robertm said:
Here is some science for you Crosson:
http://thesciencenetwork.org/programs/2005%20Skeptics%20Society%20Annual%20Conference/"
This is worse then I feared, these scientist's are prematurely biased towards their desired conclusion. Far from showing me evidence, they are instead just repeating their conclusion over and again, as if the identification between brain states and thoughts was a fact of the language. At the very least this shows that they are too crude in style to present a deductive argument without shortcutting instantly to their conclusion every five minutes.
Also, that audio-visual has too many irrelevant anecdotes, I would prefer manuscripts that are as dense and to the point as possible.
I believe most if not all of these people would disagree with you Crosson, and they have evidence to back it up.
I don't care how many confused people disagree with me. What you see as evidence, I see as misguided and biased interpretations. Frequently they assume much more then they claim to show; they are not delicate enough in their use of concepts to be able to handle these issues.
Do you have any counter evidence to present? Or just 'counter philosophy'?
The grammar of your use of 'just' indicates that you think science to be somehow superior to philosophy. Philosophy is concerned with concept development, and science goes astray when its concepts are poorly understood. All the evidence you could present doesn't change anything if it involves premises that are stronger than its conclusion.
Concerning the argument from existence presented earlier, your two objections where
(1) skepticism against the application category of quality to the noumena
I would like to argue that the notion that the application of a category of quality to the noumena is a necessary presupposition in order to hold the concept of the noumena as meaningful in the first place.
But this presupposition is the same as your conclusion C3, that categories apply to things-in-themselves.
I disagree with you, and think that the concept of noumena is meaningful without it belonging to the category of quality. It's meaning is it's use (L.W.).
A similar argument can be made against your second objection, either because noncognitivism is enough to disprove a concept or because the asserted inability to prove or disprove a concept render it meaningless as well?
Noncognitivism is hardly a disproof of anything, this is a form of the appeal to incredulity.
A concept which cannot be proven or disproven (in a particular system) is called undecidable. Mathematical logic has succeeded in proving some theorems to be undecidable within it's standard framework, e.g. the continuum hypothesis, and Godel's incompleteness theorem asserts that any logical system of reasonable complexity will contain undecidable statements.
Furthermore, undecidability cannot make a concept meaningless, because it's meaning is it's use.
Naturally, a rejection of law of the excluded middle leads to the rather absurd conclusion that even if you could show that it was true that materialism was not true, this would not necessarily imply that materialism was false. If we allow that something can be true and false at the same time, then by the principle of explosion, everything goes, including
Your first sentence is true, but your second sentence does not necessarily follow from the first.
If we let go of the law of the excluded middle, but maintain the law of non-contradiction, then we are forced to let something else go and the prime candidate is the double negation law.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intuitionism
You may also want to read about the developments in mathematical logic that go beyond the law of the excluded middle. A good starting point is the theory of smooth infinitesimal analysis (not to be confused with Robinson's nonstandard analysis):
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smooth_infinitesimal_analysis
Yes, holding such as distinction would be irrational if one hold as knowledge that any such a distinction is false.
I am a lucid dreamer, but even if I know that it is a dream-plane this does not make the feeling of separation go away. Remember that according to Wittgenstein knowledge is ultimately grounded in forms of life that stem from primitive reactions, and no amount of 'knowledge' is enough to rationally conclude that the dream-plane is a part of myself. We cannot hold 'rational' beliefs that are in discord with the way we go about our actions in the world!
Do you dispute the validity of the senses?
The fallacy of the loaded question, e.g. "have you stopped cheating on your wife yet? Yes or No?"
What do you mean by 'the senses', and what does it mean to say that they are valid or invalid?
Perhaps you mean "do you think that analyzing sense impressions is a valid way to learn about the world." If so then I agree, provided that 'the world' is short for 'the world of sense impressions.' And less you think this is an empty statement, I am merely asserting that the world of sense impressions has enough structure or logos that it can be organized to at least some extent in terms of concepts, as science has done to date.
How can an idealist commit to realism about other minds and at the same time don't find much value in empiricism? Seems like a rank contradiction to me.
I might have made a bad word choice, I didn't mean to fully assert realism towards other minds. For an idealist to deal with LW's private language argument we only need to assert the apparent existence of other minds.
I'm not sure that anything more than a straight solution is required. Now, I'm no Wittgenstein scholar, but didn't W. himself rejects the paradox as based on a misunderstanding and point to a distinction between interpretations and 'graspings' as the key to dissolving the paradox? I honestly do not see a threat to a classical realist account of meaning?
I agree with your highly accurate account of Wittgenstein's views towards this paradox, but as much as I admire his work I do feel that it was left unfinished.
Instead I am referring to the rule-following paradox as it struck Kripke:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kripkenstein
All the both LW and Kripke himself eventually backed away from their paradox, I do not see it as satisfactorily resolvable in a materialist system.
In the idealist philosophy of Plato or Liebniz, there is an admittedly mystical connection to the eternal ideas, but here I only use mystical to mean 'not rigorously described' which applies exactly as well to the materialist connection between the mind and brain, the lack of the mathematical operator I suggested earlier.
What makes you think that all sense impressions are private objects, or that sense impressions are somehow fundamentally different from the objects they represent?
No two people in the room have the same point of view, they do not share each others sense impressions. If I smell a rose, you cannot see the sensation of how it smelled to me, that is a private sense impression.