WernerQH
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Why should a classical concept retain its usefulness down to the smallest scales of space and time?Demystifier said:Why is it flawed?
Why should a classical concept retain its usefulness down to the smallest scales of space and time?Demystifier said:Why is it flawed?
Do you know some interpretation of QM that does not retain any classical concept at the smallest scales?WernerQH said:Why should a classical concept retain its usefulness down to the smallest scales of space and time?
Sunil said:But for low energy, gravity is extremely weak, so weak that it safely can be ignored. What remains observable in all those particle colliders are only renormalizable theories.
The problem indeed is that we don't have a complete theory yet, i.e., the gravitational interaction is not successfully "quantized". Quantum theory describes everything except gravity in a given "background spacetime", i.e., the gravitational interaction is treated classically in the sense that it is reinterpreted as a spacetime which is determined by the Einstein field equations with the classical energy-momentum tensor of the macroscopic matter.stevendaryl said:It’s not that you can’t have a background geometry, but that geometry cannot take into account quantum particles.
You can have electrons moving in a background geometry but by definition that background doesn’t include the effect of those electrons. The background geometry would (contrary to the spirit of Newton’s third law) act on the electrons but would not be acted on by them.
WernerQH said:Even Steven Carlip (post #6) admitted that he cannot prove that gravity needs to be quantized. It's quite a different animal. It differs from the other interactions in that it doesn't couple to a discrete charge. One could even argue that it doesn't interact with elementary particles at all. It just tells them to follow the "most natural" path. I for one can't make sense of a superposition of space-time geometries; only an average background geometry makes sense to me.
Why should a useful and successful classical concept lose its usefulness simply because of scales becoming small?WernerQH said:Why should a classical concept retain its usefulness down to the smallest scales of space and time?
Yes, it's the expectation values. Also pressure is just an average taken over many moving atoms. I see GR as a macroscopic theory, microscopic physics enters only in an averaged form. Today nobody views elastic forces as fundamental, they are reduced to electromagnetic interactions. Gravity may be some kind of residue of the other three interactions, and quantizing gravity similar to, but of course much harder than quantizing elasticity.stevendaryl said:But then what is the source (the stress-energy tensor) for the field equations? If it is the energy and momenta of quantum particles, then I don't see how you can get away without needing to quantize gravity. One alternative, possibly, is that the source is the expectation values of the quantum energy/momenta. Expectation values being c-numbers.
Why should classical mechanics and electrodynamics fail to describe atoms?Sunil said:Why should a useful and successful classical concept lose its usefulness simply because of scales becoming small?
Because the experiment tells us that they fail. Why they fail remains, of course, unknown until the better theory has been found.WernerQH said:Why should classical mechanics and electrodynamics fail to describe atoms?
Perhaps it does not need to be quantized in a sense in which electromagnetism is quantized, but it certainly needs to be quantized in a sense in which Schrodinger cat is quantized.WernerQH said:Even Steven Carlip (post #6) admitted that he cannot prove that gravity needs to be quantized.
Maybe it is along the lines of Gell-Mann and Hartle:stevendaryl said:To me, that’s just mush.
bhobba said:Maybe it is along the lines of Gell-Mann and Hartle:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1106.0767.pdf
I do not think all the details have been worked out, but it is how I look at the emergence of a classical world from QM. Otherwise, such is a BIG problem, most definitely pointing to QM being incomplete (as Einstein sits laughing on the sidelines).
One could equally say that MW is just DH with a confusing sematic waffle added:Quantumental said:Isn't Gell-Mann and Hartle just Everett in chronic denial?
*now* said:I think CH treats time differently, as I think other views can treat it in different ways.
bhobba said:It is like solipsism. I can't prove it wrong. However, personally, like most people, I believe it wrong. It simply does not sit well with the world as having an independent objective existence. In probability theory, we think of the outcomes we assign probabilities to as potentially real, and one becomes actually real. We do not think of all possible outcomes as actually real. It is just a convention - but one most people hold to.
Thanks
Bill
Sure. But it is what most people do. Other than realising other views are possible, and virtually everyone rejects them, it really doesn't matter. If it worries you, I think a philosophy forum is more suitable than here.Quantumental said:In this example don't you just choose to believe that somehow, someway, one world is real for no other reason than the fact that the others cannot be observed (like consciousness of others) ?
bhobba said:Sure. But it is what most people do. Other than realising other views are possible, and virtually everyone rejects them, it really doesn't matter. If it worries you, I think a philosophy forum is more suitable than here.
Thanks
Bill
I'd say, if it is incomplete, people would have found the missing (global) hidden variables by now. Again, the problem with QM is how to interpret QM to match our intuition.Interested_observer said:Einstein was right. QM is useful, but it is not complete.
yjjiang said:I'd say, if it is incomplete, people would have found the missing (global) hidden variables by now. Again, the problem with QM is how to interpret QM to match our intuition.
yjjiang said:I'd say, if it is incomplete, people would have found the missing (global) hidden variables by now. Again, the problem with QM is how to interpret QM to match our intuition.
.stevendaryl said:That's not necessarily true. It could be that there is some theory ##QM+## whose differences with ordinary ##QM## are completely negligible when the number of interacting particles is small but become important when there are, say, ##10^{10}## or more interacting particles. It would be very difficult to empirically test the difference, because we can't actually analytically study systems of many particles without making approximations.