the relevance of this. The question can be simplified as follows. The device showing ##0## implies the Friend's description of the device and system is ##|00\rangle##, but why would this imply the absence of the ##|111\rangle## term for Wigner's description of the whole lab?

As I showed in the post I linked to it doesn't even imply its absence in Spekkens toy model.
 
  • #153
DarMM said:
Of course they're not, the superposition is for the entire lab. However I don't see the relevance of this

Neither do I, but you brought up that he doesn't "observe the lab down to the atomic level."

DarMM said:
why would this imply the absence of the ##|111\rangle## term for Wigner's description of the whole lab?

Because this is the definition of a collapse/state reduction due to F's measurement. There is still a possibility of 1 for Wigner because he lacks information re which collapse outcome obtained. But for anyone who believes a collapse has in fact occured, thereafter there can be no prediction of interference between the 0 and 1 outcomes anymore, so for someone with this belief, there's no guarantee of Wigner getting |+> .

DarMM said:
As I showed in the post I linked to it doesn't even imply its absence in Spekkens toy model.

This has HVs instead of collapse, its not the same analysis.
 
  • #154
charters said:
Neither do I, but you brought up that he doesn't "observe the lab down to the atomic level."
charters said:
Because this is the definition of a collapse/state reduction due to F's measurement
Why does the collapse have to occur on all scales though? The Friend observes his system and device obtaining ##0## and thus updates his state for the system and device. Why would he update the state of the whole lab in the manner you mention. Especially in the realistic case where the lab environment forms most of the state?

charters said:
This has HVs instead of collapse, its not the same analysis
What difference does this make though in this particular case? Look at what Spekkens model says. Collapse at one level does not imply collapse at all levels. Collapsing the state of the system and device does not mean you should collapse the lab state. Why? Because the lab state concerns a much larger set of variables, including a multitude you have no knowledge of and performed no measurements on.
Further more QM shows this. Trace out the lab environment and one is able form a Boolean lattice around device observables.

So why can't we take the same explanation in QM. Rather than solipsism we see that the superposed state for the entire lab is consistent with definite outcomes for the device, but also encodes statistics for atomic level observations.
 
  • #155
DarMM said:
Why would he update the state of the whole lab in the manner you mention

It doesn't matter if he does or doesn't. All that matters is whether you believe, for any given subsystem which *was* measured, does the unobtained outcome for that subsystem still exist in some way, with its proper relative phase, such that it can later on recombine with your outcome. The collapse thesis is no, as saying yes is tacit acceptance of MWI type branching.

DarMM said:
the lab state concerns a much larger set of variables, including a multitude you have no knowledge of and performed no measurements on.

Again, the status of any such variables is irrelevant for the prediction of the interference experiment succeeding or failing.

The difference with Spekkens is you can use the HVs, ie the existence of the hidden ontic state can preserve the necessary information from the original preparation state to predict the + outcome only (same basic deal as in Bohm). In collapse, this information is truly, non-unitarily lost.

Matt Pusey discusses Copenhagen versus Spekkens in the context of Wigner's Friend a little in this short editorial: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41567-018-0293-7?WT.feed_name=subjects_quantum-mechanics

Spekkens is really not helpful to this issue. His idea is psi-epistemic within the ontological models framework, not pure epistemic, and he solves Wigners Friend basically the same way as Bohm. Another way to see the difference is QBism/Bub has no PBR theorem problem, but Spekkens does. So these are disjoint interpretations with different weak points.
 
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  • #156
See my next post as well.

charters said:
Another way to see the difference is QBism/Bub has no PBR theorem problem, but Spekkens does
What do you mean by "Spekkens does"?
I assume you don't mean the toy model has a PBR theorem problem.
Acausal/Retrocausal ontic models also don't have a PBR theorem problem since they are outside the ontological model framework within which the theorem is proved and it's usually models like these that Leifer, Spekkens and others are working on.

charters said:
The difference with Spekkens is you can use the HVs, ie the existence of the hidden ontic state can preserve the necessary information from the original preparation state to predict the + outcome only
I don't quite agree with this. What the toy model has is that collapse at one scale does not permit collapse at a lower scale. Thus the removal of epistemic states involving ##1## at the higher level does not imply their loss in the state for the whole lab.
Since after decoherence we can give the macroscopic variables a Boolean lattice structure after the Friend's measurement why can't we follow this "collapse at one level and not another" in Copenhagen style models?
 
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  • #157
I think we can resolve this based on your previous post.
QBism and Copenhagen views by saying there is no ontic state are not saying there is nothing beneath the quantum epistemic states, but rather that what lies beneath cannot be modeled mathematically. "The world is not a mechanism" as one of the QBist authors Ruediger Schack has said. So they think that like Spekkens model the level beneath the epistemic states is holding the "details" as you mentioned as being necessary. The difference is that in Spekkens model these can be described with mathematical variables, but in these views they cannot.

So it's really a choice between assuming "transcendent" elements of reality beneath the quantum formalism come to your rescue, multiple worlds, nonlocality, or some form of retro/acausality.
 
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  • #158
Woops last point. There is also the option of holding a Copenhagen style view but just rejecting the existence of superobservers as Peres and Omnès do.
 
  • #159
DarMM said:
I think we can resolve this based on your previous post.
QBism and Copenhagen views by saying there is no ontic state are not saying there is nothing beneath the quantum epistemic states, but rather that what lies beneath cannot be modeled mathematically. "The world is not a mechanism" as one of the QBist authors Reudiger Schack has said. So they think that like Spekkens model the level beneath the epistemic states is holding the "details" as you mentioned as being necessary. The difference is that in Spekkens model these can be described with mathematical variables, but in these views they cannot.

So it's really a choice between assuming "transcendent" elements of reality beneath the quantum formalism come to your rescue, multiple worlds, nonlocality, or some form of retro/acausality.

Yes, agreed. Or you accept you have a "single user" theory or (as you mention) you deny superobservers somehow.
 
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  • #160
Perfect. Thanks for the discussion @charters , always worthwhile with yourself.
 
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  • #161
DarMM said:
Perfect. Thanks for the discussion @charters , always worthwhile with yourself.

Same to you!
 
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  • #162
charters said:
Or, if Friend's state is only valid up to Wigner's choice to do a recombination experiment, at which point Friend has to switch to using Wigner's state (this being one of Baumann & Brukner's ideas to resolve the tension), then Friend is admitting they need MWI or HV type reasoning, at least in some cases/for some predictions. At this point, they might as well just apply this full time, since it will work in all cases
I was just rereading some of Brukner's papers including this one. Brukner himself holds a view that's a form of Copenhagen/QBism so I wanted to see what he was saying.

It seems to be that he thinks Wigner's friend type situations call for a generalisation of the Born rule. This Born rule allows one to compute probabilities like ##p(k|j)##, i.e. that the superobserver sees outcome ##k## given that the observer see outcome ##j##.

So before we listed the "outs" for a Copenhagen view regarding Wigner's friend as:
  1. The necessary info to prevent a contradiction is hidden in the unmodelable layer of the world. It basically takes the solution to be like Spekkens approach, but replaces the HVs.
  2. Facts are relative to the observer. More accurately their environment. A quantum system can imprint itself differently in different classical environments in a way that makes reasoning about their combination inconsistent. This is the approach QBism seems to take, a relativisation of classical facts.
  3. There are no superobservers. Peres and Decoherent history authors take this approach. Bub uses a form of this as well.
To this Brukner seems to be adding that scenarios like Wigner's friend require a modification of the Born rule and that it is this modification as a genuine mathematical feature of the formalism that points to (2) being the correct answer (given a Copenhagen style view of course).
 
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  • #163
DarMM said:
To this Brukner seems to be adding that scenarios like Wigner's friend require a modification of the Born rule and that it is this modification as a genuine mathematical feature of the formalism that points to (2) being the correct answer (given a Copenhagen style view of

I guess I think this is just careful speech to avoid explicitly saying what Friend would really be doing here - in using unitary V (in appendix A to Baumann & Brukner) she is very clearly making her prediction of Wigner's outcome based on the expectation that her obtained outcome path will overlap with, recombine with, and interfere with the unobtained outcome path in her initial measurement. Making the prediction requires treating the obtained and unobtained outcomes as both still relevant after the alleged collapse, which undermines the notion of the collapse altogether.

The admission that unitary V is necessary for Friend's prediction undermines believing in collapse, given a definition of the term that is reasonably close to the standard textbook account and/or close to how (imo) most people use and understand the concept.
 
  • #164
So then I would have a slight question before more reading.

Earlier you said there was a flaw in Bub's view. What is it given that Bub does believe in total collapse, i.e. that the other element of the superposition is completely gone leading him to derive:
$$p(ok|t_{L}) = 0$$
for the FR experiment.
 
  • #165
DarMM said:
So then I would have a slight question before more reading.

Earlier you said there was a flaw in Bub's view. What is it given that Bub does believe in total collapse, i.e. that the other element of the superposition is completely gone leading him to derive:
$$p(ok|t_{L}) = 0$$
for the FR experiment.

In https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.03267 Bub says (where annoyingly he calls one of the superobservers "Friend"):

"There is another option, which is to reject assumption (ii)—not by restricting the universality of the unitary dynamics or any part of quantum mechanics, but by interpreting the quantum state probabilistically rather than representationally in the sense of §3. Quantum probabilities don’t quantify incomplete knowledge about an ontic state, but reflect the irreducibly probabilistic relation between the non-Boolean microlevel and the Boolean macrolevel, expressed through the intrinsic randomness of events associated with the outcomes of quantum measurements. On this option, what the Frauchiger-Renner argument shows is that quantum mechanics, as it stands without embellishment, is self-contradictory if the quantum state is interpreted representationally. The conclusion is avoided if we interpret the state probabilistically, with respect to a Boolean frame defined with respect to an “ultimate measuring instrument” or “ultimate observer.” In a situation, as in the Frauchiger-Renner argument, where there are multiple candidate observers, there is a question as to whether Alice and Bob are “ultimate observers,” or whether only Wigner and Friend are “ultimate observers.” The difference has to do with whether Alice and Bob perform measurements of the observables A and B with definite outcomes at the Boolean macrolevel, or whether they are manipulated by Wigner and Friend in unitary transformations that entangle Alice and Bob with systems in their laboratories, with no definite outcomes for the observables A and B. What actually happens to Alice and Bob is different in the two situations."

The problem is, if measurement induced collapse is a thing, then every human being must consider *him or her self* an ultimate observer in all cases. Nothing else is consistent with experience. So, Alice thinks she is an ultimate observer even when Wigner thinks she isn't. This is what causes the single user limitation, and Bub doesn't avoid this, despite claiming he does.
 
  • #166
My reading of Bub was more that when Alice is an observer then she is to everybody, Wigner cannot consider her not an observer due to the difference in the FR probabilites of ##\frac{1}{4}## vs ##\frac{1}{12}##. In other words he is saying any application of FR on a real human being would give ##\frac{1}{4}##. Alice and Bob can't be observers and Wigner still use the superposed state. If Wigner does use the superposed state then Alice and Bob are not observers. This would not happen for actual human observers.
 
  • #167
DarMM said:
Alice and Bob can't be observers and Wigner still use the superposed state. If Wigner does use the superposed state then Alice and Bob are not observers. This would not happen for actual human observers.

But he says: "There is another option, which is to reject assumption (ii)—not by restricting the universality of the unitary dynamics or any part of quantum mechanics"

You are however restricting QM. You are saying Wigner can't use unitary QM if doing so means he'd have to unitarily recombine a human, because the internal human already made a Boolean macrolevel measurement.

This is the GRW type of answer, and it is a sensible one. But its not universally unitary, so I can't say Bub is clearly arguing for this. Ultimately this is because I think the root problem is he's trying to have his cake and eat it too, and not accepting he has to just bite one of the 3 F&R bullets/accept some downside. So, whatever plausible view you ascribe to him, there will be some remark inconsistent with that view, where he denies its necessary implications.
 
  • #168
I agree which is what confuses me, it seems to me that it is a restriction of QM because in his view there clearly is a macro level where events actually occur as he says and where superposition doesn't seem to be valid. I haven't seen much commentary on the paper, so I'm willing to believe there might be something I haven't understood. Currently though what you say seems true. When he says "universally" he seems to mean "can be applied to any micro/macro interaction" not "can be applied to anything".

What do you think of Renato Renner's view (referenced in Bub's most recent paper) that MWI bites two bullets, rejecting single world and inter-agent consistency?
 
  • #169
DarMM said:
What do you think of Renato Renner's view (referenced in Bub's most recent paper) that MWI bites two bullets, rejecting single world and inter-agent consistency?

I think F&R came up with a very nice framework - the choice to give up Q, C, or S - but I think they misdiagnose some interpretations, and this problem got worse between the 2015 and 2018 papers.

To me, the whole issue only needs the basic Wigner's friend scenario, not the extended version. Then, there is simply one material question: after Wigner (attempts to) perform the recombination step of the interference experiment, does he see (A) 100% |+> or (B) 50/50 |+> and|->?

If both W and F agree on (A), then F is accepting that something (e.g., an MWI copy or a pilot wave) persists on the unobtained path after her measurement. This is what giving up S means: for maximum predictive accuracy, F is required to still keep track of unobtained measurement outcomes, especially their relative phases, just in case recombination is attempted in the future. There's no inescapable duty to treat these unobtained as literal "other worlds". F just can't act like they've been "collapsed away" such that they have 0 ongoing empirical significance, if she wants to always recover Wigner's unitary prediction.

If both parties agree on answer (B), then W is giving up universally unitary QT, ie giving up assumption Q, and technically introducing a modification to the Schrodinger eq.

If W and F don't agree on (A) or (B) - yet agree it is reasonable that they can disagree on this point - they give up C.

So, since in MWI the two certainly can agree on the empirical question, I can't see why they'd also have to give up C, which is defined by the absence of agreement.
 
  • #170
charters said:
So, since in MWI the two certainly can agree on the empirical question, I can't see why they'd also have to give up C, which is defined by the absence of agreement
The state supporting it is given on p.15-16 of Bub's paper if you want to see Renner's argument. The elements behind his argument wouldn't occur in a basic Wigner's friend, so I don't think there's anything in that case that would force MWI to give up C. It only seems to occur in extended Wigner's friend scenarios.
 
  • #171
DarMM said:
The state supporting it is given on p.15-16 of Bub's paper if you want to see Renner's argument. The elements behind his argument wouldn't occur in a basic Wigner's friend, so I don't think there's anything in that case that would force MWI to give up C. It only seems to occur in extended Wigner's friend scenarios.

None of the Bub papers I have saved have 15+ pages. Link?
 
  • #173
DarMM said:
Woops, that should have been eq.15-16 on p.11-12 here:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.06240

That's where we started this back and forth/what I wanted to call your attention to. See my comment #109. Basically I think he is just wrong about what information W-bar can obtain on a given run. He is making a basic complementarity error.
 
  • #174
In the step between (16) and (17) I thought what was happening is that it displays the results of ##W## and ##\bar{W}## using modal logic after getting their superobservable results rather than them obtaining the results of ##F## and ##\bar{F}##.

Of course I think the problem is that using such logic isn't valid in QM at all in any interpretation.
 
  • #175
DarMM said:
In the step between (16) and (17) I thought what was happening is that it displays the results of ##W## and ##\bar{W}## using modal logic after getting their superobservable results rather than them obtaining the results of ##F## and ##\bar{F}##.

Of course I think the problem is that using such logic isn't valid in QM at all in any interpretation.

But there's no logical inference by which you can get specific F outcomes just from the Ws knowing their ok/fail outcomes. The ok/fail outcomes are equivalent to W "inserting the second beamsplitter" to close the interferometer, which means both the |ok> and |fail> paths are interfering combinations of F's paths along both the heads/tails or up/down paths, as appropriate.
 
  • #176
charters said:
But there's no logical inference by which you can get specific F outcomes just from the Ws knowing their ok/fail outcomes
Well the whole set up of the Frauchiger-Renner paper essentially attempts to.

Depending on the paper the contradiction is either presented as:
$$w = ok \Rightarrow F=tails\\
\bar{w} = \overline{ok} \Rightarrow F=heads$$
or as:
$$w = ok \Rightarrow F=tails \Rightarrow \bar{w} = \overline{fail}\\
|\psi\rangle \Rightarrow P(\overline{ok}) \neq 0$$

I agree that using modal logic in QM doesn't seem to make much sense. Thus I'm not really sure what FR says about any interpretation.
 
  • #177
But these inferences are not valid in MWI/unitary QM. The Fs always take both paths and both paths get intertwined during recombination, such that |ok> and |fail> outcomes both receive amplitude from both F paths. Bub is still acting like F is a Copenhagen observer when treating the problem in MWI, which isn't fair.
 
  • #178
charters said:
But these inferences are not valid in MWI/unitary QM. The Fs always take both paths and both paths get intertwined during recombination, such that |ok> and |fail> outcomes both receive amplitude from both F paths. Bub is still acting like F is a Copenhagen observer when treating the problem in MWI, which isn't fair.
I'm not arguing for Bub ( I need to think about it more). I'm just saying that's what FR do.
 
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  • #179
charters said:
Yes, agreed. Or you accept you have a "single user" theory or (as you mention) you deny superobservers somehow.
Earlier we characterised Copenhagen explanations of Wigner's friend and its extensions as either
  1. Have transcendent elements of reality fill the role of storing some trace of the preparation
  2. Single user theory
  3. No superobservers
Where would you place the Consistent Histories explanation? FR treats Consistent histories in their paper,as does this paper:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.10095
It clearly breaks assumption C but it doesn't seem to obviously do so by the methods above, more so just restricting reasoning in general. FR explain it a bit differently to Losada et al.
 
  • #180
DarMM said:
Where would you place the Consistent Histories explanation?

I think CH will deny superobservers; the idea of a histories partition assumes you can absolutely neglect the risk of "recoherence" in the classical limit. So after F measures, W has no hope of pulling of the necessary measurement.
 
  • #181
I don't believe this paper has been referenced yet in this thread, as it just recently came out:

https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.05607
Testing the reality of Wigner's friend's experience
Kok-Wei Bong, Aníbal Utreras-Alarcón, Farzad Ghafari, Yeong-Cherng Liang, Nora Tischler, Eric G. Cavalcanti, Geoff J. Pryde, Howard M. Wiseman

Does quantum theory apply to observers? A resurgence of interest in the long-standing Wigner's friend paradox has shed new light on this fundamental question. Brukner introduced a scenario with two separated but entangled friends. Here, building on that work, we rigorously prove that if quantum evolution is controllable on the scale of an observer, then one of the following three assumptions must be false: "freedom of choice", "locality", or "observer-independent facts" (i.e. that every observed event exists absolutely, not relatively). We show that although the violation of Bell-type inequalities in such scenarios is not in general sufficient to demonstrate the contradiction between those assumptions, new inequalities can be derived, in a theory-independent manner, which are violated by quantum correlations. We demonstrate this in a proof-of-principle experiment where a photon's path is deemed an observer. We discuss how this new theorem places strictly stronger constraints on quantum reality than Bell's theorem.

This discusses the subject both on the theoretical and experimental levels, concluding that nature violates "Local Friendliness" (their version of 3 assumptions mentioned in Brukner's paper).
 
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  • #182
DrChinese said:
I don't believe this paper has been referenced yet in this thread, as it just recently came out:
I did read it, I hope I understood it correctly. The locality and freedom of choice are well known, but the Objective Facts one is the most interesting. Dropping it means acknowledging a new form of complimentarity.

An interesting thing about Consistent histories as a formalism is that it has shown us that there are diachronic instances of complimentarity that go beyond the usual cases, in that one can have sequences of operators at a set of times ##t_1,\dots,t_n## that are all part of the same context/Boolean frame at each time, but the histories overall are not.

No Objective facts seems to expand complimentarity in a different direction, between the descriptions of an external and encapsulated observer. One cannot discuss Wigner and the Friend's experiences within the same Boolean context.

Of course to get around this you might reject superobservers.

I know some forms of Copenhagen (e.g. QBism and Consistent Histories) drop the Objective facts aspect, others reject superobservers (Neo-Copenhagen, e.g. Peres). Bohmian mechanics clearly drops locality. Many-Worlds drops Objective facts as well. Superdeterminism drops freedom of choice.

@RUTA what's your take?
 
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  • #183
DarMM said:
Of course to get around this you might reject superobservers.
Rejecting superobservers is not a viable option, as observers can freely observe one another performing experiments. If there are observers, then there are by necessity super-observers.

You'd have to reject things in the other direction: that observers who can realistically exist in a superposition of states must necessarily be so simple that they can't really be considered to be observers. But then we're back to what I was saying earlier: you can then just prove that it is unnecessary to have an observer cause collapse by increasing the interactions of the pseudo-observer with its environment. By proving that collapse can occur with even these pseudo-observers, it makes nonsense of any such observer-based theories (e.g. you need a conscious observer to cause collapse).
 
  • #184
kimbyd said:
Rejecting superobservers is not a viable option, as observers can freely observe one another performing experiments. If there are observers, then there are by necessity super-observers
A superobserver isn't just an observer who can view another performing an experiment, it's an observer who is completely isolated from the first observer and has the ability to perform arbitrarily powerful observations on them down to the atomic level. Roland Omnes has a discussion of how realistic they are in chapter 7 of his "The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics".

It'a related to the old question of whether all self-adjoint operators are part of the actual observable algebra.
 
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  • #185
charters said:
I think CH will deny superobservers; the idea of a histories partition assumes you can absolutely neglect the risk of "recoherence" in the classical limit. So after F measures, W has no hope of pulling of the necessary measurement.
That's definitely the case on a practical level, though I think the formalism is robust enough to handle them. E.g. If we have a Wigner's friend scenario characterised by an initial state ##|\Psi\rangle = |\psi\rangle_p|\Omega\rangle_F|\Omega\rangle_W## that evolves unitarily into a final state ##(|0\rangle_p|0\rangle_F+|1\rangle_p|1\rangle_F)|+\rangle_W## (ignoring normalisation), CH would let us describe Wigner's friend's measurement with the partition
$$[\Psi]\otimes\{[0]_F,[1]_F\}$$
or Wigner's measurement with the partition
$$[\Psi]\otimes\{[+]_W,[-]_W\}$$
CH even let's us go wild and build partitions like
$$[\Psi]\otimes\{[0]_p,[1]_p\}\otimes\{[0]_F,[1]_F\}$$
which contains propositions about the properties of the particle before Wigner's friend's measurement. Absolute crazytown! but partitions like
$$[\Psi]\otimes\{[0]_F,[1]_F\}\otimes\{[+]_W,[-]_W\}$$
are forbidden. Hence we cannot infer anything about what Wigner will measure based on any description of his friend's measurement. So e.g. if Wigner's friend says "I measured ##[0]_p## therefore Wigner has a 50-50 chance of measuring ##[F]_+##", they would be incorrectly applying QM. As an aside, if the particle is prepared with the property ##[0]_p## then partitions like
$$[0]_p\otimes\{[0]_F,[1]_F\}\otimes\{[+]_W,[-]_W\}$$
which contains propositions about both measurements are permitted (provided Wigner's measurement happens after his friend's). In either case, CH would also agree re/ Wigner's friend's lab/brain having no record of Wigner's friend's measurement.

[edit]- PS In case it wasn't clear I was considering Wigner's measurement to be characterised by the isometry ##J(|0\rangle_p|0\rangle_F+|1\rangle_p|1\rangle_F) = (|0\rangle_p|0\rangle_F+|1\rangle_p|1\rangle_F)|+\rangle_W## which I think is in line with the discussion you were having.
 
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  • #186
DrChinese said:
if quantum evolution is controllable on the scale of an observer

I think this is the critical premise of the argument, and in fact of the entire discussion about "superobservers" and such scenarios. Basically, a "superobserver" is an entity that can perform arbitrary unitary transformations on anything whatever, including "observers" like people. But this capability is equivalent to the capability to undo decoherence. And if there are entities that have the capability of undoing decoherence, then our entire conceptual framework surrounding "measurements" and "results" goes out the window. No measurement result could ever be considered to be permanently, irreversibly recorded, because a superobserver could always come along and erase it by the appropriate unitary operation that undid the decoherence.

DarMM said:
the Objective Facts one is the most interesting. Dropping it means acknowledging a new form of complimentarity.

I think it's more drastic than that; dropping Objective Facts means what I described above, that there would be no such thing as "measurements" and "results" at all, because one could never consider anything to be permanently, irreversibly recorded.
 
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  • #187
PeterDonis said:
I think it's more drastic than that; dropping Objective Facts means what I described above, that there would be no such thing as "measurements" and "results" at all, because one could never consider anything to be permanently, irreversibly recorded.
This is my current understanding, I'm not confident on it.
In classical mechanics we would have the possibility of such superobervers, people who could rewind Hamiltonian or more generally Liouville evolution. The difference is in classical mechanics this reversal wouldn't leave incompatibility in the sense of the previous results ##a,b## and the superoberver results ##c,d## could still be considered to occur in a common sample space.

Also as far as I know Brukner and FR don't actually use unitary reversal, only Masanes's theorem does. FR and Brukner only use somebody with the power to measure to arbitrary strength. They still undo decoherence but not by reversal, just by an utterly destructive measurement.
 
  • #188
DarMM said:
FR and Brukner only use somebody with the power to measure to arbitrary strength. They still undo decoherence but not by reversal, just by an utterly destructive measurement.

Yes, actually "reversal" is too narrow a term. The idea is that a superobserver can make a measurement on an observer that is the equivalent of measuring spin-x on a qubit for which the spin-z basis is the one that corresponds to a permanently recorded observation.
 
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  • #189
Morbert said:
That's definitely the case on a practical level, though I think the formalism is robust enough to handle them
I was playing around with CH regarding Wigner's friend myself and regarding:
Morbert said:
but partitions like
$$[\Psi]\otimes\{[0]_F,[1]_F\}\otimes\{[+]_W,[-]_W\}$$
are forbidden
it seems that we can have the following consistent family:
$$\{[\Psi]\odot [0]_F \odot[+]_W, [\Psi]\odot [1]_F \odot[-]_W\}$$
and this one:
$$\{[\Psi]\odot [1]_F \odot[+]_W, [\Psi]\odot [0]_F \odot[-]_W\}$$
So indeed you can't form the partition as you said. The ones you can are pretty strange, i.e. that:
$$[\Psi]\odot [0]_F \odot[+]_W$$
and
$$[\Psi]\odot [1]_F \odot[+]_W$$
are not consistent and thus complimentary.
 
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  • #190
PeterDonis said:
Yes, actually "reversal" is too narrow a term. The idea is that a superobserver can make a measurement on an observer that is the equivalent of measuring spin-x on a qubit for which the spin-z basis is the one that corresponds to a permanently recorded observation.
Yes precisely and so we have bases complimentary to what we take to be macroscopic facts/results as you said.

Again in classical mechanics, in theory, one can imagine no result being permanent because somebody could reverse your local history. It's more this complimentarity that's odd.
 
  • #191
DarMM said:
I was playing around with CH regarding Wigner's friend myself and regarding:

it seems that we can have the following consistent family:
$$\{[\Psi]\odot [0]_F \odot[+]_W, [\Psi]\odot [1]_F \odot[-]_W\}$$
and this one:
$$\{[\Psi]\odot [1]_F \odot[+]_W, [\Psi]\odot [0]_F \odot[-]_W\}$$
So indeed you can't form the partition as you said. The ones you can are pretty strange, i.e. that:
The stuff you can construct with CH can be pretty out there for sure.

One question: Typically a family of histories is a projective decomposition of the identity, such that the probabilities of the histories sum to one. For the families above, I compute a probability of 0.25 for each history, and two histories in each family mean their probabilities sum to 0.5? Although maybe there are more general accounts of families beyond PDIs I'm not aware of.
 
  • #192
Isn't the summary of all these discussions that "superobservers" are simply "counterfactual fictitions"? To get sane again after all these debates, I recommend to read the classic

A. Peres, Quantum Theory: Concepts and Methods, Kluwer
Academic Publishers, New York, Boston, Dordrecht, London,
Moscow (2002).

It's a gem, i.e., a "no-nonsense book" about the foundations of QT.
 
  • #193
vanhees71 said:
Isn't the summary of all these discussions that "superobservers" are simply "counterfactual fictitions"?
What do you mean by "counterfactual fictions"? Fictions I get, but I don't understand the counterfactual part.

vanhees71 said:
A. Peres, Quantum Theory: Concepts and Methods, Kluwer
Academic Publishers, New York, Boston, Dordrecht, London,
Moscow (2002).

It's a gem, i.e., a "no-nonsense book" about the foundations of QT.
Having read it I think Peres is a very very good book, but on this point I think Omnes is better. Peres just states there are no superobservers as an axiom. Omnes provides reasons for thinking this via a first principles calculation in QM that bounds their size.
 
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  • #194
As I understand it Peres names ideas "counterfactual" things which are just thought about but not realizable in nature. The most simple example is to say, "I've prepared my electron's spin in the state ##\sigma_z=1/2##" by running it through a Stern-Gerlach magnetic field and then ask "what if I'd have prepared it in the state ##\sigma_x=-1/2##? Shouldn't also ##s_x## have a definite value, though I've not prepared it?" Of course that's fictitious and counterfactual: If you think about how the SG apparatus works in selecting spin states, it's clear you can prepare only either ##s_z## or ##s_x## (or the spin component in anyone direction), but then the other components are indetermined. Indeed, the SG apparatus works in entangling (almost maximally) the value of the spin component in direction of the large homogeneous part of the magnetic field, while those in the other direction are rapidly precessing such that they are complete indetermined even if you think in a semiclassical way, i.e., even in classical theory you couldn't determine the spin components not in direction of the field very precisely. QT tells us that there's no apparatus at all that could do this.

Which paper/book by Omnes are you talking about? He's one of the founders of the consistent-history interpretation, right? I've not read anything by him yet.
 
  • #195
Morbert said:
One question: Typically a family of histories is a projective decomposition of the identity, such that the probabilities of the histories sum to one. For the families above, I compute a probability of 0.25
You're quite right. I'll have something longer up regarding consistent histories later today.
 
  • #196
vanhees71 said:
As I understand it Peres names ideas "counterfactual" things which are just thought about but not realizable in nature.

even in classical theory you couldn't determine the spin components not in direction of the field very precisely. QT tells us that there's no apparatus at all that could do this.
Counterfactual refers to reasoning about the results of experiments unperformed. It's not directly the same as not realizable. Superobservers might not be realizable but the reasons have little to do with counterfactuals.

vanhees71 said:
Which paper/book by Omnes are you talking about? He's one of the founders of the consistent-history interpretation, right? I've not read anything by him yet.
The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.
 
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  • #197
DarMM said:
Counterfactual refers to reasoning about the results of experiments unperformed. It's not directly the same as not realizable. Superobservers might not be realizable but the reasons have little to do with counterfactuals.The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.
But isn't the upshot with "superobservers" usually that you claim they could "know" something due to measurements that are not changing the system, and then you think about a measurement (or rather a preparation) that's not realizable at all according to QM since it involves the simultaneous preparation in eigenstates of incompatible observables?

Isn't this the key mistake of the EPR argument, where you have a state of two particles, described by a two-particle wave function of the type
$$\Psi(\vec{r},\vec{P})=\psi(\vec{r}) \tilde{\phi}(\vec{P})$$
where ##\psi## is a sharply peaked relative-position wave function (##\vec{r}=\vec{x}_1-\vec{x}_2##) and ##\tilde{\phi}## a sharply peaked total-momentum wave function (##\vec{P}=\vec{p}_1+\vec{p}_2##). Note that these two observables are compatible and of course one can prepare such a state.

If you now measure ##\vec{x}_1## precisely, then also ##\vec{x}_2## is known precisely due to this preparation though, of course, nothing in measuring the position ##\vec{x}_1## disturbs the far distant particle at position ##\vec{x}_2=\vec{x}_1-\vec{r}##. Then, of course neither ##\vec{p}_1## nor ##\vec{p}_2## can be known very precisely.

Now EPR argue that you could have measured ##\vec{p}_1## very precisely without disturbing particle 2 in any way (which is of course true), and then you know also ##\vec{p}_2=\vec{P}-\vec{p}_1## very well. The mistake by EPR now simply is to conclude that does you'd know both ##\vec{x}_1## and ##\vec{p}_1## precisely though that violates the HUP.

The mistake simply is that this is counterfactual: If you measure ##\vec{p}_1## precisely you cannot also determine ##\vec{x}_1## precisely and thus also not know ##\vec{x}_2## precisely, while you in fact know ##\vec{p}_2## precisely. So choosing which measurement (position or momentum) you perform on particle 1 also determines what's precisely known about particle 2 (either position or momentum, respectively).

As Peres puts it: "unperformed measurements have no result".

It's a simple exercise to calculate the corresponding Fourier transformations for position or momentum measurements on either particle, e.g.,
$$\tilde{Psi}(\vec{x}_1,\vec{x}_2)=\psi(\vec{x}_1-\vec{x}_2) \int_{\mathbb{R}^3} \mathrm{d}^3 P \exp[\mathrm{i} \vec{P}(\vec{x}_1+\vec{x}_2)/2]/\sqrt{(2 \pi)^3} \tilde{\phi}(\vec{P})=\psi(\vec{x}_1-\vec{x}_2) \phi[(\vec{x}_1+\vec{x}_2)/2].$$
Indeed since ##\tilde{\phi}## is sharply peaked in ##\vec{P}##, ##\phi## is a wide distribution in ##\vec{R}=(\vec{x}_1+\vec{x}_2)/2##. Looking at all particle pairs, the position distribution of particle 1 is given by
$$P_1(\vec{x}_1)=\int_{\mathbb{R}^3} \mathrm{d}^3 x_2 |\tilde{\Psi}(\vec{x}_1,\vec{x}_2)|^2$$
which of course is a wide distribution.

Yet determining ##\vec{x}_2## to be in a small region around ##\vec{x}_{20}##, the corresponding probability distribution is
$$\tilde{P}_1(\vec{x}_1|\vec{x}_2 \simeq \vec{x}_{20}) \simeq \tilde{\Psi}(\vec{x}_1,\vec{x}_{20}),$$
which is sharply peaked in ##\vec{x}_1##, because ##\psi(\vec{x}_1-\vec{x}_{20})## is sharply peaked.

The analogous arguments can be made with the momenta, using the momentum representation of ##\Psi##.

What's well determined about particle 1 through measurements on particle 2 depends in this example (a) on the original preparation, and in this case the positions ##\vec{x}_1## and ##\vec{x}_2## are entangled in a specific sense though both alone are quite undetermined as well as the momenta ##\vec{p}_1## and ##\vec{p}_2## are entangled though also their individual values are quite indetermined, and on (b) what's measured (either ##\vec{x}_2## or ##\vec{p}_2##). Though not disturbing particle 1 in any way by the measurement on particle 2, you cannot know both ##\vec{x}_2## and ##\vec{p}_2## by a feasible measurement on particle 1.

Ironically what EPR call "realistic" is in fact utmost inrealistic according to QT, because they envoked a "counterfactual argument". Of course in their time, they could well claim that QT is incomplete (answering the question in the title of this infamous article with "yes" based on the counterfactual argument), because at this time neither the Bell inequality as a consequence of local deterministic HV theories were known nor the corresponding experiments have been performed. With all these achievements in the last 85 years, of course, such an excuse is mute since the corresponding zillions of "Bell tests" have confirmed the predictions of QT, and the stronger-than-classically-possible correlations described by entanglement, can be described nevertheless with microcausal relativisitc QFT, i.e., there's indeed no hint at "spooky actions at a distance".

The EPR paper becomes the more disfactory when one takes into account that Einstein himself didn't like it, because his own real quibble with QT was precisely the "inseparability" issue, i.e., the possibility of long-ranged correlations described by entanglement.
 
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  • #198
vanhees71 said:
But isn't the upshot with "superobservers" usually that you claim they could "know" something due to measurements that are not changing the system, and then you think about a measurement (or rather a preparation) that's not realizable at all according to QM since it involves the simultaneous preparation in eigenstates of incompatible observables?
No, they perform a measurement that seems to be realizable according to QM the results of which seem to contradict the observer having obtained a fixed result.
 
  • #199
Hm, that sounds also strange. Either the observer has obtained a fixed result or not. No superobserver can change it, because "fixed" means it's irreversible. I guess, it's hard to discuss without a concrete example.
 
  • #200
vanhees71 said:
Either the observer has obtained a fixed result or not. No superobserver can change it, because "fixed" means it's irreversible.

If superobservers exist, the observer's observation of a result is not irreversible, because the superobserver has the ability to perform arbitrary unitary operations on the observer, including ones that reverse or destroy the observer's observation of the result. For example, if the observer observes, say, spin-z up, the superobserver could perform a unitary operation on the observer that took him from the "observed spin-z up" state to the state

$$
\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \left( | \text{observed spin-z up} \rangle + | \text{observed spin-z down} \rangle \right)
$$

which is a state in which the observer has not observed any definite result at all.
 
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