The Role of Philosophy in Science: Separating Fact from Fiction

[Aquamarine]

Nonsense.
There is simply not sufficient degree of separation if the kids run to and fro their parents' and aunties' house.

You have given no proof that they live very close together. Or that they who do are in the studies.

However, let's assume that they are all next door neighbors. No matter you twist it, there is no denying that the twins reared apart have a greater difference in environment than those who live together. And that is all that is needed.

Do you think that something this obvious would have been missed by the reviewers in some the world's most prestigious medical journals?

 

[arildno]

"No matter you twist it, there is no denying that the twins reared apart have a greater difference in environment than those who live together. And that is all that is needed."

Fanciful overinterpretations to suit one's preconceptions.

Besides, it is not me who should supply detailed data about twins in order to ensure that environmental influence can be discarded. It is, as a matter of fact, the duty of honest researchers.


If you are to have a really solid basis to come to the conclusion of significant genetic influence, you must ensure:
1) The twins are reared apart, in order to:
a) Hinder families from producing similar environmental influence
b) Hinder the twins from forming bonds between themselves, and developing their traits in unison
2) Have sufficiently DIS-similar social environments in order to gauge:
a) To which extent do the twins take on the values of their social equals?
b) To which extent are there surprising similarities in the twins' behaviour across social strata.

Conjuring up so-called "control groups" is easy, to make good choices, and pertinent criteria for judgment is not.

"Twin studies" is a bastardization of science; it does NOT fulfill sufficiently rigourous criteria to be taken seriously.

As for the "prestigious journal"-argument, look at some of the articles of socio-biology admitted into Nature. Sheer crap.

 

[Aquamarine]

"No matter you twist it, there is no denying that the twins reared apart have a greater difference in environment than those who live together. And that is all that is needed."

Fanciful overinterpretations to suit one's preconceptions.

Besides, it is not me who should supply detailed data about twins in order to ensure that environmental influence can be discarded. It is, as a matter of fact, the duty of honest researchers.


If you are to have a really solid basis to come to the conclusion of significant genetic influence, you must ensure:
1) The twins are reared apart, in order to:
a) Hinder families from producing similar environmental influence
b) Hinder the twins from forming bonds between themselves, and developing their traits in unison
2) Have sufficiently DIS-similar social environments in order to gauge:
a) To which extent do the twins take on the values of their social equals?
b) To which extent are there surprising similarities in the twins' behaviour across social strata.

Conjuring up so-called "control groups" is easy, to make good choices, and pertinent criteria for judgment is not.

"Twin studies" is a bastardization of science; it does NOT fulfill sufficiently rigourous criteria to be taken seriously.

As for the "prestigious journal"-argument, look at some of the articles of socio-biology admitted into Nature. Sheer crap.

Regarding journals, are you attacking the whole process peer review? Or just the whole of medical science? The only crap here is the crackpot argument that you somehow know more than medical researchers who have spent their lives doing research.

The only thing needed in twin research in order to study the role of environment apart from genetics, is to have a different environment and the same genetics. Not a completely different environment which is not possible or needed, just a different.

If your theory that the environment is too similar was correct, there would be no difference between the twins reared apart and together.

 

[arildno]

Of course there would be differences: they're different INDIVIDUALS.
If you are to find significant genetic influence, you must show that there are traits which persevere across different social strata.

 

[hypnagogue]

My dear friend, i think you have become the victim of your own "posh" vocabularium. I never said that the term "just mechanics" was derived out of your post. I meant it as a reference to the words of cogito (i believe that's his name). This is what a real scientist would call a 'false statement' or a 'lie'

If you need a reminder, you said:

this extract clearly shows how the semi-scientists (also referred to as philosophers) share their view on us. We are the "mechanics" or the "technicians" and though we construct the theoretical models, we donnot know how they work

If you did not mean to imply "This extract clearly shows how the semi-scientists share their view that we are the 'mechanics' ... etc" then you just did a poor job wording your statement.

I also don't think you can compare math with philosophy just because they are not constructed following empirical rules. Though this is true i think every one here will agree that math is NOT constructed in the same way as philosophy and math has a lot more value to other sciences then philosophy will ever have...Math is a language, the language of physics and so on...

I merely pointed out some similarities between philosophy and math which obviously obtain. They are both primarily non-empirical in that they are both primarily based on reasoning and inference. Philosophy also has rigorous systems of formal logic not unlike the rigorous formalisms of mathematics. That's all I claimed, nothing more. But apparently you are more interested in arguing with a strawman.

Your statement about "average" scientists not knowing what makes good science is a real insult.

Let's review my statement.

But perhaps the average scientist does not understand exactly what makes it good science-- what really justifies an inductive claim, what counterarguments and such exist and why they ultimately do not win the day, and so on-- to the extent that a philosopher of science does.

The key words here are "to the extent that." I did not imply the average scientist does not know what makes good science. I claimed that the average scientist doesn't know what justifies the criteria we have for good science to the extent that a philosopher of science does. There's an enormous difference here.

In the semi-scientists-thread i posted a text on how real exact sciences work. I suggest you check it out, i think you will find it most revealing. Basically the mechanism of real sciences is really easy and there ain't much to philosophy about.

Perhaps the application of the mechanisms is easy, and perhaps the prima facie justification for these mechanisms is easy to grasp as well. That doesn't imply that there aren't deeper issues to think about. If you believe that there is nothing at all problematic about (e.g.) how to justify inductive claims, perhaps that is just because you have never been exposed to such problems in your academic career. And again, I don't mean that as an insult, so please don't take it that way. I don't doubt that you know enough of what you need to know to do good science. All I'm saying is that there are deeper issues here than there might appear to be, and some people dedicate themselves to studying those deeper problems. As a rough analogy, I know that there is more to understand about number theory than what I know, but I also know that I know enough to do basic calculus.

If any considerations on constructing science were to be made (which is ofcourse the case) then they will be done by real scientists and real scientists alone, because they have the knowledge and thus the justification to do so. No philosopher can really philosophy on physics are math because they do not have the knowledge of these fields of study, at least not as thorough as a real scientist

That's an easy claim to make, but can you justify it? What is the relevant knowledge that requires one to be a dedicated scientist or mathematician in order to grasp? How is such knowledge critical to epistemic considerations, such that one who does not have such knowledge cannot make a contribution to an epistemic framework of science?

The argument (not made by you btw but by cogito and the other one) that we only construct theories but we donnot know how they work the the best joke i heard this week.

cogito didn't claim that you don't know how scientific theories work. He claimed that you don't have a full understanding of all the epistemic considerations that go into justifying the creation of such theories. (And again, needless to say, that is not to imply that you don't have any understanding of any such epistemic considerations.) Do you see the difference?

 

[Aquamarine]

Of course there would be differences: they're different INDIVIDUALS.
If you are to find significant genetic influence, you must show that there are traits which persevere across different social strata.

Social strata? Are you talking about class differences? The only thing needed is a difference in environment. Not that one in the pair was transported to Mali to live as a slave and the other was adapted by Bill Gates.

Yes, they are individuals. But the twins have identical genes. In these studies, the only way to explain differences between the twins reared apart and together is a difference in environment. And how large the relative differences for different traits are indicates the relative role the environment has on these traits.

To repeat again, if your theory that the environmental difference was to small was correct, there would be no difference between the two twin groups. I think you don't understand what is studied here. It not primarily the differences between the twin reared apart, but the differences between the groups of twins reared apart and together.

 

[arildno]

There's no need to establish the existence of environmental influence. That is trivially present for ALL humans.

What is needed is to determine to which extent purely GENETIC traits mold individuality.

 

[jcsd]

Your missing one major diffence between maths and philosophy; maths does not claim to say anything about the real world so it would be downright absurd if it had an empirical foundation, philosphy on the other hand does claim to say something about the real world.

Few scientist would regard philosophers as any sort of authority on the formulation of scientific theories.

 

[Aquamarine]

There's no need to establish the existence of environmental influence. That is trivially present for ALL humans.

What is needed is to determine to which extent purely GENETIC traits mold individuality.

What is your point? Twins studies shows result like that height are relatively mostly genetic, intelligence somewhat less, happiness and personality somewhat less, political views the least.

 

[arildno]

Well, then you obviously have read some other twin studies than the crap I've seen and which, possibly, have made me prejudiced against the whole lot.
Shall we say: You win, I lose?

 

[marlon]

If you did not mean to imply "This extract clearly shows how the semi-scientists share their view that we are the 'mechanics' ... etc" then you just did a poor job wording your statement.

Maybe, yet keep in mind that i was referring to a description used by some one else, not you. This ugly word appears in the extract you wrote but we both know where it came from originally so let's not pretend...

I merely pointed out some similarities between philosophy and math which obviously obtain. But apparently you are more interested in arguing with a strawman.

No i am not, , i was just responding to your statements...

The key words here are "to the extent that." I did not imply the average scientist does not know what makes good science. I claimed that the average scientist doesn't know what justifies the criteria we have for good science to the extent that a philosopher of science does. There's an enormous difference here.

I totally disagree with this easy claim for which i really would like to see some justification.

Perhaps the application of the mechanisms is easy, and perhaps the prima facie justification for these mechanisms is easy to grasp as well. That doesn't imply that there aren't deeper issues to think about. If you believe that there is nothing at all problematic about (e.g.) how to justify inductive claims, perhaps that is just because you have never been exposed to such problems in your academic career. And again, I don't mean that as an insult, so please don't take it that way. I don't doubt that you know enough of what you need to know to do good science. All I'm saying is that there are deeper issues here than there might appear to be, and some people dedicate themselves to studying those deeper problems. As a rough analogy, I know that there is more to understand about number theory than what I know, but I also know that I know enough to do basic calculus.

Please, give me one example of these deeper issues that might appear and that are or have been valuable to the development of physics...

That's an easy claim to make, but can you justify it? What is the relevant knowledge that requires one to be a dedicated scientist or mathematician in order to grasp? How is such knowledge critical to epistemic considerations, such that one who does not have such knowledge cannot make a contribution to an epistemic framework of science?

This is what i would call a fancy over-consideration...like I stated before, you need to read my post on how physical models are constructed, in the semi-scientists-thread. The answer is as easy as the claim.

cogito didn't claim that you don't know how scientific theories work. He claimed that you don't have a full understanding of all the epistemic considerations that go into justifying the creation of such theories. (And again, needless to say, that is not to imply that you don't have any understanding of any such epistemic considerations.) Do you see the difference?

I see the difference and i see your point, yet first of all you are incorrect in your statement on "cogito's words". He clearly stated that we do not fully grasp how theories work. The epistemic considerations you are referring to are indeed an interesting point. Now, no real scientist will ever be debating these issues in the way you are bringing them up. Once again i say that doing science is not inventing some field of study and then proclaim to be a specialist in it. Considerations with respect to epistemology and ontology are indeed made in real science but by real scientists only and they play a secondary role in the development of science in itself because they do not depend on real facts but on interpretations. I mean, we look at facts, experimental backup and mathematical rigour. Yes indeed, speculations are made, but with some clear goal in mind. Besides the first thing a real scientist will do is prove or try to prove these speculations in some way (experiments or reproducing already known results in some regime) and this is a big difference with philosophy. Philosophy deals with imaginary situations and one can speculate on all possible outcomes as much as one desires. Yet there is not real valuable backup and that is the big flaw here...

regards
marlon

 

[meteor]

I try to stay away from the philosophy forum, because the ideas expressed are too vague,... Whatever is the human mind, is something that is difficult to control. If it were easy, then all the people would be a great scientist! I mean, I believe that if you are able to control your mind and channel its capacity towards the absorbance of scientific ideas, and then you are able to play with these ideas, you can elaborate theories, and you can discover the laws of the universe. Not all the people is able to do it. I mean, you're not going to discover the laws of the universe by lying in your bed thinking about what is bad and what is good... So I would say that science should be defined as the systematic investigation of the laws of the universe... This requires experimentation, and very important, a knowledge of the accumulated amount of discoveries that people like Newton, Maxwell,Einstein have made. They have made theories that work, so science is dedicated to the improvement of these theories. I always fear to involve myself in philosophy discusions because they usually involve religious ideas, or metaphysical speculation,... It's something that is not satisfactory for me.
I'm really interested in the history of science, I have read about Popper, Kuhn, Feyerabend,... I would say that philosophy of the science is the only part that interest me of the philosophy business.

 

[Aquamarine]

Well, then you obviously have read some other twin studies than the crap I've seen and which, possibly, have made me prejudiced against the whole lot.
Shall we say: You win, I lose?

Sounds good to me.

I don't doubt there have been many bad twin studies.

 

[Aquamarine]

I really would like some answers to the following questions that are studied by the philosophy of science. Since philosophy is proclaimed useless or better known by physicists, those suggesting this should have some answers or justification for not answering.

What is the answer to the problem of induction?
Is Popper's rule of falsifiability the correct criterion for science? How do you respond to the common objections?
What is your view on coherentism versus foundationalism? The regress argument?
What is the role of Ockham's razor in science? What role do you see for algorithmic information theory?
Do you claim that there is no contradictory evidence at all against the major theories today? How do you explain away minor contradictions? When do they become large enough for the theory to fail?
What your view on Bayesian inference? Quasi-empirical methods?

 

[selfAdjoint]

What is the answer to the problem of induction?

We don't need no lousy induction.

Is Popper's rule of falsifiability the correct criterion for science? How do you respond to the common objections?

What works, works.

What is your view on coherentism versus foundationalism? The regress argument?

Never heard of 'em, never missed 'em

What is the role of Ockham's razor in science? What role do you see for algorithmic information theory?

Ockham is a useful first-cut search strategy. You shouldn't push it too far. The algorithmic people can make their case or not the same as anybody else.

Do you claim that there is no contradictory evidence at all against the major theories today? How do you explain away minor contradictions? When do they become large enough for the theory to fail?

To be decided interactively by the community over time. Meanwhile sociology rules.

What your view on Bayesian inference? Quasi-empirical methods?

Shalizi showed Bayesian approaches might reverse entropy, if simple assumptions are accepted. Something for the philosophers to do at last!

 

[ZapperZ]

I really would like some answers to the following questions that are studied by the philosophy of science. Since philosophy is proclaimed useless or better known by physicists, those suggesting this should have some answers or justification for not answering.

What is the answer to the problem of induction?
Is Popper's rule of falsifiability the correct criterion for science? How do you respond to the common objections?
What is your view on coherentism versus foundationalism? The regress argument?
What is the role of Ockham's razor in science? What role do you see for algorithmic information theory?
Do you claim that there is no contradictory evidence at all against the major theories today? How do you explain away minor contradictions? When do they become large enough for the theory to fail?
What your view on Bayesian inference? Quasi-empirical methods?

1. What makes you think the majority of physicsts would even know what these are? I will remind you that philosophy of science is NOT a required course in the training of being a physicist. So most of these things mean nothing to a physicist. Only those who have a personal interest in the philosophy of science would have any clue on what they are.

2. Physicists continue to make progress in expanding the body of knowledge of physics.

3. What does Point 1 and Point 2 imply if both of them are correct? It means that physicists very seldom (if at all) think about the epistemiology of what they do. They don't try to analyzie or over-analyze their methodology. In fact, most of them either are ignorant, or don't care, of such things. In this aspect, I fully agree with hypnagogue. It also implies that knowing the epistemiology is not required in the practice of physics. We don't sit down, look at the "rules" within the philosophy of science, and then do a checklist of all the things we have statisfied. This is also not the way that a theory or an experimental observation is validated or accepted. How the existence of the top quark is accepted goes through a very different path than how the existence of high-Tc superconductors is verified. If you think we sit around and apply popper's falsifiability, or any other rules, to what we do, then you have a very distorted view of what physicists do.

4. *I* have never proclaimed that philosophy is "useless" - although I may have said that in jest. I have said, and so have several other prominent physicists including Sheldon Glashow in an essay I cited earlier, that physicists very seldom refer to philosophers in their everyday practice. You may not like this, but this is what it is! I apologize for not referring and citing all those giants in the world of philosophy when I write my papers for publication. Maybe philosophy does have a role to play in other areas - it has been mentioned that it could bridge the understanding of physics among the "general public". But you need to be clear in this that the very fact that most physicists are either ignorant, or maybe not conscious, of the espistemiological aspect of what they do, it means that in their everyday professional endeavor, such things play NO role. Maybe they become amateur philosphers when they leave their work place (they may also participate in a poetry slam-fest), but in their work? Unless there are tons of closeted philosophers in physics, I do not see this happening.

Zz.

 

[Les Sleeth]

We don't need no lousy induction.

You are kidding, right?

 

[Les Sleeth]

1. What makes you think the majority of physicsts would even know what these are? . . . Physicists continue to make progress in expanding the body of knowledge of physics. . . . physicists very seldom (if at all) think about the epistemiology of what they do. They don't try to analyzie or over-analyze their methodology. In fact, most of them either are ignorant, or don't care, of such things.

Possibly you will consider this idea. An oceanologist dedicates his life to saving the oceans. He applies technology developed by specialist chemists for bioremediation, who relied on principles discovered by physicists throughout the centuries. The oceanologist when working doesn't want to get bogged down by excessive details of the science behind bioremediation, he just wants to use the principles and products that help him do what he wants to do. He is a scientist, but he uses other specialists' work to build his own specialty.

What you said in your statements above seems to say something similar to that situation. The empirical methods science relies on everyday were worked out by philosophizing humans, some of whom were scientifically experimenting too. I don't believe anyone is saying scientists need to study philosophy. Why should anyone if they don't want to? Mostly we are talking about (or are supposed to be) the potential value of a philosophy area at PF, and in that respect I'd say the philosophy side of our discussion has been supporting the value of thinking about thinking.

I hope we aren't talking about a "class" of people, but rather a human endeavor. I am not a "philosopher," I am a human being who, among other things, finds it valuable to understand the reasons behind why we do what we do, or why it is something like empirical thinking "works." Why? Often a general principle can be taken from specific things that "work," and applied to other things.

So some people prefer to think about developing technologies or understanding the physical nature of reality, and others like to think about what kind of thinking can help in that regard (as well as in other areas of human thought). Is there any inherent reason we need to be at odds over this?

 

[selfAdjoint]

You are kidding, right?

On the square. Does a scientist when contemplating a new theory or designing a new experiment, think or care about what some philosopher may say about induction?

 

[Les Sleeth]

On the square. Does a scientist when contemplating a new theory or designing a new experiment, think or care about what some philosopher may say about induction?

From the way you wrote your comment, it seemed like you were saying scientists don't rely on induction, and that's what I asked if you were kidding about.

Yes you are right that to use induction it isn't necessary to understand where our insights about it came from or what anyone today has to say about it. As I wrote to Zapper, I still don't see why anyone would object to others who might want to see what else they might figure out about thinking that could be useful, or to helping those less accomplished at thinking empirically than science-types learn why it is so effective?

 

[cogito]

I don't object to philsophy in genral, what i do object to is modern academic philsophy. There are some worethwile parts such as the study of symbolic logic which can help us to understand physical and mathematical theories, but in the main the moden academic subject of philosophy contians very little of value. This is as many valuable subjects that were formally in the domain of philosophy have now become academic subjects in their own right leaving the modern philospher to pick over the scraps.

Interesting. So, you think that the subject of ethics over the last couple thousand years contains very little of value?

 

[cogito]

It will be hard to find something valuable that cannot be studied scientifically. The arts and beauty, it can be studied. A beautiful face very symmetrical. The great painters and architects were very careful to follow the golden ratio. Identical twins reared apart often have remarkably similar tastes in art. Religious experiences can be induced by stimulating the temporal cortex. Economics is the study of how to maximize value with scarce resources. The biochemical and anatomical pathways of pleasure and reward can certainly be studied.

How do you think you ought to go about establishing scientifically that which we ought to value. How should you go about establishing scientifically what type of character you ought to cultivate, or what type of life you ought to live, or what acts are permissible, obligatory, or forbidden? In short, how do you think you ought to go about establishing scientifically the answers to the normative questions that confront every human who finds himself in the world?

 

[Clausius2]

Interesting. So, you think that the subject of ethics over the last couple thousand years contains very little of value?

I would say YES. Where is the ethic of the people nowadays?. I don't see it anywhere. Why did they spend so much time thinking in that dreams instead of being more practical?. People and Politics today are the proof of the invalidity of that old theories.

 

[Aquamarine]

How do you think you ought to go about establishing scientifically that which we ought to value. How should you go about establishing scientifically what type of character you ought to cultivate, or what type of life you ought to live, or what acts are permissible, obligatory, or forbidden? In short, how do you think you ought to go about establishing scientifically the answers to the normative questions that confront every human who finds himself in the world?

I can certainly study scientifically what, how, where and why we value.

And I think the theory of descriptive hedonism is the best available theory of value. In short, given enough pain, all humans will abandon whatever other morals or ethics they may have, if this will lessen this pain.

The question of if and what we ought to value is strange and wrong. Given existence and goal-oriented behavior, our goal is to increase value. Which may well mean actually changing the very genes deciding what gives us value. For example, eliminating the very neural architecture giving us our current feeling of pain. And that this is goal of science, to help us maximize our pleasure, to levels beyond what any of us can understand or conceptualize today.

 

[cogito]

I can certainly study scientifically what, how, where and why we value.

And I think the theory of descriptive hedonism is the best available theory of value. In short, given enough pain, all humans will abandon whatever other morals or ethics they may have, if this will lessen this pain.

The question of if and what we ought to value is strange and wrong. Given existence and goal-oriented behavior, our goal is to increase value. Which may well mean actually changing the very genes deciding what gives us value. For example, eliminating the very neural architecture giving us our current feeling of pain. And that this is goal of science, to help us maximize our pleasure, to levels beyond what any of us can understand or conceptualize today.

First, studying what we value and why we do doesn't answer the normative questions I asked above.

Second, you mischaracterize descriptive hedonism. Descriptive hedonism is the claim that all human action is motivated by a desire to maximize pleasure/minimize pain. If you'd like to see two decisive refutations of this view about human motivation, please read Joel Feinberg's "Psychological Egoism", and Robert Nozick's "Experience Machine".

You claim that the question "what ought we value?" is strange and wrong, but your argument seems to assume that we can do nothing other than value our own pleasure and pain, and that, moreover, these are the only things we can value. What evidence do you have for this view concerning human motivation? Please note that on this view of human motivation, it is never possible to truly desire that another person be happy for that person's own sake. On this view, desiring the happiness of another is only possible for S if S thinks that the other's happiness is instrumental for S's own happiness. Although that entailment should really be sufficient reason for you to jettison this view, I'll wait for you to check out the articles I mentioned.

Cheers.

 

[cogito]

I would say YES. Where is the ethic of the people nowadays?. I don't see it anywhere. Why did they spend so much time thinking in that dreams instead of being more practical?. People and Politics today are the proof of the invalidity of that old theories.

You think the subject of ethics is supposed to train people to be moral? Weird. Have you ever taken a class in ethics, or read a work on ethics?

 

[Aquamarine]

What happened to this noble goal:

1)By forcing yourself to express your ideas in quantifiable/mathematical form enable others to pick out (possibly subtle) logical flaws in your arguments/pet theory.

Given the below, one should expect amazing quantifiable and logical knowledge from the "real" scientists on the philosophy of science.

Basically the mechanism of real sciences is really easy and there ain't much to philosophy about. If any considerations on constructing science were to be made (which is ofcourse the case) then they will be done by real scientists and real scientists alone, because they have the knowledge and thus the justification to do so. No philosopher can really philosophy on physics are math because they do not have the knowledge of these fields of study, at least not as thorough as a real scientist.

But what answers are given when taken to the test? For example

Do you claim that there is no contradictory evidence at all against the major theories today? How do you explain away minor contradictions? When do they become large enough for the theory to fail?

To be decided interactively by the community over time. Meanwhile sociology rules.

Science is democracy?

It means that physicists very seldom (if at all) think about the epistemiology of what they do. They don't try to analyzie or over-analyze their methodology. In fact, most of them either are ignorant, or don't care, of such things.

But wasn't the "real" scientists those with logical and quantifiable theories? It seems that "real" scientists should conduct their experiment based on gut feeling and majority opinion? Is this the additional knowledge that physicists have that philosophers of science don't?

I find it amazing that scientists willingly reveal this ignorance. And not only that, in their arrogance take pride in this fact. And that at the same time that a whole generation physicists/psychologists/economists/biologists have in reality abandoned the old paradigm. Don't you see the need to establish new improved criteria for science, where the old criteria is a subset?

 

[Aquamarine]

First, studying what we value and why we do doesn't answer the normative questions I asked above.

Second, you mischaracterize descriptive hedonism. Descriptive hedonism is the claim that all human action is motivated by a desire to maximize pleasure/minimize pain. If you'd like to see two decisive refutations of this view about human motivation, please read Joel Feinberg's "Psychological Egoism", and Robert Nozick's "Experience Machine".

You claim that the question "what ought we value?" is strange and wrong, but your argument seems to assume that we can do nothing other than value our own pleasure and pain, and that, moreover, these are the only things we can value. What evidence do you have for this view concerning human motivation? Please note that on this view of human motivation, it is never possible to truly desire that another person be happy for that person's own sake. On this view, desiring the happiness of another is only possible for S if S thinks that the other's happiness is instrumental for S's own happiness. Although that entailment should really be sufficient reason for you to jettison this view, I'll wait for you to check out the articles I mentioned.

Cheers.

I don't see anything wrong with desiring happiness for other due to the fact that this will increase our own happiness. People care most for their children, less for their friends and diffusely for the whole of humanity. That this may be because it affects our own happiness does not make it objectionable.

Regarding the experience machine experiment, it is constructed wrongly. Those people refusing to hook up to the machine may well believe that this will not give long-term pleasure. For example, that they will go to hell or they believe that the machine can never provide genuine feelings. Instead, it should be constructed as I mentioned before. Given the maximum possible pain, people should be given the choice of escaping this at the cost of breaking any other ethical or moral obligation. The prediction is that when human are thus unambiosuly given the choice between hedonism or not, they will choose hedonism.

Regarding Feinbeg, he seems to make many questionable assumptions. Like that pleasure can be divided into that of the body and that of the mind. Here are some answers to his objections:
http://projectparadox.f2o.org/thoughts/hedonism.php

 

[marlon]

You think the subject of ethics is supposed to train people to be moral? Weird. Have you ever taken a class in ethics, or read a work on ethics?

Clausius, don't mind these words, questioning your knowledge of secondary facts is the speciality of this cogito-person. You are totally right and i would like to add that ethics has no value what so ever to the development of any real science...

regards
marlon, and thanks Clausius, for your reply, muchos gracias amigo...

 

[marlon]

We don't need no lousy induction.

What works, works.

Never heard of 'em, never missed 'em

Ockham is a useful first-cut search strategy. You shouldn't push it too far. The algorithmic people can make their case or not the same as anybody else.

To be decided interactively by the community over time. Meanwhile sociology rules.

Shalizi showed Bayesian approaches might reverse entropy, if simple assumptions are accepted. Something for the philosophers to do at last!

amen to your wise words selfAdjoint and thanks for participating in this thread. It was my intention that some of the real science authorities would step up and discuss this philosophy mumbo jumbo. Let's do this once and thoroughly and then continue with the real science and leave these semi-scientists behind... molto grazie amico...

regards
marlon

 

[metacristi]

This is a message to all real scientists : this extract clearly shows how the semi-scientists (also referred to as philosophers) share their view on us. We are the "mechanics" or the "technicians" and though we construct the theoretical models, we donnot know how they work, according to them phillo's...



Any comments ?

Well,from my own experience on different Internet sites,I'm afraid that the average scientist knows very little philosophy of science.Probably this is why enough of them believe that philosophy (of science) has no relevance to their work.The vast majority of them are aware of 'empiricism' and 'falsificationism' but without being aware of the big epistemological problems that still remain.I was in the same position once,immediately after graduating.The fault,I think,is mainly of the academy itself,unfortunately we can talk of 'scientific indoctrination'...

Happily philosophy is very good against all sorts of dogmatisms (its first meaning is to question all our alleged 'certainties' in different problems before attempting to give a more detailed account...).In what regards science well, Feyerabend's philosophy of science is very good against the 'myths' existing around the so called 'scientfic method' (that it is the only possible 'right way',that we have sufficient reasons to think that science can at least approach truth and so on).And against the arrogance of some 'religious' scientists,basically having science as their 'religion' (even without being aware,indeed it's not enough to merely say that science is 'fallible').

The reality is that we do not even have now sufficient reasons to think that a rigid scientific method is the 'right way' enabling science to approach 'truth' (fecundity alone does not suffice,the bayesian approach has also many 'technical' problems,not to mention its intrinsically subjective status).

Moreover even if we do not make reference to 'truth',as the history of science proves plenty,a too rigid method (of the type advocated by many hardliners) could harm scientific 'progress' (in what fecundity is concerned) at least by delaying possible scientific 'breakthroughs'.

All we are entitled now (based also on logical grounds,empiricism alone is not enough) is to grant a provisional epistemological privilege (that is openly accpeted as fallible) to a minimal scientific method,we can still indicate a positive heuristic on what programmes should scientists devote more efforts (by trying to develop them further).

I taked of a positive heuristic but it should be mentioned that we have to go well beyond the 'naive' empiricism of Popper (how Lakatos named it) falsificationism has a lot of problems.Sometimes,history show this,ad hoc hypotheses proved to be very helpful,sometimes it did pay to spend the most time by trying to make progressive programmes which openly contradicted the 'normal science' of the day (yes maverick hypotheses might be very serious in spite of the fact that such programmes could be stagnant,even degenerating at a certain moment).

Thus it is safer to talk of different degrees of confidence (of scientists) in different programmes than to talk of a clear difference between science and pseudo-science (Laudan even talk of the impossibility to make a clear difference in front of the existing problems).For example scientists have a greater degree of confidence in GR than in,let's say,the standard inflationary theory and a greater degree of confidence in the standard inflationary theory than in Guth's M[ulti]verse theory (making reference to the existence of different physical laws in other universes or not).

Indeed even the so called 'normal science',no matter how well corroborated, can,at most,be viewed as the most promising program at certain time,thus all we can propose (in my opinon) is a minimal scientific method,an 'official' heuristic,involving a clear ladder of preferences,that is on what programmes should scientists devote most of their time (by trying to make them theoretically and empirically progressive).This in no case limit the possibility for scientists to pursue mainly maverick programmes (to have a 'private' ladder of preferences).

 

[Clausius2]

You think the subject of ethics is supposed to train people to be moral? Weird. Have you ever taken a class in ethics, or read a work on ethics?

Yep, You're the unique person in the world that has read a pair of ethics books. And how many books have you written?. It would be nice to know how many so that I'm forewarned and won't read anyone.

Part of the Antique Philosophe has deteriorated into nowadays politics. We see them talking, talking, speeching, meeting... :zzz: :zzz: without doing

ANYTHING

Words, words, words, well sounding but without any substance...

Our nowadays society wants...
FACTS

and Science is giving it.

The fact is the age of handling words up and down is ENDED.

Tell me about practical things and do not try to answer the question: why am I here?. what is the soul? what is the Nature? Which is my vital mission?, because today's philosophers haven't got the knowledge enough to answer that. They are OFF-SIDE (If you have watched a soccer match, you will know what the hell that word mean).

 

[marlon]

metacristi, thanks for your reply and sharing your thoughts with us...

regards
marlon

 

[humanino]

Any comments ?

I feel sad. I think most of physicists consider they serve philosophy first. Philosophy without science is masturbation of the mind. We experimentalist try to figure out which road can lead us to the outside of Plato's cave.

I want to add that most physicists I know are well educated and respectable persons, eager to learn about philosophy. As for myself, I am meeting on thursday a philosophy student friend of mine, both of us have much considerations for the other's occupation. We were together studying math in kindergarden He wants to discuss his views on relativity, and I intend to deepenth my understanding of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason".

Remember the beginning of the century : philosophers were aware of and understanding the current open problems of physics. Louis de Broglie himself was only Maurice's little brother, and Louis first wanted to go for litterature. Today, philosophers are not afraid of claiming "I do not get it at all ! No matter..." when it comes to quantum stuff. This is very sad.

 

[metacristi]

double post