I Anton Zeilinger's comment about free will being required for science

[Buzz Bloom]

If you believe that that antecedent factors unambigiously determine the next action humans make, and you still believe in free will, then a computer must have free will as well by your reasoning.

Hi user:

I am not sure I understand what you mean by "unambiguously". Also, I am not sure if "determine" means antecedent (old stuff) factors are is the only component of the determining factors, or just part of the factors.

I disagree with the quote above for the reason I explain below.

A person does not make decisions only based on his/her immediate present inputs. It is the nature of growth that habits of making choices which are related to a large variety of situations are a continuous subcounscious process. So when a decision is made, it includes influences from the immediate conscious situation and also influences from subconsciously formed habits. This means that much of the process of making decisions in not conscious, and therefore the sense of exercising free will is partly imaginary. Sometimes decisions are made subconsciously and entirely by the old habits, and usually (but not always) when that happens, a person will not remember making that decision.

Is making a decision by flipping a coin a free will option? Suppose I have to make a difficult choice, and I flip a coin with heads choosng A and tails choosing B. Suppose heads comes up and when I think about this result, I decide: I really don't like A so I will definitely do B. Is this free will?

At the present time computers have not yet been programmed to acquire decision making habits based on a lot of past experiences, but some slow progress is being made in that direction. Different observers are likely to have different thresholds for deciding that some amount of computer habit forming is enough to support something like human free will, or some might call it just imaginary free will.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[PeterDonis]

What does "from the outside" mean? What does "free will" mean?

In the particular case described in Zeilinger's quotes, it means that whatever it is that determines the measurement settings that Alice and Bob select is independent of whatever it is that determines the measurement results they observe.

One point that often gets discussed is exactly what "independent" should mean in the above. Should it just mean "statistically independent"? Or is some stronger condition required? It's impossible for it to mean causally independent, since the choice of measurement settings must be in the past light cone of the measurement result.

 

[user30]

Is making a decision by flipping a coin a free will option? Suppose I have to make a difficult choice, and I flip a coin with heads choosng A and tails choosing B. Suppose heads comes up and when I think about this result, I decide: I really don't like A so I will definitely do B. Is this free will?Regards,
Buzz

Depends on if you live in a deterministic universe or not.

By ambigious I meant: action b was neccesitated by action a. There was never in doubt what action b would be.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

In the particular case described in Zeilinger's quotes, it means that whatever it is that determines the measurement settings that Alice and Bob select is independent of whatever it is that determines the measurement results they observe.

This is an interesting example, but some aspects are vague. Are you sure that "independent" is related to "whatever it is that determines the measurement results"? Could it be referring to the fact that Alice and Bob make independent decisions about the measurement process? Is there a question about whether or not Alice and Bob have free will when they make their choices about how to setup their equipment?

Alice and Bob are free to choose the position of the switch that determines which measurement is performed on their respective particles.​

Suppose Alice and Bob independently choose one of two choices for "the position of the switch". Suppose they both make their choice by flipping a coin. Is their choice a free will choice? According to your interpretation, the coin flips are certainly independent of "whatever it is that determines the measurement results they observe". But it definitely does not seem like free will to me.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[PeterDonis]

Suppose Alice and Bob independently choose one of two choices for "the position of the switch". Suppose they both make their choice by flipping a coin.

In modern experiments to test for violations of the Bell inequalities, measurement settings are indeed determined by (computerized) coin flips, in order to ensure that the events at which the settings for the two measurements are determined are spacelike separated from each other.

it definitely does not seem like free will to me.

The free will in a case like the above would be the experimenters' choices in how the experiment was set up, including the choice to let the settings be determined by computers. So all the events involved in those choices would also have to be independent of the measurement results.

 

[EPR]

In a general way, yes. However, if a deterministic system is chaotic, it can be unpredictable even though it is deterministic, so there would be no way of having a predictive model of a specific system that accounted for specific events.

Such a system can on the whole be predictable(at least approximately). I had other failings of determinism in mind, e.g. what is the deterministic model of the stability of atoms and matter?

 

[PeterDonis]

Such a system can on the whole be predictable(at least approximately).

For some length of time into the future, yes. But often not very far. We can't predict the weather more than a few days in advance, because the weather is chaotic.

what is the deterministic model of the stability of atoms and matter?

I don't know that there is one, since the only such model we have is QM and QM is not deterministic.

 

[PeterDonis]

Is making a decision by flipping a coin a free will option?

Sure. Choosing how you will make a decision is itself a decision.

Suppose I have to make a difficult choice, and I flip a coin with heads choosng A and tails choosing B. Suppose heads comes up and when I think about this result, I decide: I really don't like A so I will definitely do B. Is this free will?

Yes.

 

[Demystifier]

That's why they are all problematic.

No, that's why such a definition of realism is problematic.
https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9601013

 

[Lord Jestocost]

Summary: Questioning a remark by Anton Zeilinger that free will is required by science

Regarding Zeilinger's "Alice and Bob are free to choose the position of the switch that determines which measurement is performed on their respective particles", maybe the following might be of help:

"After all, the backward light cones of those two acts do eventually overlap, and one can imagine one region which controls the decision of the two experimenters who chose a and b. We cannot deny such a possibility. But we feel that it is wrong on methodological grounds to worry seriously about it if no specific causal linkage is proposed. In any scientific experiment in which two or more variables are supposed to be randomly selected, one can always conjecture that some factor in the overlap of the backward light cones has controlled the presumably random choices. But, we maintain, skepticism of this sort will essentially dismiss all results of scientific experimentation. Unless we proceed under the assumption that hidden conspiracies of this sort do not occur, we have abondoned in advance the whole enterprise of discovering the laws of nature by experimentation."

A. Shimony, M.A. Horne and J.F. Clauser in “An exchange on local beables” (dialectica, Volume 39, Issue 2, 1985)

 

[Lord Jestocost]

There has been a lot of work done in this field since William James.

To my mind, William James’ argument is somehow in line with Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument. According to The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

"This general pattern of inference is applied to the thesis of causal determinism to yield a powerful argument for incompatibilism. The argument requires the assumption that determinism is true, and that the facts of the past and the laws of nature are fixed. Given these assumptions, here is a rough, non-technical sketch of the argument:

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

According to the Consequence Argument, if determinism is true, it appears that no person has any power to alter how her own future will unfold."

 

[Elias1960]

Because they say that the wave function is real, i.e. not merely a representation of our subjective incomplete knowledge.

That is not a requirement for a realist interpretation. An interpretation where the trajectory $q(t) \in Q$ exists all the time is realistic even if the wave function is interpreted as epistemic, as describing incomplete knowledge of that real trajectory.

An example of such a realist psi-epistemic interpretation is Caticha's entropic dynamics.

Caticha, A. (2011). Entropic Dynamics, Time and Quantum Theory, J. Phys. A44:225303,
arxiv:1005.2357

 

[PeterDonis]

According to the Consequence Argument, if determinism is true, it appears that no person has any power to alter how her own future will unfold."

All three of the given statements are false. People are not separate from the rest of the universe. People themselves are facts (or, if you want to be particular, the states of their brains and bodies and the actions they take are facts) and can "have power" over other facts because people are part of the universe and can interact with other parts.

 

[DrChinese]

In the particular case described in Zeilinger's quotes, it means that whatever it is that determines the measurement settings that Alice and Bob select is independent of whatever it is that determines the measurement results they observe.

One point that often gets discussed is exactly what "independent" should mean in the above. Should it just mean "statistically independent"? Or is some stronger condition required? It's impossible for it to mean causally independent, since the choice of measurement settings must be in the past light cone of the measurement result.

Is there any requirement here that IF Alice/Bob's settings are NOT independent of whatever is determining the measurement results, THEN the results CHANGE from what they otherwise would be?

The thing I get confused about is this: Alice and Bob can set their settings at anything, by whatever means they like. They can change them quickly, or they can leave them set static for hours. We can get thousands of people to participate in the decisions. No matter what is done, the results always confirm the same basic relationship and that relationship matches expectation values from theory. How is that not good science? How is that requiring us to make some assumption other than "the very large sample is representative of the true universe"?

So I guess I don't see that free will is really a significant factor in that equation. And further: why would this be a burning assumption for Bell tests, when it doesn't seem to be much of an issue when we test force of attraction of an object to the Earth? (Or any other experimental result in physics?) I can't tell from the previous comments whether my viewpoint is common here or not. Thanks...

 

[PeterDonis]

Is there any requirement here that IF Alice/Bob's settings are NOT independent of whatever is determining the measurement results, THEN the results CHANGE from what they otherwise would be?

As far as I can tell from Zeilinger's quotes, what he is trying to rule out is superdeterminism:

"If this were not true, then, I suggest, it would make no sense at all to ask nature questions in an experiment, since then nature could determine what our questions are, and that could guide our questions such that we arrive at a false picture of nature."

I'm not sure this sort of thing is testable; I don't think Zeilinger is saying that we would expect Alice and Bob's measurement results to be different if his "free will" assumption were false than if it were true. I think he's just saying that his "free will" assumption is necessary if we are going to deduce laws of physics from experimental results at all; if his assumption were false, we would have no valid grounds for believing, for example, that QM is true simply because all of our experimental results are consistent with it.

why would this be a burning assumption for Bell tests, when it doesn't seem to be much of an issue when we test force of attraction of an object to the Earth?

I don't think Zeilinger intends for his claims to only apply to QM, or to Bell tests; it just happens to be a historical fact in our universe that the kinds of questions he is addressing were prompted by QM and Bell tests.

 

[Lord Jestocost]

Alice and Bob can set their settings at anything, by whatever means they like. They can change them quickly, or they can leave them set static for hours... So I guess I don't see that free will is really a significant factor in that equation...

See: https://www.physicsforums.com/threa...eing-required-for-science.989803/post-6351422

And from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superdeterminism:

"In the 1980s, John Bell discussed superdeterminism in a BBC interview:[3][4]

There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will. Suppose the world is super-deterministic, with not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork, but with our behavior, including our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment rather than another, absolutely predetermined, including the "decision" by the experimenter to carry out one set of measurements rather than another, the difficulty disappears. There is no need for a faster than light signal to tell particle A what measurement has been carried out on particle B, because the universe, including particle A, already "knows" what that measurement, and its outcome, will be.

[3] BBC Radio interview with Paul Davies, 1985
[4] The quotation is an adaptation from the edited transcript of the radio interview with John Bell of 1985. See The Ghost in the Atom: A Discussion of the Mysteries of Quantum Physics, by Paul C. W. Davies and Julian R. Brown, 1986/1993, pp. 45-46"

 

[A. Neumaier]

But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will.

Identifying these two items is a hidden assumption. Assuming it is very questionable.

 

[EPR]

Identifying these two items is a hidden assumption. Assuming it is very questionable.

What does this mean? We need something like 'free will'(whatever that is) to do science. Otheriwse, superdeterminism ends all our endeavors to understand reality. If we are just process-driven, nothing we ever say can be taken to be truth as it can just be the way determinism plays out(for reason encoded in the low entropy at the BB). Luckily, determinism fails at the lowest scale and even at the macro scales at times. You don't know what is fundamental - there is no general coherent picture of how the world works at all scales.
Sorry if i misunderstood your comments - this is why i ask for clarification.

 

[A. Neumaier]

We need something like 'free will'(whatever that is) to do science.

No. We have been successfully doing science for five centuries but the problem of free will is unsettled since at least twice that time. So there cannot be a significant relation between science and free will.

Sorry if i misunderstood your comments - this is why i ask for clarification.

I was saying that equating absolute determinism with the complete absence of free will is very questionable.

 

[DrChinese]

"In the 1980s, John Bell discussed superdeterminism in a BBC interview:[3][4]

There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will. Suppose the world is super-deterministic, with not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork, but with our behavior, including our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment rather than another, absolutely predetermined, including the "decision" by the experimenter to carry out one set of measurements rather than another, the difficulty disappears. There is no need for a faster than light signal to tell particle A what measurement has been carried out on particle B, because the universe, including particle A, already "knows" what that measurement, and its outcome, will be.

[3] BBC Radio interview with Paul Davies, 1985
[4] The quotation is an adaptation from the edited transcript of the radio interview with John Bell of 1985. See The Ghost in the Atom: A Discussion of the Mysteries of Quantum Physics, by Paul C. W. Davies and Julian R. Brown, 1986/1993, pp. 45-46"

Yes, I previously saw your quote of that, and it is a good one.

Superdeterminism purports to say that the "answers" to Bell statistical tests are embedded somewhere in a fashion that entangled particles can both draw upon*. Further, there is to be no counterfactual definiteness as the future settings are similarly embedded in the macroscopic (non-quantum) world so that the "answers" are always matched to the right "questions". So the assumption of superdeterminism requires a lot more than something that affects the experimenters' free will, it also affects/controls the system being tested as well, and it must match the theoretical statistical values that physicists predicted (developed without any knowledge of all this mechanism). And presumably, superdeterminism affects other areas of physics/science as well, but we just haven't guessed that yet.

I realize that Bell was in no way arguing for superdeterminism as a viable interpretation. But if you assume instead that the test data is a representative sample of the full universe, then superdeterminism just becomes another interpretation to consider**.

So I am not really trying to argue against superdeterminism (although my thoughts on it are fairly obvious). I just don't see that assuming free will itself is needed to get us past the idea that our science is valid. Just the assumption, common to all experimental work in all scientific fields, that our sample is representative of the whole.*Even if they had never existed in a common light cone. As presumably, even such particles would have been created by macroscopic entities that could pass on this embedded programming.

**Then someone could start with that, and attempt to describe exactly how it would actually work. Which I don't think is actually possible, since it requires a lot to link quantum particles with macroscopic experimental setups and all possible decision making devices.

 

[DrChinese]

No. We have been successfully doing science for five centuries but the problem of free will is unsettled since at least twice that time. So cannot be a significant relation between science and free will.

I was saying that equating absolute determinism with the complete absence of free will is very questionable.

Agreeing with you about making scientific progress without solving the issue of free will.

If there is some kind of (super)determinism that is somehow fooling us, then we are still doing science. Certainly, scientists look at most every type of variation on what is studied precisely so as to make sure we are not fools. It wouldn't be our fault if there was an elaborate conspiracy to hide nature's true self from us behind a veil. In fact, some believe there is such a veil* - although perhaps not so elaborate.

And regardless, our science is useful... it's not like we can't use it to make or predict things.*Maya, illusion.

 

[Lord Jestocost]

Hans Primas in „Hidden Determinism, Probability, and Time’s Arrow“:

„At present the problem of how free will relates to physics seems to be intractable since no known physical theory deals with consciousness or free will. Fortunately, the topic at issue here is a much simpler one. It is neither our experience of personal freedom, nor the question whether the idea of freedom could be an illusion, nor whether we are responsible for our actions. The topic here is that the framework of experimental science requires a freedom of action in the material world as a constitutive presupposition. In this way “freedom” refers to actions in a material domain which are not governed by deterministic first principles of physics.

To get a clearer idea of what is essential in this argument we recall that the most consequential accomplishment by Isaac Newton was his insight that the laws of nature have to be separated from initial conditions. The initial conditions are not accounted for by first principles of physics, they are assumed to be “given”. In experimental physics it is always taken for granted that the experimenter has the freedom to choose these initial condition, and to repeat his experiment at any particular instant. To deny this freedom of action is to deny the possibility of experimental science.

In other words, we assume that the physical system under investigation is governed by strictly deterministic or probabilistic laws. On the other hand, we also have to assume that the experimentalist stands out of these natural laws. The traditional assumption of theoretical physics that the basic deterministic laws are universally and globally valid for all matter thus entails a pragmatic contradiction between theory and practice. A globally deterministic physics is impossible.“
[Italics in original, LJ]

 

[A. Neumaier]

In experimental physics it is always taken for granted that the experimenter has the freedom to choose these initial condition,

This is far from generally true.

Experimenters must respect the laws of Nature, and can choose only initial conditions over which they have actual control. Indeed, much of the progress of experimental science is about finding better ways to gain control over desired initial conditions!

Moreover, even automatic experimenters such as Mars rovers can choose experimental conditions that produce scientific information, although as far as the preparation of experiments is concerned, these are completely deterministic automata.

Thus there is no relationship between determinism and the limited freedom of choice needed for science

 

[Lord Jestocost]

The point is: Those who think that both the inanimate and animate nature are exclusively ruled by deterministic physical laws ("not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork"), have to submit themselves to their own ideological belief that a globally deterministic physics rules everything. They themselves cannot escape from their own doctrine because of wishful thinking. Even if they believe that they have the freedom of choice, that would be a mere illusion from the viewpoint of – so to speak – Laplace’s demon: It would be irrelevant what they think or do, because they have to think and it have to do it.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

This is the assumption of free will. It is a free decision what measurement one wants to perform. In the experiment on the entangled pair of photons, Alice and Bob are free to choose the position of the switch that determines which measurement is performed on their respective particles. It was a basic assumption in our discussion that that choice is not determined from the outside. This fundamental assumption is essential to doing science.

I find this quote not as free of ambiguity as it is intended to be. There are several plausible interpretations, particularly: what does it means for both Alice and Bob to exercise free will in choosing the position of their respective spin determining apparatus. The following is my attempt at describing several examples of what the quote might intend.

Each of a series of experiments has a series of trials. Each trial involves determining each of the spins of the pair of entangled photons. I am assuming that when a pair of entangled photons are created, and they move in opposite directions, their paths may not take them from the creation apparatus to the spin determining apparatus. That means that randomly only some of the created pairs of photons get measured for spin by the apparatus. As the spin of a photon is determined, the time of the occurrence of the measurement is recorded along with whether the spin is "up" or "down". The distance between the entangled photon pair creating apparatus and each spin determining apparatus is the same. Also the two clocks which record the time of spin determination are synced. That means that for every recorded spin and time at Alice's apparatus will have a corresponding recorded spin and time as Bob's apparatus, and the two recorded times will be identical, and vice versa.

The distances between the apparatus which creates the photon pairs and the two measuring setups are identical. Assuming the size of the measuring setup is fixed, say for example a circle of diameter 20 m, the farther apart this distance is, the fewer photons will be measured. If Alice and Bob's setups are 100 m apart, then only 1% of the created pairs of photons will be measured.

The spin determining apparatus has two possible settings.
(1) Vertical. Normally this means the direction is relative to the direction of Earth's gravity. This implies that the two apparatus setups will not have the vertical settings exactly parallel. However, assuming the 100 m separation, this should not matter significantly.
(2) Horizontal. This is perpendicular to the direction of the separation, and perpendicular to the local vertical direction. The two horizontal settings will be parallel.

For each experiment, the principal scientist, Jessie, who is in charge of the research will calculate p the fraction of times Alice's apparatus and Bob's apparatus agree on "up"/"down". It is of course expected that the p value will either be close to zero or close to some value I am not sure about, but I think it is either 50%, or 70.7%, or 29.3%.

For each of the a first series of experiments Alice and Bob will set the orientation of the spin direction detector according to the Jesse's instructions. The following are the options. Some of these are (a) consistent with "Alice and Bob are free to choose the position of the switch", and some are (b) not consistent. I think different readers here might disagree which the of the options are consistent and which not.

(1) Both are instructed to choose vertical.​

(2) Both are instructed to choose horizontal.​

(3) Alice is instructed to choose vertical and Bob is instructed to choose horizontal.​

(4) Alice is instructed to choose horizontal and Bob is instructed to choose vertical .​

(5) Both Alice and Bob are instructed to flip a coin, and if heads, choose vertical, and if tails choose horizontal.​

The following options give instructions Jesse will use for a second series of experiments. For each of these options Alice and Bob will use identical copies of a pseudo random number generator (PRNG). Each use of a PRNG involves entering (a) a key multi-digit number which controls the sequence of pseudo random numbers generated, and (b) an integer that determines the number of pseudo random numbers to be generated and printed out. The specific random numbers generated with be a "1" or a "2".

(6) Jessie gives Alice and Bob different key numbers to use. If a "1" is the next Pseudo random number to use, use horizontal on the apparatus. If a "2" is the next Pseudo random number to use, use vertical on the apparatus.​

(7) Same as (6) except Alice and Bob independently choose whether "1" is for horizontal and "2" is for vertical, or vice versa.​

(8) Same as (7) except both Alice and Bob choose the key number they will use with no consulting with each other. Some examples might be (a) a date of birth for someone she/he knows personally , (b) a telephone number of someone she/he knows personally, or (c) other choices the reader might think of.​

​

Which of these 8 options (if any) involve free will choices by Alice and Bob in the sense intended by the quote? I suspect that different responders will give different answers.​

​

Regards,​

Buzz​

​

​

 

[Buzz Bloom]

Hi
@A. Neumaier,
@Demystifier,
@DrChinese,
@Elias1960,
@EPR,
@jfizzix,
@Lord Jestocost,
@martinbn,
@mattt,
@nrqed,
@PeterDonis,
@Pony,
@user30, and
@vanhees71:

I have enjoyed reading your posts in this thread, in particular your various disagreements. I am a bit disappointed though, that none of you have responded to the question in my post #116 in the three days since it was posted.

Which of these 8 options (if any) involve free will choices by Alice and Bob in the sense intended by the quote?​

I would like to prepare a poll of all your answers with respect to the 8 options I presented regarding Alice and Bob exercising free will, or not. What I have in mind is each responder replies with 8 numbers (1 through 8)
and with each number a letter: Y for "yes", N for "no", and P for "pass" meaning no choice.

I think such a poll would be interesting to all of you. If any of you hae a reason why you do not want to participate in the poll, I would appreciate receiving your reason, either in a post or a conversation.

If you prefer to sending me your answer using a "conversation" rather than a post,
that would be better since it would avoid having one answer influencing another.

I am hoping to get your responses soon.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[PeterDonis]

Which of these 8 options (if any) involve free will choices by Alice and Bob in the sense intended by the quote?

All of them. In all of your examples, whatever it is that causes the Alice and Bob measurement settings to be what they are is, by assumption, independent of whatever it is that generates the entangled photon pairs. That is what "free will" means in this setup, and that's all it means. Zeilinger is simply saying that, if we can't make that assumption in a setup like this, we can't infer anything from the results we get.

 

[nrqed]

Hi
@A. Neumaier,
@Demystifier,
@DrChinese,
@Elias1960,
@EPR,
@jfizzix,
@Lord Jestocost,
@martinbn,
@mattt,
@nrqed,
@PeterDonis,
@Pony,
@user30, and
@vanhees71:

I have enjoyed reading your posts in this thread, in particular your various disagreements. I am a bit disappointed though, that none of you have responded to the question in my post #116 in the three days since it was posted.

Which of these 8 options (if any) involve free will choices by Alice and Bob in the sense intended by the quote?​

I would like to prepare a poll of all your answers with respect to the 8 options I presented regarding Alice and Bob exercising free will, or not. What I have in mind is each responder replies with 8 numbers (1 through 8)
and with each number a letter: Y for "yes", N for "no", and P for "pass" meaning no choice.

I think such a poll would be interesting to all of you. If any of you hae a reason why you do not want to participate in the poll, I would appreciate receiving your reason, either in a post or a conversation.

If you prefer to sending me your answer using a "conversation" rather than a post,
that would be better since it would avoid having one answer influencing another.

I am hoping to get your responses soon.

Regards,
Buzz

Thanks for your post.

I have given up posting on this subject when I was accused of "believing in magic" and being completely anti-scientific when I stated that in a deterministic world, there can't be no free will. Apparently, my "accusers" decided to define free will as something possible when everything is deterministic. Which does not make sense to me. They would agree that a tree does not "decide" to fall. But somehow they consider than if a system is complex enough, free will magically appears at some point. They say that humans have free will but a tree does not. I don't know at what point free will magically appears. Does a mouse have free will? What about a cockroach? I don't know, and I won't ask them because they will just say that I believe in "magic", somehow.

 

[PeterDonis]

my "accusers" decided to define free will as something possible when everything is deterministic. Which does not make sense to me.

Which does not entitle you to simply dismiss the idea out of hand, as you have been doing. What does not make sense to you does make sense to a lot of other people, who have written many papers, articles, and books on the subject. If you have not read them, you should do so before making dogmatic pronouncements simply because something doesn't make sense to you.

somehow they consider than if a system is complex enough, free will magically appears at some point. They say that humans have free will but a tree does not. I don't know at what point free will magically appears. Does a mouse have free will? What about a cockroach? I don't know, and I won't ask them because they will just say that I believe in "magic", somehow.

This is a perfect example of the dismissive attitude that has gotten you into trouble. First, you misrepresent what advocates of the position that doesn't make sense to you are actually saying. Then, when you ask questions based on your misrepresentation instead of on what they are actually saying, you wonder why you get responses that don't seem helpful.

If this is the best you can do at participating in the discussion, you would have done better to stick to your resolve to give up posting on the subject. Particularly as your complaints are completely irrelevant to the question @Buzz Bloom was asking. You could have answered his question just fine without dragging in any of your complaints. Since you chose to complain instead, which adds nothing of value to the discussion, you are now banned from further posting in this thread.

 

[A. Neumaier]

They would agree that a tree does not "decide" to fall.

Because a tree has no internal mechanism for making a choice, while a computer program containing an if-then-else command or a random number generator has one. This is the relevant difference in complexity.

Both if-then-else and the random number generator are deterministic in the strict sense, though the latter behaves in practice probabilistically.

Thus choices and decisions (in the common sense of these words) have nothing to do with determinism.